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Abstract
Institutional Structure and the Optimal Level of Lying 
Rodney Fred Hiser
This study is an interdisciplinary comparative analysis of two institutional 
structures and their relation to lying. The author examines institutional structure through 
an institutional continuum with contrasting ideal-types at opposing ends. These ideal- 
types are the “private property order” and the “bureau.” The author models lying as a 
benefit-cost analysis and examines lying through a two-person model of society called the 
“information relation.” Using the information relation, he shows the problem of lying is 
an agency problem between the informer and the informee.
In two separate analyses, the author evaluates the ideal-types’ tendencies to either 
allow or hinder lying. In the first analysis, the author identifies seven protection-from- 
lying strategies and compares their necessary requirements to the institutional constraints 
of the ideal types. In the second analysis, the author examines six social phenomena, 
within the institutional context of each ideal type, that affect people’s benefit-cost ratio of 
lying.
The author concludes that there exists a positive correlation between the degree of 
central planning and the optimal level of lying, as seen from the point of view of each 
individual in society. The author argues that a movement on the continuum away from 
the private property order toward the bureau tends to (1) breakdown community relations, 
(2) provide incentive for society members to adopt value relativism, (3) change the nature 
of competition (4) lower society’s overall material standard of living, and (5) create a 
social environment of mutual self-deception. The author sees important implications in 
this study for the economics of information, theories of government regulation, and the 
sociology of science.
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Preface
When I began my doctoral studies, I did not intend to write about lying. I simply 
hoped to solve a problem that had puzzled me for some time. That is, why are some 
theories taught as fact and other theories ignored by mainstream educational institutions? 
Specifically, I wondered why the Austrian school of economics was ignored in favor of 
neo-classicism. Neither o f these theories has been “proven* in the conventional empirical 
sense, so why ignore one in favor of the other? Why not teach both of them as criticisms 
of each other?
It occurred to me that whatever was the cause of the Austrians being ignored was 
also responsible for the existing quality of economic information. It seemed a reasonable 
assumption that one of the theories was better able to capture economic reality than the 
ether. A substitution of one for the other, either partially or in total, would then result in 
a different overall quality level of economic information. If Austrian theory was suddenly 
introduced into university economic curriculums nationwide, then economic information 
nationwide would either be of higher quality (captures more of reality) or lower quality 
(captures less of reality) than it was previously.
I expected to find help in the traditional economics of information literature, but 
alas discovered that it focuses heavily on the optimal amount of information with quality 
being almost an afterthought. I found the most help in the Austrian literature, public 
choice economics, institutional economics, and sociology.
After several rejected thesis proposals that posited a relationship between the 
quality o f information and the level of government regulation, my committee concluded 
that I was actually talking about lying and institutions. I then discovered the sparsity of 
literature in this area and became convinced that I was on to an idea that could result in an 
original and important addition to several existing literatures.
I Look back on the completed work with gratitude to all those people who aided in 
its completion. I wish to thank Lloyd Hilling and Robert H. Knight, Esq., both fellow 
graduate students, for offering suggestions on various chapters. Thanks go to my
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committee members who encouraged me, read draft after draft, and guided me through 
the maze. They are committee chair Dr. Robert R. Logan and Dr. Greg Goering both of 
the University of Alaska Fairbanks Economics Department, Dr. Rudolph Krejci,
Emeritus, University of Alaska Fairbanks Philosophy Department, And Dr. Lydia Black, 
Emeritus, University of Alaska Fairbanks Anthropology Department. I further wish to 
thank Dr. Joseph R. Kan, Dean of the University of Alaska Fairbanks Graduate School 
for his guidance on committee matters and for the 1999 summer funding that allowed me 
to finish on a timely basis. I would like to thank my daughter, Jennifer Ayn Degen, and 
son, Nicholas Rand Hiser. Jennifer helped with proofing and offered suggestions on my 
proposal, and Nicholas rallied my spirits time and again when I was not sure that I could 
face another rejection. Lastly, I wish to thank my lovely wife and best friend, Laura Jeane 
Hiser, who has stuck by me through thick and thin for the last thirty two years. Her 
commitment to this project required postponement of her own plans for six years. During 
that time, she not only provided financial and moral support, she also spent untold hours 
listening to my ideas and proofing my writing.
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1Chapter 1 
Introduction
A wise ruler, therefore, cannot and should not keep his word when such an observance of faith 
would be to his disadvantage and when the reasons which made him promise are removed. And if 
men were all good, this rule would not be good; but since men are a contemptible lot and will not 
keep their promises to you, you likewise need not keep yours to them.
— Machiavelli. The Prince 
In our country the lie has become not just a moral category but a pillar of the State.
— Alexander Solzhenitsyn.
The Observer. 'Sayings of the
Year’. 29 Dec 1974
Let us begin by committing ourselves to the truth, to see it like it is and to tell it like it is, to find 
the truth, to speak the truth and live with the truth. That’s what well do.
— Richard Milhous Nixon
• (1913-1994) US president.
Nomination acceptance
speech, Miami. 8 Aug 1968
A man who tells the truth should keep his horse saddled.
Caucasus Proverb
Some people may find it disconcerting to think o f  their fellow man in terms of his 
propensity to lie, but as Rue points out, “deception is universal in human cultures, and 
each culture must find its own patterns for managing it”  (215). From an evolutionary 
point of view, man as a lying animal is quite consistent with the observed deceptive 
behavior of other forms of life including plants, insects, and other mammals. For 
example, certain species of “good” tasting butterflies mimic “nasty” tasting species in 
order to avoid being eaten. Similarly, hover-flies have adopted the black and yellow 
stripes of wasps, which makes them appear dangerous. Angler fish lure their prey by 
w iggling a worm-like piece of flesh to attract their prey. Also, female fireflies display the 
mating flash patterns of another genus of fireflies so they can attract its males and eat 
them.
Dawkins argues that because of competition for resources lying and deception 
play a significant role in deciding which genes get selected to survive another generation,
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2i.e., selection will favor those genes that are more adept at lying and deception. Hence, 
“lying” genes become a part of a species genetic make up. Dawkins says that “we must 
expect lies and deceit, and selfish exploitation of communication to arise whenever the 
interests of the genes of different individuals diverge” (72). He points out that interests of 
the members of the same species diverge more than interests of members of different 
species because members o f the same species compete for exacdy the same resources. It 
follows from this that lying has its greatest survival value among members o f the same 
species. For example, as Dawkins points our, “a male might benefit his own genes if  he 
does something detrimental to another male with whom he is competing” (72). Dawkins 
says that contrary to the belief that animal communication signals initially evolve out of 
mutual benefit of the species and then become exploited, “it may well be that all animal 
communication contains an element of deception right from the start, because all animal 
interactions involve at least some conflict o f interest” (70).
In any event, it is evident that members of the human species learn to lie at a very 
early age. According to Vasek, “to lie successfully, one must have knowledge of 
another’s knowledge and beliefs, recognize the information required to sway the beliefs 
of the listener, and communicate such that this information, rather than information 
which suggests one’s intent to deceive, is passed on.” She says that “at the beginning of 
the school years children have all the skills theoretically necessary to lie effectively.” She 
adds that “all they need, perhaps, is some practice with deception and the inclination to 
deceive” (287).
This study argues that the optimal level of lying in society, from the point of view 
of each individual, is related to society’s institutions. That is, that people can lie and get 
away with it with less costly repercussions if caught under one institutional arrangement 
than they can under another. This study further argues that the optimal level o f lying, 
again from the point o f view of each individual, changes as institutions change. These 
arguments are supported by comparing two extreme type models o f institutional structure, 
the private property order and the bureau, and showing that they differ in the number of 
constraints that they place on lying. To put it differently this study argues that the private
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3property order and the bureau differ in how they aid or hinder lying, that the choice sets 
concerning lying differ between these institutions and that they permit different optimal 
levels o f lying.
Before proceeding, I must qualify my usage o f the terms “lying,” “institutions,” 
and “optimality.” As the political and ethical controversy that engulfed President Clinton 
attests, people have different notions as to the nature o f lying. There are also many 
different usages for the term “institution,” and the term “optimal” is not commonly used 
outside of the mathematical community.
Any concept of “lying” must be looked at in relation to some idea of what is true 
and what is false. This will help us distinguish the difference between true and false on 
the one hand and truth and lie on the other. There are four basic philosophical theories 
about truth: the correspondence theory, the coherency theory, the pragmatic theory and 
the performative theory. We will briefly visit each one.
Theories of Truth
The correspondence theory says that a true statement is one that corresponds to 
some fact of physical reality. As Aristotle put it, ‘T o  say of what is so that it is not so, 
and to say of that which is not so that it is so, is false; while to say of what is so that it is 
so, and of what is not so that it is not so, is true” (qtd. in Nyberg 35). In other words, if I 
report that it is raining and it actually is raining, then my statement corresponds to reality 
and is, therefore, true. If  I report that it is raining and it is not raining, then my statement 
is false. Popper calls the correspondence theory the “common sense idea of truth”
(Unended Quest 98). It is common sense because people realize that they must adjust 
their actions to the facts of reality if they are to attain their ends. Hence, people generally 
presuppose the correspondence theory of truth in their everyday lives. When people ask 
“Is it raining?”, they are presupposing a knowable reality and their ability to communicate 
reality through words.
The coherency theory holds that a true idea is one that coheres or fits within a 
system of other true statements, all of which are tied together logically. For example, the 
truth o f a proposition in mathematics depends on the condition that it is possible for the
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4proposition to be deduced from a system of true axioms. In this view, a false statement or
idea is one that does not cohere to some system of other statements that are accepted as
true. People are using the coherency theory when they deem a new idea either true or
false by comparing it with the total of what they already believe. As Ford puts it,
we all expend a considerable amount o f psychic energy evaluating the 
constant input o f new information. This information is checked against 
previously acquired knowledge, and older information is reevaluated in 
light o f new data. This process is so automatic that it usually goes 
unnoticed, reaching consciousness only when there are major 
discrepancies or when disturbing emotions are elicited. (198)
The reason that tales of extra-terrestrial abduction fall primarily on deaf ears is because 
the idea of extra-terrestrials being able to traverse vast expanses of space and visit earth 
undetected by earth technology does not cohere with most peoples’ belief systems 
concerning space, matter, and time, or with their views about God and creation.
Pragmatic theory or pragmatism discounts metaphysical speculations about the 
truth of statements and focuses more on belief. In this view, the search for truth is really 
a search for belief. People seeking the truth of an idea are deciding whether to believe it 
or not. They will believe that an idea is true if it is practically useful to their lives, i. e., if 
the application of the idea to their everyday life results in perceived benefits. Whether a 
belief is actually true has no relevance for the pragmatists. What counts is whether it 
works to produce desired benefits. As pragmatist philosopher William James put it, “On 
pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of 
the word, it is ‘true’” ( Qtd. in Edwards 6: 428). In this view, a false idea is one that is 
not useful in obtaining desired benefits.
There is a common thread running through the above three theories. This 
common thread highlights the traditional view of truth, i. e., that the truth of a proposition 
can be determined by the application of some principle. Despite their differences, these 
three theories agree that words like “true” and “false” are descriptive expressions; to say 
that a proposition is true is to say that truth is an essential characteristic of the 
proposition. The theories only differ in what principle they apply to determine if the
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5characteristic of being true is present in any given statement. They contend that a  
proposition is true if and only if it meets some criteria, such as corresponding to reality, 
verifiability, or being suitable as a basis for action. In contrast, performative theory, as 
developed by P. F. Strawson, says this approach amounts to nothing more than the 
proposition that a statement is true if and only if the statement is true. In Strawsons’ 
view, to say that a proposition is true does not describe the proposition, but is merely a 
performative act o f agreeing with or accepting the proposition. When one says “It is true 
that it is raining,” he is really saying “I agree or believe that it is raining.” By the same 
token, to assert that a proposition is false is to assert one’s disagreement with it. 
“According to this view, ‘true’ has no independent assertive meaning, and the traditional 
notion of truth as a property or relation is misguided”(Edwards 6: 88). In other words, 
“true” and “false” cease to have objective meaning.
In the first three theories, we find a basis for defining a false statement as shown 
above. Now we must make a distinction between false statements and lies. Lying 
depends on the relationship between what one believes to be true and what one reports to 
others as being true. It may not actually be raining; however, if I believe and report to 
others that it is raining, then my report is false but I have not lied. If, on the other hand, I 
believe that it is raining and say that it is not, then I have lied whether it is actually raining 
or not.
In each of the above theories, except the performative theory, lying is the 
intentional reporting or sending of information that the reporter does not believe to be 
true. According to correspondence theory, a lie is a report about objective reality that is 
not believed by the reporter. A lie in view of the coherency theory is an ingenuous 
assertion about the relationship of a  statement to received theory. A lie according to 
pragmatic theory is an ingenuous assertion that a  commitment to a belief and the resulting 
course of action will result in personal benefits for the believer. Lying viewed from the 
performative theory ceases to have any real meaning since, as shown above, the theory 
teaches that “the traditional notion o f truth as a property or relation is 
misguided”(Edwards 6: 88).
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its inability to explain the nature of the correspondence between words and facts. 
However, Tarski rescued the correspondence theory by introducing what he called a 
“metalanguage” that could speak about language as well as facts (Popper Unended Quest 
141-142). In light of Tarski’s work and an intuitive sense that people presuppose the 
correspondence theory in their everyday lives, I make the assumption that the 
correspondence theory is most relevant to this study. All references to lying, unless stated 
otherwise, presume that someone is trying to mislead someone else concerning the facts 
of reality, or at least what that someone believes to be the facts of reality.
Institutions and Optimality
Optimality is a mathematical concept in which a function is optimized 
(maximized or minimized) under given mathematical constraints. In the case of 
maximization, the function is allowed to increase until it overlaps with a pre-existing or 
given function. On a graph this appears as a line that rises in accordance with its function 
until it intersects the line of a constraining function. The point of intersection is the point 
of optimality. Although I do not develop a mathematical m odel, it is this concept that I 
am referring to in the “optimal level of lying” portion of the title. The optimal level of 
lying, in this view, is the point where the expected marginal benefit function for lying 
intersects with (is constrained by) the expected marginal cost function for lying.
For our purposes, what level of lying is optimal is a decision made by each 
individual after weighing the expected personal benefits and costs. It is the greatest 
number of lies or the greatest degree of lying that can be expected to produce more 
personal benefits than costs under existing social constraints. Various institutions form 
the existing social constraints to lying by making it less beneficial or more costly. This 
study argues that within a given institutional environment people form a subjective 
expected benefit-cost ratio to decide whether to lie at the margin, i.e., whether to tell one 
more lie.
According to North, “institutions are the rules o f the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.
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economic” {Institutions 3). If we see communication an exchange, then North is saying 
that institutions structure the incentives and, hence, the expected benefits and costs of 
lying. He continues by saying that “institutions define and limit the set of choices of 
individuals” {Institutions 4). This suggests that under a given structure of institutional 
rules there may be a set of choices concerning lying from which people can choose what 
they expect to be their most desirable or optimal choice.
Still following North, institutions can be consciously devised and formal, e.g., the 
United States Constitution, or they can informally evolve, e.g., common law, 
conventions, and norms. Using a competitive team sport analogy, he explains that formal 
institutions are the written rules of the game that constrain all players’ choice sets. In 
contrast, ideas about what constitutes good sportsmanship are informal institutional 
constraints on players’ choice sets and may vary from player to player. North continues 
that the rules of the game are institutions while the teams themselves are organizations 
that formulate strategies to achieve a common purpose, to win, within the rules of the 
game. Organizations, then, are “groups of individuals bound by some common purpose 
to achieve objectives” . North claims that both “what organizations come into existence 
and how they evolve are fundamentally influenced by the institutional framework” 
{Institutions 5).
The analyses that follow in later chapters, adapt North’s above distinction 
between formal and informal institutions to formal and informal institutional constraints 
on lying. The presence or absence of such constraints, it will be argued is the source of 
differences in the optimal level of lying in markets and bureaus.
This next five sections of this chapter develop different aspects of lying. The first 
following section examines methods of lying. The second following section looks at 
lying through the benefit-cost model of economists. The third following section develops 
a two-person model of society called the “information relation,” which is the relationship 
that people enter into when they exchange information. A  salient feature of this 
relationship is the fact that lying is a potential strategy people can use to benefit
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agency problem, which is the problem o f how to get people to live up to the terms o f their 
contracts with each other. The fourth following section shows how both the division of 
labor and Hayek’s “particular knowledge” aggravate the agency problem in the 
information relation. The fifth following section introduces us to ways that people 
protect themselves from lying.
Methods of Lying
How many ways are there to lie? Montaigne makes it clear that classifying lying 
is no easy matter:
If, like truth, the lie had but one face, we would be on better terms. For we 
would accept as certain the opposite of what the liar would say. But the 
reverse of truth has a hundred thousand faces and an infinite field, (qtd. in 
Bok 3)
Perhaps “a hundred thousand faces” is a  bit of an exaggeration; however, a glance at a 
thesaurus reveals that there are many ways of misleading someone, some of which we 
may need a dictionary to appreciate. The terms “perfidy,” “cozen,” “dissimulation,” 
“duplicity” “aspersion,” and “calumny” are different ways of being deceptive, which, 
according to Bok, is the larger category of which lying is a member (14). Besides telling 
an outright lie, deceivers might betray a  trust, pretend to have a relationship with 
someone important, engage in name dropping, pretend to be someone else, or engage in 
defaming someone with slander and innuendo. They might send information through as 
many intermediaries as possible, knowing it is unlikely that the information will arrive 
intact. They may orchestrate their deceptions in order to take advantage of the biases or 
prejudices of their intended victims. They might lie with context by putting an opinion 
piece in a journal known for its objectivity.
Deceivers are guilty of what Kuran calls “preference falsification” when they 
dissimulate by pretending to have different values and knowledge than they really do (3). 
Kuran notes Scott’s field work in Malaysia in which Scott documented peasants 
deliberately and routinely dissembling regarding their knowledge and dispositions in their
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9relations with landlords and government officials (339). And of course, there is the big 
lie, the lie so ludicrous that no one would actually try to get away with it if  it were not 
true. Plato wondered in the Republic “if we could contrive some magnificent myth that 
would in itself carry conviction to our whole community,” and centuries later, Hitler 
echoed in Mein Kampf: ‘The greater the lie, the greater the chance that it will be 
believed” (qtd. in Compton’s Ref., quotations, search propaganda).
Lying by selection is a very common means o f lying. People learn early that they 
are better off if some things remain unreported. School children routinely withhold the 
“whole story” of the playground squabble. Teenagers conceal from their parents a 
multitude of unacceptable activities with “just hung out with friends.” Suppose teenage 
friends sneak into an X-rated movie, stop in the park to smoke a joint, and break three 
windows by throwing rocks as they walk home from the park. Upon arriving home, they 
report to their parents that they went to the movie, talked in the park, and walked home. 
Of course what they report is true, but it is the least important part of their evening as far 
as the parents are concerned. These teenagers are lying by selection, because they know 
that their parents would select differently if presented with all the facts.
Of course we all select out of necessity each time we speak or write. It is 
impossible to tell everything about an event because it is too time consuming and would 
require more from our listeners than what they would be willing to endure. The teenagers 
above could also have told their parents that they each drank a soda at the theater, that one 
of them said hello to a friend, that they used the restroom, that one of the street lights was 
burned out, that they saw a squirrel in the park and so on ad infinitum. However, if we 
honestly recount an event, we select those aspects of the event that we believe that our 
listeners would consider most important if they were doing the selecting from the same 
information base. People who lie by selection select differently than they expect that their 
listeners would select, given the same information base. Barnes calls this “lying by 
omission” which he says is “the creation of a false impression by concealing information 
that was not required to be disclosed” (40). He contrasts this with Tying by commission” 
or an explicit statement contrary to reality. He says that “in practice lies of omission are
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widely regarded as less reprehensible than lies of commission.” They are also safer, from 
the liars point of view, because “they provide fewer possibly vulnerable statements for the 
opposition to latch on to” (37).
Rue suggests an example of deception by selection, if not lying, in his description 
of the manner in which historians construct and reconstruct history. He points out that 
historians are likely to be biased for a variety of social and personal factors, such as 
religious and ideological convictions, and that these factors influence the manner in 
which historians select and interpret data. He says that “the historical perspective of a 
social group will tend to be characterized by selective biases which expunge or 
deconstruct negative elements while preserving and embellishing (even fabricating) the 
positive.” That is to say that historians, knowingly or otherwise, construct history so that 
it supports their personal biases or the biases of their culture. Rue points out that bias in 
historical selection is evident in that “atheists and fundamentalists will come up with 
radically divergent historical perspectives, as will capitalists and socialists” (250). Of 
course not all history is deception. Deception by historical selection occurs when 
historians, aware of their personal and cultural biases, consciously select to support them, 
knowing that their readers would select differently if given the same expertise and data 
base. Historians unaware of their biases write spurious history and engage in self­
deception but they are not lying.
It is also possible to lie by selection in how we define our problems. Kingdon 
explains that “there are great political stakes in problem definition. Some are helped and 
others are hurt, depending on how problems get defined.” For example, in the 1970s, 
American automobile companies, hoping to get government bailouts, explained their 
reduced market-share problem as the result of “unfair competition” and “repressive 
government regulation.”(l 10). This may or may not be an instance of lying by selection, 
i.e., lying by what one has omitted. In addition to unfair competition and repressive 
government regulation, American automobile companies’ reduced market shares may 
also have been caused by bad decisions on the part of management; however the reported 
reason is more likely to get the companies favorable legislation.
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Another method of lying is that o f changing the definitions of words. This 
method, which I call epistemological lying, is particularly insidious because it leaves the 
victims conceptually defenseless, i. e., victims no longer have the mental categories 
necessary to identify the deception. Totalitarian regimes routinely change the definitions 
of words in order to get people to accept the beliefs propagated by the state. James 
Wilson’s American Government text tells us that “in the former Soviet Union and its 
satellites and in China, Cuba, and many Third World dictatorships, a government is said 
to be ‘democratic’ if its decisions serve the ‘true interests of the people’, whether or not 
those people had any say in making the decisions” (5). This hardly jibes with the concept 
of democracy as it developed in the Western world. Being deprived of the Western view 
of democracy, how could the Russian people know that they were being deceived? As 
Hayek explains, an effective way of getting the doctrines of the state accepted is to make 
people believe that these doctrines are the same values that they have always believed in 
but which were not properly understood. “The most efficient technique to this end,” says 
Hayek, “is to use the old words but change their meanings” (Serfdom 157).
Some argue that a finely honed craft of lying must include self-deception on the 
part of the liar. Rue argues that self-deception or self-lying is actually beneficial to liars 
in their efforts to deceive others. Following Triver’s explanation as to why self-deception 
was not selected out of existence in the evolutionary process, Rue explains that liars often 
give themselves away by their involuntary body language, such as eye movements, 
nervousness, and voice quavering, that are a result of internal conflicts. If a liar believes 
his own lies, he can assert them with the confidence of a truthteller. Rue says that “what 
the liar requires is the ability to store contradictory information in the brain and to read 
out the false while keeping the true suppressed in the unconscious” (146). In this view, 
self-deception on the part of liars results in a  double-lie since they lie both with their 
words and with their supporting involuntary movements.
Werth and Flaherty point out that self-deception on the part of the victim can help 
liars as well. They cite a case study of a wife whose husband was deceiving her by 
having an affair with another woman. In the interview the wife reported:
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Little by little things were happening that didn’t make sense, but I can 
remember making excuses for them myself...I didn’t want to believe there 
was anything to find out...so I  was being deceived from two angles...I 
was deceiving myself...I didn’t sit there when it was happening saying, ‘I 
am just fooling myself.’ You know, I, I, as I said, I made up a lot of 
excuses, and really believed them ... (296)
The self-deception of the wife facilitated the husband’s lying by making it easier for him 
to lie without getting caught. As the wife makes clear, self-deception on the part o f 
victims results in their being deceived twice, once by liars and once by themselves.
In light of the views of Rue and those o f Werth and Flaherty, we can imagine that 
there may be cases where both liars and their victims engage in self-deception. In such 
cases, liars could assert their lies with the confidence of truthtellers to victims who are 
stone deaf to the truth. People in such a relationship would necessarily be living in a 
fantasy world where what ever liars believe to be true is accepted as true by both liars and 
their victims. However, in such a world, liars are not really lying as previously described. 
Lying was qualified earlier as being a report contrary to one’s beliefs. According to this 
qualification, self-deception and lying do not go together. If people delude themselves 
into believing that what they report is true when it is in reality not true, then they have 
reported false information, but they have not lied by our standards.
In the real world, deception, both of others and of oneself, is seldom complete or 
total but rather partial and incremental. That is, people lie to some degree or with some 
frequency that falls on a continuum from slightly to completely or from never to always. 
People place themselves on this continuum by their choices of when and how much to lie. 
The next section develops the idea that people’s choices to lie or to refrain from lying are 
based on their subjective evaluation of expected benefits and costs.
Lying as a Benefit-Cost Analysis 
According to Bok and Arendt, the many versions of lying have two things in 
common: they all are deliberate and they all deal with contingent facts. Bok makes the 
distinction between giving someone bad information and giving someone bad information 
on purpose, thereby making it clear that intention to lie is a necessary part of the
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definition of lying (13). Arendt points out that lies deal with contingent facts, i.e., facts 
that are not necessarily true. For example, I could lie that I flew to Hawaii for vacation 
last summer, for that could be true or false; however, I could not lie that I drove to 
Hawaii because that contradicts a fact that is necessarily true: One cannot drive to 
Hawaii. Arendt says that by sticking to contingent facts a lie “never comes in conflict 
with reason, because things could indeed have been as the liar maintains they were” 
{Crises 6). She also points out that liars have the advantage of knowing beforehand what 
their audiences wish or expect to hear; therefore, they can customize their lies, often 
making them sound more plausible than reality. Of the liar Arendt says, “He has prepared 
his story for public consumption with a careful eye to making it credible, whereas reality 
has the disconcerting habit of confronting us with the unexpected, for which we were not 
prepared” {Crises 6-7).
Eck puts the motivations for lying into ten categories (60-63), but Bok distills 
them into only four: to avoid harm, to get benefits, to effect fairness, and to protect a 
larger truth (76). The latter category, what Plato called “noble lies,” Bok calls “pious 
fraud” (7). Bok’s four categories easily collapse into two once we realize that “effecting 
fairness” and “protecting a larger truth” are really actions to get benefits. We are left with 
“to avoid harm” and “to get benefits,” which coincide with the benefit-cost approach of 
economics.
According to economic theory, people make choices by using a benefit-cost 
process; they weigh the expected benefits of a choice against its expected costs and 
choose so as to maximize their total benefits. Probably the most fundamental statement 
o f the benefit-cost theory of decision making is that of Ludwig von Mises whose action 
axiom holds that all people at all times act in a manner that they believe will move 
themselves from a state of lesser satisfaction to a state of greater satisfaction {Human 
Action 13-14). From this, we see that people’s lies are an attempt to move themselves 
from a perceived state of lesser satisfaction to perceived state of greater satisfaction, i.e., 
to increase their expected benefits or to reduce their expected costs. In other words, they
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are trying to change the benefit-cost ratio that they expect would be the result if they tell 
the truth.
Among the things that people see as benefits are survival, power, money, sex, 
prestige, revenge, influence, the welfare of their friends, self-esteem, health, and true 
information; among the things that people regard as costs are work, punishment, 
humiliation, pain, loss of wealth or health, and being lied to. In this view, even the lie to 
spare others pain is a lie to avoid costs or get personal benefits on the part o f the liar. The 
doctor who lies to the family of the dying father avoids having to personally cause the 
family pain, which is avoiding a cost. He also can give the family a few more months of 
hope and postpone their grief. If he values helping these people feel better longer, he has 
gained a benefit.
Applying the benefit-cost view of lying to everyday life, we can understand why 
people in various positions might choose to lie to change the outcome of events.
Teachers may select materials to influence the values o f their students. Lawyers may 
conceal, select, or slant information in order to protect a client or win prestige. Witnesses 
may perjure themselves to avoid prison or help a friend. Politicians may over-promise to 
gain political office, or they may pretend to confide in the American people in order to 
protect national unity or save face. Businessmen and professionals may feign a social 
problem and promote government regulations that would restrict their competition. 
Lobbyists may select or conceal information in order to influence government policy. 
Employees may dissemble or hide their actions to get or keep a job, get a sick day, or to 
avoid personal effort. Researchers may falsely promise confidentiality to get the 
respondents o f surveys to reveal their true preferences. In their everyday lives, people 
may lie to protect friends or harm enemies, to avoid taxes or jury duty, or just to save a 
few pennies at the checkout counter.
To understand how expected benefits and expected costs of lying are subjectively 
evaluated by individuals, it is helpful to view lying as a strategy for interacting with 
others with whom one engages in a specific relationship which I call the “information
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relation.” The next section explains this relationship and shows how lying can be used to 
advance one’s aims within it.
The Information Relation and the Agency Problem
In this paper, I refer to the relationship that people have when they exchange 
declamatory statements for the purpose o f gaining useable information, as the 
“information relation.” Looked at from a benefit-cost perspective, the information 
relation takes on specific characteristics, and both parties to the exchange understand the 
“rules of the game,” i.e., how to get benefits and avoid costs. From here on, I refer to the 
person making the declamatory statement as “Informer” and the person receiving the 
statement as “Informee.”
Informer makes assertions, which according to Searle is a type of illocutionary act 
that conforms to certain semantic and pragmatic rules. Briefly, these rules are: The 
maker of assertions (1) commits himself to the truth of the expressed proposition, (2) 
must be in a position to offer evidence of the truth of the proposition, (3) must express 
propositions not obviously true to both himself and his listener, and (4) commits himself 
to a belief in the truth of the proposition (62). In short, Informer is in a kind of promising 
position, because by the mere fact that he informs someone of something, he implies that 
he, himself, believes what he imparts is true. Informer weighs the expected benefits and 
costs of lying and truth-telling and chooses the strategy judged to get the most benefits at 
the least cost.
Informee, on the other hand, is in a trusting position and must decide whether to 
believe what he is being told. Informee weighs the expected benefits and costs of 
believing or not believing and of verifying or not verifying Informer’s information and 
also chooses the strategy most likely to get the most benefits at the least cost. Both 
parties in the relationship are aware of their options and aware that there are benefits and 
costs involved in their deciding on one or the other of them. They are also both aware of 
their counterpart’s options and aware that their counterpart weighs expected benefits and 
costs when choosing between them. People act as Informer in some situations and as 
Informee in others, and they change their positions and their options as they change roles.
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Sometimes people change roles quickly and often as in a casual conversation. I shall 
henceforth refer to the relationship between Informer and Informee as the “information 
relation.”
The information relation coincides with the principal-agent model in many ways. 
The essence of the principal-agent relationship is contained in the saying, “When the cat’s 
away the mice will play.” How does the cat make the mice do his bidding when he is 
gone? Economists, who commonly refer to this problem as the agency problem, often use 
the principal-agent model to analyze hierarchical relationships such as those in firms and 
government agencies where everyone is both a principal and an agent, a principal in 
relation to subordinates, and an agent in relation to superiors. However, as Eggertsson 
points out, “it has a general application to all forms of exchange” (40). Eggertsson 
reminds us that the principal-agent relationship is formed when an agent agrees to 
represent the interests of the principal in return for payment, e.g., one person may agree to 
paint another person’s house in return for an agreed-upon hourly wage. The agency 
problem occurs when agents engage in opportunistic behavior and do not live up to the 
terms of their agreements or “contracts.” Agents may have different conceptions of 
compliance than do principals, or they may decide to cheat. This imposes transaction 
costs on principals so that they must monitor the actions of agents to ensure an acceptable 
level of compliance; however, principals do not monitor completely the actions of agents 
because the process is costly. Principals monitor only to the point where expected 
marginal costs of monitoring equals expected marginal benefits from increased 
compliance by the agent. (40-45).
The information relation fits quite neatly into the above model if we imagine 
Informer in the position of an agent, and Informee, that o f a principal. Take, for example, 
the information relation between authors and buyers of nonfiction books. Authors are the 
agents in the principal-agent relationship since they, as explained below, tacitly agree to 
represent the interests of the book buyers, and book buyers are the principal because they 
pay a fee for the cooperation of the author. People who buy nonfiction books are aware 
that authors may choose to misrepresent the facts for their own person gain; however,
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buyers show, by the act of buying, that they expect in those instances o f buying that 
authors hold the purpose of finding the truth of the matter, and that the contents of those 
books represent authors’ honest efforts to report true information. In the words of Miller 
and Stiff, these buyers have adopted a “truth bias,” which is a generalized belief that our 
communicative partners are truthful” (35). Authors are aware of buyers’ expectations or 
truth bias since there could be little other reason for buying nonfiction books. These 
expectations by book buyers, which are known and tacitly agreed to by authors, can be 
seen as the “contract” that authors enter into with buyers when they take payment for their 
work.
If authors misrepresent the facts or even exaggerate, say to try to sell more books 
or increase their prestige among their peers, they are breaking the terms of their implied 
contract with buyers and imposing transactions costs on them. Buyers, to avoid being at 
the mercy of authors’ whims, must, in some manner and to some degree, monitor authors 
by verifying the information in nonfiction books. Buyers monitor authors by getting 
second opinions, consulting other sources, checking with friends, etc. Since this is a 
costly activity, buyers monitor only to the point where expected marginal costs of doing 
so equal expected marginal benefits.
This example also includes certain fiction books although, at first glance it would 
seem that fiction writers are either lying or ill-informed since they appear to be breaking 
Searle’s illocution rules (1), (2) and (4) as stated above: Fiction writers do not commit 
themselves to the truth; fiction writers do not have evidence for the much of what they 
write; nor do they pretend to believe what they write. According to Searle, “what 
distinguishes fiction from lies is the existence of a separate set of conventions which 
enables the author to go through the motions of making statements which he knows to be 
not true even though he had no intention to deceive” (67). fit other words, fiction writers 
are pretending with readers’ knowledge and permission. This convention, says Searle, 
enables writers to “use words with their literal meanings without undertaking the 
commitments that are normally required by those meanings” (66).
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Given this qualification, Searle says that “almost any important work of fiction 
conveys a ‘message’ or ‘messages’ which are conveyed by the text but are not in the text”
(74). As an example, Dickens’s anti-industrial revolution message in Oliver Twist comes 
to mind. In Searle’s words, Dickens “conveys a serious speech act through the 
performance of the pretended speech acts which constitute the work of fiction...” (75). It 
is this serious speech act or “message” that a writer of literary fiction commits himself to 
and that his readers hold him accountable for rather than the actual words of the book. 
The book itself, the characters, the plot etc., may be construed as the author’s evidence 
for the truth of the message.
I exclude fiction writings such as romance novels, mysteries, and other popular 
fiction works from the above example because they are not declamatory statements about 
the true state of the world, nor do they convey a “message” as does the serious novel 
genre. These works are primarily for entertainment. Buyers of these works do not expect 
to learn the true state of the world, nor do they expect a “message.” They expect a good 
story or an escape from reality, and hence, do not hold the author accountable for not 
presenting a true state of the world. Without the purpose of “finding the true state of the 
world,” the information relation, as described above, ceases to exist. Without 
expectations of truthfulness by readers, there is no “contract” between writers and readers 
of popular fiction, and hence, they are not in a principal-agent relationship with each 
other. Popular fiction writers can “lie” all they want without hurting anyone. There is no 
agency problem between writers and readers of popular fiction.
The contractual relationship that exists between nonfiction writers and readers 
appears to hold in other situations where people exchange declamatory statements.
People go to speeches, take classes, turn on the nightly news, or read the morning 
newspaper because they expect that speakers, teachers, broadcasters, and editors will 
honestly report the facts as best they can. Like the authors of nonfiction books, 
professional reporters of information are aware of people’s expectations of truthfulness 
and, therefore, tacitly agree on a contract of honesty with their patrons. People are, of 
course, aware that they might be lied to in these situations. However, by choosing certain
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speeches, classes, news shows, and newspapers over competing sources, they are 
expressing an expectation that they will be told the truth in these instances. It is safe to 
assume that people do not engage in these activities for the purpose of being lied to.
We cannot, however, restrict this contractual relationship to professionals and 
their patrons; it is also present when people engage in friendly conversation and write 
letters to each other. The mere fact that people engage in these activities allows us to 
assume that they expect to benefit by learning something about other people or the state 
of the world. Like book buyers, they expect the truth of the matter or at least what the 
fellow conversant or letter-writer believes to be the truth. By the same token, 
conversationalists and letter-writers are aware that their listeners and readers expect the 
truth of the matter, because it is understood that people, including themselves, would not 
waste time conversing or reading letters if they expected to be lied to. In this situation, as 
in the earlier examples, there is the expectation of honesty and the knowledge of this 
expectation, hence, the “contract.”
Since there exists an implicit contract in every instance of the information 
relation, it follows that whenever people utter or write declamatory sentences, they are 
playing the role of agent. This is so, because they are the source of propositions about the 
state of the world for other people, and they are aware that their listeners are paying a 
price, whether a direct, agreed-upon payment, as in the book example, or simply the costs 
of taking the time to listen and exerting the mental effort to understand, as in casual 
conversation. People are also aware that their listeners expect to learn something about 
the true state of the world, hence the contract, and by engaging in declamatory utterances, 
these people tacitly agree to represent the interests o f their listeners in return for payment 
It also follows from the idea of an implicit contract that whenever people cognize 
declamatory sentences that are spoken or written by others, they are in the principal role, 
because they are paying a  price for the information and because they suffer the risk that 
Informer may engage in opportunistic behavior by intentionally misinforming them. In 
regards to in form ation , then, people are both sources of information used by others and 
users of information obtained from others, and are, by this fact, in a complex hierarchical
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principal/agent relationship, where they play the role of principal in relation to those who 
inform them and the role of agent when they inform others. Therefore, people must, in 
some fashion and to some degree, monitor the sources of information that they use, and 
they, in turn, are themselves scrutinized when they are the source of information.
We have already encountered a terminology problem that presents itself when one 
analyzes lying, i.e., what terms best describe the relationship between liars and their 
victims. Some writers use “liar and victim” as I just have. Another option is the 
“Informer and Informee” personification that I used in developing the information 
relation. Later we will encounter Klein’s use of “promisor and truster” and Barnes’s “liar 
and dupe.” In the following chapters I use all of these pairs of designations depending on 
the context. However, as a rule, I prefer “Informer” and “Informee,” because 
personification o f the terms tends to remind us of the principal-agent relationship that 
exists in the information relation.
A simple example illustrates how producers of information might benefit 
themselves by lying. Suppose that person “A” hires person “B” to paint his house for S10 
per hour. Assuming that “A” did not monitor “B’s” actions, “B” has private information, 
i.e., “B” alone knows exactly how many hours were spent painting. This situation is what 
Arrow calls “asymmetrical information” between trading partners. Arrow argues that 
asymmetrical information can lead to “adverse selection” or “moral hazard,” which are, 
respectively, the economist’s terms for deception before and after a contract is agreed 
upon (251-252). If “B” lies about the number of hours he spent painting “A’s” house, we 
have an example of moral hazard, because “B” would be lying after their agreement.
This example points out that, as Molho puts it, “private information is a pre­
condition of lying.”(2). Person “B” can consider using a strategy of lying in his efforts to 
maximize his benefits when informing “A”. Person “B’s” expected benefits from lying 
are a larger paycheck. Expected costs include the risk of being found out and the risk of 
losing future business. We must also include as a cost for lying the emotional or moral 
costs of breaking his personal moral code. As Ostrom points out, if people accept the 
validity o f norms against some course o f action they will not normally include it in their
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action set; however, if they expect a large benefit from acting against their values, they 
may temporarily include it in their action set, but to choose it causes large costs (35).
At this point, person “B” weighs an expected larger pay check against his possible 
ruination from being caught and against the emotional stress o f breaking his moral code 
against lying (assuming he has one). “B” also chooses how much to lie by choosing 
among smaller or larger increments. Let us say that “B” actually spent 100 hours painting 
“A’s” house. “B” could report that he spent 101 hours or even 1000 hours. “A” would 
probably believe a report of 101 hours since it stands close to the actual amount; 
however, “A” would probably not believe a report of 1000 hours because it stretches far 
from the truth and perhaps contradicts a necessary fact as discussed above. Therefore, 
lying is subject to diminishing marginal returns. As Arendt points out, “there always 
comes the point beyond which lying becomes counter productive” (Crisis 7). “B’s” 
optimal level of lying, i.e., the choice that from his point of view would give him the 
greatest expected benefits, rests somewhere between the two extremes. The main task 
facing person “B” is locating the optimal level of lying given the expected marginal 
benefits and marginal costs that he is facing in this situation. Of course this amount may 
be zero.
The success or failure of lying and cheating as a strategy in the information 
relation depends on the amount of monitoring that takes place between Informer and 
Informee. After all, fisherman can lie about the size of their catch only to people who 
were not in the boat with them. More monitoring means less private information and, 
hence, a lower optimal level of lying as seen from the individual decision-maker’s point 
of view. In the painting example above, the potential for agency problems exists because 
person “A” did not monitor the actions of person “B”, which led to private information on 
“B ’s” part. “A” could have reduced the problem by periodically checking on “B’s” 
progress, but “A’s” monitoring will always be less than total because the expected costs 
in time and foregone opportunities of observing “B” completely, i.e., watching him every 
second, is greater than the expected benefits. If this were not so, “A” would paint his 
own house.
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Of course “A” could hire person “C” to monitor the work of “B”, but who, then, 
would monitor “C” to make sure that his report to “A” is accurate? Person “A” could 
even carry it a step further and hire person “D” to monitor the original monitor, person 
“C.” However, as Thomas Sowell points out, “it is always possible to hire people to 
watch other people, but how conscientiously they will watch and report is as 
problematical as the original behavior that requires watching”. He adds that “hiring more 
monitors to monitor the first set of monitors merely raises the same question on a new 
level rather than providing an answer” {Knowledge and Decisions 65-66). Sowell is 
describing the nesting of a secondary agency problem within the primary agency problem 
, which creates a whole new set of monitoring costs. This is essentially the monitoring 
problem that exists in hierarchically structured organizations like firms and government
bureaus.
Miller and Stiff point out that people are sometimes not motivated on their own 
behalf to monitor lying. They also use the example of a dependent housewife who 
suspects that her husband is having an affair. By monitoring or finding out for sure, she 
may loose her happy home and her source of income. Consequently, she adopts the “I 
don’t want to know” position and does not monitor her husbands behavior.(34). Miller 
and Stiff suggest that this is somehow a special case; however, as seen from the benefit- 
cost view of lying, the wife is monitoring to the point where her expected costs from 
monitoring equals her expected benefits from doing so, i. e., at zero. From her point of 
view, any amount of monitoring is too costly. As the wife in Werth and Flaherty’s study 
mentioned earlier put it, “But as much as I wanted to be a detective and find him out, I 
didn’t want to either. Because the truth, I was afraid more of the truth than living in the 
lie kind o f ’ (296).
Besides being a prerequisite of lying, private information is also a prerequisite of 
being an informer in the information relation: I must know something that you do not 
know before I can inform you of it. This is only a restatement, in a new context, of 
Searle’s rule (3) of assertions above which says that “the expressed proposition must not 
be obviously true to both the speaker and the hearer in the context of utterance” (62). If
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two people knew exactly the same things, they could not engage in the information 
relation. In a nutshell, then, Informer always has private information. From this fact, 
coupled with the fact that monitoring is necessarily incomplete (because of monitoring 
costs), it follows that the opportunity to obtain benefits by lying exist, to some degree, in 
every instance of the information relation.
As we shall see next, societies organized along the principle of the division of 
labor are particularly vulnerable to lying, because their members intentionally acquire 
different sets of knowledge and information. In so doing people both increase private 
information and reduce their ability to monitor the sources of specialized information.
Division of Labor, Particular Knowledge, and the Agency Problem
Division of labor makes it possible for society to benefit from a much larger total 
set of information than under autarkic production by doing away with large amounts of 
duplication of knowledge among society’s individual members: Each person only has to 
know his specialty. Adam Smith was the first to explain this phenomenon when he 
showed that for a single individual to make a pin he must have knowledge of mining, 
metallurgy, smelting, wire pulling, etc., and could scarcely make one pin per day; 
however, with division of labor, a person with no great knowledge o f any of these things 
can make thousands o f pins per day (Wealth o f  Nations vol. 18-9).
Division of labor increases a society’s overall wealth, but, as Arrow points out, it 
also increases the potential for lying by increasing private information. He says that 
“every profession, such as the medical, owes its economic function to the inequality of 
information between the professional and his client; what the latter is buying is most of 
all the superior knowledge of the former” (253). In modern-day economies, there are, 
perhaps, thousands of divisions of labor or specialties about which some people are 
experts but most people are novices or are completely ignorant. Under division of labor, 
people are sources o f information regarding their specialties, but they use information 
from other specialties about which they may know very little: The doctor and the auto 
mechanic trade information and are, therefore, susceptible to being lied to by each other. 
Division of labor, then, separates people into enclaves o f  private information within
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society. This shows the need for increased monitoring under the division of labor, but it 
also shows that monitoring becomes more difficult. Because o f the complexity of 
information coming from specialties, information users cannot personally verify it; for 
the most part, they must rely on knowledgeable third persons. This situation reminds us 
of person “C” monitoring person “B” for person “A”, which creates a nesting of agency 
problems as mentioned earlier.
Hayek points out how society is subdivided into still smaller, more subtle units of 
private information than those created by the division of labor. He says that because 
people occupy a unique place in time and space they have unique knowledge, or as he 
calls it, “the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” ("‘Use of 
Knowledge ” 80). This knowledge, or information for our purposes, is even more specific 
than information from the various divisions of labor. It is unique to each person. For 
example, the half-empty bottle of water that I keep on my desk has some role, however 
minuscule, in fulfilling society’s total need for fresh water. Because of unique 
circumstances, I am the only person in society that knows the condition of those few 
ounces of water: how old it is, whether it is potable, etc. Therefore, I am the only person 
in society that knows whether I could best use this water for drinking or watering my 
plant, Ozzy. Since this “particular knowledge” is unique to me, I have private 
information about the most efficient use of a valuable resource. In a similar vein, for any 
given resource and any given instant, there is someone with unique and current 
knowledge about it.
Hayek writes that society’s knowledge problem is that of how to use particular 
knowledge, or, in his own words, it is “ a problem of the utilization of knowledge which 
is not given to anyone in its totality” ( "Use of Knowledge ” 78). From our point of view, 
given Hayek’s insight, society’s knowledge problem is that of how to make use of 
particular knowledge in light of the realization that it is private information and, hence, 
potentially useful for lying. Any social unit, therefore, must solve a dual problem of (1) 
how to use information that is not “given to anyone in its totality” and (2) how to use 
information that in itself presents a unique opportunity for lying.
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This makes particular knowledge especially troublesome for societies that use 
central planning. For example, focusing here on the opportunity for lying aspect of the 
problem, if people are aware that their particular knowledge may be used by a central 
authority to formulate policies that will harm them, they may lie when reporting it. Lying 
to a central authority for the purpose of influencing its decisions creates what Milgrom 
and Roberts call “influence costs” (“Bargaining Costs” 86). This idea recognizes that one 
cost of central planning is the unavoidable use of information that, to some degree, has 
been altered to serve the interests of the sources of information. When people report 
private information to a central authority, they are spurred to attempt to influence the 
outcome of policy formation, and of course, lying is a potential strategy. This situation 
spawns what Kingdon calls “policy entrepreneurs” (204) and what North more broadly 
defines as “intellectual entrepreneurs” (Structure and Change 51-54). These are, in 
different contexts, people trying to benefit themselves in the policy-making process by 
saying the “right” thing rather than what is, even in their opinion, true.
The concepts of “influence costs” and “policy entrepreneurs” further illuminate 
the duality of society’s knowledge problem, especially the part with which we are here 
concerned: Given the extent of the potential for lying inherent in the various divisions of 
labor and in particular knowledge, and given the difficulty and costliness of monitoring 
people’s behavior, how does society ever use true information? Restating this question in 
terms of the agency problem as it relates to the information relation, how does society use 
true information under circumstances where people are both principals, that cannot 
directly monitor much of the information that they use, and agents, that cannot be directly 
monitored in regards to the information that they provide for use by others? Inherent in 
this question is the realization that people are locked in a perpetual bout with the agency 
problem each time they become involved in the information relation, and that societies 
must somehow deal with this problem or they could not be viable.
Social Remedies To Lying
Bok says that victims of lies suffer substantial costs, because “to be given false 
information about important choices in their live is to be rendered powerless. For them,
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their very autonomy may be at stake” (xvii). She concludes that any society “whose 
members were unable to distinguish truthful messages from deceptive ones, would 
collapse” (19). As the following example shows, these costs occur because lying causes 
people to make less beneficial choices.
Lying hurts people in two ways. First, it causes people to make decisions based 
on false information. This creates costs because these decisions do not result in the 
desired and expected outcomes. “The advantage falls to the cheater because the cheated 
person misperceives what is assumed to be the real world” (Bell and Whaley 47). For 
example, if a used car salesman successfully lies about the quality of a car, the person 
who buys it gets less total benefits than expected because he pays for quality that does not 
exist. Second, lying requires that people remove resources from other uses and devote 
these resources to protecting themselves from lying. Once the used car buyer realizes that 
he has been lied to, he devises a strategy to protect himself from future lying. This 
strategy requires resources that were previously benefiting the car buyer in other ways. 
The time and money that it takes to become knowledgeable about the mechanical 
workings of automobiles are resources that were previously devoted to leisure, 
investment, groceries, or any number of other uses.
Because of these costs, many societies, both modem and primitive, put some form 
of constraint or sanction on lying. According to Radin, the Winnebago Indians consider 
truth-telling in regard to war deeds to be sacred, and they warn that exaggerating them in 
order to add to one’s honor will result in premature death. However, the war deeds 
context is the only time lying and truth-telling are mentioned in twenty-three moral 
generalizations that Radin gleaned from Winnebago texts (ctd. in Edel and Edel 122). 
Given this selective sanctioning, the Winnebago apparently believe that truth-telling is 
more important in some situations than in others. Modem societies also selectively 
sanction lying. Certain categories of lying like fraud and bigamy are punishable by laws 
which are, by our definition above, formal institutions. Other instances of lying, such as 
boasting, are sanctioned by social norms which are informal institutions, and still others, 
like the “white lie” are overlooked.
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Formal constraints on lying, such as the sacred constraints of the Winnebago and 
the legal sanctions against fraud in modem societies, will reduce overall lying by 
increasing its costs, but by themselves they are not a sufficient deterrent to protect 
individuals from being lied to in many of their everyday encounters. People may still lie 
in situations where the law does not apply or where people do not fear the law, i.e., 
anywhere that the law does not have sufficient force to imply large enough expected costs 
to overcome expected benefits o f lying. Therefore, Informee cannot be certain that 
Informer is telling the truth even in the presence of formal constraints on lying. Informer 
will still lie if he expects that he can benefit themselves at an acceptable cost.
This points out that individuals are ultimately responsible for shielding 
themselves from the effects of lying, and that if societies are to overcome the agency 
problem inherent in the information relation, there must be an individual informal 
response as well as a formal response to lying. How do individuals protect themselves 
from lying? Some people may try to sharpen their lie detecting skills, such as watching 
for nervous mannerisms, overly deliberate speech, or constricted facial muscles.
However, it is doubtful that this effort will result in much success, because it has been 
shown that humans are poor lie detectors. Citing several studies, Miller and Stiff 
conclude that humans can detect deception just slightly better than chance levels. These 
studies also show that professionals who are trained to detect deception, such as customs 
inspectors, federal polygraphers, crime investigators, judges, and psychiatrists, are not 
much better than college students (69).
This leaves individuals in the position of having to adopt rules of thumb that make 
it less likely that someone will lie to them or less likely that they will be hurt if someone 
does lie to them. These rules of thumb grow out of human collective experience of 
dealing with liars, and they sometimes attain the status of mini-morals or principles by 
which to live ones life. When looked at analytically, these rules of thumb are strategies 
that people adopt to m inim ize  the advantages of liars. The old saying, “Cheat me once, 
your fault; cheat me twice, my fault” is an example of such a strategy. This strategy is 
immortalized in the fable about the boy who cried wolf. In this fable, the towns people
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do not believe the warnings of the boy who previously lied to them. This simple story 
contains two strategies: Do not believe someone who has lied to you in the past, and do 
not lie if you want to be believed in the future.
Folklore is filled with admonitions and caveats that aim to arm naive people with 
lie protection strategies. For example, Aesop’s lamb who is being eaten by a wolf warns, 
“Any excuse will serve a tyrant.” The essence of this strategy is to not place to much 
trust in people who are more powerful than you are because the power imbalance leaves 
you no recourse in the event that you are lied to. Another example is the fable that 
proclaims, “One bad turn deserves another.” This is reminiscent of the T1T-FOR-TAT or 
reciprocity strategy that prevailed in Robert Axelrod’s now famous computer tournament. 
The decision rule in TIT FOR TAT says to start out cooperating then do what your 
partner does every move after that (36). Yet another example, “Distrust interested 
advice,” is a strategy that recognizes that people serve their own interests when they 
report information. This is reminiscent of Kingdon’s “policy entrepreneur” as mentioned 
earlier. Other admonitions by Aesop are: “Do not trust flatterers;” “Appearances are 
deceptive;” “Enemies’ promises were made to be broken;” “Never trust a friend who 
deserts you at a pinch;” “We often give our enemies the means for our own destruction.” 
Each of these “morals” contains a strategy for protecting oneself from lying and deception 
(Fables o f  Aesop).
A little reflection reveals that we each routinely use such strategies, sometimes 
almost subconsciously, to protect ourselves from lying: not trusting strangers, getting a 
second opinion, “test driving” before we buy, shunning suspected liars, buying from 
reputable dealers, etc. Klein points out that in modem societies, some of these personal 
strategies have become institutionalized, such as name brand buying and reputation 
building. These institutions are what Klein calls “voluntary remedies” to trust problems 
(‘T rust For Hire” 97).
The next section explains how market and bureau models will be analyzed and 
compared in their tendencies to either aid or hinder lying and will show the sequence of 
development in coming chapters.
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Comparing Markets And Bureaus
It seems a reasonable assumption that the existing institutional arrangements of a 
society, the laws, social norms, property relations, power structure, etc., may be either 
more or Less helpful to people in their application of protection-ffom-lying strategies than 
some other possible institutional arrangement. That is to say, one institutional 
arrangement may reasonably be thought to encourage or advance protection strategies, 
while another arrangement hinders such strategies. It also seems a reasonable assumption 
that one institutional arrangement may provide greater incentives and opportunities to lie 
than another arrangement.
For heuristic purposes, Berger and Luckmann postulate a model society in which
institutionalization is total. That is, all social actions are done according to rules.
In such a society, all problems are common, all solutions to these 
problems are socially objectivated and all social actions are 
institutionalized. The institutional order embraces the totality of social 
life, which resembles the continuous performance of a complex, highly 
stylized liturgy. There is no role-specific distribution of knowledge, or 
nearly none, since all roles are performed within situations of equal 
relevance to all the actors. (75)
In other words, the authors say, “everybody does everything and knows everything” (76). 
Although this kind of society cannot be found in history, Berger and Luckmann compare 
actual societies in terms of their closeness to this extreme type. “It is possible to say that 
primitive societies approximate the type to a much higher degree than civilized ones. It 
may even be said that in the development of archaic civilizations there is a progressive 
movement away from this type” (75).
They develop this model further by conceiving the opposite extreme.
The opposite extreme would be a society in which there is only one 
common problem, and institutionalization occurs only with respect to 
actions concerned with this problem. In such a society there would be 
almost no common stock of knowledge. Almost all knowledge would be 
role-specific. (75)
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Again there are no examples o f this society in history; however, Berger and Luckmann 
claim that certain approximations can be found in small libertarian colonies whose only 
common concern is their economic arrangements or their common purpose of waging war
(75).
This kind of dichotomy can be useful in that it creates a continuum upon which 
social organizations of the real world can be placed, nearer to one end or the other, so as 
to see the relative relationship between them. For example using this continuum, Berger 
and Luckmann conclude that “the private sphere that has emerged in modern industrial 
society is considerably deinstitutionalized as compared to the public sphere” (76).
In the following chapters, I pursue a similar kind of comparison using similar 
kinds of extreme types. I create a continuum with a market model at one end and a 
bureau model at the other, realizing of course that all actual societies fit somewhere in 
between. The market model that is useful here is the one developed by classical liberal 
writers. This model, like Berger and Luckmann’s extreme type, has a single common 
problem, i.e., defense of property rights. For the opposite extreme, I use Max Weber’s 
ideal type model of bureaucracy. This model is less extreme than Berger and 
Luckmann’s “total institutionalization” model since it contains division of labor and role- 
specific knowledge; however, it is extreme enough for our purposes. I compare these 
extreme types in their tendencies to either aid or hinder peoples’ protection-ffom-lying 
strategies and in their overall tendencies to affect the benefit-cost ratio of lying. Any 
conclusions regarding these extreme types can then be imputed to actual social 
organizations relative to their position on the continuum.
This study conducts two analyses on both models: one on each side of the 
information relation. The first analysis, from the point of view of Informee, evaluates the 
effectiveness of protection strategies in both models. Using the writings of various 
authors on protection strategies, the necessary requirements for these strategies are 
ascertained. They are then compared to market and bureau model constraints to see how 
well these models accommodate protection-from-lying strategies. In other words, the 
study ascertains whether there is a difference in how markets and bureaus aid or hinder
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protection strategies. Restated once more, it determines whether markets and 
bureaucracies are “protection strategy friendly” or “protection strategy unfriendly.” For 
example, as we shall see, Smith, Tullock, and Klein show that free association is a 
necessary requirement for reputation building, which is a protection-from-lying strategy; 
therefore, it is appropriate to evaluate to what degree market and bureau models allow 
free association. Similar comparisons are conducted with all the protection strategies.
The second analysis, from the point of view of Informer, evaluates the benefit-cost 
ratio of lying in both models. This is done by examining, within the institutional context 
of each model, six social phenomena that affect the benefit-cost ratio o f lying in all 
societies: particular knowledge, organizations, free riding, institutional restrictions on 
communication, time preference, and ethical codes o f conduct. This analysis determines 
whether the overall benefit-cost ratio o f lying is higher in one model than the other.
Chapter 2 discusses protection-from-lying strategies and isolates their necessary 
requirements. Chapter 3 develops a market model and conducts both of the above 
described analyses on this model. Chapter 4 is essentially a repeat of the analysis of 
Chapter 3 except it analyzes protection strategies and the benefit-cost ratio of lying within 
a bureau model. Chapter 5 contains conclusions, implications of these conclusions, and 
recommendations for further research. In general, this study concludes that there is a 
solid theoretical case for the existence of a relationship between institutions and an 
accompanying optimal level o f lying and shows that this conclusion brings into question 
the objectivity of the social sciences under conditions where the social sciences are useful 
as policy shapers.
The remainder o f this chapter is the justification o f my method of comparing 
markets and bureaus. I justify my choice of methodology by placing my work in the 
context of the debate over methodology in the social sciences.
Justification of Methodology
I have chosen the method of comparing models because it allows me to deal with 
lying on a purely theoretical basis. La subsequent studies (by me or by others), my 
theoretical structure can be operationalized in various settings for empirical study. I
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suspect that operationalizing lying so as to make it amenable to empirical research may 
prove rather difficult due to the subjective nature o f lying and the elusive nature o f liars. 
On the one hand, researchers would be faced with the problems of discerning their 
subjects beliefs, intent, and degree of self-deception. On the other hand, they would be 
dealing with subjects reluctant to reveal themselves and perhaps practiced at not doing so. 
In any event, by concentrating on theory first, I believe that I am providing a framework 
that gives some structure to the study of lying.
Strict empiricists would criticize that I have put the cart before the horse, saying 
that data should be collected and processed before formulating a theory. This theory 
should then be verified by subsequent research. This view is essentially the scientific 
method as handed down from Francis Bacon in the seventeenth century, as applied to the 
social sciences by Comte in the nineteenth century, and as developed and reinforced by 
logical positivists and logical empiricists in the twentieth century. However, 
philosophers of science and even practitioners in various fields have become increasingly 
reluctant to accept this framework. I believe that it is appropriate at this point to digress 
from the topic of lying in order to show that even though my method departs from this 
narrowly construed view of what scientists do, my research does in fact fit into the overall 
debate concerning methodology in science.
The Great Debate
Karl Popper presented a major challenge to the traditional view of what scientists 
do and what constitutes knowledge when he introduced the idea of falsifiability in his 
1934 book Logik der Forschung. Popper argued that a theory can never be verified once- 
and-for-all because there is always the chance that the next empirical instance may refute 
it. For example, the theory that all swans are white is not completely verified after 
observing one hundred or even one thousand white swans, because the next swan may be 
black. The best that scientists can do says Popper is to construct theories that are capable 
of being falsified, i.e., capable of being proven wrong by observations in the real word.
He says that “scientific theories, if  they are not falsified, for ever remain hypotheses or 
conjectures” (Unended Quest 79).
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The concept of falsifiability severely undermined the views of the positivists as to 
what scientists do and what constitutes knowledge. It was really a  three-pronged attack 
that rejected the three pillars of the scientific method as it had been received from Bacon. 
Those three pillars were verifiability, disinterested scientists, and inductive logic. 
Scientists since Bacon had used verifiability as the standard of demarcation between 
science on the one hand and pseudoscience, theology, and metaphysics on the other. 
Falsifiability destroyed this traditional demarcation. Popper maintained that the 
“verification” of the positivists’ was actually only “corroboration,” and, as Trout explains 
Popper’s view, “a theory is potentially a scientific theory if and only if there are possible 
observations that would falsify or refute it.” (15).
In rejecting verifiability, Popper was also rejecting the existence of inductive 
logic. Verifiability assumes unbiased, disinterested scientists looking at all the facts and 
coming to inescapable conclusions. To the contrary, Popper says that there is no such 
thing as unprejudiced observation, because observation is an active process engaged in by 
the observer to find or check some regularity which is believed or at least suspected to 
exist. Popper concluded that “since there can be no theory-free observation, and no 
theory-free language, there can of course be no theory-free rule or principle of induction” 
{Unended Quest 148).
The concept of falsifiability received new impetus when Popper’s Logik der 
Forschung was published in English as Logic o f Scientific Discovery in 1959. 
Falsifiability became the new standard of demarcation between science and nonscience. 
Thenceforth, to be scientific, theories must be potentially falsifiable. This new standard 
eventually became accepted, or at least acknowledged, in all the sciences (Trout 16). 
Scientists, who previously viewed scientific progress as the accumulation o f observations, 
came to view progress as the replacement of weaker theories with stronger ones. 
“According to this view, finding theories which are better approximations to truth is what 
the scientist aims at” {Unended Quest 150). In other words, to be scientific meant that 
“there was competition between theories—a kind of Darwinian struggle for survival” 
{Unended Quest 79).
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Another important attack on logical positivism and the Baconian view of the 
scientific method occurred when Thomas S. Kuhn published The Structure o f  Scientific 
Revolutions in 1962. Kuhn’s book put three terms into the vocabulary o f most 
contemporary scientists: “paradigm,” “normal science,” and “extraordinary science.” 
Kuhn explained that the various branches of science tend to mature into paradigms of 
accepted ways of thinking about the science’s fundamentals and its methodology. These 
paradigms, he says, are generated by the contributions o f great thinkers like Copernicus, 
Newton, and Einstein whose works have more explanatory power than the works of their 
contemporaries or their predecessors. After most scientists accept the works of the great 
thinkers, scientists as writers assume that they and their readers share a common view of 
the fundamentals of their science; therefore, instead of writing books accessible to a 
general readership, scientists write short articles intended specifically for other scientists 
in their field with an ever narrowing focus on subdivisions of their discipline. Their 
works become increasingly esoteric and inaccessible to persons outside of their field. At 
this point, Kuhn says, scientists are working within a paradigm, and books, as texts, now 
serve the purpose of passing the established paradigm to the next generation (Structure o f  
Scientific Revolutions 10-22).
Kuhn continues that “when there emerges a core of accepted beliefs among the 
scientists of a given field, this core acts as a paradigm that guides the research of most o f 
the researchers. This is what Kuhn calls “normal science.” In normal science, scientists 
do research that is “directed to the articulation of those phenomena and theories that the 
paradigm already supplies” (Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions 24). They are in a sense, 
Kuhn says, trying to make nature fit into the pre-formed boxes of the paradigm. “No part 
o f the aim of normal science is to call forth new sorts of phenomena; indeed those that 
will not fit the box are often not seen at all” (Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions 24).
An important aspect of Kuhn’s view of normal science is that its research looks 
for expected results. The paradigm guides scientists in selecting topics of research, in 
constructing research apparatus, and in predicting the results of research. Under these 
circumstances, Kuhn says, unexpected results or anomalies stand out in relief to the
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predictions of the paradigm. When anomalies persist and strike at the core of a science, 
scientists may “come to view its resolution as the subject matter of their discipline” 
{Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions 83). It is at this point, Kuhn says that normal science 
shifts to extraordinary science.
Kuhn defines extraordinary science as the state of affairs when scientists see a 
problem as being more than just an unsolved puzzle whose solution will further articulate 
the current paradigm. It is an anomaly that stands out from the rest, that captures the 
attention of most scientists in the field. The old paradigm and the old rules are stretched 
and strained in every conceivable way to try to explain the anomaly. When the anomaly 
cannot be explained, Kuhn says, there is a scientific revolution in which old theories are 
discarded in favor of new theories. {Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions 77).
Kuhn argues that paradigms establish the mental categories of perception and that 
we observe only what our mental categories allow or prepare us to see. After a paradigm 
shift, scientists perceive reality using new categories. Therefore, they can observe new 
phenomena looking at old data with old instruments, similar to a Gestalt switch. Current 
science, since Descartes, has operated as if data are fixed and are the given of experience. 
To the contrary, Kuhn says that data are “collected with difficulty” instead of being given 
and that the paradigm of the scientist determines which data to collect by showing which 
data is important in the articulation of the current paradigm {Structure o f  Scientific 
Revolutions 111-130).
Kuhn’s and Popper’s views have much in common. They agree that data 
collection is influenced by the beliefs of the scientists who collects them. They also agree 
that there are no rules for inducing correct theories from facts (Kuhn, “Logic of 
Discovery” 12). However, they take different views as to how scientific knowledge 
grows. Popper says that good research consists in making bold conjectures and then 
criticizing them ruthlessly, throwing out bad theories and replacing them with more 
suitable ones. Kuhn agrees that scientists do this but only during periods of extraordinary 
science. Most of the time, Kuhn says, scientists are engaged in normal science, and they 
only rarely engage in the actual falsification procedures as Popper describes them. “I
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suggest then,” says Kuhn, “that Sir Karl has characterized the entire scientific enterprise 
in terms that apply only to its occasional revolutionary parts” (“Logic of Discovery” 5-6). 
Kuhn adds “that it is normal science, in which Sir Karl’s sort of testing does not occur, 
rather than extraordinary science which most nearly distinguishes science from other 
enterprises” (“Logic of Discovery” 6).
In response to Kuhn, Popper admits that normal science exists but at the same 
time deplores it. He attributes it to scientists who have been taught badly and who are the 
victims of indoctrination ( “Normal Science” 52-53). Therefore, says Popper, “Kuhn is 
mistaken when he suggests that what he calls ‘normal’ science is normal” ( “Normal 
Science ” 53). Nor, says Popper, is normal science necessary or desirable as Kuhn 
indicates. Popper also points out that there are many gradations between what Kuhn 
calls normal science and extraordinary science. Each gradation is occupied by scientists 
with abilities higher or lower than the skills of scientists around them ( “Normal Science" 
54).
Imre Lakatos is critical of some aspects of both Kuhn’s and Popper’s views. He 
charges that Kuhn’s view transforms the philosophy of science into the psychology of 
science. According to Lakatos, Kuhn does not offer a rational explanation of how one 
theory replaces another, but instead attributes this change to crises and revolutions which 
are psychological events (178). Lakatos also charges Popper with being naive in 
suggesting that one instance of empirical falsification can cause a long-standing theory to 
go away. Lakatos says that in his view, “criticism does not—and must not—kill as fast as 
Popper imagined” (179).
Lakatos attempts to reconcile Kuhn’s and Popper’s views by extending Popper’s 
view to what he calls “sophisticated falsification,” and reconstructing Kuhn’s 
“paradigms” as “research programmes.” In regard to Popper, Lakatos says that scientists 
do not work with single theories and accept or reject them one at a time. Rather, they 
work with groups of mutually corroborating theories, and they reject a theory when it 
ceases to be corroborated by theories with greater empirical content In other words, “it is
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not that we propose a theory and Nature may shout NO; rather, we propose a  maze of 
theories, and Nature may shout INCONSISTENT’ (130).
Lakatos agrees with Kuhn that scientists work within a kind of framework, but he 
does not agree that it is the nonrational framework that Kuhn calls a paradigm. The 
actual framework, according to Lakatos, is better described by the term “research 
programme.” A research programme is a set of theories which act as a core, and a set of 
hypotheses that act as a protective shield for the core. It is this protective shield that 
receives the criticism which is thus deflected from the core. This is necessary, he says, 
because no theory can avoid all anomalies and must be protected from the criticism of 
other theories that explain the anomalies while the research programme is allowed to 
mature. This protective shield of hypotheses either strengthens and grows by encounters 
with conflicting theories, or it gets chipped away until the criticisms strike the core, at 
which point the core would be discarded (133).
Kuhn’s views have received a great deal of both criticism and praise because they
raise a fundamental question. As Paul Feyerabend points out, Kuhn raised a question
which challenges the rationality o f science.
The question raised by Kuhn is not whether there are limits to our reason; 
the question is where these limits are situated. Are they outside the 
sciences so that science itself remains entirely rational, or are irrational 
changes an essential part of even the most rational enterprise that has been 
invented by man? (218)
Various philosophers of science have taken turns criticizing Kuhn’s concepts o f “normal 
science” (Watkins), “paradigm” (Masterman), and “scientific revolutions” (L. Pearce 
Williams). However, sociologists o f science have been much kinder to him. As Peter 
Weingart has written, ’’Kuhn’s influence on the sociology of science has proved to be so 
profound that he has all but attained the rank of Merton” (qtd. in Gutting 9).
Sociologists’ reverence for Kuhn’s views may be explained, in part, by their emphasis on 
psychological processes in the overall process of scientific research as suggested by 
Lakatos as cited above.
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The Sciences in Turmoil
The debate between the positivists, Popperites, and Kuhnians continues today, and 
has left the state of science somewhat disorganized. The common view that the sciences 
are one great uniformity in which all scientists use the same method and all agree on what 
has been determined as true is no longer unanimously accepted. Philosophers of science 
have come to see that the sciences are very different; for example astronomy and biology 
and geology are mainly observational sciences that must settle for what nature shows 
them, whereas chemistry and physics are mainly experimental sciences that can decide 
what to study . As Bauer points out, “each science—and to a degree each specialization 
within each science— has thus come to be an idiosyncratic blend of theorizing and 
empiricism; and that brings inevitably with it distinct notions about what knowledge (in 
general!) is and about the degree to which knowledge can be said to be ‘certain’” (26).
Bauer cites Michael Polanyi’s likening of the actual scientific process to putting 
together a jigsaw puzzle in public. In this view, every one is working on a problem 
together, and all observe the contributions of each. This allows all to criticize the work of 
each and also makes new possibilities created by the work of individuals apparent to all. 
This system of public criticism creates a kind of filter for scientific knowledge as it 
moves from frontier science, which is very undependable, into the primary literature, then 
the secondary literature, and finally, after considerable lag time, into textbook science 
which is usually dependable knowledge (42-48). According to Bauer, the fact that 
scientific inquiry has arranged itself in such a fashion is itself evidence of the 
shortcomings of the scientific method. He says that “if the scientific method delivers 
results that require perpetual self-correction, then it is hardly a  method that leads to 
certifiably reliable knowledge” (51).
The implication that scientists do not conduct their research according to the 
scientific method as received from Bacon creates credibility difficulties particularly for 
the social sciences. Bauer argues, therefore, that “if anything, practitioners of the social 
sciences are much more explicitly scrupulous to follow the scientific method than are 
practitioners of the natural sciences” (128). He argues that the social sciences are not
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really science because they do not together add up to an integrated and, hence, usable 
body of knowledge. He adds that “to support their claim to being scientific, social 
scientists adhere to and promulgate the myth of the scientific method—for their only 
possible claim to being scientific is that they practice that method”(129).
Bauer uses Richard Burian’s phrase “reality therapy” to describe the process 
whereby the rational opinion o f scientists as to what is true is sensitive to the test of 
nature. Scientists bump into reality, so to speak, and are thus guided by it (89). He says 
that reality therapy forces physical scientists to agree on what is true even if some new 
truth goes against their personal beliefs. However, he continues, “in the social sciences, 
by contrast, it is very difficult to find even trivial things to study that do not have some 
immediately evident bearing on political, social, or religious doctrine; and so from the 
very beginning of studies of apparent minutiae, opposing schools of thought will 
disagree” (135). He concludes that “reality therapy can often be conclusive in the natural 
sciences but only rarely in the social sciences; in consequence, a body of consensually 
agreed upon knowledge has accumulated in the former but not in the latter” (129).
So far, I have shown that there is much disagreement as to methodology in the 
sciences in general. To round out my digression, I now look at a few of the 
disagreements concerning methodology within a single field of the social sciences. 
Disagreement in Economics
Neoclassical economics in this century has become highly theoretical and 
mathematical under the guidance of such Nobel Prize winners as Paul A. Samuelson 
(1970) and Kenneth Arrow (1972) who heightened the overall mathematical nature of 
economic methodology. Nobelist Gerald Debreu (1983) made methodology still more 
mathematically abstract by using what is called the axiomatic approach which has a 
mathematical form that is completely separated from its economic content. This 
approach states an economic problem in a mathematical form that is valid mathematically 
even if  the economic interpretations are removed. Debreu thought that one could then use 
the purely objective laws of mathematics to solve economic problems (Maler 79-81).
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Welfare economics is a generic term that refers to the normative aspects of 
economics. The basic assumptions underlying welfare economics are value judgments 
that economists are free to accept or reject. This branch of economics is usually 
contrasted with positive economics which is considered value-free. Welfare economists 
are primarily concerned with policy recommendations, and try to arrive at conditions to 
show why social state A is preferable to social state B. One approach is to strive for 
Pareto optimality, which says to take those actions but only those actions that makes 
someone better off without hurting anyone. Another approach aggregates the utility 
functions of individuals into a social utility function. This process assumes that utility is 
cardinally and interpersonally measurable. It uses hypothetical compensation tests to 
argue that a given government action can make society as a whole better off, since those 
who benefit by the action are enough better off to compensate those who are hurt. (Pearce 
461-462).
Keynesian economics is a term that refers to macroeconomic theory as developed 
by J. M. Keynes. This theory is distinguished from neoclassical theory by its concern 
with aggregate behavior, especially total expenditure and total investment. Mark Blaug 
points out that Keynesian economics, with its concern for aggregates, rejects 
methodological individualism which had been the basis o f economics at least since Adam 
Smith (cited in Gutting 148). Jan Tinbergen and Ragnar Frisch, both Nobelists in 1969, 
pioneered the construction of econometric macromodels in the 1930s. Building on this 
work, Nobelist Lawrence R. Klein (1980) incorporated econometric models into Keynes’s 
theory and founded the Wharton Econometric Forecasting Unit. This organization under 
Klein’s leadership developed national econometric models used by government and 
industry (Lindbeck 413-415).
The public choice school o f economics questions the welfare view of the state and 
thereby added a theory of the state to contemporary economics. According to Gwartney 
and Wagner, “one of the primary objectives of public choice scholarship is to enhance our 
ability to differentiate between institutional arrangements that bring individual self­
interest and the general welfare into harmony, and institutional arrangements that leave
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them in conflict” (8). In other words, it is an attempt to put methodological individualism 
back into policy-oriented economics. Public choice’s best known proponent is Nobelist 
James Buchanan (1986), who received the award “for his development of the contractual 
and constitutional basis for the theory of economic and political decision-making” (Maler 
175). The Public Choice School applies the economic tools o f decision-making to the 
public sector. This school argues that the self-interest of the individual decision-maker is 
a driving force on decision-making in the public sector as well as in the private sector. 
Through this model, Buchanan questioned the most fundamental axioms of democracy 
and of welfare and Keynesian economics: that government employees act in the public 
interest, that government intervention can improve the economy, that majority vote is the 
ideal tool o f group decision-making.
These schools of thought, though diverse in approach and purpose, all rely heavily 
on mathematics and econometric modeling. However, not all economists are happy with 
their profession’s state o f affairs. Boulding charges that “we have been obsessed with 
macroeconomics, with piddling refinements in mathematical models, and with the 
monumentally unsuccessful exercise in welfare economics which has preoccupied a 
whole generation with a dead end, to the almost total neglect of some of the major 
problems of our day.” (34). Boulding suggests that economists could more profitably 
spend their time developing economic anthropology or economic sociology, “in the 
analysis of the way in which organizational structure affects the flow of information, 
hence affects the information input into the decision-maker, hence affects his image of 
the future and his decisions, even perhaps his value function” (29).
Although they are not economic anthropologists, Austrian Economists do address, 
at least indirectly, the lines of study that Boulding suggests as shown earlier in Hayek’s 
discussion of particular knowledge. They also admit little application of mathematics to 
the study of economics since they regard value as subjective and hence, not quantifiable. 
Utility in the Austrian view, is seen as an ordinal arrangement of preferences as opposed 
to the cardinal approach of the neoclassicists. The two schools also disagree on the 
concept of human action. Neoclassicists separate action into the rational and the
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irrational, defining rational action as a striving for monetary profit. Mises argues that 
“the assertion that there is irrational action is always rooted in an evaluation of a scale of 
values different from our own” ('Epistemological Problems 33). To the Austrians, all 
action is rational because people always use means to strive after ends. This view 
explains negligence and passivity, unexplained by neoclassicism, as well as the monetary 
profit motive.
Mises chastises economists for trying to emulate the methodology of the physical 
sciences when he says that “the popular epistemological doctrines of our age do not admit 
that a fundamental difference prevails between the realm of events that the natural 
sciences investigate and the domain o f human action that is the subject matter of 
economics and history” (Epistemological Problems xiii). He says that “this science is a 
priori, not empirical. Like logic and mathematics, it is not derived from experience; it is 
prior to experience. It is, as it were, the logic of action and deed” {Epistemological 
Problems 13).
Mises, like Popper and Kuhn, argues that there is no such thing as neutral 
observation of the facts, that, in fact, it is necessary to use a theory to determine what the 
facts are. A theory or theories about acting, Mises says, are implicit in our language; 
therefore, “to apply language, with its words and concepts, to anything is at the same time 
to approach it with a theory” {Epistemological Problems 28). This leads Mises to 
conclude, contrary to Popper’s assertions about falsifiability, that a proposition of an 
aprioristic theory can never be refuted by experience {Epistemological Problems 28-29).
It is even possible, he says, for supporters of conflicting doctrines to point to the same 
data as support for their position.
In light of the above discussion of methodology, I can now place my method of 
comparing models into perspective. Following Popper, I  make no attempt to induce a 
theory from data, but instead, following Kuhn, I work within a paradigm that has been 
carved out by the works of prominent thinkers from various disciplines, such as Adam 
Smith, Friedrich Hayek, Hannah Arendt, Robert Axelrod, and Ludwig von Mises. 
Following Mises, I use deductive reasoning and comparative analysis as my method. It
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should also be apparent that there is a certain congruity in Boulding’s suggestion to 
develop economic sociology and my investigation of the influence of social institutions 
on the flow of true information. With that said, it is appropriate to end this digression and 
to proceed with the analysis of the affect of institutional constraints on lying.
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Chapter 2 
Protection-From-Lying Strategies
With lying sporting a thousand faces and given the difficulty of monitoring 
people’s behavior, it would seem impossible to ever identify and use good information. 
North says that the transactions cost of monitoring and measuring peoples’ behavior is so 
high that opportunistic behavior should, by the neo-classical model, make economic and 
political organization impossible(Sfr«cmre and Change 45-47). Yet, in our everyday life, 
we see highly complex systems of economic and political organization. We also observe 
people acting honestly when they could get away with lying, which does not accord with 
the “profit maximizer” of the neoclassical model. This shows that people somehow 
maneuver successfully through a sea of private information and, for the most part, are 
able to separate good information from the bad. How do people do that?
The Simple Strategies
In a word, they engage in individual protection-from-lying strategies. Of course 
there are formal rules complete with formal sanctions against certain kinds of lying in all 
modem societies, but much of what people lie about is not addressed by formal rules.
This leaves people largely vulnerable in many areas where lying can create severe costs to 
them. That is to say, people are essentially on their own as far as lying goes. As we saw 
in Chapter 1, people respond by consciously, or even sub-consciously, adopting strategies 
that make the liar’s job much more difficult.
In everyday life, by varying degrees, we all engage in two strategies that Klein 
calls “hostage taking” and “incrementalism.” Hostage taking refers to the practice o f 
holding some part of the promisor’s wealth in escrow until the truster has the opportunity 
to decide if  he has been lied to. The terms “promisor” and “truster” are Klein’s terms for 
persons in an exchange (‘T rust for Hire” 121). Promisors, with more private information, 
are in a position of strength; trusters, with less private information, are vulnerable to lies. 
For example, Landlords, as trusters, routinely require a security deposit of renters, who 
promise to care for the landlords property but may later renege. The security deposit is a
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kind of hostage held by the landlord until such time as the renter is no longer in a position 
to damage the property. There are many variations of this practice such as raises that are 
tied to demonstrated increase in productivity, warranties and guarantees, and even such 
simple practices as providing service first and billing later as in restaurants, law firms, 
and taxicab companies. All of these variations o f hostage taking, as Klein points out, 
“give the truster a retaliatory move late in the relationship” (102). Hostage taking reduces 
lying because the truster’s ability to retaliate increases the promisor’s expected costs of 
lying.
Incrementalism can be summed up in the phrases “look before you leap” and 
“taste before you bite.” It is the strategy of trying a little bit of something before 
committing to a lot of it. I buy one orange from the bushel and taste-test it before 
deciding whether to buy the whole bushel. We all adopt this strategy, sometimes almost 
sub-consciously, in areas of uncertainty in order to minimize our exposure to danger. 
Recognizing this fact, honest producers and retailers make it easy for the potential 
customer to incrementalize. Some examples of this practice are free samples, tryout 
periods, advertisements, and first-time discounts. Such practices are so common in the U.
S. that we have come to expect them.
Consumers generally incrementalize in relation to inherent qualities of the 
products in question. As Church points out, some product qualities are easy to verify and 
therefore require very little or no incrementalizing on the part of consumers. For 
example, to verify the quality “color,” consumers need only visit a display before buying. 
If my favorite tissue has only recently been offered in my favorite color, I only need look 
at it before purchasing. This and other product qualities that are verifiable on the spot 
Church calls “search qualities.” Some products, such as laundry detergent, have qualities 
that require consumers to actually use the product in order to verify its qualities. Church 
calls these qualities “experience qualities.” Still other product qualities require extended 
use or perhaps the help of experts in order to verify them. Church calls these qualities 
“credence qualities.” He claims that environmental benefits like ‘‘biodegradable” and
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“fluorocarbon-free,” are credence qualities. Such qualities are very difficult or 
impossible for the average consumer to verify (274).
If we look upon information as a product, then the above qualities and also 
incrementalizing apply to information as well as to tissue, soap, and fluorocarbon. Seen 
as such, information takes on the above qualities in relation to the ease or difficulty of 
verifying it. Church says that “the EOI [economics of information] search "model predicts 
that uncertainty and mistrust should be highest where the cost of obtaining information to 
evaluate the claim is highest” (277). Applying this to information seen as a product, 
information that is most difficult to verify would be the most suspect, and conversely, 
information that is easy to verify could usually be trusted. Proceeding further down this 
line of thought, information that is difficult to verify would be used in an incremental way 
whereas information that is easy to verify would be taken at face value.
This all seems to accord with our intuition regarding the use of information. We 
all tend to incrementalize our use of highly specialized information. For example, we 
normally prefer to have a doctor treat our less serious illnesses before we let him operate. 
It just seems prudent to tread cautiously when we are on unfamiliar ground. We also tend 
to accept at face value information that is easy to verify, as when someone tells us the 
time of day or gives us directions. We again intuitively sense that there is little need to 
incrementalize the use o f such information because there is little potential for harm; we 
sense that we can easily catch the liar under such circumstances and that he knows it so 
will not lie.
Of course, we also judge the need to incrementalize information by our 
relationship to Informer as well as by the easy of verifying it. Information coming from 
friends seems less in need of being used incrementally than information coming from 
strangers regardless o f its complexity. This matches our tendency to trust the product 
claims of products being sold by friends more than those being sold by strangers.
Another protection-from-lying strategy is what Klein calls “pointed knowledge.” 
This refers to a process of solving one’s problems by asking a series o f questions of 
different people. Klein gives the example of a woman in need of air-conditioner repair.
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Instead of seeking general knowledge about condensation and thermodynamics, she 
focuses her attention on developing an information or remedy path: She consults 
neighbors who have had similar problems; she asks one or more of her neighbors’ 
references to analyze her air-conditioner, she may get a second or third opinion; she 
inquires about new air-conditioners. Each question leads her closer the person who can 
solve her problem most to her liking. By tracing an information path, the woman is not 
only solving her problem but also learning about her air-conditioner problem and hence 
alleviating the asymmetric information problem (“Trust for Hire” 99-100).
The above individual strategies are, for the most part, familiar ground to most 
people. Few would disagree that they engage in them regularly. Other strategies are less 
overt and more diffused into our life styles, self-images, and world views, and are 
therefore less recognizable as individual strategies. An example of such a strategy is 
“reputation.” We each are more or less aware of the importance of our personal 
reputation and its maintenance in regard to our work, our neighborhood, and in other 
associations that we find ourselves. We also regularly refer to other people’s reputations 
in our dealings with them. Reputation is among those individual strategies that, as Klein 
mentioned earlier, have become institutionalized. Institutionalization occurs when many 
people, engaging in the same strategy, develop common expectations concerning the 
behavior of their fellow man. These expectations eventually gel into informal rules of 
engagement. Because of the institutionalization of reputation as a strategy, it is difficult 
to distinguish whether it is an individual or a community protection strategy. Individually 
people engage in reputation building and maintenance, but they also sanction bad 
behavior collectively with informal norms.
The next three sections of this chapter discuss three institutionalized responses to 
lying: reputation, com m unity, and ideology. These sections focus on isolating the 
necessary conditions for these protection strategies to function. The last section develops 
an institutional continuum model that is used in Chapters 3 and 4  to compare markets and 
bureaus.
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Reputation
Adam Smith was among the first to suggest the importance o f reputation when he 
noted that the Dutch, who he said are the most commercial nation in the world, “are also 
the most faithful to their word.” Smith points out that this relationship also holds when 
looking at the English and the Scottish who are respectively less commercial and less 
faithful to their word. This, Smith says, is not attributable to national character but is 
instead reducible to self-interest. “When a person makes perhaps 20 contracts in a day. 
he cannot gain so much by endeavouring to impose on his neighbours, as the very 
appearance of a cheat would make him lose.” In other words, dealers are afraid of losing 
their character in the eyes of those with whom they have repeated dealings. On the other 
hand, Smith says, “Where people seldom deal with one another, we find that they are 
somewhat disposed to cheat, because they can gain more by a smart trick than they can 
lose by the injury which it does their character.” Smith concludes that “whenever 
commerce is introduced into any country, probity and punctuality always accompany it” 
(“Lecture on the Influence of Commerce on Manners” 17).
Tullock works out Smith’s insight about the discipline of repeated dealings in 
light of modem game theory. He shows with a five-sided game, in which players must 
choose between “cooperate” and “defect,” that in one play, all players chose the “defect” 
response, hence, a prisoners’ dilemma. A prisoners’ dilemma is a situation where all 
players would be better off if they could cooperate, but the expected marginal costs and 
benefits that the individual players face lead each of them to defect. However, when the 
game was played repeatedly and players were allowed to form groups and communicate 
freely, all players chose the “cooperate” response. Tullock argues that their change in 
response is due to the reputation effect. “Anyone who chose to defect in any given game 
would, in essence, put himself in a situation where it would be extremely difficult for him 
to get partners for any future game” (23). Tullock adds that the reason that the prisoners’ 
dilemma disappears under repeated plays is “ simply that people voluntarily choose their 
own partners" (23-24). The ability to choose one’s playing partner, says Tullock, adds a 
third strategy, “don’t play,” to the above two-strategy game. The addition of this third
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strategy raises the expected cost of cheating. Thus, he concludes, “ a reputation for being 
‘sound’ is a valuable asset, and we should expect people to make every effort to get it” 
(25).
This explains, says Tullock, why people are much more trusting in dealing with a 
merchant than he is of them. “His reputation spreads over far more people, and it is 
harder for him to change partners readily” (26). Merchants, therefore, often require 
identification and credit checks that their customers do not require of them.
Tullock points out another application of this analysis. “If an individual has lost 
reputation, there is litde or no reason why he should play cooperative strategies in the 
future.” The reason, Tullock says, is that a lost reputation is very difficult to recover. It 
requires that the person with the ruined reputation persuade someone to play with him, 
which may be near to impossible, and it requires a large number of games of perfect 
cooperation to regain a reputation equal to those of his fellow players. Under these 
circumstances, says Tullock, individual benefit-cost analysis suggests that “he should 
attempt to con people into games, and when he gets them in, the decision to play 
noncooperatively may well be perfectly rational” (26).
Marc Ryser’s article “Sanctions Without Law” shows how the Japanese banking 
system uses Tullock’s third strategy to reduce bad checks and default rates on promissory 
notes. Firms that issue bad paper are reported to the central clearinghouse by both the 
issuer’s bank and the collection bank of the person who received the check. The central 
clearinghouse publishes the names of defaulters in newspapers and forbids its member 
banks from doing business with them, effectively shutting down these firms (227-228). 
This system is an adaptation of the “don’t play” strategy. Banks are saying “if you write 
bad paper, we won’t play with you.” Defaulters can only regain their previous fair-player 
status by a vote of the member banks.
A study by Robert Axelrod gives considerable weight to Smith’s emphasis on 
repeated dealings and to Tullock’s views about the importance of future games in players’ 
present decision strategies. In his well-known The Evolution o f  Cooperation, Axelrod 
reported an interesting strategy for dealing with defectors called ‘TIT FOR TAT.”
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Axelrod invited experts in various fields to submit decision strategies for playing the 
prisoners’ dilemma game to be pitted against one another in a round-robin computer 
tournament. Entrants’ strategies could win points in relation to outcome payoffs T, R, S, 
and P: T = 5 = temptation reward for defecting; R = 3 = reward for mutual cooperation;
S = 0 = suckers payment for cooperation with a defecting partner; P = 1 = punishment for 
mutual defection (Evolution O f Cooperation 8).
The first round of the tournament pined fourteen anonymous entrants and 
strategies against one another. These entrants came from five disciplines: psychology, 
economics, political science, mathematics, and sociology. The simplest strategy, ITT 
FOR TAT, submitted by psychology Professor Anatol Rapoport of the University of 
Toronto, was the clear winner. The second round of the tournament was comprised of 
sixty-four entrants who received a detailed analysis of the first round as well as a 
discussion of strategy rules that would have excelled in the first round. Entrants 
represented each of the former five disciplines as well biology, physics, and computer 
science. Professor Rapoport resubmitted TIT FOR TAT and won again.
TIT FOR TAT’s decision rule says to start out cooperating then do what your 
partner does every move after that. Its success may be somewhat surprising in light of the 
knowledge that it was pitted against all other strategies, thereby eliminating the 
opportunity to choose one’s partners as in Tullock’s model. Axelrod attributes TIT FOR 
TAT’s success to its characteristics of being nice, provokeable, forgiving, and clear. As 
he explains,
its niceness means that it is never the first to defect, and this property 
prevents it from getting into unnecessary trouble. Its retaliation 
discourages the other side from persisting whenever defection is tried. Its 
forgiveness helps restore mutual cooperation. And its clarity makes its 
behavioral pattern easy to recognize: and once recognized, it is easy to 
perceive that the best way of dealing with TIT FOR TAT is to cooperate 
with it. CEvolution O f Cooperation 176)
Axelrod argues that the mere possibility that players might meet again is what 
allows cooperation to emerge in the prisoners’ dilemma. This possibility, he says,
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suggests that current choices not only determine current payoffs, they also, to some lesser 
degree, determine future payoffs in that they will influence the choices of players in the 
event that there are future games. ‘T he future can therefore cast a shadow back upon the 
present and thereby affect the current strategic situation” (Evolution O f Cooperation 12). 
Since the payoff of the current move is more valuable to players than the payoff of the 
next move, Axelrod weights the value of future payoffs with parameter w This 
parameter, he says, “represents the degree to which the payoff of each move is discounted 
relative to the previous move, and is therefore a discount parameter'’ (Evolution O f 
Cooperation 13).
Results of the tournament show further that the single best predictor o f how well a 
strategy performed is whether or not it is a “nice” strategy, i.e., whether or not it is the 
first to defect (Evolution O f Cooperation 113). Axelrod found that a whole community 
using the TIT FOR TAT strategy, what he calls a “nice” community, cannot be invaded 
and subverted by an individual or sub-community using an alternate strategy, one trying 
to invade the larger TIT FOR TAT population. Axelrod, therefore, considers TIT FOR 
TAT a collectively stable strategy (Evolution O f Cooperation 56).
Axelrod also shows that “nice” strategies or “any strategy that may be the first to 
cooperate is stable only when the discount parameter is high enough; this means that no 
form of cooperation is stable when the future is not important enough relative to the 
present” (Evolution O f Cooperation 128-29). In other words players must place a 
sufficiently high value on future games relative to current games in order for “nice” 
strategies to dominate. Said in yet another way, if the future becomes uncertain, then a 
cooperating strategy may not be the best choice for maximizing benefits.
Niceness can be carried too far however. Axelrod points out that unconditional 
cooperation strategies resemble The Golden Rule, which says to “do unto others...” 
regardless of what they do to you. “The problem with this view is that turning the other 
cheek provides an incentive for the other player to exploit you.” It also “tends to spoil the 
other player; it leaves a burden on the rest of the community to reform the spoiled 
player...” CEvolution O f Cooperation 136).
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Bernard Williams argues that Axelrod’s results apply only indirectly to actual 
human experience. Axelrod’s contestants were all engaged in the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
and, hence, all had the same unchanging preference schedule (ordering of possible 
outcomes). However, Williams points out, other preference schedules are possible, such 
as those modeled by the “assurance” game and the “other-regarding” game discussed by 
A. K. Sen in his “Choice, Orderings and Morality.” In Axelrod’s study, the only thing 
that differed were the strategies used to maximize one’s points given the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma preference schedule. In real life, says Williams, people also have different 
preference schedules, and both their strategies and preference schedules have conditional 
features and may be modified by experience, i.e., they may change according to 
circumstance (5-6).
Smith, Tullock, and Axelrod all emphasize the importance of future games or 
future trading opportunities in peoples’ decisions not to lie or cheat, but what about 
situations where traders do not expect future trades with each other? Such situations are 
common; for example, buying gasoline along the interstate, selling one’s used car in the 
want ads, or giving a stranger directions. What is to prevent people from lying in these 
one-time transactions? Shearmur and Klein build upon Smith’s idea of reputation by 
extending it into the larger social order where people cannot monitor each other’s actions 
as they can in face-to-face dealings. Smith believed that people had a character to lose 
only in situations where everyone could monitor everyone else’s actions as in small 
villages. When people go to large cities, he says, they are lost in anonymity, and so the 
reputation mechanism ceases to work (Wealth o f  Nations vol. I I 317). Shearmur and 
Klein show that, even under conditions of anonymity, people form social patchworks of 
overlapping and interlocking groups and associations that screen and monitor their 
members’ behavior.
Using an example by Max Weber, Shearmur and Klein explain how groups with 
formal memberships can confer moral seals o f approval on their members. Weber 
recounted witnessing a baptism in 1904 North Carolina. A relative of Weber told him 
that the baptismal candidate had campaigned untiringly to be accepted into the local
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Baptist congregation because he wanted to open a bank. The relative explained that
baptismal candidates were put on a lengthy probation, during which their character was
probed all the way back to childhood. As Weber explains, acceptance by the
congregation was actually a moral seal of approval that was considered valid even outside
of the congregation:
Admission to the congregation is recognized as an absolute guarantee of 
the moral qualities of a gentleman, especially of those qualities required in 
business matters...When a sect member moved to a different place, or if 
he was a travelling salesman, he carried the certificate of his congregation 
with him; and thereby found not only easy contact with sect members but, 
above all, he found credit everywhere, (qtd. in Shearmur and Klein 36)
Shearmur and Klein say that formal groups must meet two criteria in order to 
confer moral seals of approval upon their members: First, they must be internally 
familiar enough to know of their members’ activities and to judge competently their 
members’ characters; second, their assessments of their members must be available 
outside the group and respected as trustworthy (37). A few examples of groups in 
addition to churches that meet these criteria are Rotary, Kiwanis, chambers of commerce, 
the Bar Association, and some fraternal organizations. Shearmur and Klein suggest that 
society may be seen as a composite of many subdivisions of formal groups engaging in a 
division of labor, whereby groups specialize in learning their members characters and 
serving their members by conferring and maintaining group seals of approval (37).
People also belong to many informal groups—the neighborhood, the workplace, 
the bowling league, a circle of friends, etc. Informal groups often have fluid membership 
and overlapping boundaries. Members in the same neighborhood may be members of 
different workplaces, recreation, and friend groups. Informal groups cannot confer seals 
of approval because they often fail to meet one or both of the above requirements; 
however, as Shearmur and Klein point out, they still play a role in monitoring the 
character of their members. Members of informal groups have a window into a fellow 
member’s character, and therefore, have information valuable to any nonmember wishing 
to deal him. For example, if person A wants to deal with person B, whom he does not
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know personally, he may ask person C, who is B’s neighbor and a fellow worker o f A, 
about B’s character (37).
When we consider both formal and informal groups, each of us has a network of 
overlapping social relationships that tend to refine the picture of our character for others 
to see. Shearmur and Klein call this network of social relationships our “reputational 
nexus”(38). When we have an opportunity to deal with somebody anonymous, we may 
choose to “not play,” or we may inquire about the prospective player’s seals of approval. 
We may also rely on the assessments of other people who are in a position to know the 
prospective player and whose judgment we trust. Should we choose to deal with this 
prospective player, our conduct toward him is tempered by the realization that he is using 
our reputational nexus to inquire about us. Any misconduct on our part may return to our 
reputational community and cause us long term future harm. As Shearmur and Klein put 
it, “gossip follows us home, and we may well decide to cooperate with perfect strangers” 
(38).
According to Shearmur and Klein’s view, “the Great Society can be seen as a 
flowing patchwork of reputational nexuses” (38). Thereby, they say, the reputation 
mechanism of Adam Smith functions also in extended society where people lack the face- 
to-face interaction of small villages. These social patchworks, say the authors, “should be 
as thoroughly rooted in free individual choice as can possibly be managed. It is by free 
individual choice that the refinement and integrity o f seals o f approval are made possible” 
(40). In addition to overcoming Smith’s anonymity problem, social patchworks also 
remove the need for repeated dealings. Therefore, say the authors, “the invisible hand 
reaches beyond the economic realm” (40).
Klein calls processes like social patchworks formation the “all-seeing invisible 
eye.” (“Knowledge, Reputation, and Trust” I). This view is similar to Smith’s “invisible 
hand” principle, which illustrates how the individual pursuit of self-interest results in 
socially beneficial outcomes. Klein is suggesting that individuals pursuing their self­
interest can increase honesty in society. Another example of the invisible eye is evident, 
Klein says, when we recognize “that trust problems generate associated profit
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opportunities and finally their own remedies” (“Knowledge, Reputation, and Trust” 6). 
Stated differently, it is the recognition that the potential for lying creates uncertainty and 
that people are willing to pay to have this uncertainty removed. Klein dubs this process, 
and the name of his article, ‘Trust for Hire.” Trust for hire opens the door to for-profit 
organizations like Consumers Union, Consumer Reports, Underwriters Laboratories, Dun 
and Bradstreet, the Better Business Bureau, and Good Housekeeping that provide seals of 
approval or information about product quality and honesty to consumers. Dun and 
Bradstreet can, at a moment’s notice, provide information about trustworthiness on any 
business in the U. S. and on thousands of businesses in other countries (Newman 95).
The Underwriters’ Laboratories’ label is a certification of quality for electrical appliances 
or, as Brearly describes it, “a certificate of character awarded to an inanimate object”
(78). Manufacturers of these appliances seek out certification at their own expense 
because it is a way of communicating credibly to wary consumers.
The above relationship, in which some businesses pay to have another business 
certify the quality of their products, as in the relationship between manufacturers and 
Underwriters’ Laboratories, is an example of what Spence calls “signaling.” Signaling, 
says Spence, becomes necessary when honest people find their messages competing with 
the lies of dishonest people, and potential consumers of this information cannot tell the 
difference. Foot patrols during the Vietnam war experienced this problem by not being 
able to communicate credibly with helicopter pilots. Wishing to be airlifted, patrols 
routinely radioed for pick-up at areas designated by colored smoke flares. However, the 
Vietcong, intercepting radio transmissions, set flares of the same color hoping to ambush 
the helicopter.
Spence gives the example of applicants for a job. Ail applicants say, and may 
well believe, that they are the best choice, and some of them will exaggerate in order to 
increase their chances of getting the job. Employers, like the helicopter pilots, cannot 
differentiate between those communications that are true and those that are not.
However, by investing in costly signals (education is the signal in Spence’s example) 
honest applicants can differentiate themselves from liars. Investment in education allows
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truthful applicants to signal with diplomas and other institutional certification that allows 
employers to identify them. (16-19).
A similar concept to signaling, one sometimes used interchangeably, is what has 
become known in the economic literature as “screening.” Molho explains the difference 
between signaling a ' la Spence and screening initially pioneered by Rothchild and 
Stiglitz. In Spence’s signaling example, job applicants make the first move by signaling 
with their diplomas to employers, and employers respond to their signals with job offers. 
Under screening, employers move first by offering contracts for various combinations of 
wage and education levels. ‘T he job applicants then respond by choosing their preferred 
contract, that is they ‘self-select’ into contracts” (82). What is important for our purposes 
is that both signaling and screening are ways that people can give their messages 
credence. Using these strategies, people can communicate with each other credibly even 
when in competition with those who use lying as a strategy.
Klein points out yet a third way that the all-seeing invisible eye does its 
monitoring in what he calls “extended dealings.” This idea recognizes that people discuss 
their satisfaction and especially their dissatisfaction concerning goods and services with 
their family, friends, neighbors, and business associates. Among the ways they do this is 
with gossip, newsletters, letters of recommendation, data banks, referral agencies, and the 
Internet. The information spread in this manner is deemed reliable by those who use it 
because it comes from personal acquaintances. Extended dealings, though initiated by 
wary consumers or “trusters” as Klein calls them, are welcome by honest businesses or 
“promisors.” ‘T he trustworthy promisors welcome information-sharing and, where 
permitted by law, will tend to organize themselves to facilitate and expand the extension 
of dealings.” Information-sharing, Klein adds, is unwelcome only by untrustworthy 
promisors (‘Trust for Hire” 121).
Extended dealings might be viewed as extended forms o f gossiping.. Although 
often seen as an unsavory pastime, gossip can be, as Merry argues, an important force in 
social control of individual behavior by focusing on behavior that goes against social 
norms. Merry says that “gossip can be viewed as a means of storing and retrieving
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information...” (50) “It forms dossiers on each member o f one’s community: who is a 
good curer, who can be approached for loans,...who is a good worker, and who is a thief’ 
(54-55). People wish to control what is said about them behind their backs because 
gossip can result in a collective response.
Citing research projects throughout the world, Merry documents that in many 
primitive societies, persons accused of lying or any number of other social offenses may 
be exiled or executed (60). In modem urban societies the importance of gossip in 
controlling individual behavior is reduced; however. Merry argues that “when urban 
conditions foster close-knit social enclaves with extensive economic and social 
interdependence and barriers to mobility outside the community, gossip seems to lead to 
powerful social consequences, just as it does in small-scale societies” (64).
From her study of gossip in a housing project with 1200 inhabitants in a major 
Eastern city, Merry formulates four major criteria regarding how and under what 
circumstances gossip can effectively alter behavior. She writes:
1. The impact of gossip and scandal is greater in more bounded social 
systems in which the cost of desertion or expulsion are higher and the 
availability of alternative social relationships less.
2. The impact of gossip and scandal is greater in social settings where the 
members of the local social system are more interdependent for 
economic a id , jobs, political protection, and social support.
3. The impact of gossip and scandal is greater when it has the potential of 
producing a community consensus that can be converted into a variety 
of collective actions such as public shaming, ridicule, expulsion, or 
death.
4. The impact of gossip and scandal is greater when normative consensus 
about the behavior in question is more extensive. (69-70)
Merry’s four criteria above precipitate into “isolation,” “economic dependency,” 
“community consensus,” and “common moral values.” In this short form they bring to 
mind Smith’s criteria for reputation, i.e. the face-to-face conditions and interactions of the 
small village. It would be surprising, then, to find that gossip could influence people’s 
behavior in contemporary urban settings other than in small enclaves as Merry described 
above; however, in modem society, gossip takes on a modem form: massed media.
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In a 1990 Time article, columnist William A. Henry HI gives us a glimpse inside 
the “gossip industry.” This industry is a network of print and electronic media that 
devotes a portion of its time or print space to the spread of gossip. “W e’re not talking 
just the wacky supermarket scandal sheets...” According to Henry, most major 
newspapers in New York City have three or four gossip pages. Also, he says, “gossip is 
booming on television, in magazines, in nonfiction books, in docudrama TV movies and 
mini-series” (46).
Gossip columnists mainly feature stories about the rich and famous and other 
influential people who live in the area. In Los Angeles there are stories about movie stars 
and producers, in Chicago about celebrity sports figures, in St. Louis about Busch 
brewery heirs, in Boston about the local aristocracy such as the Kennedy family, and in 
Washington about government officials. Gossip columnists also include national stories 
picked up on the news wire, and they even feature stories about other gossip columnists 
(Henry 48).
Many public figures hire public relations counselors. For example during their 
divorce, Donald and Ivana Trump each hired public relations counselors to spin the media 
gossip in their favors. It is becoming increasingly common for lesser names to also be 
concerned with their public image. Henry says that movie stars, singers, models, lawyers, 
landlords, opticians, restaurateurs, resort owners, novelists and socialites are among the 
clients of public relations counselors (48).
Applying Merry’s criteria to the gossip industry, we see how gossip can function 
as an enforcer of norms on a national basis. Applying Merry’s first criteria, celebrities 
and politicians are subject to high expected costs of being expelled from their social 
circles. For example, if President Clinton had in fact gotten impeached, his long term 
financial and social status could well have taken a turn for the worse. Following Merry’s 
second criteria above, the celebrities and politicians are, within their own fields, 
interdependent for economic aid, jobs, political protection, and social support. This is 
especially true in government where politicians routinely scratch each other’s backs with 
aid, favors, and protections of various kinds. Third, as Merry requires and as we observe
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in political scandals, nationwide gossip has the potential of producing a “community 
consensus” regarding the behavior of national figures that can be converted into a variety 
of collective actions such as public shaming or ridicule, expulsion, lost opportunity, lost 
election, lost deals, and loss of wealth; Fourth, Merry’s final requirement, a “normative 
consensus,” is certainly evident in the national community in regards to the behavior of 
business people and government officials, though perhaps not so much with respect to 
movie stars.
Moving now from the twentieth century to the eleventh, Avner Greifis study of 
eleventh-century Mediterranean trade illustrates how a group know as the Maghribi 
traders managed to maximize all four of Merry’s conditions. In doing so, they were able 
to use gossip to enhance the reputation mechanism sufficiently to ensure honesty in long­
distance trade even in the absence of legal protections. The Maghribi traders were Jewish 
traders who lived in an area centered around Baghdad until the first half of the tenth 
Century, when they emigrated to Tunisia in North Africa. Later during the eleventh 
century, they emigrated to Spain, Sicily, Egypt, and Palestine. The Maghribi traders, 
though they were accepted into existing Jewish communities wherever they emigrated, 
maintained their social identity for as long as they were involved in long-distance trade.
Interregional trade required the use of agents to do a merchant’s business in 
distant markets. Inherent in this relationship, an example of the principal/agent 
relationship discussed in Chapter 1, was a large potential for lying and cheating on the 
part of the agent, since the merchant was not present to monitor the business transactions 
of the agent. Maghribi traders minimized these problems by organizing agency relations 
within an economic institution that Greif refers to as a “coalition” (148).
The coalition membership consisted o f merchants who wished to trade in foreign 
markets and agents who wished to be retained by these merchants. Merchants often acted 
as agents for other merchants, and agents in their turn often acted as merchants 
themselves in need of the services of an agent. Coalition members agreed to employ only 
other members and to pay them a wage higher than what could be received outside the 
coalition. This premium wage tended to keep agents honest by ensuring that they suffer a
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reduction in income if they were to get caught cheating and get fired. Coalition 
merchants agreed to never employ an agent who had previously cheated while in the 
employ of a coalition member. Furthermore, agents caught cheating could then be 
cheated by other coalition members with impunity. Coalition members looked the other 
way when fellow members cheated a cheater and did not hold it against them in future 
dealings. Coalition members also held members’ relatives responsible for members’ 
debts. This prevented older agents from cheating near life’s end for fear that punishment 
would be imposed on their relatives. It was also the duty of members to provide each 
other with information about markets, prices, and the actions of fellow members.
Under these agreements, lying and cheating were kept to a minimum. If an agent 
considered cheating a specific merchant, he risked his relations with all merchants in the 
coalition. Contracts were of short duration so cheating could be punished quickly if the 
terms of the contract were not abided by. Short-term contracts also made agents weigh a 
short-term gain from cheating against their lifetime loss of dealing with the coalition.
In the second half of the twelfth century, the Maghribi traders were forced by 
Muslim rulers to abandon their trade. At that point, according to Greif, they integrated 
into the larger Jewish communities and lost their identity. Greif argues that they retained 
their separate identity within the Jewish world as long as they were active in long­
distance commerce.
The Maghribi traders’ separate identity within the Jewish communities 
was preserved because it provided a network for the transmission of 
information that facilitated agency relations, while the agency relations 
themselves provided the social interactions required for retaining their 
separate identity. When the Maghribi traders ceased to operate in long­
distance trade and to utilize agency relations, the social interactions 
diminished, and the social structure—the Maghribi traders group—lost its 
vitality. (160)
Merry’s four criteria above are evident in the coalition o f the Maghribi traders. 
The coalition isolated them from the larger communities of Jews and Christians who were 
eager to trade with them, and at the same time created a strong economic dependency 
among the members. Also, the coalition was formed around shared moral values and
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made it possible for members to reach a consensus regarding fellow member’s behavior 
and to sanction undesirable behavior severely.
Before moving to the next section on community, it is necessary to isolate from 
the above writers the necessary requirements for reputation that will be used in Chapters 
3 and 4 to analyze the viability of reputation in a market model and a bureau model.
These requirements are Smith’s “repeated dealings,” Tullock’s “freely chosen partners” 
and “don’t play” option, Shearmur and Klein's “moral seals of approval” and “informal 
groups,” Klein’s “extended dealings,” and Axelrod’s “high value of the future” and “tit- 
for-tat reciprocity.”
Merry’s four criteria for gossip, though they could well be used for necessary 
requirements for reputation, are deliberately being excluded here, because, as we shall see 
in the next section, they apply equally well as necessary requirements for community. In 
fact, we can simply substitute the introductory phrase, ‘The formation of community is 
more likely to occur...” for Merry’s, ‘The impact of gossip and scandal is greater...” and 
her gossip criteria become community criteria. We can see now that what Merry 
describes as “social enclaves” are really communities.
Community
Merry’s above four criteria for making gossip an effective deterrent to bad 
behavior and Smith’s “repeated dealings” criteria for the formation of reputation occur 
naturally in a community setting. Community is a protection-from-lying strategy in that it 
makes it easy for people to monitor each other’s behavior. As Smith puts it, “While [a 
man of low condition] remains in a country village his conduct may be attended to, and 
he may be obliged to attend to it himself'{Wealth o f  Nations vol. II, 317). Community is 
an individual response to lying to the degree that individuals choose to participate in it. 
People choose com m unity when they move out o f metropolitan areas to the refuge of 
small rural communities, when they restrict their dealings to people of similar interests 
and values, and when they deliberately work to foster friendly relations with others.
Nelson, Ramsey and Verner point out that some aspects o f community are forced 
upon us by the fact that our basic needs must be met on a daily basis, which restricts us to
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easy traveling distance from home. Our workplace, our place o f worship, where we shop 
for food, where we educate our children, they say, must all be close to home (11). As we 
will see below, this is a narrow view of community; however, even within these 
constraints there is much room for strategizing.
Aspects of community as an individual strategy flow from our preference for 
familiarity in our dealings with other people and our resulting choices that arrange or 
finesse social situations that satisfy our preferences. In modem society, we have a large 
degree of choice regarding the intensity of our community involvement. Our choices are 
primarily choices of where we live, what we do for work, where we play, where we 
worship, what groups we choose to join or not join, where we shop, etc. Also, within any 
community or sub-community that we choose to belong to, we can chose our preferred 
level o f participation. In our choices, we balance our preferred level of risk tolerance for 
being lied to with our preferred level of scrutinization by others. A preference for a more 
trusting environment may lead us to choose isolation, intense interaction, and 
interdependence with a small group of people so as to develop a history with them that 
we can refer to in future episodes of risk exposure with them. This choice amounts to a 
strategy since we are very much aware that in the process of satisfying our preferences for 
risk tolerance we are finessing a shared fate with these people which causes everyone to 
be more concerned about each other’s well being.
Much has been written about community, but sociologists have not reached a 
consensus as to what it is. Hillery notes no fewer than ninety-four different definitions in 
the literature on community studies. Analyzing these definitions, Hillery finds that the 
only theme common to them all is that they all deal with people (“Definitions of 
Community” 117). Analyzing the definitions further, he concludes that “of the 94 
definitions, 69 are in accord that social interaction, area, and a common tie or ties are 
commonly found in community life”. These elements, listed in order from least to 
greatest as to their importance in forming agreement among the sociologist are; area, 
common ties, and social interaction (“Definitions of Community” 118).
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Disagreement concerning the definition of community has led to varying 
approaches to community study. Specific approaches to community include the 
following: viewing community as an ecosystem; viewing community as a system of 
institutions formed by the inhabitants: viewing community as being shaped by macro­
social processes; viewing community as not being an object of study at all but simply an 
opportunity to gather data from which theories can be constructed; viewing community 
as social networks; viewing community as a rural-urban continuum (Bell and Newby 32­
53).
Amos Hawley uses an ecological approach. Viewing community as a biological
entity, Hawley argues that
not only is the community a more or less self-sufficient entity, having 
inherent in it the principle of its own life process, it has also a growth or 
natural history with well-defined stages of youth, maturity and senescence. 
It is therefore a whole which is something different from the sum of its 
parts, possessing powers and potentialities not present in any of its 
components. If not an organism, it is at least a super-organism. (50)
In this view, community has the same relation to larger society that individual people 
have to community.
The rural-urban continuum approach, according to Bell and Newby, is the most 
pervasive, even having worked its way into everyday usage (42). It is characterized by 
idealizing community as those human relations that existed in by-gone rural communities 
before the onset of such social forces as large scale division of labor, that tend to break 
them down. According to this view, movement away from this ideal is associated with 
disorganization and is hence a threat to community (Bell and Newby 48).
Ferdinand Tonnies develops the rural-urban continuum approach in his book 
Community and Society. He calls the end of his continuum associated with the rural 
community “Gemeinschafi,” and the opposing end associated with larger society 
”Gesellschaft.” Tonnies essentially sees Gemeinschafi as being a natural or organic 
system of relationships and Gesellschaft as an unnatural or deliberate system of 
relationships. He associates Gemeinschafi with shared language, folkways, mores, and
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beliefs, and he associates Gesellschaft with business, travel, and science. Gemeinschafi is 
“all intimate, private, and exclusive living together” while Gesellschaft “is public life—it 
is the world itself’ (33). This view has been criticized for its inclusion of value 
judgments and for not specifying the Gesellschaft end of the continuum as fully as the 
Gemeinschafi end (Bell and Newby 48-49). Value judgments are evident in Tonnies’s 
statement, “A young man is warned against bad Gesellschaft, but the expression bad 
Gemeinschafi violates the meaning of the word” (34).
Tonnies differentiates three different kinds o f  Gemeinscha.fr. that of blood, of
locality and of mind. Gemeinschafi of blood refers to social interaction among people
with kinship ties. Gemeinschaft of locality is based on the principle of co-residence and
“may be conceived as a community of physical life, just as Gemeinschaft of mind
expresses the community of mental life.” Tonnies explains further:
Kinship Gemeinschaft signifies a common relation to, and share in, human 
beings themselves, while in Gemeinschaft of locality such a common 
relation is established through collective ownership of land; and, in 
Gemeinschaft of mind, the common bond is represented by sacred places 
and worshiped [sic] deities. (42)
Tonnies distills these categories into (1) kinship, (2) neighborhood, and (3) friendship. 
These more-familiar categories are epitomized by the social relationships that occur in 
small communities of the Midwest and elsewhere, where people are often related to each 
other by blood, share a common geographic locality, and develop intimate friendships 
through common beliefs and repeated dealings.
Durkheim’s distinction between community and society is that between 
mechanical solidarity—solidarity resulting from similarity among people—and organic 
solidarity—solidarity resulting from interdependencies created by the division o f labor.
He argues that these two kinds of solidarity have different fundamental rules which form 
the basis of social order and morality. The rule of community is “to resemble everyone 
else, to have nothing that is personal, whether as regards beliefs or practices” (329), and 
the rule of society is to specialize. Durkheim argues that even though these rules 
contradict each other, they are both present in both community and society. In
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com m unity, the first rule predominates, and in society the latter. As a community
intensifies its division o f labor, its basis for social order and morality shifts from the first
rule to the second. Durkheim explains that
not only does the division of labour exhibit that character by which we 
define morality, but it increasingly tends to become the essential condition 
for social solidarity. As evolution advances, the bonds that attach the 
individual to his family to his native heath, to the traditions that the past 
has bequeathed him, to the collective practices of the group— all these 
become loosened. (332-333)
Durkheim’s views of community and society are similar to Tonnies’s 
Gemeinschaft-Gesellschafi continuum in that they both see an increase in the division of 
labor as being destructive of previous social relations. However, whereas Tonnies sees 
such a move as going from “good” to “bad”, Durkheim concludes that a move from 
community to society is really a move from a community of one type to a community of 
another type.
More recent writers have tended to downplay the importance of area and location 
in the concept of community, which has resulted in a weakening of the rural-urban 
continuum approach. Parsons and Shils analyze social action using what they call 
“pattern variables.” These are dichotomous choices that they say every actor faces in 
every social situation (77). These choices are as follows:
1. Affectivity—Affective neutrality, (refers to whether the actor will 
choose immediate gratification or choose to evaluate the longer term 
consequences of doing so.)
2. Self-orientation—Collectivity-orientation. (refers to the fact that if the 
actor chooses to evaluate, he must further choose whether to abide by 
his personal moral standards or those of the social system.
3. Universalism—Particularism, (refers to whether action is governed by 
principle or in relation to the reference scheme of a particular actor.)
4. Ascription—Achievement, (refers to whether actors characterize 
another actor according to who or what he is or what he can do.)
5. Specificity—Diffuseness, (refers to whether the scope of a 
relationship is based on a narrow function or on many functions, e .g ., 
my barber vs. my wife.)
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In the context of these pattern variables, the rural-urban distinction has little meaning, 
because they apply equally to both ends of the continuum.
Distinguishing community from society, Parsons says that
the values of a society operate not only at the most general level, but 
permeate its structure as a whole. Every subsystem has a value system of 
its own which is a differentiated and specialized version of the general 
value system...It is imperative of cultural integration that there should be a 
relative pattem-congruence at these different levels. (193)
In other words, community and society are related by some common value or values.
Hillary further weakens the rural-urban continuum approach by constructing a 
taxonomy of human groups. He constructs the taxonomy around the following principles: 
“The quality of working for a specific goal or of having no goal, the degree of 
institutionalization, and the degree of inclusiveness” (inclusiveness meaning the number 
of people served by the group){Communal Organizations 150). Hillary places the 
concepts of nation, vill (a term combining the meaning of rural village and city), 
neighborhood, and family all in the same classification, i.e., they are all groups with no 
specific purpose. He argues that they differ in degree rather than type(Communal 
Organizations 145-151).
Hillary argues that society is “the consequence of interaction...” (Communal 
Organizations 96). More specifically, society for Hillary is tied up in his concept of 
“nation,” which he says contains neighborhoods, vills, and formal organizations. In this 
view, society differs from community in two ways: First, it is larger than community, 
contains community, and is related to community like an organism is related to its parts; 
second, while communities “are integrated by three discernible foci—space, cooperation 
and families—the nation [society] is integrated primarily by one—the state” (Communal 
Organizations 157).
Pahl essentially rejects the concept of “community” as an analytical concept. He 
says that “whether we call the processes acting on the local community ‘urbanization’, 
‘differentiation’, ‘modernization’, ‘mass-society’, or whatever, it is clear it is not so much 
communities that are acted upon as groups and individuals at particular places in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67
social structure” (293). Pahl states that he “can find little universal evidence of a rural- 
urban continuum...” and argues that “of much greater importance is the notion of a 
fundamental distinction between the local and the national...” or as he states latter, 
“differences between the small-scale and the large-scale” (285-286). Pahl prefers to view 
community as a continuum of tighter- or looser-knit social networks (290). Elsewhere, he 
has called networks “non-place communities” (qtd. in Bell and Newby 53). In this view, 
community and society are social networks that differ primarily in size and intensity. 
Society is looser-knit social organization on the national level, whereas community is 
tighter-knit, on the local level.
Pahl’s conception of networks as “non-place communities” allows community
relations in ways not previously considered. Shearmur and Klein point out “by virtue of
the easier social intercourse that [technological] advancements make possible, morally
significant community no longer means local, face-to-face interaction” (44). In the age of
the Internet, as Wilbur explains,
an increasing number of people are finding their lives touched by 
collectivities which have nothing to do with physical proximity. A space 
has opened up for something like community on computer networks, at a 
time when so many forms of ‘real life’ community seem under attack, 
perhaps even by the same techno-culture forces that make Internet culture 
possible. (5)
Shearmur and Klein suggest that “the electronic revolution may force us to reconsider 
how we think about community” (44). This is not to suggest that community looses its 
character or its force in people’s lives, but rather that it can exist where previously not 
thought possible.
If people can form morally significant communities on the Internet, then 
community relations are much more robust than previously thought: Geographical 
isolation has ceased to be, or perhaps never was, a necessary condition of community; 
hence, “locality” takes on a broader meaning. “Locality” may be a place in time, social 
structure, or virtual space as well as physical reality. This suggests that community can
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be a viable protection-from-lying strategy even when groups of people are not isolated by 
their physical proximity to other groups.
Rheingold argues that people are in fact forming communities in virtual space.
He calls these communities “virtual communities, ” recognizing both that they are real or 
actual in many of their practical effects, but that they do not exist as a physical presence. 
In his work The Virtual Community Rheingold adopts the metaphor of pioneers building 
virtual communities by homesteading on the electronic frontier. He describes these 
virtual communities as “social aggregations that emerge from the Net when enough 
people carry on those public discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to 
form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace” (5).
Foster recognizes Tonnies’s Gemeinschaft relations in virtual communities. In his 
view, Gemeinschaft means identifying with the collective, or as he puts it, “succinctly 
stated, the term embodies a set of voluntary, social, and reciprocal relations that are 
bound together by an immutable ‘we-feeling’” (25). Foster argues that “virtual 
communities should be seen as being co-determined by the simultaneous forces of 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft’ (35).
According to Bellah et al., virtual communities differ from Gemeinschaft 
communities in that they tend to be more homogeneous than heterogeneous. According 
to this view, people find themselves in actual communities for a variety of reasons, some 
of which may not be totally voluntary, hence, actual communities commonly have a 
somewhat heterogeneous population. Contrary to this, membership in virtual 
communities is strictly voluntary and very liquid as there is no cost to leaving. As 
Drucker puts it, “community was fate, organization is voluntary membership” (qtd. in 
Healy 61). Bellah et al. prefers to call virtual communities “lifestyle enclaves” rather 
than communities since the internet “brings together those who are socially, 
economically, or culturally similar, and one of its chief aims is the enjoyment of being 
with those who ‘share one’s lifestyle’” (qtd. in Healy 61). This argument does not make 
virtual communities appear less Gemeinschaft, as Bellah et al. apparently intended. On 
the contrary, in light o f Tonnies's “Gemeinschaft o f mind", it makes them appear more
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Gemeinschafi. After all, what is “socially, economically, or culturally similar” if not a 
reflection of common values?
I would argue that Bellah’s et al. distinction between Gemeinschaft and virtual 
communities is not valid when comparing virtual communities to rural communities of 
the Midwest. In such a comparison, they appear nearly identical. For example in 
Nebraska, small communities are ethnic communities which are largely homogeneous, 
maintaining aspects of their old world cultures. They could well be described as 
“lifestyle enclaves.” Community members have similar values that are reflected, among 
other things, in their cuisine, their recreation, and their religion. They speak English with 
accents that mark them of common ancestry, and they exhibit a great deal of pride in their 
ethnic homogeneity, which in most small communities is celebrated annually.
Two such communities are Loup City, claiming to be the Polish capital, and 
Wilbur, claiming to be the Czech capital of Nebraska. Both communities celebrate their 
cultural heritage with food, spirits, music, dance, and dress unique to their old world 
cultures. Similar celebrations are held in nearby Danish, Swedish, and German 
communities. There no doubt was, as Drucker suggests above, a certain amount of fate 
involved in the formation of these communities; however, their persistent homogeneity 
suggests that a high degree of voluntary self-selection is involved in constituting their 
present populations. Community members are, as Bellah et al. describe members of 
virtual communities, “socially, economically, and culturally similar,” and it could be 
argued that one of their chief aims is “the enjoyment of being with those who ‘share one’s 
lifestyle.’” It would seem, then, that small communities in Nebraska fit Bellah’s et al. 
description of “lifestyle enclaves” nearly as well as do virtual communities.
Virtual communities exist in many forms including bulletin boards, news groups, 
Internet Relay Chat, and Multi-User Dimensions (MUDs). In “gaming” MUDs, 
participants develop a character, interact with other characters and work to be accepted by 
the community. Acceptance requires that “newbies” read the history o f the community’s 
extended dialogue and follow its rules o f acceptable conduct while in the community. As 
in any community, conduct of individuals, especially newcomers, is monitored by the
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locals, and people who break the rules are sanctioned. Particularly troublesome are 
uncooperative participants who are just “passing through.” These participants try to hide 
their uninitiated status long enough to raise havoc in the local community and then move 
on. Consequently, MUDers have devised various techniques to identify insincere 
participants. One such technique has the descriptive utle of “trolling,” in reference to 
fishing. Trailers are MUDer locals who dangle “bait” for uninitiated newbies. The bait 
may consists of obvious misspellings of certain words or obviously wrong statements 
about anything from science to popular culture. The locals, having engaged in extended 
dialogue with each other, recognize these “errors” as bait and smilingly ignore them. 
However, as Tepper explains, “newbies who correct such ‘errors’ are referred to as 
having ‘jumped in the boat’—they have exposed themselves as outsiders without anyone 
needing to put any effort in to excluding them” (46). The possibility of being exposed as 
an ignorant newbie acts as a social norm to constrain the behavior of participants.
Mizuko Ito shows that virtual communities engender an immutable “we-feeling,”
which Foster above says defines Gemeinschaft communities. Ito, who was doing field
research of a virtual community named “Farside,” relates that Farside experienced a
population explosion as members of another MUD called “Sushi,” which was shut down,
migrated to Farside. Ito explains that “there was a sudden influx of new characters on
Farside with the tag “Sushiite” appended to their titles. For a few months, they comprised
a highly visible enclave within the Farside social and political scene, a displaced but
proud sub-community” (102). Several years later, in August, 1994, the machine that
Farside was living in suffered a systems failure and all player files and interface elements
were lost. Community leaders searched in vain for a new home for Farside, so Farsidians
migrated to other MUDs. Ito explains her/his loss:
I pined at the loss of my fieldsite, not to mention the character that, for me, 
was quite an accomplished ninth level. I created a newbie character on 
Kerovnia, and began conducting interviews with former Farsidians there, 
happy to see old Mends using the same names on a MUD that had many 
shared elements with Farside. (102)
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These virtual migrations seem little different than the actual migrations that 
resulted in the “displaced but proud sub-communities” of rural Nebraska. Like the virtual 
immigrants, immigrant Germans, Danes, Swedes, and Czechs felt the loss of being 
separated and having to leave the old country. They too were happy to be reunited with 
friends and family that had preceded them and settled in communities with landscape 
similar to the homes that they left. The only apparent difference, other than perhaps the 
emotional intensity of loss and reunion, is that virtual migration takes minutes while 
actual migration may take decades.
Ito says that “there are currently hundreds of MUDs running worldwide with tens 
of thousands of users” (90). Besides “gaming” MUDs, as those discussed above, there 
are also “talker” MUDs, which are organized around many different themes including 
educational and professional interests, and by-invitation-only MUDs and secret- 
membership MUDs. As we have seen, these virtual communities exhibit many 
conventional community social relations. They, therefore, should be able to foster 
reputation building through Smith’s “repeated dealings,” and Tullock’s “don’t play” and 
“choose your own partner” strategies. Since some of these MUDs resemble formal 
groups with stable memberships, such as by-invitation-only MUDs, they should be able to 
foster Shearmur and Klein’s “social seals of approval.” Other MUDs, which resemble 
informal groups with fluid membership and overlapping boundaries like many actual 
groups to which we belong, should be able to foster valuable character information for 
use by nonmembers. Considered in their totality, virtual communities resemble Shearmur 
and Klein’s “flowing patchwork of reputational nexuses.” We, therefore, may assume 
that Klein’s “all-seeing invisible eye” is also present in virtual reality.
Klein’s “extended dealings,” gossip, and Spence’s “signaling” are also present in 
virtual communities. Extended dealings and gossip are transformed into worldwide 
phenomena since the Internet greatly reduces the transactions costs of engaging in them. 
Internet users can easily express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with products or 
services with friends, acquaintances, and even complete strangers in near by communities
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or in distant countries. This kind of monitoring should be especially effective for 
constraining the decisions o f national and international corporations.
‘Trolling” can be seen as a virtual example of Spence’s “signaling.” The sincere 
participants read the rules and take part in an extended dialogue, which is an investment 
in costly signals, in order to signal their sincerity by refraining from taking the “bait.” 
This may actually more closely resemble “screen” a'la Rothchild and Stiglitz since the 
person in the weaker position regarding private information moves first by offering the 
“bait.”
We must now pull from the above discussion a working definition or model of 
community that has the ability to prevent or at least constrain lying. We must also 
differentiate community from larger society. From the above discussion, I conclude that a 
working definition of community must be one of human relationships that can change and 
grow, strengthen or weaken. Parsons and Shils’s premise that individuals and groups 
make a series of decisions in relation to other individuals and groups suggests that 
community is formed by individual and group decisions. These decisions could have 
been different and they can change. Change is inherent in Hawley’s idea that 
communities have well-defined stages of youth, maturity and senescence.
I also conclude that our definition must allow for different degrees of community. 
Degrees of community are suggested by Durkheim’s continuum of mechanical and 
organic solidarity, by Hillary’s taxonomy of community, and by Pahi’s idea that 
community is a non-place group of people who are connected by a continuum of tighter- 
or looser-kit social networks. Degrees of community are also well expressed by 
Tonnies’s ideas of community of blood, location, and mind. Further, I conclude that our 
definition must include the idea , as expressed by Hillary and others, that community has 
no overall purpose, i.e. it is not deliberately organized to attain a collective purpose. 
Finally, I conclude that our definition must make community “morally significant,” using 
Klein’s term, since it must be able to change people’s behavior, i.e., in our context, 
prevent them from lying.
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I now advance our working definition of community. Communities are dynamic 
social networks that are organically formed, that exist in varying intensities, and that 
influence people’s behavior. Influencing people’s behavior, as Merry explained above, 
requires that communities are able to reach consensus and engage in sanction, and this in 
tum requires that those being sanctioned are economically and socially interdependent 
with those doing the sanctioning and that there are barriers to mobility outside the 
community.
We can also use the above writers to form a definition of society. Hawley sees 
society as an integrated eco-system composed of a collection of smaller eco-systems. 
Tonnies sees society as any activity that is different from the ideal rural community. For 
Durkheim, society is social order based on the division of labor. In Hillary’s view, 
society is larger than community, contains community, has no overall purpose, and is 
integrated by the state. Pahl sees society as a loose-knit social network.
Before advancing a definition of society, I must explain the need for and use of 
such a definition in the analyses of the following chapters, and thereby explain a 
necessary feature of it. A definition of society is needed to create a distinction between 
society and community. In the following chapters, when analyzing market and bureau 
models, these models are society. These are the models o f society to which we are 
comparing our model of community. Our definition must be general enough to include 
both markets and bureaus, each seen as a type of society. Therefore, we cannot include in 
our definition that society is formed organically or spontaneously as do the above writers. 
Such a qualification would completely preclude society in the bureau.
With that in mind, I now advance a working definition of society: Society is a 
social network that contains many communities, that is based on the division of labor, and 
that is integrated by the state. This definition is certainly not inclusive, even less so than 
the definition of community above. It obviously describes state societies better than pre­
state societies, however, state societies are our primary focus here.
We have yet to isolate the requirements of community that can be used to analyze 
the market and bureau models in later chapters. Certainly we should consider those areas
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of agreement among sociologists as identified by Hillary above. Increasing in 
importance, they are: area, common ties and social interaction. Minar and Greer argue 
that community is rooted in a “shared fate” that is brought about by isolation, intense 
interaction, interdependence, and communication (x). Taylor argues that community has 
three basic characteristics that we may call requirements: common values, direct and 
many sided relations between members, and reciprocity (Community, Anarchy and 
Liberty 26-28).
These requirements for community are similar to and in some cases identical with 
Merry’s requirements for gossip as discussed above. Merry’s requirements are isolation, 
economic interdependence, consensus and sanction, and similar values. However, Merry 
includes requirements important to this study that the others do not: consensus and 
sanction. Consensus and sanction are important here because they are what makes 
community a strategy from the individual’s point of view. Earlier, we saw how the 
Maghribi traders used social isolation, economic interdependence, consensus and 
sanction, and similar values to enforce honest behavior in their trading community that 
spanned several centuries and many continents. For these reasons in the next two 
chapters, I use Merry’s requirements for gossip to analyze community.
Furthermore, since I concluded above that community exists in different degrees 
of intensity, I use Ferdinand Tonnies’s notions of Gemeinschaft of blood, locality, and 
mind— with their corresponding requirements: kinship relations, collective ownership of 
land, and common sacred places and worshipped deities— as a measure of what degrees 
of community can exist in the market and bureau models. Tonnies says that 
Gemeinschaft of blood is fundamental and that Gemeinschaft o f locality and 
Gemeinschaft o f mind are derived from it. These three aspects of community, he says, 
can manifest themselves separately, but their conjunction “represents the truly human and 
supreme form of community” (42). I will therefore regard the phenomenon of 
community as a matter of degree depending on the conjunction or isolation of Tonnies’s 
three types.
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Ideology
The extension of reputation from communities into larger society in the form of 
flowing patchworks of reputational nexuses, as we have discussed so far, explains how 
the monitoring of individual behavior can take place in the absence of face-to-face 
contact and repeated dealings, but, as North points out, it does not explain why some 
people choose to be honest when they could cheat and get away with it. North asks why 
some people follow the rules of society when it appears that they could get more 
individual benefits by breaking them. It appears as if these people are making choices 
where the costs are greater than the benefits. Besides people who choose not to lie, North 
reminds us, there are people who routinely vote and donate blood anonymously in spite of 
there appearing to be more costs for them than benefits. Also unexplained is the fact that 
large group action is possible in spite of the “free rider” problem, which is discussed 
below (Structure and Change 46).
North is not suggesting that these actions are irrational, but that “the calculation of 
benefits and costs that we employ is too limited to catch other elements in people’s 
decision-making processes” (Structure and Change 46). The benefit from feeling good 
when doing “good” is an element in people’s decision-making process that the traditional 
calculation of benefits and costs does not capture. North says that people who appear to 
be acting irrationally according to the neoclassical model are acting according to values 
that are a part of some learned and accepted ideology. He argues that it is “the values 
inculcated by the family and by schooling that lead individuals to restrain their behavior 
so that they do not behave like free riders.” He concludes that “strong moral and ethical 
codes of a society is the cement of social stability which makes an economic system 
viable” (Structure and Change 47).
Ideology, as a response to lying, is a belief, disposition, or attitude that sees truth- 
telling as a moral imperative. Lying, in this view, becomes a diminishment of one’s self­
esteem or self-image and of one’s esteem in the eyes of a group, society, or a supernatural 
being. Ideology as a means of reducing lying is important in our everyday lives. Arrow 
says that “ethical elements enter in some measure into every contract; without them, no
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market could function” (253). He also points out that professions often develop codes of 
conduct to constrain the behavior of their members as in medicine and law.
Ideology is a protection-from-lying strategy in the sense that people recruit others 
into a community of values in which all perpetually reaffirm each other’s belief in these 
values, thereby making everyone’s actions and decisions more predictable. Also, people 
personally evaluate other’s commitment to moral values, as nearly as they can discern 
them, before deciding whether to deal with them. When the community at large has a 
high degree of consensus that truth-telling is virtuous, the institutions of the community 
are used to spread this belief: Mothers teach their children; schools teach their students; 
clergy teach their congregations, etc.
According to Berger and Luckmann, a social process called “legitimation” 
underlies a full understanding of ideology. They describe legitimation “as a ‘second- 
order’ objectivation of meaning,” that is to say, “legitimation produces new meanings that 
serve to integrate the meanings already attached to disparate institutional processes” (85). 
First-order objectivation of meaning refers to meanings that individual and diverse 
participants in the institutional order assign to their particular roles and partial 
institutions. The process of legitimation, then, seeks to integrate these diverse meanings 
into a larger context so that the totality of the institutional order or the larger society 
makes sense concurrently to participants in different institutional processes.
According to Berger and Luckmann, the legitimation process integrates both 
horizontally and vertically. Horizontal integration refers to the process described above.
It gives meaning to the various roles in which people participate and to the specific 
institutional processes that they engage in at any given time. In other words, it explains 
the present relations. Vertical integration gives meaning to the totality of one’s life by 
explaining and justifying the various roles and institutional process through which one 
may pass in a lifetime (86). Thus it may be said to explain the future.
In the view of Berger and Luckmann, legitimation serves a  two-fold purpose: It 
both explains and justifies the existing institutional order. Legitimation explains when it 
provides a cognitive rationale for the existing institutional order. Legitimation justifies
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the existing order by “by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives” (86).
This dual purpose of legitimation appeals both to people’s need for knowledge and to 
their need for moral justification of the actions that practical necessity requires.
An example from American history may be the case of U. S. policy during the 
settlement of the West. Then current legitimations no doubt romanticized the settling of 
the West, perhaps as the inevitable expansion of a young, God-fearing nation into the 
virgin territory of ungodly savages. Such a legitimation could both explain and justify the 
wholesale slaughter of American Indians and herds of bison: It explains the “natural” 
relationship between whites and Indians and why westward expansion is a practical 
necessity; it prepares settlers for what they might expect from the native people and what 
measures might be necessary for self-defense; it justifies wholesale slaughter in that 
Indians are “ungodly savages” impeding the inevitable expansion of Christian virtues, and 
in that buffalo are the source of the “savages’” sustenance.
According to Berger and Luckmann, legitimation becomes necessary only when 
institutions formed in one generation are passed on to the next. In the earlier generation, 
they say, institutions are mere habitualizations that result from the repetition of actions 
that prove most effective at attaining the desired result. For example, at some point it was 
determined that the preservation of foods by canning, if done according to certain 
procedures, resulted in the greatest degree of preservation with the lowest risk of food 
poisoning. By continuous repetition of these procedures, the habitualizations of canning 
became rules of action or institutions that freed individuals from the necessity of “making 
all those decisions.” At this point, the institutions surrounding the canning of food are 
experienced as self-evident facts. There is no need for legitimation since they are 
conscious rules of habit adhered to for known reasons and are subject to change by the 
people who embody them (55).
In the succeeding generation, however, the rules of action or institutions lack the 
first-hand knowledge of the actors. Institutions thereby gain a historic quality and are 
experienced as something over and above the people who happen to embody them in a 
particular instance. What was experienced in the earlier generation as, “Here I go again
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preserving food in the way that I discovered gives the best results,” is experienced in the 
succeeding generation as, “This is how things are done.” What resulted from conscious 
choice in the earlier generation becomes the primary facts of reality in the succeeding 
generation. In the words of Berger and Luckmann, institutions are now experienced as 
possessing a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the individual as an external and 
coercive fact” (55) It is in this state of affairs, say Berger and Luckmann that legitimation 
becomes necessary to provide explanation and justification for institutions that have lost 
their personal embodiment and their self-evident status (50-56).
Berger and Luckmann note four levels of legitimation. The most fundamental, 
pre-theoretical level of legitimation is language, wherein a specific vocabulary is used to 
teach children about the world. To learn that John is my cousin “immediately and 
inherently legitimates the conduct with regard to ‘cousins’ that is learned along with the 
designation”(87). At this level, children learn that “this is how things are done” as if they 
were facts of reality. The next level of legitimation is the semi-theoretical stage during 
which people Ieam explanations for things in the form of proverbs, myths, moral maxims, 
legends and folk tales. The third level of legitimation is the theoretical stage. In this 
stage, segments of the institutional order are explained by comprehensive theories so 
complex that they are left in the hands of specialists, who become full-time legitimators 
(87-88).
The fourth level of legitimation contains theories that integrate the various 
segments of theoretical knowledge from the previous level. This gives the institutional 
order a kind of “symbolic totality.” This level is symbolic in the sense that it is 
completely abstract from practical everyday reality. Its purpose is the ultimate integration 
of all levels of legitimation so that each individual sees his place and his actions as being 
consonant with those of his neighbors as well as with the workings of the universe and 
the nature of man. It is, therefore, a definition of reality. As Berger and Luckmann put it 
“the symbolic universe is conceived o f as the matrix of all socially objectivated and 
subjectively real meanings; the entire historic society and the entire biography o f the 
individual are seen as events taking place within this universe” (89). They add that in this
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context, “even the most trivial transactions of everyday life may come to be imbued with 
profound significance” (92).
With the integration o f the totality of human existence in the symbolic universe, 
say Berger and Luckmann, the process of legitimation is complete. It is, after all, 
institutions that are somewhat problematic and in need of legitimation; with the fourth 
level of legitimation the problematic nature of institutions has been removed. People take 
the symbolic universe for granted and go about their business in society with the 
assurance that their actions are correct and moral. Even though they, themselves, may not 
understand the higher, theoretical levels of legitimation, they are confident that the full­
time legitimators who are rightfully entrusted with such things do understand them. That 
is until an alternative symbolic universe appears which challenges the status quo. ‘The 
appearance of an alternative symbolic universe poses a threat because its very existence 
demonstrates empirically that one’s own universe is less than inevitable” (100).
This could happen, for example, if two isolated societies with unique 
legitimations crossed paths. It could also take place within a single society if 
socialization is incomplete so as to allow sub-societies to grow, complete with their own 
legitimations. It could also take place within the mind of one person who comes in 
contact with new ideas after previously having been totally immersed, for whatever 
reason, in a given reality. From such confrontations of symbolic universes, there 
develops what Berger and Luckmann call “conceptual machineries of universe- 
maintenance” (96). These are theoretical justifications of the symbolic universe itself,
i.e., theoretical shields for a preferred definition of reality.
After confrontation occurs, each of the four previous levels of legitimation 
become levels of conceptual machineries of universe-maintenance. They become shields 
for society’s preferred definition of reality for the purpose of preventing massed 
migration to the opposing view. Myths, theologies, and even theoretical sciences, acting 
as machineries of universe-maintenance, exist side-by-side at different levels of 
legitimation. Since both sides of the confrontation are engaging in universe-maintenance, 
conflicting definitions o f reality, say Berger and Luckmann, result in a power play that
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determines which definition is “made to stick” in society. War, with each group 
defending its own definition of reality, is a likely outcome of the confrontation o f two 
societies because wholesale persuasion is out o f the question, since, being outsiders in 
regard to one another, neither of their conceptual machineries is persuasive to the other 
( 100- 101).
In this power play environment, continue Berger and Luckmann, theories acquire 
a new standard for validity. Prior to confrontation, theories were validated by how well 
they succeeded in practical experience. Berger and Luckmann give the example of 
competing theories o f boar hunting. The merits o f such theories are easily decided by 
counting the successes o f hunters who adhere to the different theories. However after 
confrontation, theorists develop abstract arguments of universe-maintenance that cannot 
be validated by experience. There is no easy way to decide the merits of such theories so 
both theories remain and come into conflict. They compete to attract new adherents and 
to prevent massed migration to the opposing view. After confrontation, “good” theories 
are those able to neutralize the appeal of competing theories and to extract the loyalty of 
large numbers of adherents, thereby creating a power base. The confrontation manifests 
itself in the struggle of experts and their power bases trying to acquire control of the 
socialization processes of society, such as police powers and the educational processes, 
because “power in society includes the power to determine decisive socialization 
processes and, therefore, the power to produce reality” (110).
According to Berger and Luckmann, “these considerations imply that there will 
always be a social-structural base for competition between rival definitions of reality and 
that the outcome of the rivalry will be affected, if not always determined outright, by the 
development of this base (110). This means that the success of theories during the period 
of conflict is determined not by theoretical considerations, such as internal coherency, 
practical application to everyday life, etc., but by the extra-theoretical consideration of 
whether they result in the formation of a power base. That is, say Berger and Luckmann, 
“a theory is ‘demonstrated’ to be pragmatically superior not by virtue of its intrinsic
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qualities, but by its applicability to the social interests of the group that has become its 
‘carrier” ’ (111).
In Berger and Luckmann’s view, theories become ideologies, when they are used 
to advance the interests of social groups. On one side of the confrontation, we have 
social groups that wish to maintain the status quo, who espouse traditional theory and 
religion, and who exalt full-time legitimators in the form of traditional theorists and 
theologians. On the other side, there are competing social groups who espouse competing 
theories and exalt competing theorists and theologians. In essence, we have competing 
power bases protecting and promoting different definitions of reality. “When a particular 
definition of reality comes to be attached to a concrete power interest, it may be called an 
ideology” (113).
For Berger and Luckmann, legitimations prior to confrontation do not amount to 
ideologies because everyone equally inhabits the symbolic universe, that is, everyone 
holds the same definition of reality and cannot conceive o f any other. It is only after 
confrontation that legitimations take on the characteristics of ideology. In this view, 
Christianity during the Middle Ages was not an ideology since everyone from serf to king 
used it to define their world; however, Christianity during the Industrial Revolution 
could be considered an ideology because the bourgeoisie used it against the new worker 
class who no longer defined their reality through Christianity. For Berger and Luckmann, 
then, “the distinctiveness of ideology is rather that the same overall universe is interpreted 
in different ways, depending upon concrete vested interests within the society in 
question” (114).
At this point the reader may have noticed the parallelism between Berger and 
Luckmann’s theory of legitimation and Kuhn’s theory of scientific paradigms discussed 
in Chapter 1. Berger and Luckmann’s pre-confrontation society, in which everyone lives 
their lives without questioning their universally accepted world view, sounds much like 
Kuhn’s description of scientists with their accept core of beliefs doing “normal science” 
within the current scientific paradigm. In both, the adherents of dominant views of reality 
consign themselves the task of articulating the current paradigm or world view: Pre­
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confrontation society members restrict their actions to those that are validated by their 
universally accepted world view , and scientists work within the boundaries of theories 
provided by their paradigm.
The parallelism extends still farther. Berger and Luckmann’s “confrontation” and 
the resulting “conceptual machineries of universe-maintenance” corresponds with the 
appearance of “anomalies” and the move to “extraordinary science” in Kuhn’s views. In 
the former view, legitimations once accepted as universal are, after confrontation, shown 
to be specific to a certain society and not universal truths at all; theories are then put 
forth to protect the old world view and there ensues a struggle for dominance between the 
old and the new world views. In the latter view, scientists do not question the 
assumptions of their paradigm until the appearance of anomalies forces them to; at that 
point they move in to extraordinary science in an attempt to salvage the current paradigm.
There are other similarities between Berger and Luckmann and Kuhn and also 
between Berger and Luckmann and Lakatos. Berger and Luckmann contend that the 
same overall universe is interpreted in different ways by the adherents of different 
ideologies. Kuhn speaks of scientists moving from the old to the new paradigm being 
able to observe new phenomena looking at old data with old instruments similar to a 
Gestalt switch. Berger and Luckmann show four levels of legitimation, each level 
integrating and validating the level below, all for the purpose of protecting a world view. 
This is similar to Lakatos’s description in Chapter 1 of research programmes, i.e., a set of 
theories which act as a core, and a set of hypotheses that act as a protective shield for the 
core.
Returning now to ideology, Mannheim makes the same pre-and-post- 
confr ontation distinction with regard to ideology as do Berger and Luckmann, but he sees 
the legitimations of society both prior to and after confrontation as ideology. He says that 
“the concept ‘ideology’ reflects the one discovery which emerged from political conflict, 
namely, that ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a 
situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine 
their sense of domination” (40). It is confrontation that “breaks the spell,” so to speak,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
83
and makes it apparent to members of a  previously closed society that their sacred views 
are, in fact, ideologies.
So for Mannheim, there are two kinds of ideology. He calls them “particular”
ideology and “total” ideology. In this view, particular ideology is that usage which
recognizes that people’s views are interested rather than purely objective and that we
must approach these views with caution as we would the views of an opponent, believing
them at our own risk. Mannheim says we typically regard an opponent’s ideas
as more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, the 
true recognition of which would not be in accord with [our] interest.
These distortions range all the way from conscious lies to half-conscious 
and unwitting disguises; from calculated attempts to dupe others to self­
deception. (55-56)
Mannheim’s concept of “particular ideology” is roughly synonymous with Berger and 
Luckmann’s conception of “ideology” as being a given definition of reality attached to a 
concrete power interest.
Total ideology, according to Mannheim, means the world view of an age or of 
specific historic-social groups, or the mindset or total structure of the mind of an epoch or 
group. Mannheim sees the study of total ideology as the primary content of a branch of 
sociology known as the “sociology of knowledge.” In total ideology there is no thought 
of using ideology for deception because there is no conception of alternative or 
conflicting ideologies. Total ideology is predicated upon the assumption that peoples’ 
views are colored by their time and place in history and society. Total ideology resembles 
Berger and Luckmann’s view of legitimations prior to confrontation with opposing views.
Mannheim uses the example of the country lad who moves to the city to highlight
the difference between total and particular ideology. He explains that
for the son of a peasant who has grown up within the confines of his 
village and spends his whole life in the place of his birth, the mode of 
thinking and speaking characteristic of that village is something that he 
takes entirely for granted. But for the country lad who goes to the city and 
adapts himself gradually to city life, the rural mode of living and thinking 
ceases to be something to be taken for granted. He has won a certain
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detachment from it, and he distinguishes now, perhaps quite consciously, 
between ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ modes of thought and ideas. (281)
In this way explains Mannheim, “that which within a given group is accepted as absolute 
appears to the outsider [as] conditioned by the group situation and recognized as partial” 
(282). In sum, then, Mannheim says that everyone’s views are biased by their social 
environment, and often people are unaware of this fact. They are unaware so long as they 
are totally immersed in the prevailing mode of thinking.
What is more, says Mannheim, there are differences in how various institutional 
and social structures insulate and hence preserve the “total” nature of the world views of 
people living within these social structures. He says that “the multiplicity of ways of 
thinking cannot become a problem in periods when social stability underlies and 
guarantees the internal unity of a world-view,” that is, when institutional and social 
structures prevent social movement. He continues that “it is primarily the intensification 
of social mobility which destroys the earlier illusion, prevalent in a static society, that all 
things can change, but thought remains eternally the same” (6-7).
He separates social mobility into “horizontal” and “vertical” mobility. Horizontal 
mobility occurs when one moves to a different position without changing social status. 
This kind of movement makes it apparent that different people think differently about 
things, but it does not seriously threaten one’s beliefs, since the context of the national or 
shared traditions remains intact; such differences are simply chalked up to curiosities or 
errors. However, when horizontal mobility is accompanied by vertical mobility, 
movement up or down through different social strata, one encounters entirely new ways 
of thinking about things that can shake one’s confidence in one’s beliefs. Mannheim says 
that vertical mobility “is the decisive factor in making persons uncertain and skeptical of 
their traditional view of the world” (7).
Mannheim explains why entirely different ways of thinking are encountered by 
people who move vertically through society. He says that in a static society, one 
organized around closed castes or ranks, the virtual absence of vertical mobility tends to 
isolate stratas of people and allow divergent world views to develop and to coexist in the
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same society. Thus, for example, all classes of a society may worship the same god but
experience religion in entirely different ways. Different world views can coexist in the
same society, he says, so long as the divergent views are held in different minds. It is at
historic times when there is communication between classes or castes that current beliefs
are challenged. As Mannheim succinctly puts it,
the most significant stage of this communication is reached when the 
forms o f thought and experience, which had hitherto developed 
independently, enter into one and the same consciousness impelling the 
mind to discover the irreconcilability of the conflicting conceptions of the 
world. (8)
This is the process of detachment as experienced by Mannheim’s country lad
above. The acquiring of a “detached perspective,” as Mannheim describes it, is what
makes it possible for persons to recognize the “particular” nature of their previous mode
of thinking. Once recognized as particular, the previous mode of thinking is eventually
replaced by the detached perspective which becomes the new mode of thinking.
Mannheim says that one can gain a detached perspective in the following ways:
(a) a member of a group leaves his social position (by ascending to a 
higher class, emigration, etc.); (b) the basis of existence of a whole group 
shifts in relation to its traditional norms and institutions; (c) within the 
same society two or more socially determined modes of interpretation 
come into conflict and , in criticizing one another, render one another 
transparent and establish perspectives with reference to each other. (282)
Part (a) above is the case of the country lad above. An example of part (b) is the 
case of the American Indian after conquest by whites. Part (c) is exemplified by the fact 
that the conflict between environmentalism and development has in many places resulted 
in environmentally-ffiendly development. Another example of part (c) is the conflicting 
views of the various branches of science resulting in refinements in them all. In this 
sense, interdisciplinary studies itself could be seen as a way of acquiring Mannheim’s 
“detached perspective.”
The distinction that Berger and Luckmann and Mannheim make above, i.e., 
ideology as unquestioned presuppositions on the one hand or ideology as deception on the
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other, is a useful distinction for analytical purposes. Since Mannheim’s terminology is 
more descriptive than Berger and Luckmann’s, for convenience and to avoid confusion, 
from this point forward I shall use Mannheim’s, “total ideology” to refer to ideology as 
unquestioned presuppositions and his “particular ideology,” to refer to ideology as 
deception.
This distinction is especially enlightening when used in conjunction with the 
information relation as developed in Chapter I . We can imagine Informer choosing to 
tell the truth in spite of having knowingly been lied to by Informee in a previous 
exchange. We can now see that adherence to a personally accepted ideology is a benefit 
of truth-telling and that acting contrary is a cost. When Informer chooses to tell the truth 
in spite of greater apparent costs than benefits, he is not acting contrary economic theory. 
We simply cannot observe an important element of his benefit-cost analysis, i.e., his 
personal satisfaction for having retained ideological integrity.
In the above example, all o f society consists of only two people: one whose 
actions were influenced by truth-telling ideology and one whose actions were not. This 
demonstrates that all of society or even all of a group need not be totally immersed in an 
ideology for its effects to be total on individual members. Mannheim’s isolation 
condition for the existence of total ideology can be met in the case o f individuals as well. 
Individuals can intentionally isolate themselves physically by moving to a remote location 
or by physically excluding others from their location. More importantly, however, they 
also can isolate themselves practically by limiting their circle of acquaintances , by 
reading only “moral” materials, by discussing only “proper” subjects, by refraining from 
pondering anomalies that present themselves in daily life, by refraining from 
introspection that might reveal a  conflict between beliefs and feelings, or in general, by 
purposely closing their consciousness to conflicting views.
From all of this we get a more useable view of ideology, yet one that is consistent 
with the above authors: In any instance where an individual alters his behavior for the 
sole purpose of being in accord with an ideology, such as telling the truth instead o f lying, 
its practical effects on him are total; in any instance where an individual is aware of an
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ideology but does not alter his behavior because o f it, its practical effects on him are 
particular. In this view, an ideology can have a total effect on an individual in one 
instance and a particular effect in another, depending on whether he alters his behavior to 
be in accord with it. The point of all of this is to bring out that it is only instances of total 
ideology that move people to tell the truth or, as we shall see later, to not free ride, and 
that responding to total ideology can be a very individual and private event. Furthermore, 
we need not see total ideology as a pristine porcelain icon that all revere with complete 
devotion so long as it is intact, and that loses its enchantment entirely once it has fallen 
and shattered on the floor. For some people, this may be true, but others can be 
occasionally enchanted by contemplating and responding to various fragments in a total 
way.
North does not explicitly make the distinction between total and particular 
ideology. He does, however, use the term in both senses. His likening of ideology to the 
“strong moral and ethical codes of a society” and to “the cement of social stability,” as 
cited above, is a usage similar to Mannheim’s “total ideology.” North’s “intellectual 
entrepreneur,” whom we shall meet below, is most certainly a usage of the term 
“ideology” in its particular sense.
North says that “ideologies are intellectual efforts to rationalize the behavioral 
pattern of individuals and groups” (Structure 48). He says that ideology guides our 
everyday lives by providing an explanation of the world that we experience. By 
providing explanation, he says, ideology serves the same function as theory. He 
continues, a 'la  Popper, that theories can never be proven, only be refuted, and since no 
definitive tests exist to eliminate all but one theory, we employ competing theories or 
ideologies to explain the world around us.
North stresses what he believes are three important aspects of ideology:
1. Ideology is an economizing device by which individuals come 
to terms with their environment and are provided with a “world 
view” so that the decision-making process is simplified.
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2. Ideology is inextricably interwoven with moral and ethical 
judgments about the fairness of the world the individual 
perceives.
3. Individuals alter their ideological perspectives when their 
experiences are inconsistent with their ideology. In effect, they 
attempt to develop a new set of rationalizations that are a better 
“fit” with their experiences. {Structure and Change 49)
Aspects (I) and (2) are obviously in the vein of total ideology, and aspect (3) describes 
the process of the country lad acquiring Mannheim’s “detached perspective.” Taken 
together they suggest that when change renders ideologies obsolete, people lose an 
important aid in decision making as well as their moral compass; these are things that 
people are anxious to replace.
Sowell agrees that ideology is a knowledge-economizing device, but adds that by
this very fact ideology appeals to those with higher costs in acquiring alternative
knowledge, i.e., people who are inexperienced or politically apathetic. He cites
specifically “youth” and the “masses” {Knowledge and Decisions 309). Arendt adds
weight to this view when she points out that
it was characteristic of the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany and of 
the Communist movements in Europe after 1930 that they recruited their 
members from this mass of apparently indifferent people whom all other 
parties had given up as too apathetic or too stupid for their attention. 
{Origins o f Totalitarianism 311)
Sowell continues that the knowledge-economizing benefit o f ideology decreases with the 
passing of time. As one grows older and acquires more experience and information, the 
costs of reconciling one’s ideology to the current state of one’s knowledge becomes 
greater than the cost of discarding one’s ideology in favor of one with more explanatory 
power. Sowell gives the example of people clinging to the “earth is flat” world view 
during which generally increasing scientific knowledge made it ever more costly to do so. 
He says that the incremental costs of adopting a more complex ideology, the “earth is 
round” view, is repaid by lesser intellectual effort in reconciling one’s beliefs to the 
empirical world. Which ideology people adhere to, says Sowell, “is a question of cost-
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effectiveness rather than of reaching ultimate, immutable truth” (Knowledge and 
Decisions 309). In Sowell’s view, then, people adopt ideologies to keep the costs of 
knowledge low; people change ideologies in order to reduce costs.
North says that inherent in ideology is a judgment about the fairness of the social 
system in which people find themselves. He argues that the terms of exchange in society 
are an important variable in this judgment. He gives four examples of external change, in 
the form of changes in relative prices, that he believes are sufficient to alter peoples’ 
perception about the fairness of the economic system and, hence, sufficient to cause 
people to alter their ideologies:
1. an alteration in property rights which denies individuals access to 
resources which they had heretofore come to accept as customary or 
just (the enclosure of common land, for example).
2. a decline in the terms of exchange in a factor or product market away 
from what had come to be regarded as a just exchange ratio.
3. a decline in the relative income position of a particular group in the 
labor force.
4. a reduction in information costs that results in individuals perceiving 
that different and more favorable terms of exchange may prevail 
elsewhere. (Structure 50)
From Mannheim’s point of view, North is claiming that the above changes in relative 
prices are sufficient for people to come to realize that their views are particular. From 
Sowell’s point of view, North is claiming that these relative price changes increase 
people’s cost of holding their current views sufficiently that they will discard them in 
favor of more cost effective views.
Item one above is reminiscent of the ideological conflicts that occurred between 
ranchers and “sod busters” during the settling of the West in the United States as 
individual property rights expanded and common property rights receded. A similar 
situation is currently being played out in Alaska between developers and 
environmentalists. Items two and three respectively bring to mind the plight of the 
twentieth century American farmer and laborer and the ideological battles that define our
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century. Item four describes our current situation as the Internet spans the physical 
isolation of even the most remote communities rendering them less parochial.
North argues that as people become willing to alter their ideologies, replacement 
ideologies spring up and vie for adherents. Almost without exception, North says, 
alternative ideologies develop under the guidance o f intellectuals who get some kind of 
reward or payoff by promoting them to others. He calls these promoters “intellectual 
entrepreneurs” because they see opportunity in the domain of ideas where others do not. 
He says that such “entrepreneurs spring up whenever there develop contrasting views of 
the world around us as a result of differential experiences” CStructure and Change 5 1).
Whether ideologies are used to justify existing social and economic structures or 
to attack the existing arrangements and to promote change, successful ideologies, 
according to North, have a number of characteristics in common. North, in using the 
term “ideology” in the sense of being “successful,” is using it in the “total” sense a' la 
Mannheim. Fundamental to all successful ideologies, North says, is their ability to 
explain how the current property rights structures and terms of exchange fit into a larger 
context or system. They must also be able to explain history in ways favorable to current 
beliefs. Furthermore, successful ideologies must be flexible enough to attract the loyalty 
of new groups and to retain current loyalties as social and economic conditions change. 
However, “most crucially,” says North, “any successful ideology must overcome the free 
rider problem.” To do that, he says, ideologies must “energize groups to behave contrary 
to a simple, hedonistic, individual calculus of costs and benefits.” This, he says, must be 
the central thrust o f successful ideologies because “neither maintenance of the existing 
order nor its overthrow is possible without such behavior” (Structure and Change 53).
The free rider problem is similar to the prisoners’ dilemma in that everyone would 
be better off if  each individual would cooperate in some designated way; however, the 
benefit/cost choice facing each individual is such that each individual chooses not to 
cooperate. Moiho gives the example of public television. Individual patrons, deciding 
whether to “pay their fair share,” see themselves as dupes if they pay and others do not 
pay. On the other hand, if individuals do not pay, they are not dupes and they can enjoy
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the broadcasts free while others pay (3). The free rider problem, common to all group 
action, is considered by economists as the fundamental problem of collective action.
The free rider problem is especially troublesome for ideologies intended to 
prevent lying since, as Barnes points out, lying itself is a form of free riding. Barnes says 
that lies are successful only when dupes believe that liars mean what they say. He 
continues that dupes will mistakenly believe that liars mean what they say only under 
circumstances where most people mean what they say most of the time. In other words, 
most people must tell the truth in order for lairs to be able to free ride. As Barnes puts it, 
“in any sustained system of interaction, lying being one example, the majority of actors 
must pay their way; only a minority can be free riders.” This suggests another way of 
looking at the optimal level of lying. Bames says a “search for an optimal level of lying, 
if optimality were to be measured by maximum success, might be rephrased as a quest for 
an optimal number of free riders” (10).
Barnes’s view also adds a new dimension to the information relation as described 
in Chapter 1. There, participants weigh their various strategies: Informer weighs the 
expected benefits and costs of lying and truth-telling and Informee weighs the expected 
benefits and costs of believing or not believing and of verifying or not verifying 
Informer’s information; each then chooses the strategy he expects most likely to result in 
benefits. In Barnes’s view, Informer’s choices are somewhat more constrained in that he 
must tell the truth most of the time in order to create an atmosphere of trust before he can 
consider lying as a possible strategy. It is as if repeated truth-telling has a kind of 
momentum that will carry piggy-back the occasional lie.
North’s views add yet another dimension to the information relation. He makes it 
clear that ideology can be used either to legitimate an existing structure o f property rights 
and the terms of exchange or to attack the injustice of it. Ideology can, therefore, be used 
by either participant in a principal agent relationship against the other. Principals can 
promote ideologies that encourage loyalty and discourage lying, cheating, and slacking to 
make it less likely that agents will renege on their agreements. Agents can promote 
ideologies that instill trust, guilt, or class consciousness to make it less likely that
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principals will monitor their actions. Relating this to the information relation, Informee, 
the principal in the information relation, can promote ideologies against lying while 
Informer, the agent, can promote those that tend to reduce monitoring and verifying.
The former situation, principals trying to get the agents to do what they have 
agreed to do, is the normal or familiar case. In some role, we each rely on other people’s 
buying in to some ideology to ensure that they live up to their agreements with us. The 
somewhat more unusual latter situation, agents using ideology to change the behavior of 
principals, is exemplified by the relationship between Cuba and the former Soviet Union. 
As my memory serves me, when the Soviet Union attempted to wean Cuba off subsidies, 
Cuba’s official position was that in spite of their need for increasing subsidies, Cuba was 
more Marxian than Russia. This was an obvious use of ideology to get more subsidies 
and to reduce monitoring of their use by instilling guilt in the monitor.
Mancur Olson argues that there are only two ways to overcome free riding. The 
first way, he says, is to attach selective or excludable incentives to collective goods. By 
this he means that people must receive some personal benefit for donating money or 
paying their “fair share” to a cause(cited in Higgs 40). As Heyne puts it, “each will not 
do what is in the interest of all unless it is in the interest of each” (365-366). For 
example, professionals who pay the dues to their professional organization are rewarded 
with the association’s journal. The journal is an excludable good, meaning that only 
those people who pay dues get it; the rest are excluded. In this way, the free ride 
problem is overcome. Individuals pay dues to get the journal and thereby benefit the 
collective actions of the professional organization. The second and only other way to 
overcome free riding, says Olson, is by the use of coercion (cited in Higgs 40). Examples 
of this option are too numerous in our tax-everyone-for-the-common-good society to 
warrant mentioning.
Yet, as North explained above, people often act contrary to “individual calculus.” 
Without the lure of selective incentives and without being coerced, people vote, donate 
blood, and in other instances pay their “fair share” even when they could avoid these 
costs and still reap the benefits. People do these things, he says, to the extent that they
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believe the existing system is morally just. That is, people follow the rules, despite the 
appearance of a negative individual calculus, because they see the cost of acting contrary 
to their ideological beliefs as being greater than the benefits that they would receive from 
doing so. ‘T o  put the issue precisely,” says North, “the premium necessary to induce 
people to become free riders is positively correlated with the perceived legitimacy o f the 
existing institution” (Structure and Change 54). Restated in terms of costs, the stronger 
people believe that the existing institution is legitimate and just, the greater are the moral 
costs to them of free riding.
It is the legitimacy of the existing institution or “cause” that “intellectual 
entrepreneurs” are hoping to instill in the population at large. They want adherents to 
recruit, to influence public opinion, and to develop and refine the ideology to include 
issues and segments of the population heretofore excluded. However, promoters of 
various ideologies encounter the free rider problem as do promoters of all group action. 
The above activities impart substantial costs to adherents who engage in them. Yet, 
adherents who do not engage in them will receive benefits just the same.
Using a personal example, for years I have sympathized with the National 
Riflemen’s’ Association’s (NRA) position concerning our Second Amendment right to 
bear arms. Even so, it seemed that I could never justify the membership fee, especially 
since my membership would add so little to the pot, so to speak a n d , of course, knowing 
full well that NRA’s political gains were my benefits regardless. I did however, discuss 
the importance of supporting the NRA with my wife Jeane, who then joined even though 
she knew little about guns. She subsequently appropriated my allowance and purchased a 
second membership in my name. Today, Jeane is an active member, recruiting and 
promoting the cause, while I am a passive member somewhat miffed about my allowance. 
North would say that the NRA ideology did not sufficiently energize me “to behave 
contrary to a simple, hedonistic, individual calculus of costs and benefits” (Structure and 
Change 53).
In North’s view, then, people adhere to a given ideology and, hence, abstain from 
free riding, because they believe that said ideology and its corresponding institutions are
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legitimate and ju s t Higgs argues that it is for reasons of solidarity that people choose to 
adhere to the prescriptions of an ideology. This view is complementary to North’s but 
has a different emphasis. Higgs argues th a t, “people crave the comfort of association 
with those they recognize as their ‘own kind.’” It is this “comfort of association” with 
people who hold similar opinions that provides the individual incentives for people to 
participate in a collective action. As Higgs puts it, “to embrace an ideology is to join a 
community of like-minded people” (42). This view of community resembles Tonnies’s 
concept of “Gemeinschaft of mind” and its derivative, “friendship,” as discussed above. 
Friendship, says Tonnies, develops among those of “common mentality...Thus, those who 
are brethren of such a common faith feel, like members of the same craft or rank, 
everywhere united by a spiritual bond and the co-operation in a common task” (43).
One final comment about ideology, Barnes’s views above suggests an interesting 
irony, perhaps even a dilemma, that ideologies intended to prevent lying are in the 
interests of liars. This is so because such ideologies create a favorable environment for 
lying. In a society under the sway of ideologies intended to prevent lying, most people 
would tell the truth most of the time. This is the circumstance under which, Barnes says, 
dupes would most often mistakenly believe that liars mean what they say. In other words, 
when most people tell the truth, people become more trusting, and hence the liars job 
becomes easier. It would stand to reason, then, that liars want everyone else to tell the 
truth. If so, we might expect that liars may be among the most vociferous and active 
promoters of truth-telling ideologies. This would make them, a 'la  North, “intellectual 
entrepreneurs” or as he sometimes calls them, “ideological entrepreneurs” (Structure and 
Change 65).
From the above writers, we must now isolate the necessary requirements of 
ideology that will be used to analyze the market and bureau models in Chapters 3 and 4. 
These necessary requirements are Mannheim’s “isolation,” “rigid social classes,” “no 
vertical social mobility,” and “no communication between classes,” Sowell’s “a high cost 
for alternative information,” North’s “minimal changes in the terms of exchange,” and 
Higgs’s “opportunity to satisfy the craving for association with like-minded people.”
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The next chapter develops a market model and conducts two analyses on it. The 
first analysis compares the simple protection strategies and the necessary requirements of 
reputation, community and ideology to the institutional constraints of the model. The 
second analysis evaluates the model’s affect on six social phenomena that influence the 
benefit-cost ration of lying in all societies. The social phenomena used for analysis are 
particular knowledge, organizations, free riding, institutional restrictions on 
communication, time preference, and ethical codes of conduct.
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Chapter 3 
Lying in the Private Property Order
In this chapter, I develop a market model that resembles Berger and Luckmann’s 
extreme type model of a society with a single common problem. I then compare the 
constraints of this single-institution market model to the necessary conditions of the 
protection-from-lying strategies that were discussed in the last chapter. Those strategies 
are hostage-taking, incrementalizing, seeking pointed knowledge, signaling, reputation, 
community, and ideology. I also evaluate six social phenomena that influence the 
expected benefit-cost ratio of lying in society: the use of particular knowledge; kinds of 
organizations; the existence of free riding; institutional restrictions on communication; 
the elements of time preference formation; the engendering of ethical codes of conduct.
By evaluating the success of protection strategies and the extent of factors that 
influence the benefit-cost ratio of lying, I will be analyzing lying from both sides of the 
information relation: The strategies are what Informee uses to protect himself; the six 
factors above are what Informer considers when deciding whether or not to lie. 
Conducting this analysis here in relation to the private property order and in Chapter 4 in 
relation to the bureau, will allow us to see if strategies are relatively more effective in one 
model than the other, and if the six factors influencing the benefit-cost ratio of lying are 
relatively more beneficial or harmful in one model than the other.
Choosing a Market Model
There are many market models that we could choose from. Lindblom places 
market systems into four general categories: consumer sovereignty systems and planner 
sovereignty systems, both of which divide into public and private kinds. His consumer 
sovereignty model specifies that “no central government authority directs production; 
production responds to consumer demand in markets” (106). In this model, if capital is in 
private hands, then there exists what we normally call markets. If capital is in public 
hands, there exists what we normally call public utilities. In either case, says Lindblom, 
consumers respond to market prices and hence decide what is produced (100).
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In Lindblom’s planner sovereignty model, the preferences of planners replace the 
preference of consumers. This model specifies that “central governmental authority is 
limited to purchasing final outputs, with market coordination of all intermediate 
production” (106). In its most extreme form, says Lindblom, “all production, consumer 
goods included, is guided by the purchases of a government that has displaced the 
consumer as the ‘sovereign’” (98). All firms, whether public or privately owned, sell 
their output to the government or to other firms who in turn sell to the government. 
Government officials then dispense goods to consumers according to planning 
prescriptions. Lindblom proposes that all real-world, market-oriented systems are, at 
least in part, planner sovereignty systems, because their governments are buyers of many 
final outputs, such as roads and education (99).
By increasingly applying more qualifications to his planner sovereignty model, 
Lindblom produces two more market models: a central authoritative planning model and 
an authoritatively computed prices model. His central authoritative planning model 
specifies “authoritative specification of output targets both for end and intermediate 
products, along with authoritative allocations of inputs, all facilitated, however, through 
money payments and prices.” This he says is the market model of Soviet, Eastern 
European, Cuban and Chinese communism. In Lindblom’s authoritatively computed 
prices model, government “calculates synthetic or shadow prices and other magnitudes to 
attempt an optimal set of physical input allocations and output assignments” (105-106). 
Although no such system actually exists, Lindblom, maintains that its existence is 
theoretically possible (100).
Polanyi separates the concept of “market” from the concept of “economy.” In this 
view, economy is a larger category than that of the market. Economy, says Polanyi, 
includes all human activity whose purpose is producing or procuring things to sustain 
human life. This of course includes market activity, but it also includes reciprocity, gift 
giving, distribution and other exchanges more typical of primitive societies that do not 
appear to be motivated by personal gain. These exchanges, says Polanyi, are imbedded 
within the noneconomic institutions of society such as religion, kinship relations,
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traditions, and ceremony. In this view, economy is “simply a by-product of the working 
of other, noneconomic institutions” (52).
On the other hand, says Polanyi, the market is “institutionally distinct from the 
rest of society.” The production and distribution of goods in the market is carried on by a 
self-regulating system complete with its own laws and institutions. “This institutional 
arrangement is thus separate from the noneconomic institutions of society: its kinship 
organization and its political and religious systems” (47). Polanyi also distinguishes 
between price-making markets and non-price-making markets. In the latter, exchange 
occurs through what he calls “fixed equivalencies,” i.e. fixed relationships, for example 
one bushel of potatoes equals one pound of meat, that are set by tradition or cultural 
norms. (125). His main concern, however, is with markets’ specific institutions, their 
self-regulating mechanism, and the ways in which they differ from his view of economy. 
One could say, as North in fact does, that “Polanyi made a market synonymous with a 
price-making market’ (Structure and Change 42).
The perfect competition market model has been the basis of economic analysis in 
the U. S. since about the 1920s. This model assumes that all producers have perfect 
information, and use identical production methods to produce homogeneous (identical) 
goods. These goods are produced by many producers all of whom face a horizontal 
demand curve. This makes all producers price takers rather than price searchers. Any 
producer that raises prices loses all of his customers to competitors. The assumption of 
free entry and exit into and out of the industry with no transactions costs assures that all 
producers make only normal profits, since other firms will quickly enter production to 
take advantage of above normal profits and thereby push profits down. According to this 
model, most real-world producers are monopolists to varying degrees.
For our purposes, we need a market model that approximates Berger and 
Luckmann’s criteria for an extreme type society in which “there is only one common 
problem, and institutionalization occurs only with respect to actions concerned with this 
problem.” We should also be reminded that “in such a society there would be almost no 
common stock o f knowledge. Almost all knowledge would be role-specific” (75).
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These criteria eliminate all of Lindblom’s planner sovereignty models. These 
models explicitly specify considerable government intervention which implies many 
common problems rather than the single one that is required. In fact, Lindblom’s central 
authoritative planning model and his authoritatively computed prices model specify that 
all economic actions are by government officials who are following rules, even the 
calculation of prices in the latter model. This makes them indistinguishable from Berger 
and Luckmann’s total institutionalization extreme-type model. They would be more 
appropriate at the opposite end of our continuum rather than at the market end.
Lindblom’s consumer sovereignty model is a possible candidate; however, it 
leaves the role of government largely unspecified and hence open. He simply says that 
“no central government authority directs production” as cited above. This still leaves 
room for a host of government regulations that do not necessarily direct production but 
might still prevent production, alter production, initiate production, or in some other way 
change the production outcome from its non-regulated state. Seen as institutionalized 
action, as in Berger and Luckmann’s model, the presence of government regulation of 
market processes indicates the presence of common social problems. We see then that 
Lindblom’s consumer sovereignty model suggests, or at least allows, considerably more 
than one common problem.
Polanyi’s view of economy is far too broad for our purposes; it includes all of 
Lindblom’s models which have already been passed over for reasons which we have just 
discussed. Also, it is not entirely clear that distribution and gift-giving are a form of 
exchange completely divorced of market institutions. The most notable distinction is that 
market exchange is base on direct reciprocity, a one time exchange of items of equivalent 
value or valuation, while distribution and gift giving are base on indirect reciprocity, in 
which there is always a time lag in the exchange process. This distinction seems hardly 
sufficient to create a strict dichotomy between market and noneconomic institutions. 
Mauss argues that market institutions, though sublimated, are at work in primitive 
societies. He shows that gifts are not voluntary as theory has it but are in fact both given 
and repaid under obligation. He says that the gift received includes many legal principles
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that modem societies have separated. The gift received is “at the same time property and 
a possession, a pledge and a loan, an object sold and an object bought, a deposit, a 
mandate, a trust” (22). Mauss notes that “to refuse to give, or to fail to invite is— like 
refusing to accept—the equivalent of a declaration of war; it is a refusal of friendship and 
intercourse” (11). This view suggests that primitive people use benefit-cost analysis in 
relation to gift-giving and-receiving, that self-interest is involved in such exchanges, and 
that gifts exact their price, although not in the form of money.
Polanyi’s price-making market model is also too broad in one sense. Yet in 
another sense, it is too narrow. It is too broad because it includes both Lindblom’s 
planner sovereignty model and his central authoritative planning model. These models, 
to varying degrees of course, use money prices to allocate resources, but both have 
already been passed over because they allow more than one common problem. His price- 
making market model is too narrow because it does not include barter, a voluntary 
contractual exchange such as that between the pig farmer and the com farmer exchanging 
pigs for com at an agreed upon ratio without the use of money. This exchange is not an 
instance of Polanyi’s nonprice-making markets with their fixed equivalencies nor is it an 
instance of reciprocity or gift-giving. Most importantly it does not create market prices, 
but as North says, “it should be readily apparent, however, that any form of voluntary 
contractual exchange involves a market..."{Structure and Change 42).
Actually, exchange, such as the one above, predated the development of price- 
making markets by many centuries. “The first known price-making market was in the 
Athenian agora in the sixth century B. C., but exchange had been going on for millennia 
before that” (North Structure and Change 42). Mauss points out that “markets are found 
before the development of merchants, and before their most important innovation, 
currency as we know it” (2).
The perfect competition model is far from suitable for our purposes. This model 
assumes perfect information on the part of the market participants, which is an 
insurmountable violation of Berger and Luckmann’s “no common stock of knowledge” 
criterion. Also, as Hayek points out, the perfect competition model, despite its name,
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assumes away the most important feature o f markets. If, Hayek argues, we view 
competition as “the action of endeavoring to gain what another endeavors to gain at the 
same time,” then the perfect competition model precludes market competition altogether. 
Those actions, he continues, that are the essence o f competition in real markets such as 
“advertising, undercutting, and improving ( ‘differentiating’) the goods or services 
produced are all excluded by definition— ‘perfect’ competition means indeed the absence 
of all competitive activities” (“Meaning of Competition” 96).
For our purposes, we need a market model that posits only one common problem 
and almost no common stock of knowledge among the market’s individual members.
The stipulation of a single common problem implies that people will, for the most part, be 
pursuing their personal agendas, i.e., there will be no overall design to people’s economic 
actions. The stipulation of no common stock of knowledge implies that individuals must 
be able to provide for their personal needs using only the knowledge that they posses. 
Such a market model would have to explain how the actions of many individuals 
pursuing their personal concerns can result in social cooperation. Furthermore, it must 
explain how a society, whose members posses different sets of knowledge, can make use 
of that knowledge to solve its problems without any single mind knowing the combined 
total of everyone’s knowledge.
Fortunately, such a model exists, and in fact has a long and venerable history. It is 
the model o f the free-market that developed within the classical liberal tradition. This 
model was developed by a long line o f thinkers: the scholastics of the 13th - 16th centuries 
who based their writings on Aristotle and early Church Fathers; the physiocrats of middle 
18th century France, especially Anne Robert Jacques Turgot; the Levellers, a group of 
libertarian thinkers in England during the civil war (1640-50); John Locke, whose theory 
of property rights and natural law, as expressed in his Two Treatises O f Government, was 
based on the works of the scholastics and the Levellers; the classical economists, 
particularly the French school, of the 18th and 19th centuries; and the Austrian school of 
economics of today.
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In tracing the development of this model, economic historian Murray Rothbard 
credits Richard Cantillon (early 1680s-1734) rather than Adam Smith with founding 
economics. Rothbard says Cantillon was the first to demarcate economics as an 
independent field of learning and to present a general treatise on all its aspects (Economic 
Thought 347-358). Smith, who is normally recognized as the father of free-market 
thinking, was, according to Rothbard, actually an inconsistent advocate of laissez-faire, 
who rather than advancing free-market theory, actually shunted it toward an 
interventionism that Ricardo and later classical economists supported(£conom/c Thought 
466-467)..
Rothbard argues that the huge popularity of Smith’s Wealth o f  Nations obscured 
the importance of previous thinker’s contributions and set back free-market theory by 
nearly a century. Prior to Smith, says Rothbard, subjective utility, the scarcity theory of 
value, and the entrepreneurship-and-uncertainty approach was well developed. However, 
Smith rejected these in favor of a labor theory of value and a total elimination o f the 
entrepreneur from economic analysis. This resulted in the “blotting out of knowledge of 
the rich tradition of economic thought that had developed before Smith.” Therefore, 
continues Rothbard, “the Austrians and their nineteenth century predecessors, largely 
deprived of knowledge of the pre-Smith tradition, were in many ways forced to reinvent 
the wheel, to painfully claw their way back to the knowledge that many pre-Smithians 
had enjoyed long before” (Economic Thought 502).
Rothbard further argues that the Smith phenomenon is an excellent example of 
Thomas Kuhn’s contention that the development of science is not a steady, continuous 
march upward into the light of knowledge as is commonly thought. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, Kuhn argues that sciences work within paradigms that only change during 
times of crisis, which brings the old paradigm into question. As Rothbard reminds us, 
Kuhn says this can result in a kind of “zig-zag o f great gain and loss, of advances in 
knowledge followed by decay and false leads, and then by periods of attempts to 
recapture lost knowledge, trying often dimly and against fierce opposition, to regain 
paradigms lost” (Economic Thought 502).
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According to Rothbard, free-market theory was better advanced in France with the 
writings of John Baptist Say (1767-1832), who wrote in the tradition of Turgot and 
Cantillon. Say was said by some to have only developed what Smith had only begun, but, 
according to Rothbard, Say restored economic analysis to a “subjective utility and 
consistent laissez-faire tradition that managed to retain dominance over French 
economics for nearly a century” (Classical Economics 441). The most well known 
among the younger French generation that Say influenced was economist, statesman, and 
author Frederic Bastiat, whose The Law, still published today, shows a relationship 
between the law and plunder.
Still later, near the end of the 19th century, free-market theory was advance by the 
Austrian school of economics. Though initiated in Austria by Menger and his student 
Bohm-Bawerk, Austrian economics was developed primarily in America through the 
works of World War II immigrants Ludwig von Mises and 1974 Nobelist Friedrich 
Hayek. To the Austrian school, a price-making market is only part of a free-market 
model. They a see a free market more as a market society based on the principle of 
voluntary action and division of labor. In such a society, the free market is a spontaneous 
process that manifests itself in many ways. One such manifestation is market prices, but 
any instance of voluntary exchange or voluntary cooperation is also included. Although 
most writers probably use the terms “market” and “free market,” interchangeably, it is 
this larger free-market society and its principle of non-aggression that Austrian writers are 
referring to when they use either term.
This is the market model that we need in our comparison, but there is the problem 
of what to call it. Whatever name we choose must designate a category broad enough to 
include all voluntary action and narrow enough to exclude Lindblom’s market models all 
of which have been shown above to be unsuitable. Our term must also capture the sense 
of spontaneous processes and order. The term “free market” is commonly used, but as we 
have seen, “free market” and “market” are often used interchangeably, and as we have 
also seen in Lindblom’s usage, “market” can mean too many things to be analytically 
useful. Hayek uses the term “liberal social order” in his “Principles of a Liberal Social
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Order.”, which captures the idea o f social order but again the term “liberal” means too 
many things and indeed in today’s political context suggests a  highly constraint m arket 
“Laissez faire,” a term borrowed from the physiocrats is also commonly used; however, 
since Herbert Spencer, this term has come to be associated with Darwin’s usage of 
“evolution” and the law of the jungle, a far cry from voluntary society.
Greaves calls such a market model a  “contract society,” a suitable term but one 
that, to my mind at least, does not suggest spontaneous processes (I)- Rand calls it 
“capitalism” (Virtue 92), and Hoppe calls it “pure capitalism” (18). Rand’s choice is 
hopelessly muddled with the connotation of class conflict because of the fact that Marx 
originated the term, and Hoppe’s choice suffers the same stigma as well as being 
somewhat reminiscent of the perfect competition market model, often called “pure 
competition.”
A better term, in my mind, than any of the above is the term “private property 
order” used on the web page of the Foundation for Economic Education to describe their 
mission. Their welcome to web visitors reads, “Welcome to The Foundation for 
Economic Education (FEE) the oldest research organization dedicated to the preservation 
o f individual freedom and the private property order.” This term suggests to me both the 
principle of voluntarism and spontaneous order. I shall therefore use it throughout the 
remainder of this work to designate the extreme type market model developed below that 
sits at one end of an institutional continuum.
The Private Property Order
The private property order is based on the political philosophy called 
“individualism.” According to Hayek, “the most general principle on which an 
individualist system is based is that it uses the universal acceptance o f general principles 
as the means to create order in social affairs” (“Individualism: True and False” 19). 
Hayek traces the historical development o f two strains of individualism, the British 
school and the Cartesian school. He argues that much of today’s confusion about what 
constitutes individualism stems from the fact that there are two incompatible schools of 
thought both claiming the title “individualism.” The British school is true individualism,
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says Hayek, because its practical result is a stable social order characterized by the 
freedom of each individual. This strain was developed in the works of John Locke, 
Bernard Mandeville, David Hume, Josiah Tucker, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith,
Edmund Burke, Lord Acton and Alexis de Tocqueville. The Cartesian school was 
developed primarily in France through the works of Descartes, the Encyclopedists, 
Rousseau, and the physiocrats. This school uses the name “individualism” in a false 
sense, says Hayek, because the practical result of its philosophy is socialism or 
collectivism, (“Individualism: True and False” 4).
The main difference between the British and the Cartesian schools of 
individualism was in their views concerning the nature of man. The British school saw 
man as selfish, rather weak-willed, and only sporadically rational. They therefore became 
known as the “anti-rationalists.” In contrast, the Cartesian school became known as the 
“rationalists” because of their view that man has perfect or perfectible rationality. The 
anti-rationalists explained social order as being the result of spontaneous processes which 
were generated by the actions of individuals pursuing their own ends and which guided 
and corrected the actions of these individuals. The rationalists had no use for 
spontaneous processes. For them, social order was the result of a perfect rationality 
having so designed it (Hayek “Individualism: Tme and False” 8-9).
These different views of human nature led to very different approaches. The anti­
rationalists saw society as nothing more than a collection of individuals. Understanding 
social order for them was synonymous with understanding individual action and the 
consequent spontaneous processes; therefore, the individual became their unit of 
analysis. This approach has become known as “methodological individualism.” Contrary 
to this, the Cartesian school contemplated society as a whole, independent of individual 
action. Their unit o f analysis was the group or some social whole (Hayek “Individualism: 
Tme and False” 6).
These different views of human nature also led to very different practical 
outcomes. The anti-rationalist believed people should be as free as possible to pursue 
their own ends. For them, this was the way to ensure the formation of spontaneous
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processes necessary to correct the deficiencies o f human nature. The rationalists, on the 
other hand, thought that society should be rationally designed, specifically by those minds 
that had attained the greatest degree of perfection. With their different emphases, one on 
unrestrained action and the other on design, it is easy to see how the British school led to 
the private property order, and the Cartesian school led to socialism.
The reader may have noticed the irony concerning the nations of origin of 
individualism, as described here by Hayek, and of free-market theory, as described by 
Rothbard above. Although true individualism was developed in England, Smith and the 
other English classical economists were unsuccessful at incorporating it consistently into 
their free-market theories. Adding to the irony, while the Cartesian school of 
individualism in France was framing collectivist theories of political economy, J. B. Say 
and the French classical economists managed to salvage free-market theory. However 
that may be, from this point on, I use the term “individualism” to refer to the political 
philosophy of the British school, and, as mentioned above, I use the term “private 
property order” to refer to the free-market society of the French and the Austrian schools.
So what are the main features of individualism? As mentioned above . 
individualism sees human nature as fundamental and unalterable. Part of that nature, 
explains Hayek, is the constitutional limitation of man’s knowledge and interests, i.e.,
“the fact that he cannot know more than a tiny part of the whole of society and that 
therefore all that can enter into his motives are the immediate effects which his actions 
will have in the sphere he knows” (“Individualism: True and False” 14). Even a person’s 
moral inclinations are of little consequence for social order, says Hayek, given that “the 
human needs for which he can effectively care are an almost negligible fraction of the 
needs of all members of society” (“Individualism: True and False” 14).
The main problem for individualist theorists in their construction of social theory 
“was how these limited concerns, which did in fact determine people’s actions, could be 
made effective inducements to cause them voluntarily to contribute as much as possible 
to needs which lay outside the range of their vision” (Hayek “Individualism: True and 
False” 14). A successful system would have to somehow relegate to individuals an area
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of action and responsibility so limited that it did not demand more of them than their 
nature allowed them to successfully occupy. At the same time, these areas o f  action and 
responsibility must be large enough to allow individuals to make full use of all their 
natural gifts and talents. Also, the relative importance of the personal benefits that 
individuals could achieve for themselves by acting within these limited areas of 
responsibility must correspond to the relative importance of the more remote, unknown, 
and unintended consequences of their actions to other people. That is to say, the effects 
of people’s actions on others must be similar to the effects on themselves. It was a 
further complication that such an area of responsibility could not be assigned to 
individuals because of the inability of man’s limited rationality to complete such a task. 
(Hayek “Individualism: True and False” 17).
Individualist theorists searched for a system of institutions that would induce 
people, who are selfish by nature, to make correct choices in regards to social order. 
Somewhat to their surprise they found that such a system, although imperfectly formed, 
already existed. Hayek explains:
The chief concern of the great individualist writers was indeed to find a set 
of institutions by which man could be induced, by his own choice and 
from the motives which determined his ordinary conduct, to contribute as 
much as possible to the need of all others; and their discovery was that the 
system of private property did provide such inducements to a much greater 
extent than had yet been understood. (“Individualism: True and False” 
12-13)
Individualist philosophers found that private property relegates to individuals 
limited areas of concern because it defines and delineates spheres of action and 
responsibility. They also found that private property allows individuals to have 
reasonable expectations concerning the behavior of others since everyone’s actions are 
necessarily tied to their property. Furthermore, private property results in production and 
trade as individuals use their natural gifts and talents to produce, alter, and exchange their 
property to benefit themselves. In their efforts to benefit themselves through trade 
individuals must provide goods and services desired by other people. This is the
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fulfillment of the requirement above that the effects of people’s actions on others must be 
similar to the effects on themselves.
Individualist philosophers also found that private property speaks to the role of 
coercion in social organization. Their reasoning went something like this: Individuals 
that can know or care about only a negligible segment of total society cannot be counted 
on to refrain from trespassing; these private areas of concern and responsibility created 
by private property must be protected, by force if necessary, from being violated; because 
of man’s limited knowledge and limited concern for his fellow man, no individual could 
know the best use of coercion. From this line of reasoning, individualist philosophers 
concluded that the principle of limited coercion must be a fundamental principle of social 
order (Hayek “Individualism: True and False” 16).
Theorists did not deny coercive power completely but wished to limit its use to
those areas that could reduce total coercion in society to a minimum. To accomplish this,
they reasoned, the state, as organized coercion, must be utilized to reduce the use of
coercion by individuals in their relations with one another. However, they were quick to
add, putting the power of legal coercion in the hands of the state is, in actuality, putting it
in the hands of the shortsighted, narrowly self-interested individuals who are, at any given
time, in control of the state apparatus. Therefore, the state must itself be restrained by
law in its use of coercion. As Hayek puts it,
the state, the embodiment of deliberately organized and consciously 
directed power, ought to be only a small part of the much richer organism 
which we call ‘society,’ and that the former ought to provide merely a 
framework within which free (and therefore not ‘consciously directed’) 
collaboration of men has the maximum of scope. (Individualism: True 
and False 22)
To recap before proceeding, the private property order is a society in which 
human relations are ordered by spontaneous processes that are the result of people’s 
actions within their limited areas of concern and responsibility. These areas of concern 
are identified and delineated by private property rights and are protected from trespass by 
the society’s instrument of coercion, the state. Hayek says that the ordering forces in such
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a society are “the regularity of the conduct of its members.” He says that taking 
advantage of these forces allows its members to achieve a much more complex society 
than could be done by deliberate design but at the expense of limiting their power over 
the details of that society. It also allows them to extend social cooperation beyond the 
boundaries of those of small groups which are held together by a common purpose. 
(“Principles of a Liberal Social Order” 366).
Hayek makes the distinction between the spontaneous order or private property 
order and what we commonly call an “organization.” This distinction rests on the 
absence or presence of common purpose. He says that the spontaneous order has no 
common purpose. Its members are free to pursue their own purposes within their limited 
areas of concern. With no common purpose, there is no overall design to which 
individuals must conform. Neither is there a central authority who commands individuals 
to adjust their actions to meet the requirements of an overall design. It is this lack of 
social purpose, says Hayek, that presents a space in which spontaneous order can grow 
(“Principles of a Liberal Social Order” 366).
In contrast to the spontaneous order, the social order called “organization” has a 
common purpose and an overall design to make the purpose reality. It also has a central 
authority which commands individuals to adjust their actions. Michael Oakeshot calls the 
spontaneous order a “nomocratic” (law-govemed) social order and the organization a 
telocratic (purpose-governed) social order (cited in Hayek “Principles of a Liberal Social 
Order” 366). Hayek says that the difference between these types of social order is 
fundamental, and even though the spontaneous order contains many different types of 
organizations, “the two principles of order cannot be mixed in any manner we may wish” 
(“Principles of a Liberal Social Order” 366).
Hayek’s distinction between these two fundamentally different social orders 
parallels Berger and Luckmann’s distinction between a one-common-problem society and 
an all-common-problem society: The spontaneous order has a single common problem, 
which is the defense of private property rights; in the organization, aU problems are 
common and demand a common, organizational response. Both distinctions by these
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writers emphasize and legitimate the contrast made in this paper between markets and 
bureaus.
I now look at some of the more important institutions in the private property 
order: private property, free markets, entrepreneurship, competition, and division of 
labor. I will also look at the role of the state. We will then be ready to compare the 
institutional constraints of the private property order to the requirements of protection- 
from-lying strategies.
The most fundamental institution in the private property order is the concept of 
“individual rights.” According to Rand, “a ‘right’ is a moral principle defining and 
sanctioning a man’s freedom of action in a social context” (Virtue o f  Selfishness 93).
That is, rights outline the areas of concern and responsibility, as discussed above, in 
which individuals have freedom of action. In doing so, they also constrain the ways that 
the members of society can act in common, thus restricting the actions of the actions of 
the state. Rand argues that “individual rights are the means o f subordinating society to 
moral law” (emphasis hers) (Virtue o f Selfishness 92).
According to Hazlitt, the concept of “rights” originated as a legal concept. In fact, 
he says, in most European languages, the terms for “law” and “right” are identical.* 
Hazlitt points out that “the Latin jus, the French droit, the Italian diritto, the Spanish 
derecho, the German Recht signify both the legal rule that binds a person and the legal 
right that every person claims as his own” (279). He says that a somewhat more recent 
phenomenon than this view, that rights are inherently bound up with the legal order of 
society, is the view that rights have an existence of their own separate from the legal 
order (281). Here, Hazlitt is speaking of the natural law view of rights that grew to 
dominate political economy in the 18th and early 19th centuries.
The source of rights has been the topic of a very large literature which has not yet 
setded the issue. This literature exposits two basic views regarding the source of rights: 
rights as preceding the state; rights as granted by the state. In the former view, rights are
* This is not true of the Slavic languages, however. The Slavic root zakon means law given from above or 
God’s law, while the root pravo means right as in rightful action
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either granted by God or ascribed to man by natural law. According to the natural law 
view, the basis of much 18th and 19th century political philosophy, rights spring from 
some aspect of human nature. As Francis Lieber put it, “The law of nature or natural 
law .. .is the law, the body of rights, which we deduce from the essential nature of man” 
(cited in Rothbard Ethics o f Liberty 23). In this view, rights are an integral part of the 
human condition and are therefore inalienable, meaning nonseparable from man himself. 
They therefore act as a protection for individuals against the action of the state.
In the latter view, rights are granted by the state and hence have no metaphysical 
existence. This makes them alienable; what the state gives, it can take away. The 
strongest current of this view in Western political philosophy, utilitarianism, holds that 
the state should allocate rights according to the principle of effecting the greatest good for 
the greatest number of people. This view is quite hostile to the claims of natural law 
writers. In fact, Bentham called such claims “nonsense on stilts” (cited in Paul, Miller 
and Paul ii). As we shall see later, this granted-by-the-state view is the basis of 
organization by central authority as in the bureau.
In the private property order, rights spring from the human condition. John Locke 
said that natural reason “tells us that men, being once bom, have a right to their 
preservation, and consequently to meat and drink and such other things as nature affords 
for their subsistence” (16). Locke thought that property rights stem from the self-evident 
fact that man is the sole owner of his own body. He says, “The labor of his body and the 
work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.” From this Locke deduced that 
“whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has provided and left it in, he has 
mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
property” (17).
In this century, expanding on Locke’s views, Rand argues that the concept of 
“rights” pertains only to action or freedom o f action. She says that man has a right to life 
which, she says, means the right to engage in “self-sustaining and self-generated action,” 
including the action of producing things to sustain his life. In short she says, “The right 
to life is the source of all rights—and the right to property is their only implementation”
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(94). In this view, self-ownership is the primary implementation of man’s rights and 
other property rights and even political rights flow from this fact.
Rand’s choice of the term “right to life” to refer to man’s fundamental right to 
engage in self-sustaining action was an unfortunate choice that has lost its meaning in the 
confusion in today’s legal battles over the rights of the fetus. Rand’s meaning was aimed 
at adults, who are capable of self-sustaining action. In today’s context “right to life” 
refers to the supposed right of a fetus to be bom.
Locke, recognizing the problem that dependent children present to human rights
theory, explained it this way:
Children I confess are not bom in this full state of equality (of right to their 
natural freedom), though they are bom to it. Their parents have a sort of 
rule and jurisdiction over them when they come into the world, and for 
some time after, but ‘tis but a temporary one. The bonds of this subjection 
are like the swaddling clothes they are wrapt up in, and supported by, in 
the weakness of their infancy. Age and reason as they grow up, loosen 
them till at length they drop quite off, and leave a man at his own free 
disposal. (31)
Rothbard works out problem of child rights by applying the principle of self­
ownership. He argues that “it is impermissible to interpret the term ‘right to life,’ to give 
one an enforceable claim to the action of someone else to sustain that life” (Ethics 99). 
Such a right would negate the mother’s rights to her body. Once bom, however, a baby 
“possesses the right of self-ownership by virtue of being a separate entity and a potential 
adult” {Ethics o f Liberty 100). Since the baby cannot be an autonomous self-owner, it 
becomes the property of the parents through “homesteading.” The parent’s property 
rights in the baby, attenuated by its right of self-ownership, are that of a “trustee-owner.” 
This relationship lasts so long as the child voluntarily remains in the home, which is the 
property of the parents. According to Rothbard, “the child has his/«// rights of self­
ownership when he demonstrates that he has them in nature— in short, when he leaves or 
‘runs away’ from home” (author’s emphasis) (Rothbard Ethics o f  Liberty 103).
Utilitarians solve the problem of child rights by simply assigning rights to 
children. As discussed above, this assignation is justified by the general good that it
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confers on the community or on society as a whole. As one writer explains the general
good,
unless a community does replace its members, so to speak, continuously, 
there would be nothing else it could do to maintain its existence over time. 
In fact there would be little point in having rights since rights would now 
be confined to a discrete set of persons, constantly diminishing both 
numerically and temporally, with the result that a community could never 
be a continuing but at most a purely passing phenomenon, like a meteor. 
(Stoljar 120).
Private property is often thought of in the sense of physical objects, but Alchian 
and Demsetz argue that property rights are actually use rights. A single physical object 
has many uses; for example, a tract of land may be used for tilling, hunting, construction 
etc. All o f the possible uses of an object comprise what Alchian and Demsetz call a 
“bundle” of uses, the rights to which comprise a bundle of use rights. This bundle of use 
rights, they point out, may reside in one person or in different owners. In the first case, a 
single person is the sole owner, and his right to the property may be considered absolute 
in the sense that no one may intervene on any of the possible uses of that object. In the 
second case, multiple persons may own different use rights to the same object. For 
example, a person may own the right to till the soil and to hunt on his land, or he may 
retain the right to till the soil and sell the right to hunt to someone else. This is what 
Alchian and Demsetz call “partitioning of the domain of uses” (18).
Besides use rights, the concept of property in the private property order also 
includes exclusion rights or the right to exclude others from using it. The right to exclude 
serves several functions. First, it reserves the use and, hence, the benefits of the property 
to the owner who then has an incentive to becomes a responsible steward. He cares for it 
and maintains it in relation to the stream of benefits that he is able to get from it; he acts 
as a broker who maximizes the property value by selecting the best future time stream of 
benefits and costs. Second, it also reserves the costs associated with the property to the 
owner, which is to say, it protects others from the bad effects of the owners property. 
(Demsetz “Theory Of Property Rights.” 38).
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Writers often contrast private property rights with common property rights in
order to emphasize the superior ability of private property rights to connect the magnitude
of personal benefits and costs of private action to the magnitude of the corresponding
social benefits and costs. Garrett Hardin’s 1968 article The Tragedy o f the Commons
brought the problem of common property into national focus. Hardin models the
commons as a pasture to which all herders have access. He then essentially applies
Mises’s action axiom, discussed in Chapter I, by asking how the rational herder moves
himself from a situation of lesser satisfaction to a situation of greater satisfaction under
these conditions. Each herder can get marginal benefits greater than marginal costs each
time he overgrazes. The benefits from overgrazing are captured privately, but the costs of
overgrazing, i.e., depletion of the resource, are delayed and dispersed among all of the
herders. The rational choice is to get while the getting is good. Hardin concludes:
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd 
without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward 
which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that 
believes in the freedom of the commons (115).
Resources tend to become depleted under such conditions because common 
property rights structures separate the right to use property from the right to exclude 
others from using it. In Alchian and Demsetz’s words, “each person has the private right 
to the use of a resource once it is captured or taken, but only a communal right to the 
same resource before it is taken” (22). Property is more valuable after it is taken than it is 
lying in the common pool, because the process of taking reconnects use rights and 
exclusion rights in those resource units that are taken. Alchian and Demsetz contend that 
this arrangement is an unstable rights structure because “the private right form will 
displace the communal right form” (23). Sometimes this transformation has very high 
costs as in the decimation of America’s bison herds.
Demsetz says that the great disadvantage of communal property is that “the effects 
of a person’s activities on his neighbors and on subsequent generations will not be taken 
into account fully” (“Theory O f Property Rights.” 39). That is to say that the personal
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benefits and costs o f individual action to the individual are disconnected from the benefits 
and cost to others of the more remote consequences of these actions. This means that the 
interests of individuals and the interests of society at large, which are essentially the same 
in the private property order, are disconnected in the common property order. In short, 
Adam Smith’s invisible hand ceases to work; property relations between people must be 
managed by an authority.
Continuing with institutions of the private property order, I now look more briefly 
at free markets, entrepreneurship, competition, and division of labor, which are 
intertwined.
The free m arket, where people engage in the voluntary exchange of property, is a 
natural corollary of private property. The mutual benefit of the traders is a necessary 
requirement for voluntary exchange to take place. If either party to a potential exchange 
believed that he would not be made better off by the exchange, the trade would not occur. 
In the presence of money, voluntary exchange results in money prices that reflect the 
relative importance of the exchanged goods to society. Market prices allow people to 
evaluate goods and services against one another to maximize their use in want 
satisfaction (Mises Human Action 257-258).
Input prices allow the ranking in importance of the alternative uses of resources in 
the production of consumer goods. Resources that comprise most highly valued 
consumer goods will command the highest price on input markets. Entrepreneurs 
wishing to use highly valued resources must pay a price equal to society’s next most 
valued use for them. Market prices, therefore, ensure that highly valued inputs are only 
used to make highly valued consumer goods. Lower valued consumer goods must be 
made with lower valued inputs. Entrepreneurs may wish to make steel toys, but the high 
price of steel due to, say, consumer demand for automobiles, leads toy entrepreneurs to 
use plastic instead. In this way, resources are allocated to their most highly desired use.
Entrepreneurs are allowed the use of resources so long as they abide by societies 
valuations of them. Entrepreneurs’ ordering of resources is never safe nor decided once 
and for all, but instead, must be constantly altered to accommodate changing consumer
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wants. As Hazlitt puts it, “consumers, by their purchases or refusals to purchase, daily 
decide afresh who shall own productive property and how much he shall own” (305). If 
entrepreneurs are successful at so ordering their resources, consumers allow them to keep 
their resources and reward them with profits. If entrepreneurs are unsuccessful, they are 
punished with personal losses and must turn the control of their resources over to 
someone else. In this process, individuals can meet their personal wants and needs only 
by meeting the wants and needs of other people. Everybody is both a means and an end 
in regard to social want satisfaction; he is “an ultimate end for himself and a means to 
other people in their endeavors to attain their own ends” (Mises Human Action 257).
People are both a means and an end in society because of their dual roles as 
consumers and producers. In their role as consumers, people compete with one another 
for consumption goods in their willingness and ability to pay market prices. As 
producers, people compete to arrange resources in ways that best satisfy consumers’ 
demands. Producers must keep their production costs lower than the market price in 
order to obtain a profit. Competition amongst producers spurs them to new innovations 
in procedures and technology for the purpose of lowering their production costs. If they 
fail in these efforts, they will be replaced by those of their competitors who are more 
creative or efficient, and they must move into a different line. The effect of competition 
is to continually replace less efficient managers of resources with more efficient managers 
of those same resources. Therefore, competition is an important aspect of social 
cooperation because it compels members of society to “cooperate more effectively with 
the buying public” (Hazlitt, 307).
An important aspect of competing in the market is specializing in what one does 
best. This leads to division of labor. The importance of the division of labor was 
emphasized by Adam Smith in the first sentence of Wealth o f Nations: “The greatest 
improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, 
dexterity, and judgment with which it is any where directed, or applied, seem to have 
been the effects of the division of labour” (vol. 17). Division of labor occurs because 
people have different abilities and because the earth’s resources vary from place to place.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
117
Mises calls the division o f labor the fundamental “social phenomenon” {Human Action 
157).
Division of labor makes it possible for society to benefit from a much larger total 
set of information than in autarkic production because each person only has to know his 
specialty. This is what Sowell is getting at when he says that “individually we know so 
pathetically little, and yet socially we use a range and complexity of knowledge that 
would confound a computer” (,Knowledge and Decisions 3). In comparison, primitive 
societies engage in very little division of labor, except by gender and age. Most members 
must know all that is necessary to stay alive: how to make tools, weapons, clothing, and 
shelter; how to hunt and raise and preserve food; how to defend their property; how to 
birth and raise children; how to treat disease and injury. When one’s consciousness is 
bothered by so many different categories of knowledge, one can allot only a small amount 
of time and energy to each one. The result is a low level of development for them all.
The conditions of life in such societies are hence basic.
* For an in-depth look at division of labor, see Emile Durkheim’s The division of Labor in Society.
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Adam Smith’s example o f making pins demonstrates how division of labor allows 
society to make use of more knowledge than any one person can know. He shows that for 
a single individual to make a pin he must have knowledge of mining, metallurgy, 
smelting, wire pulling, etc., and could scarcely make one pin per day; however, with 
division of labor, a person with no great knowledge of any of these things can make 
thousands of pins per day (vol. 1 8-9).
The last private property order institution that we will consider is that o f the state.
The state is the only formal institution in the private property order, and it is organized to
address the single common problem, the defense of property rights. Hayek outlines very
succinctly the role of government in a private property order:
The central concept of liberalism is that under the enforcement of 
universal rules of just conduct, protecting a recognizable private domain of 
individuals, a spontaneous order of human activities o f much greater 
complexity will form itself than could ever be produced by deliberate 
arrangement, and in that consequence the coercive activities of 
government should be limited to the enforcement of such rules...” 
(“Principles of a Liberal Social Order” 365-366)
This principle of government is what Hayek calls “Rule of Law,” by which he means 
government bound in all its actions by fixed rules announced beforehand. These rules 
make it possible to foresee with certainty “how the authority will use its coercive powers 
in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this 
knowledge.” Therefore, “under the Rule of Law government is prevented from stultifying 
individual efforts by ad hoc action” (Hayek Road to Serfdom 72-73).
Bastiat is even more to the point. He says that “each o f us has a natural right— 
from God—to defend his person, his liberty, and his property.” It follows, he argues, that 
“a group of men have the right to organize and support a common force to protect these 
rights constantly” (6). In other words, the state gets its right to use coercion from 
individuals who have this right, but only in defense of their person, liberty, or property. 
Bastiat continues:
Since no individual acting separately can lawfully use force to destroy the 
rights of others, does it not logically follow that the same principle also
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applies to the common force that is nothing more than the organized 
combination of the individual forces? (7)
Allowing any other function to the state, says Bastiat, permits it to engage in activities 
that are illegal for individuals to pursue. It therefore, allows the state to engage in “legal 
plunder” (11).
The effect of the Rule of Law is to put individuals in identical relations to 
government power. These relations are reduced to a single imperative, “Don’t use 
coercion in relations with others,” by which all people must abide or face the same 
punishment. Since people have identical relations to government, no person can use 
government power to gain an advantage over another person; therefore, although there 
may be many classes, there are no class conflicts in the private property order. The only 
clash of interests are between people who choose to follow the rules of peaceful 
cooperation and those who choose to use coercion in relation to other people: In other 
words, between people in the order and those who opt out of it. Government is 
established for the purpose of giving people who respect the rights of others advantage 
over those who don’t.
Summarizing the private property order, the private property order is a society in 
which human relations are ordered by spontaneous processes that are the result of 
people’s actions within limited areas of concern and responsibility. These limited areas 
are identified and delineated by private property rights and are protected from trespass by 
the state. The state is constrained by the Rule o f Law, which assures that government is 
bound in all its actions by fixed rules. The effect o f the Rule of Law is to put all 
individuals in identical relations to government power, assuring that no one can use 
government power to gain an advantage over others.
Mises argues that even though the private property order does not actually exist, it 
could in fact exist since its economic and social implications are based on discovered 
regularities that transcend time and space; for example, in regard to the action axiom, we 
cannot deny that action has purpose or even comprehend a category of action devoid of 
purpose. Purpose is, therefore, a regularity in the actions of all human beings who have
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ever acted or who will ever act. Purpose implies other regularities like time preference, 
marginality, diminishing marginal utility, and others that are also present in every human 
act. These regularities, says Mises, make it possible to imagine how something would be, 
if it were to come to pass, even though it has never been; the theory of money, for 
example, could have been developed even before it was observed that people were 
actually exchanging goods indirectly {Epistemological Problems 15).
In the remainder o f this chapter, I complete two basic analyses within the private 
property order: (1)1 evaluate the opportunity to protect oneself from lying, and (2) I 
evaluate the benefit-cost ratio of lying. In other words, I look at lying from both sides of 
the information relation. On the one side, Informee evaluates means and opportunities to 
protect himself from being lied to. On the other side, Informer evaluates the expected 
benefit-cost ratio of lying. The general question that these analyses address is how the 
institutional constraints of the private property order affect the options of both parties to 
the information relation. In the first analysis, I evaluate how well protection strategies 
can function in the private property order by comparing their necessary requirements to 
the constraints of the model. In the second analysis, I evaluate how the constraints of the 
private property order affect the benefit-cost ratio of lying, which informs us about the 
opportunity to lie.
Protection Strategy Effectiveness in the Private Property Order
Before beginning the first analysis, it is necessary to review the protection 
strategies. First, hostage-taking refers to the practice of holding some part of the 
promisor’s wealth in escrow until the truster has the opportunity to decide if he has been 
lied to. Second, incrementalizing is the strategy of trying a little bit of something before 
committing to a lot of it. Third, seeking pointed knowledge is the strategy of developing 
an information path by asking a series of questions of different people. Fourth, signaling 
is the strategy of differentiating oneself from liars by investing in costly signals. Fifth, 
reputation is the strategy of basing one’s personal exposure to another person’s decisions 
on what one knows first-hand or from the “grapevine” about his honesty in past dealings. 
Sixth, community is the strategy o f choosing isolation and interdependence with other
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people in order to increase one’s ability to monitor the behavior of those with whom one 
deals. Seventh, ideology is the strategy of recruiting others into a community of values in 
which all perpetually reaffirm each other’s belief in these values, thereby making 
everyone’s actions and decisions more predictable. People also, strategize by evaluating 
other’s commitment to moral values before dealing with them.
The Simple Strategies
Beginning the analysis, in the private property order, there are no obstacles to 
hostage-taking, incrementalizing, or seeking pointed knowledge. In the private property 
order context, hostage-taking means obtaining the permission of the promisor to hold a 
portion of his wealth in escrow until his promise has been fulfilled. Promisors that intend 
to fulfill their promise are likely to give such permission and perhaps even to offer a 
hostage to show good faith. People are free to incrementalize because they have free 
association with others and because their property rights are protected. People express 
their desire to incrementalize in markets, where trades take place in specific amounts for 
specific prices. People are free to seek pointed knowledge since they can choose their 
own problems and are free to associate with others, within the context of property rights, 
in seeking a solution to them.
Moving on to signaling, signaling refers to the displaying of costly signals to 
differentiate one’s claims from the claims of liars. The example used in Chapter 2 is 
college diplomas. Applicants who have college diplomas can speak with more credibility 
to employers than applicants who do not have them. Signaling occur across the spectrum 
of reputation, community, and ideology in the private property order. These complex 
strategies will be discussed below; however, briefly here, signaling, as part of the 
reputation process, is the displaying for all to see of what one has to lose by lying. The 
wealthy merchant who makes known his large network of trading partners and his history 
of satisfied trades with others, who builds his mansion by the sea and engages in the high 
life is signaling to other merchants that he dare not lie to them else he lose it all. In the 
community setting, members signal their solidarity to each other by investing in costly 
signals such as seeing to each other’s welfare and engaging in actions that benefit the
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entire community. They also, as described in relation to virtual communities above, learn 
the community’s history, traditions, and norms, which signals their ability to act as a 
community protector, since they can easily identify new comers and impostors by their 
lack of such knowledge. People who share the same ideology, such as the Amish in the 
U. S., signal to each other the extent of their commitments by acting either more or less in 
accord with the prescriptions of the ideology, thus differentiating themselves from larger 
society. Being so differentiated can also be very costly to them in terms of rejection by 
the larger society.
Having found that there are no obstacles to the simple protection strategies in the 
private property order, we now turn our attention to the complex strategies, reputation, 
community, and ideology.
Reputation
In this section, I compare the necessary requirements of reputation to the 
constraints of the private property order. The necessary requirements for reputation, 
taken from Smith, Tullock, Shearmur and Klein, and Axelrod, were brought out in 
Chapter 2. These requirements are repeated dealings, freely chosen partners, the 
opportunity to select the “don’t play” option, moral seals of approval, informal groups, 
extended dealings, high value of the future, and the opportunity for tit-for-tat reciprocity.
Repeated dealings is a situation where people expect to deal with the same people 
again in the future. Repeated dealings could be forced, as in a prison, or voluntary, as in 
the neighborhood grocery. Freely chosen partners is the condition whereby people can 
personally decide each and every instance of their dealings, which gives rise to the don’t 
play option. The “don’t play” option is the choice of whether to deal with someone, 
which is the essence of reciprocity. Moral seals of approval are conferred by formal 
groups that have standards for membership that reflect on the integrity of the members. 
Informal groups are any of the thousands of possibilities of voluntary associations. 
Extended dealings are interactions among friends, relatives, and partners in which 
knowledge of honest or deceitful behavior of other people is shared. To value the future 
simply means that people want to deal with someone at a later date. Direct tit-for-tat
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reciprocity means returning in-kind the consideration, or lack of it, that someone gives 
you.
These strategies are over lapping and interconnected. For example, freely chosen 
partners, or what we might call free association, gives rise to informal groups, extended 
dealings, and to the “don’t play” option. Also, the opportunity for repeated dealings gives 
people a reason to value the future. It is people’s valuing the future that makes it 
possible, as Tullock showed in Chapter 2, for them to overcome the prisoners’ dilemma.
I now begin comparing these strategies to the constraints of the private property 
order. Because of the interconnection and overlap o f these strategies, I first consider 
repeated dealings, freely chosen partners, reciprocity, and the “don’t play” option 
together. I then consider moral seals of approval separately followed by informal groups 
and extended dealings consider together. Finally, I consider valuing the future separately.
There are no formal constraints in the private property order that would prevent 
repeated dealings, freely chosen partners, or reciprocity. Since people are sovereign in 
their areas of responsibility, they can choose to deal repeatedly with other sovereign 
individuals, or they can choose to halt their dealings. They will repeat their dealings 
when they benefit from doing so, and they will halt such dealings when they suffer costs. 
This is the essence of Tullock’s “don’t play” option, which allows individuals the 
opportunity for a tit-for-tat kind of direct reciprocity.
There are no formal restrictions in the private property order on moral seals of 
approval. Reviewing Shearmur and Klein’s two criteria for formal groups being able to 
confer moral seals of approval upon their members as cited above, we find that (1) groups 
must be internally familiar enough to know of their members’ activities and to judge 
competently their members’ characters and (2) the groups assessments of their members 
character must be available outside the group and respected as trustworthy (37). These 
criteria find no restriction in the private property order other than possibly from social 
norms. People can organize themselves around any purpose not precluded by social 
norm s , setting whatever requirement for membership suits the purpose of the
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organization. They are also free to make information about internal appraisals available 
externally.
In addition to the real-world examples mentioned in Chapter 2 of groups that
confer moral seals of approval, i.e., churches, Rotary, Kiwanis, chambers of commerce,
and the Bar Association, there are also market organizations that perform this function for
a profit, for example credit card companies. Shearmur and Klein point out the parallels
between the holder of a credit card and the man who joined the Baptist sect for business
purposes in Weber’s story.
The modem credit card offers the modem analog to the Baptist sectary’s 
certificate from his congregation. In a large and anonymous society such 
as the United States, many people carry credit cards, which speak for them 
to people with whom they have had no previous contact and with whom 
they may well never be in contact again. The sect’s inquiries into the 
would-be member’s probity are paralleled by the credit card company’s 
scrutiny of the would-be card-holder’s credit record. (41-42)
Other real-world examples of market organizations that confer moral seals of approval 
are Underwriters Laboratories, Consumers' Report and Good House Keeping, ail of 
which provide seals of approval by vouching for the quality of products produced by 
others.
There are no formal restrictions on informal groups or extended dealings in the 
private property order. People may come and go as they please in informal groups, 
acquiring bits of information that they might use themselves or pass on to others. People 
are free to engage in extended dealings by telling their friends and acquaintances about 
their dealings with others to the extent that it serves their needs. Technological 
improvements in communication increasingly make informal groups more important in 
this regard and make extended dealings more far-reaching. For example, the Internet has 
informal chat rooms and allows friends and relatives who are separated by great distances 
to instantly communicate easily and cheaply.
The condition of “valuing the future” essentially means that people do not face 
undue uncertainty regarding the future. In the private property order people place a
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relatively high value on the future, because the two greatest potential causes of 
uncertainty about their future, private and state aggression, are removed. The potential 
for private aggression is removed by the existence of private property rights that are 
secured by state coercion. The potential for aggression by the state is removed by the rule 
of law, which confines the state to the role of defending private property rights. Because 
the state is so restricted, it cannot confiscate or regulate property rights, it cannot initiate 
war, and it cannot conscript its citizens.
The incentive for war is reduced still further in the private property order by 
heightened international interdependence. In the absences of trade and migration 
restrictions, people engage in a high degree of international division of labor. Domestic 
producers and consumers are concerned with the welfare of their foreign counterparts that 
provide them with valued markets, inputs, and goods. This mutuality of interests makes 
it less likely that sovereign nations will aggress upon one another. As Mises puts it, “if 
the tailor goes to war against the baker, he must henceforth produce his bread for 
him self’ (“War and the Welfare State” 81).
I now consider whether transactions costs in the private property order can be so 
great as to prevent reputation from being a viable protection strategy. Transactions costs 
are obstacles to exchange that occur in various forms in all social settings. Transactions 
costs can be either logistical costs like physical distance between traders or social costs 
like norms or sanctions against trading. Sovereign individuals engaging in the market 
compete in their abilities to have repeated dealings with each other. The essence of 
competition in this context is the removal or reduction of the transactions costs of 
dealing. Entrepreneurs who are most successful at reducing these costs prevail, because 
trading partners exercise their “don’t play” option with everyone else. In entrepreneurs’ 
efforts to reduce transactions costs, every form of possible organization is open to them 
except those requiring coercion.
In some situations, logistical considerations create such high transactions costs 
that at first glance it appears that reputation ceases to be a  viable lie-prevention strategy. 
Such a situation occurs along the U. S. interstate highway system where merchants rarely
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deal repeatedly with the same customer, except perhaps trucker customers. Under such 
conditions, one could argue as follows: Merchants along the highway do not expect 
repeated dealings with their customers, hence, they do not value the future sufficiently for 
reputation to form; people who are cheated by these merchants do not have a “don’t 
play” option and are, therefore, denied tit-for-tat reciprocity.
However, entrepreneurs addressed this problem by franchising businesses. In this 
form o f organization, small, individual businesses come under the scrutiny of a larger 
parent company. Individual customers may deal with a specific branch of the franchise 
only once, but they have the opportunity to deal with other branches repeatedly. Poor 
treatment in the instance of the single dealing will prevent many future dealings with 
other branches. The parent company, therefore, removes the franchise from dealers who 
abuse customers. Thus, the requirements for repeated dealings, valuing future dealings, 
“the don’t play” option, and reciprocity are all met at a higher level. When I buy gas from 
a Mobile station, or burgers from Mac Donald’s, or tools from Sears from anyplace in the 
world, I expect good treatment even though I am dealing only once with complete 
strangers, because I know that the parent companies want my future business and that 
they fear my “don’t play” option.
Informal norms are a second form of transactions costs that may present problems 
for the reputation strategy in the private property order. For example racial prejudice may 
prevent repeated dealings between classes of people. It might also prevent freely chosen 
partners, the granting of social seals of approval, the inclusion in informal groups, and 
extended dealings. Also, religious or cultural norms may interfere with the “don’t play” 
option and tit-for-tat reciprocity. For example, Joe may feel that to be a “good 
Samaritan” he must deal with Jake even though he suspects Jake is a liar and a cheat.
Although norms may exist that interfere with reputation, there are personal costs 
associated with abiding by them that over time make them tend to dissipate. Employers 
indulging their racial preferences in their hiring practices pay higher labor costs than their 
nonracist competitors, and they also restrict their consumer base. Such employers, 
therefore, become relatively less competitive by being racist, which increases the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
127
likelihood that they will be forced out of business. From the point of view of employees, 
racist wage earners have a reduced number of employment opportunities to choose from 
because of their unwillingness to work for other-race bosses. This makes them less 
competitive than nonracist wage earners in their bids for desirable jobs and higher 
incomes.
Racist norms are also costly for groups who abide by them. Racist formal groups 
may refuse membership to qualified persons of other races at their own peril, for by doing 
so, discrimination becomes one of the standards used to issue seals of approval. Such a 
standard reduces the credibility of the group among the nonracist portion of the 
population. They thus become less competitive in their bids for voluntary financial 
support and for new members than nonracist groups.
There are also costs in abiding by norms that require one to deal indiscriminately 
with everyone. Such good-Samaritan norms essentially remove the individuals “don’t 
play” option. Individuals see this as a substantial cost to them. These norms resemble 
the tum-the-other-cheek strategy or what Axelrod above called an “unconditional 
cooperation strategy.” As Axelrod pointed out in Chapter 2, “turning the other cheek 
provides an incentive for the other player to exploit you.” It also, Axelrod argues, “tends 
to spoil the other player; it leaves a burden on the rest of the community to reform the 
spoiled player...” (136). Adherents to these norms tend to temper their allegiance to 
them to some socially acceptable standard of reasonableness. They thereby retain their 
“don’t play” option in worst case scenarios. For example, they are not socially obligated 
to “play” with murderers.
There may exist in the private property order norms that promote sexism, age 
discrim ination, wealth discrimination, or discrimination against any other social class that 
we can im agine, but all such norms place similar costs on the people who choose to abide 
by them. They, therefore, like racist norms, tend to dissipate in the long term.
Before proceeding to analyze community and its link to reputation in the private 
property order, a brief summary of reputation is in order. Because people have free 
association, there are no formal constraints in the private property order to any of the
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necessary requirements of reputation. People are free to choose their own partners, which 
means they can engage in repeated dealings or opt for the “don’t play” option. They can 
engage in extended dealings on as large a scale as they deem appropriate. Groups can set 
their own standards for membership and can offer seals of approval accordingly. People 
in the private property value the future because the state is restricted to the role of defense 
of property rights. Social norms that are destructive of reputation tend to disappear 
because they are costly to abide by.
Community
Community is a protection-from-lying strategy in the sense that we choose to 
participate in it. A preference for a more trusting environment may lead us to choose 
isolation, intense interaction, and interdependence with a group o f people so as to develop 
a history with them that we can refer to in future episodes of risk exposure with them. 
This choice amounts to a strategy since we are aware that in the process of satisfying our 
preferences for risk tolerance we are finessing a shared fate with people which causes 
everyone to be more concerned about each others well being.
I here review our working definitions of community and society and the 
requirements for community that I use to analyze community in the private property 
order. The definitions are derived from the works of Hawley, Parsons and Shils’s, 
Tonnies, Durkheim, Hillary, and Pahl as discussed in Chapter 2. Communities are 
dynamic social networks that are organically formed, that exist in varying intensities, and 
that influence people’s behavior. Society is a social network that contains many 
communities, that is based on the division of labor, and that is integrated by the state.
This definition of society is not inclusive in that it does not describe pre-state societies; 
however, state societies are our primary focus here.
In the present context, the private property order is society. Like community, the 
private property order is of spontaneous origin rather than of purposeful organization. 
That is to say that in the private property order, neither community nor society has 
common purpose or direction. People pursue their own purposes within their limited 
areas of concern. With no common purpose, both community and society lack an overall
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design to which individuals must.conform, and they lack central authorities who 
command individuals to conform to a plan.
For reasons given in Chapter 2 ,1 use Merry’s requirements for gossip to analyze 
community in the private property order. They are: isolation, economic interdependence, 
consensus and sanction, and similar values. Furthermore, since I concluded in Chapter 2 
that community exist in different degrees of intensity, I use Ferdinand Tonnies’s notions 
of Gemeinschaft o f blood, locality, and mind—with their corresponding requirements: 
kinship relations, collective ownership of land, and common sacred places and 
worshipped deities—as a measure of what degree of community can exist in the private 
property order.
Beginning the analysis, as we discovered in Chapter 2, in terms of social order, 
isolation has a broader meaning than geographical separation. In my apartment building, 
residents are very effectively isolated from each other by eight inch cement block walls. 
Though my wife and I sleep with our heads as near as sixteen inches from the heads of 
our neighbors, we are not aware of their presence. Merry’s “social enclaves’’ within 
urban housing projects were isolated by language. Isolation in virtual space is attained by 
passwords, electronic camouflage, and the transactions costs of becoming Net wise. 
Differences of culture results in huge islands of isolation in the sea of humanity. Within 
various cultures, people are isolated from each other by education and by acquired skills, 
such as the ability to read music, or those associated with the various divisions of labor. 
Those factors of isolation that are subject to choice, such as moving to an isolated area 
and acquiring skills and education, require costly investment and hence are a form of 
signaling, as discussed earlier. One might say that community building is signaling.
There are no formal constraints to any of these meanings of isolation in the private 
property order. People may travel to distant locations or remain where they are, learn or 
refrain from learning languages, build or tear down walls, learn skills or remain unskilled, 
engage in the division of labor or in autarkic production.
Nor are there formal restrictions against being interdependent, which is Merry’s 
second requirement for community. In fact, people are, for the most part, economically
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interdependent in the private property order. Children are, o f course, dependent for all 
their needs on adults, which in turn are, because of division of labor, economically 
dependent on each other. Rare is the person who engages completely in autarkic 
production since his physical well-being can be greatly enhanced by engaging in division 
of labor. It is this opportunity to enhance well-being that entices people to cooperate in 
the division of labor and, hence, to voluntarily make themselves economically 
interdependent with an ever widening core of people.
Merry’s requirement for community, “consensus and sanction,” is also met in the 
private property order. In the private property order, there is broad general consensus 
regarding fundamental principles as well as appropriate behavior. There are fixed rules 
concerning their sense of justice that apply to everyone equally. These rules are 
formalized in a written constitution that confine state action to the defense of individual 
property rights. These conditions result in the market, a spontaneous social order that 
benefits people in relation to the extent that they in turn can benefit others. The market 
further galvanizes consensus among market participants as to what kind of behavior is 
appropriate in market relations. Both the formal consensus, regarding the role of the state 
and the importance of property rights, and the informal consensus of appropriate market 
behavior are backed by sanctions. Formal principles or laws are backed by formal 
sanctions, such as fines and imprisonment. Market consensus is backed by the “don’t 
play” option discussed above. That is, if one’s market partner does not behave 
appropriately, one simply does not deal with him in the future.
For these same reasons, Merry’s requirement for community, “similar values,” is 
also met in the private property order. People similarly value the general principles and 
fixed rules that protect their property and their freedom of choice. They also similarly 
value specific kinds of behavior in market relations. There are, of course, pockets or 
cells, or what Merry earlier called “social enclaves,” within larger society that have values 
that are different in some ways from the values of larger society. The Amish community 
is a real-world example of such an enclave. However, even within the Amish 
community, people value the fixed rules of larger society that protect their property rights,
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and whenever the Amish engage in market relations, they value the greatest return on 
their dollars and the honest behavior of their trading partners, just as everyone else does.
I next evaluate the degree of community allowed in the private property order by 
evaluating the opportunities for Gemeinschafi of blood, of location, and of mind. 
Gemeinschaft of blood suggests a kinship group engaged in community relations, such as 
working, playing, and praying together. In such a community, people are isolated from 
others by the fact that they have kinship ties, and they are economically interdependent 
with relatives. Consenus formulates around their similar values instilled by blood 
relatives since birth. Sanctioning is accomplished by assignment to a higher or lower 
status position within the community structure. In the Gemeinschaft o f blood, Minar and 
Greer’s “shared fate” concept of community mentioned in Chapter 2 takes on new 
meaning, because community members share not only the fate of the group, but of their 
entire blood line.
At the most basic level, Tonnies’s Gemeinschaft of blood refers to the family and 
those conditions that exist among relatives that live under one roof (42-43). There are no 
formal constraints in the private property order preventing families from living under the 
same roof. Marriage is not a formal, legal institution in the private property order, since 
the state is restricted from proclaiming it as such. Therefore, there are no laws against 
interracial, intercultural, or interdenominational marriage, nor are there laws against 
incest. However, we can safely assume that social norms prohibit incest in the private 
property order, since such prohibitions are universal throughout all known real-world 
cultures. People in the private property order organize themselves in accordance with 
their preferences and with the prevailing social norms. This results in various 
combinations of kinship relations and nonkinship relations for the purposes of 
reproduction, raising children, and meeting other basic needs.
Such real-world organizations include family-owned and operated businesses and 
corporations. For example, I once worked for a family-owned and operated hardware 
store and lumber company. The father, mother, three children, and two grandsons 
worked there as well as some in-laws and many nonfamily members. There are also
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family corporations, such as corporate farms and ranches in the Midwest. These 
agribusiness corporations expand as sons and daughters marry and settle on adjacent land. 
After several generations, these operations are run by a complex structure of mothers and 
fathers, brothers and sisters, grandchildren, uncles and aunts, cousins, in-laws, and non­
family members. The locus of these rural communities are small towns, many of whose 
residents are also related by blood and by marriage.
Instead of interfering, the private property order actually encourages Gemeinschaft 
o f blood. It does so by rewarding with reduced transactions costs those who successfully 
integrate their family and market relations. One of the main transactions cost of dealing 
with other people, whether in the market or elsewhere, is the problem of trust. Those 
families that are able to moderate the stresses and strife of family living sufficiently to 
allow family members to work together successfully in the market are rewarded with 
fewer trust problems. People who place their trust in the hands of someone who shares 
their kinship ties are less likely to be disappointed than those who must place their trust in 
the hands of strangers.
Gemeinschaft of locality encounters two formal restrictions in the private property 
order, neither of which is insurmountable. First, one is not unconditionally free to choose 
isolation by geographical location. Other people own the houses, land, and other 
resources that one needs to survive and prosper in every possible location. In order to 
relocate, one must acquire property rights to these resources. In many real-world cultures 
this is done through marriage. There is no reason to assume that this is not true in the 
private property order as well. However, given the inability to acquire the property rights, 
one can ask to rent them from the current owner. There is also the unlikely third 
possibility of receiving permission to simply use such property. The current owners may 
refuse to sell, rent, or grant permission for their own reasons. However, reluctance to sell 
or rent can usually be overcome by offering a higher price.
Second, Tonnies’s “collective ownership of land” requirement for community is 
constrained by the existence o f private property. Collective ownership in the strict sense 
means the right to use but not the right to dispose or the right to exclude community
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members. This is the meaning assigned to “a commons” by Hardin's famous article 
discussed in Chapter 2. In this sense, collective ownership does not exist in the private 
property order. This, however, is not the formidable restriction on community formation 
that it appears to be because of tacit permission, partnerships, corporations, private 
community developments, and nonprofit organizations, all of which exist in the private 
property order.
Discussing each o f these separately, people in real-world community relations 
customarily grant tacit permission for certain uses of their land to each other, especially in 
communities with strong kinship relations. Those uses deemed worthy of such 
permission are those that serve the values of the property owner and the community. For 
example, in Boelus, Nebraska, a small community where my wife and I raised our family, 
a local land owner excavated a small lake for fishing and swimming and constructed 
toilets and sun shelters for the purpose of providing wholesome recreation for the 
members of his church and others who share his values. In the same community, another 
land owner allowed the construction of a baseball diamond on his land complete with 
grandstand and parking area that was used by the whole community. It is also common 
for land owners to allow valued community members tacit permission to hunt on their 
land. After being away from the community of my up-bringing for thirty-five years, I still 
have tacit permission to hunt on land that I hunted on as a boy.
Multiple ownership and common use of land and other property is common in the 
private property order. People form organizations that accommodate such ownership and 
uses because there are no laws preventing them from doing so, and because these 
organizations serve people’s needs. Real-world examples of such organizations include 
partnerships, corporations, and nonprofit organizations. Partners own land as equals or in 
terms of some agreed upon ration. People who buy shares in corporations have 
ownership rights in proportion to the number of shares that they own. Some nonprofit 
organizations also own land and real-estate that is used in common. Protestant church 
buildings, for example are used jointly by those who support them financially and even by 
some who do not. Formal exclusion rights are in the hands of the elders and the deacons;
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however informal exclusion rights are in the hands of the congregation who may shun 
those not welcome in their church.
Another real-world example of common use of property under conditions of 
private property are community developments, which often include commons areas that 
the owners of the surrounding private property mutually agree to maintain. Purchasing a 
house in such a development includes direct use rights to common sidewalks, picnic 
areas, recreation centers, etc., and it also includes indirect exclusion rights. Exclusion 
proceedings and the exacting of penalties for not sharing the financial burden of 
maintaining the commons area is in the hands of a community development board 
composed of elected representatives of the community. Similar arrangements occur in 
condominium complexes where owners collectively own and maintain common halls, 
stairways, and foyers.
These real-world organizations, and no doubt many other possible organizations 
that are presently precluded by our current real-world conditions, make possible the 
common use of property without the problems attributed to “the commons” by Hardin. 
Consequently, the private property order version of the common usage of property may be 
more conducive to community than the commons version that Tonnies had in mind. As 
Hardin pointed out, commons have many problems with overuse and under-maintenance. 
These problems are bound to cause friction that break down community solidarity, 
whereas the actions of the farmers in Boelus, Nebraska tended to bring the community 
together.
Moving to Tonnies’s third type of community, we find that Gemeinschaft of mind 
and its requirement of common sacred places and worshipped deities is met in both a 
sacred and a secular context. In a sacred context, religious orders must buy or rent their 
“church” structure from the previous owner, purchase the resources with which to build 
it, or receive the property as a gift. In a secular context, the same restrictions apply; for 
example, people who like classical music can construct a concert hall, organize orchestras 
and choirs, and conduct membership drives, the only restraint, in both cases, being the 
property rights of others.
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So far I have shown that there are no formal obstacles to community; however, as 
with reputation, it is possible that informal norms may develop that interfere with 
community. With respect to Gemeinschaft o f blood, there may develop norms against 
interracial, intercultural, interdenominational, or incestual matings. Gemeinschaft of 
locality could be restricted by norms that deny certain people access to various locations 
because of their race, sex, age, or even hair color. Gemeinschafi of mind could be 
interfered with by norms against having personal friendships with certain classes of 
people. It is hardly necessary to mention real-world examples of such norms since they 
are so prevalent.
It must be remembered, however, that all action has costs. People that choose a 
course of action because of a norm preclude other courses of action and the benefits 
thereof. The white employer in a racist community, for example, finds that the market 
discounts the labor wages of black employees. Two equally qualified applicants, one 
white and one black, may have market wage values of $8.00 and $6.00 per hour 
respectively. The black applicant may as well be wearing a sign that says, “Hire me and 
save $2.00 per hour.” The employer is free to indulge his racial prejudices, but only at a 
substantial cost both in cash and in relative competitiveness. Other discriminations suffer 
a similar fate. A person who is reluctant to sell property to people that are in some way 
different than himself must forego the higher selling price that some of these people are 
willing to pay in order to overcome his reluctance. A person who is reluctant to make 
friends with people of a different class must do without the benefits that he observes such 
friendships accord to others less reluctant than himself. The result is that norms against 
such discriminations tend to dissipate in the private property order.
With no formal or informal obstacles to the requirements of community, all three 
types of community occur in conjunction in the private property order, which is the 
highest degree of community or, as Tonnies remarked above, “represents the truly human 
and supreme form of community.” This view is contrary to the conventional view that 
the market breaks down community. However, as Durkheim argued in Chapter 2, 
division of labor is the basis of organic solidarity, i.e. large scale or societal integration.
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In this view, the market actually creates community. It does so by allowing community to 
occur in varying degrees and in a variety of forms. It does so by rewarding people who 
form divisions of labor, which are isolations and “crafts or callings [that] are the same or 
similar of nature” as Tonnies puts it (43). Markets further create community by 
rewarding kinship structured businesses with lower trust costs or, said differently, lower 
agency costs. Markets creates economic interdependence and encourages the common 
values of probity, punctuality, and prudence, and they eliminate the need for consensus in 
order to sanction by allowing each market participant the “don’t play” opdon.
Mason City, Nebraska, the small community where I was raised, epitomizes the 
real-world conjunction of Gemeinschaft of kinship, locality, and mind. The village is 
isolated by its location on state highway two in central Nebraska about one hundred and 
eighty miles from Omaha. It is thirty five miles from Broken Bow, which is the closest 
town that community members consider a shopping center. By most standards Broken 
Bow is hardly that since it has a population of less than 4,000 people. Mason City is fifty 
miles from the nearest college, bus station, train station, television station, and interstate 
highway.
The community is further isolated by its German culture and racial homogeneity. 
One generation ago the German language was spoken in a broken manner by most of the 
community members. Two generations ago most were fluent in German and spoke 
broken English. To my knowledge, Mason City has never been the home of a single 
Black, Oriental or Hispanic family. In fact, in my youth, it was a curiosity to see a Black 
person, and people talked about it as if seeing something quite exotic. Such a sighting 
usually required a trip to Omaha, a trip that people rarely made.
Most of the people living in and around Mason City are related by blood or 
marriage. Consequently, many of their interactions are with kin. There are prominent 
fam ilies whose ancestors were instrumental in founding and developing Mason City. 
A m ong them are Holm, Cox, Turner, Philpot, Ummel, Zimmer and many others 
including Hiser. The Hisers are related to the Holms, who are related, to the Coxs, who 
are related to the Philpots and so on and so on. In many cases, farms and ranches have
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been in the family for generations. In my family’s case, the original homestead portion of 
our farm was taken by my great grandfather, Gotlieb.
The values of the community, which flow from its German heritage and its 
predominantly Protestant Christian heritage, have been taught by parent to child for 
generations. Community members value industry and hard work, social recreation, 
music, community gatherings, charity, and community solidarity. Over the years, many 
community organizations have formed to support these values. Among them is the 
Beechville Band, a community band organized some eighty years ago by my grandfather, 
Ed, and several other community members, that is still in existence today.
The values of the community are supported by strong norms, ubiquitous gossip, 
and severe sanctions. These sanctions were experienced firsthand by my parents who 
allowed us children to go to high school out of district. In allowing this, my parents 
broke the community norm for solidarity, and were shunned by other prominent families 
of the Mason City community. This breaching of norms caused strained kinship relations 
that lingers today some forty years later.
Summarizing the above analysis of community, all requirements for community 
are met in the private property order including those of Gemeinschaft o f blood, locality 
and mind. The isolation requirement is met in all of its meanings. The economic- 
interdependence requirement is not only met, the private property order rewards those 
who engage in the division of labor with enhanced well-being. The consensus-and- 
sanction requirement is met formally in the laws and punishments of the state and 
informally in the market through the “don’t play” option. The similar-values requirement 
is met, because people value the general principles and fixed rules that protect their 
property and their freedom of choice, and because people value honest behavior in market 
relations. The private property order encourages Gemeinschafi of blood by rewarding 
kinship relations in the market with reduced trust costs. Gemeinschaft o f locality’s 
common-property requirement is met through tacit permission, partnerships, corporations, 
private community developments, and nonprofit organizations. Gemeinschaft o f mind’s 
common-sacred-places-and-worshipped-deities requirement is met in both a sacred and a
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secular context, the only constraint being the property rights of others. Norms against 
community in the private property order tend to dissipate, because the market penalizes 
those who abide by them and rewards those who observe norms that encourage a fuller 
integration of society.
Ideology
Mason City, Nebraska and thousand of small communities like it, represent the 
fullest integration of reputation, community, and the topic of the this section, ideology.
As Merry has explained, sanctions as experienced by my parents require a community 
consensus which in turn require common values. As Berger and Luckmann have shown, 
common values, in their turn, depend upon their being integrated into the larger world by 
legitimations, or as we have come to call it, “total ideology.” We can thus see the 
fundamental importance of ideology in the prevention of lying. It is a separate protection- 
from-Iying strategy as well as being the cement for community, which is the setting where 
reputation is most effective.
In this section, I identify conditions in the private property order that allow the 
formation o f total ideology. I focus on the necessary requirements of total ideology rather 
than of particular ideology, because, as shown earlier, total ideology has the ability to 
prevent people from lying whereas particular ideology is viewed with suspicion. The first 
of these requirements, as in community and in gossip, is isolation. In this case it is 
isolation from other ideologies, which further requires, as Mannheim told us, rigid social 
classes, no vertical social mobility, and no communication between classes. Also there is 
Sowell’s requirement of a high cost for alternative information and North’s requirement 
for minimal changes in the terms of exchange. Finally there is Higgs’s requirement that 
people be able to satisfy their craving for association with like-minded people. This final 
requirement of Higgs’s is similar to Tonnies’s requirement for Gemeinschaft o f mind, i.e., 
common sacred places and worshipped deities.
Mannheim’s rigid-social-class requirement seems to be problematic immediately 
since there are no rigid social classes in the private property order. People can, within the 
constraints o f private property rights and their own innate abilities, move in and out of
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these classes and may belong to several simultaneously. However, simply because people 
can move between classes does not mean that they will choose to do so. Each of the 
forms of isolation discussed in the previous section isolates ideologies as well as people. 
Remote geographical locations; languages, divisions of labor, education, and acquired 
skills all tend to insulate ideologies from each other. It is possible that these natural 
isolations, transactions costs, and people’s preference for community may result in 
somewhat rigid social classes as a practical reality rather than as a formal requirement.
Real-world evidence o f this is the fact that there are “southerners,” “rednecks,” 
“yuppies,” “city slickers,” “blue and white collars,” “Midwesterners,” “bom-agains,” 
“bean towners,” and a host of other social classifications. These classes are made up of 
people who could move to any number of other classes but choose not to. For the most 
part, people in these classes like who, what, and where they are and intend to remain so. 
As they might say, “Wouldn’t have it any other way!”
Mannheim’s no-vertical-mobility requirement is partially met for these same 
practical outcome reasons. Redneck is aware that he could move up to Yuppie status but 
has no intentions of doing so. This points to another factor that prevents vertical social 
movement: People do not agree which way is up. Redneck may very well consider a 
move to Yuppie status as a step down. In the same vein, unhappy White Collar may envy 
Blue Collar. Because of this ambiguity concerning direction in social movement, all 
social movement in the private property order more closely resembles what Mannheim 
regarded in Chapter 2 as horizontal movement. As he stated there, horizontal social 
movements do not disrupt total ideology, because people who encounter differences 
simply chalk them up to mistakes or as curiosities.
All the above arguments also apply to Mannheim’s no-communication-between- 
classes requirement. Whatever isolates people from one another restricts communication 
between them. Certainly, differences o f language effectively prevent communication, but 
other isolation factors are also important. Geographical separation prevents face-to-face 
communication. Divisions o f labor require different jargons and technical languages, as
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do acquired skills. Differences in education leave people with different vocabularies and 
few common references.
In this view then, people of different social classes do not communicate with each 
other because they have different languages, jargons, accents, vocabularies, references, 
technical specialties, and perhaps most important, different interests. Different interests 
lead to different sets of knowledge, which suggests that people of different social classes 
do not communicate because they have nothing to say to each other. If you have ever 
gone to some event where you felt like an outsider, then you have thought to yourself, 
“What do I say to these people!” What would a dentist have to say at a hog producers 
convention, or a gas station attendant at a computer programmers convention? It is also 
doubtful that individuals in such situations would experience an “awakening” or anything 
resembling a threat to their world view. Most likely they would simply chalk it up to 
curiosity.
Turning to Sowell’s high-cost-for-altemative-information requirement for total 
ideology, Sowell argued in Chapter 2 that ideology is a knowledge-economizing device 
that appeals to those with higher costs in acquiring alternative knowledge, specifically, 
those who are inexperienced and politically apathetic. Viewing ideology as an 
economizing-device is a usage in the total ideology sense; people remain “under the 
spell” of an ideology and act accordingly until the cost of doing so becomes greater than 
learning new ways. Sowell also argues that the knowledge-economizing benefit of 
ideology decreases with the passing of time. That is, there will be “defections with age as 
discordant knowledge forces itself on one’s attention, until a point is reached where the 
cost of reconciling it with the ideological vision exceeds the cost of discarding the vision 
itself’ (Knowledge and Decisions 309).
Sowell’s economizing-device view of ideology helps explain how there could be 
high costs for obtaining information about alternative ideologies even under conditions of 
freedom of speech and freedom of association as in the private property order. People 
adopt an ideology to reduce the costs of making decisions. By adopting an ideology and 
its lifestyle manifestation, people save themselves the trouble of having to make decisions
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repeatedly. However, in so choosing, they also limit the set of options from which they 
can choose.
Returning to our earlier example concerning Redneck and Yuppie, both 
individuals must solve the problem of how to obtain their daily milk, but they do not 
choose from the same set of options. Redneck may get it from a neighbor or may milk a 
cow. Yuppie may go to the supermarket or have it delivered. Once an option is decided 
upon, the daily-milk problem is solved far into the future without having to be consider 
further. Why do they not consider each others options? The answer lies in their choices 
of ideology and lifestyle, which determine the transactions costs of choosing from each 
other’s options sets. One of the these transactions costs are norms that dictate what 
options are acceptable to others in their communities.
Suppose that Redneck and Yuppie were each to acquire sufficient information to 
cause them to desire to trade lifestyles with each other. How much would that 
information cost each of them? Stated generally, what are the costs to people in the 
private property order, living and working in their social-class cocoons, acting according 
to their specific world views, and isolated from each other by different culture, race, 
educational levels, divisions of labor, languages, jargons, skills, and values, of acquiring 
sufficient information so as to cause them to rethink their current world views and 
lifestyles and to consider other options?
Asked in terms of our example, what are the information costs to Redneck of his 
learning to appreciate and perhaps value Yuppie’s way of life? He must experience some 
of the socialization processes that Yuppie experienced. Hence, his costs would include 
attending Ivy League University, learning a white collar profession, living in suburbia, 
learning the ins and outs of corporate life, moving from city to city as the job demanded, 
and, or course, buying milk at the supermarket. Redneck must personally transform 
himself from who he is into someone he is not. The opportunity cost to Redneck of 
learning to value Yuppie’s lifestyle is the foregoing o f who he is, of how he sees himself 
as a person, of his history, of his self image.
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This leads me to conclude that the cost of alternative information is high 
throughout the private property order. This conclusion is supported by Sowell’s “the 
inexperienced” and “the politically apathetic” contention. The characters in our example 
are certainly inexperienced in the ways of the other, and they are likely politically 
apathetic toward each other, since neither has the political power to alter the other’s 
lifestyle. This relationship holds throughout the private property order. People have little 
experience with other ways of life and have no political reason to be concerned about 
their ignorance. It is also conceivable that as the characters in our example age and 
“discordant knowledge forces itself on [their] attention”, that they may alter their 
lifestyles somewhat. Old Yuppie may seek the simple pleasures of country life in 
retirement, and old Redneck may buy his milk at the supermarket.
I now turn our focus to North’s minimal-changes-ih-the-terms-of-exchange 
requirement for total ideology. Reviewing a bit, North argues that every ideology 
contains judgments about what is fair in its corresponding social system. He argues that 
the terms of exchange in society are an important variable in this judgment. In this view, 
changes in the terms of exchange may be sufficient reason for people to adopt a different 
ideology.
I here restate North’s four examples of changes in terms of exchange that he 
believes are sufficient to alter peoples’ perception about the fairness of the economic 
system and, hence, sufficient to cause people to alter their ideologies:
1. an alteration in property rights which denies individuals access to 
resources which they had heretofore come to accept as customary or 
just (the enclosure of common land, for example).
2. a decline in the terms of exchange in a factor or product market away 
from what had come to be regarded as a just exchange ratio.
3. a decline in the relative income position of a particular group in the 
labor force.
4. a reduction in information costs that results in individuals perceiving 
that different and more favorable terms of exchange may prevail 
elsewhere. {Structure and Change 50)
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Looking at North’s first example, common property is not present in the private 
property order. Therefore, there are no instances o f alterations in property rights resulting 
from common property coming under private ownership. However, there are changes in 
property rights that deny people access to resources which they have come to accept as 
being justly their own. Imagine losing, because of unusually low commodity prices, a 
third generation family farm. It is not difficult to imagine that such a loss, and the guilt 
and anger that most certainly would accompany it, would cause one to doubt the fairness 
of this outcome. Real-world examples abound. One such example occurred on the farm 
of Mr. Art Kirk near Cairo, Nebraska in the early 1980s, a time of low commodity prices 
accompanied by high farm bankruptcy and high farm-bank failure in the Midwest. Rather 
than surrender his farm to the bank, Mr. Kirk bunkered his farmyard with various pieces 
of machinery, and attempted to defend his property with an M I6 rifle. He was shot to 
death by the local swat team.
Even though the Kirk incident could have happened in the private property order, 
it is less than certain that it would have happened. I know from personal association with 
Mr. Kirk that his feelings of unfairness and the resulting anger were directed primarily at 
U. S. agriculture policy officials for their role in manipulating commodity prices. In the 
private property order, he would have had to find a different target for his rage, because 
there government policy makers do not exist. In the private property order, low 
commodity prices are the result of impersonal market forces that are the result of 
previously known, unchanging rules that apply to everyone equally. Under these 
circumstances, people are less likely to blame someone else for their problems. As J. S. 
Mill put it,
a fixed rule, like that of equality, might be acquiesced in, and so might 
chance, or an external necessity; but that a handful of human beings 
should weigh everybody in the balance, and give more to one and less to 
another at their sole pleasure and judgement [sic], would not be borne 
unless from persons believed to be more than men, and backed by 
supernatural terrors, (ctd in Hayek Road to Serfdom 112)
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The real-world situation Mr. Kirk faced and the situation that he would have faced 
in the private property order are as different as a tornado and a bulldozer. Both can 
destroy his property, but his reaction to them is entirely different. The tornado does not 
singled him out as expendable nor is it blithely inconsiderate of his property rights. The 
tornado, therefore, is something more to be respected than hated. The bulldozer, on the 
other hand, is operated or directed by people who have made decisions of priority and put 
Mr. Kirk’s property rights low on their list. Impersonal, purposeless market forces 
resemble the tornado, whereas government policy resembles the bulldozer. Market 
forces, though they can result in undesirable outcomes, are purposeless; they have no 
agenda. Policy is an instrument that some people use to attain their ends at the expense of 
others. Hayek says that “there can be no doubt that planning necessarily involves 
deliberate discrimination between particular needs of different people, and allowing one 
man to do what another must be prevented from doing” (Road to Serfdom 78).
The presence of fixed rules in the private property order suggests another real-
world difference in Mr. Kirk’s situation from what he would have faced in the private
property order. Under conditions of fixed rules of the private property order, Mr. Kirk
would have difficulty mustering what social psychologists call “social proof’ to give
authentication to his rebellious actions. As Cialdini explains,
we view a behavior as more correct in a given situation to the degree that 
we see others performing it. Whether the question is what to do with an 
empty popcorn box in a movie theater, how fast to drive on a certain 
stretch of highway, or how to eat chicken at a dinner party, the actions of 
those around us will be important in defining the answer, (ctd. in Axelrod 
“Evolutionary Approach” 1105)
In the real-world, Mr. Kirk found himself surrounded by a community of sympathetic 
fellow farmers, many of whom were themselves having financial difficulties and blaming 
them on agriculture policy. In such a community, Mr. Kirk was conforming, though in an 
exaggerated way, to the actions and values o f those around him. In line with Axelrod’s 
views, the community was perhaps fulfilling Mr. Kirk’s “psychological need to be part of 
a group” (“Evolutionary Approach” 1105). Also, it is not unlikely that community
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support inspired in Mr. Kirk feelings of being in possession of the moral high ground, 
perhaps reason enough for him to fire the first round.
In the private property order, rebellion against the rules of the game are unlikely to 
find community support. Rules in the private property order are unchanging and protect 
individual property rights. Since these rales are applied to everyone equally, a 
community united in their rebellion against the rules is unlikely to form. A nameless, 
faceless, impersonal force is more difficult to hate than a specific person or group of 
people thought to be the cause of one’s suffering. It is therefore doubtful that Mr. Kirk’s 
anger would have led him to the same actions in the private property order as in the 
current policy environment of the U. S. He simply would have had no one to hate, and he 
would not have received moral support from his community for his violent actions.
North’s examples two and three above are present in the private property order but 
do not cause people to question their ideology and the fairness of the system. A decline 
in the demand for one’s produce can reduce its price from what one may have come to 
believe is a just price and, at the same time, lower one’s income relative to the income of 
others. However, all the arguments that suggest that Mr. Kirk does not challenge the 
rales in the private property order suggest that people who suffer these market blows do 
not challenge them either. People do not see themselves as undeserving victims of unfair 
policy decisions but as unfortunate victims of nameless, faceless, natural forces and of 
their own bad judgment.
Another reason that North’s examples two and three do not prevent total ideology 
is the fact that price fluctuations in the private property order are relatively smaller than in 
the real-world conditions that North observed to formulate his examples. In the real 
world, the control of money is in the hands of the state, which inflates the money supply 
to effect its policies. Rothbard says that “inflation is the health of the State; it is the 
natural tendency of the State; and it is largely to enable it to inflate for its own benefit that 
the State is so determined to secure absolute control over the monetary mechanism”
CLogic o f Action One 326-326). As Wihelm Ropke puts it, “inflation is as old as the 
power of government over money” (qtd. in Rothbard Logic o f Action One 326 n3). We
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
146
know only too well that inflation can result in both wild swings in relative prices and 
decline in money’s purchasing power. In the private property order, the state is precluded 
from overseeing the monetary system. Consequently, there is no monetary authority, 
hence no monetary policy that can depreciate one’s relative income position.
North’s fourth example seems to be an obstacle for the existence of total ideology 
in the private property order. Entrepreneurs continually produce new technology that 
reduces the costs of information. The real-world state-of-the-art is, o f course, the 
Internet. However, I argue that reduced cost for information does not lower the overall 
costs of communication to any great extent, and therefore does not result, as North 
requires above, “in individuals perceiving that different and more favorable terms of 
exchange may prevail elsewhere.”
This is so, I argue, because the total cost of communication is composed of many 
components, the smallest of which is the money price of transmitting information. The 
components comprising the bulk of the total cost of communication remain substantially 
unchanged. These are the same costs that prevent Mannheim’s social mobility and 
Sowell’s alternate information as discussed earlier in this section. These costs include 
not only differences of culture, but also differences of language, education, contextual 
value references, and technical specialties. Also included are the transactions costs faced 
by Redneck and Yuppie: the cost of choosing from different sets of options to solve 
problems; the cost of foregoing one’s lifestyle and self-image; the cost of creating a new 
lifestyle and self-image; the cost of having nothing to say to each other. None of these 
costs are substantially changed by the existence of the Internet. We saw above that these 
costs prevent Redneck and Yuppie from agreeing on what constitutes an improvement in 
their current situations. In this context, these costs prevent them from agreeing on what 
“more favorable terms of exchange” consist of.
The recognition of these costs rests on a commonly made distinction between 
talking and communicating. Using this distinction, talking is something that everybody 
can do with each other, whereas communication only occurs between people who share 
common intellectual, social, and emotional value references. One might say that
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communication has a walk-a-mile-in-my-shoes condition to it. In this view, the internet 
and other technological advances have reduced the costs to people of talking with each 
other, but have not substantially reduced the overall costs of communication, because it 
has not overcome the obstacles o f language, culture, values, etc. Looked at in this way, 
North’s fourth example does not really apply to the private property order.
The final necessary requirement for total ideology is Higgs’s requirement that 
people be able to satisfy their craving for the ‘‘comfort of association with those they 
recognize as their ‘own kind’” (42). This requirement is obviously met in the private 
property order and has been already discussed in some detail in relation to Tonnies 
concept of Gemeinschaft of mind. For these reasons, I do not here consider it further.
Summarizing this section on ideology, Mannheim’s requirements of rigid social 
classes, no vertical social mobility, and no communication between classes are all met in 
the private property order for the same reasons: because of natural isolations, transactions 
costs, and people’s preference for community. Sowell’s requirement of a high cost for 
alternative information is met in the formidable transactions costs that people face in 
learning to appreciate each others ways of life. North’s requirement for minimal changes 
in the terms of exchange do not apply to the private property for the following reasons: 
There is no “common property” in the Hardin sense in the private property order; people 
in the private property order face impersonal purposeless market forces rather than the 
whims of policy makers; there is no “social p roof’ for rebellious actions in the private 
property order; price fluctuations in the private property order are relatively smaller than 
in the real-world conditions. Higgs’s requirement that people be able to satisfy their 
craving for association with like-minded people is met because people own their bodies 
and are free to associate with whom they please.
The Benefit-Cost Ratio of Lying in the Private Property Order
I now turn to the second analysis contained in this chapter, which is a point-by- 
point evaluation of six items that affect the benefit-cost ratio of lying. By investigating 
these items, we will be looking at lying from the other side of the information relation,
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that is, from the point of view of Informer as he weighs his expected costs and benefits of 
lying versus truth-telling.
First, I consider how people use Hayek’s “particular knowledge” when they are 
under the constraints of the model. This is important because, as we remember, 
particular knowledge is private information and can therefore be used for lying. Second, I 
consider what organizations are possible in the model and how they affect the opportunity 
to lie. Third, I evaluate the extent of the free riding, which is a form of lying. Fourth, I 
consider whether the model has institutional restrictions on communication, which is 
important because communication is fundamental to reputation, community, and 
ideology, all strategies to prevent lying. Fifth, I evaluate the time preference level within 
the model, which gives us some idea about the urgency of peoples’ decisions. Lastly, I 
look at what ethical codes of conduct tend to evolve given the model’s constraints. 
P articu lar Knowledge
We saw in Chapter I that because individuals occupy a unique place in time and 
space, they have unique knowledge that is important to society as a whole. Hayek calls 
this unique knowledge “the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” 
(“Use of Knowledge” 80). According to Hayek, the economic problem of society is a 
problem of
how to secure the best use o f resources known to any of the members of 
society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. 
Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is 
not given to anyone in its totality. (“Use of Knowledge” 77-78)
From the standpoint of reducing lying, there are two reasons why it is important 
that society solve the economic problem. First, society’s having solved the problem 
means that people are using their particular knowledge to advance their aims and general 
economic welfare instead of using it to lie. Second, society’s having solved the problem 
means that people’s needs are being met as well as possible under the circumstances, 
thereby minimizing overall deprivation and with it the motivation for people to prey on 
each other to fulfill their needs.
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The private property order’s solution to the economic problem is the free market. 
People utilize the resources that lie within their limited areas of concern in a manner that 
their particular knowledge suggests will most effectively move them toward their 
preferred ends within the rules of the game. Lying in the free market is risky business: 
There is a high likelihood of being caught through various strategies, and people may 
inflict painful sanctions by henceforth refusing to deal. The expected rewards are short 
term and the expected costs are long term. Consequently, people compete to advance 
their aims within the rules of the game by using their particular information to provide 
unique and high quality goods and services for others to consume.
Besides solving the economic problem, this has a beneficial side effect in that it 
tends to make particular knowledge generally known. People’s particular knowledge is a 
component of the goods and services that they produce and is hence revealed, to some 
extent, to those who buy them. This is the counterpart to the view that buyers reveal their 
preferences when they buy. For example, the cobbler who makes superior shoes reveals 
the secrets of his craft when he sells his shoes, because once sold, they can be 
deconstructed and compared to the work of others. The physical manifestation of 
particular information in the form of goods and services tends to make particular 
information less private. In the terms of product qualities, as explained by Church in 
Chapter 2, information in the free market tends toward having fewer credence qualities 
and more search and experience qualities.
In summary, the private property order, through the free market, simultaneously 
solves the economic problem and, to a large extent, prevents particular knowledge from 
being used for lying.
Organizations
Organizations within the private property order differ from the private property 
order itself, which is a  spontaneous order. Earlier in this chapter, Hayek qualified an 
organization as having a common purpose, an overall design to effect that purpose, and a 
central authority to command individuals to adjust their actions to meet the requirements 
of the overall design. Herbert Simon says that the term “organization” “refers to the
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complex pattern o f communication and relationships in a group of human beings.” This 
pattern, he says,
provides to each member of the group much of the information and many 
of the assumptions, goals, and attitudes that enter into his decisions, and 
provides him also with a set of stable and comprehensible expectations as 
to what the other members of the group are doing and how they will react 
to what he says and does. The sociologist calls this pattern a “role system”; 
to most o f us it is know as an “organization.” (xvii)
Given Hayek’s and Simon’s qualifications, the only type of organization that is 
formally prohibited in the private property order is forced organization. This excludes 
organizations like the slave plantations of the pre-Civil War south and conscript armies of 
today. This does not mean, however, that all possible kinds of organization do exist. 
Organizations whose overall purposes are held by most people to be immoral, dangerous, 
or in some other way undesirable engender community consensus and sanction against 
them. For example, it is possible for people to organize for the purpose of enhancing 
their overall ability to lie and cheat successfully, but community members levy costly 
sanctions on those who engage in them. These costs tend to keep these organizations 
from coming into existence.
Mises says that organizations that do come into existence are one of two possible 
types: profit management and bureaucratic management (Bureaucracy 18). We 
conventionally call these “profit” and “nonprofit” or “market” and “nonmarket” 
organizations. The principle of profit management is the profit motive whereas in 
bureaucratic management it is the setting and following of rules. People engaging in 
profit seeking are called “entrepreneurs,” while those engaging in bureaucratic 
organization are called “bureaucrats.” Mises says that “a bureaucrat differs from a 
nonbureaucrat precisely because he is working in a field in which it is impossible to 
appraise the result of a man’s effort in terms of money” {Bureaucracy 53).
Economists refer to profit management organizations as “firms.” Coase argues in 
his famous 1937 article “The Nature of the Firm” that the emergence of firms and their 
size are determined by the transactions costs of making exchanges in the market.
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Transactions costs are any and all obstacles to an exchange, whether monetary, cultural, 
geographic, political, or as is our concern, trust. According to this view, a primary 
decision of firms is whether to make their inputs or to buy them on the market. A firm 
will buy in the market until the transactions costs are greater than the benefits of doing so. 
At that point, as the argument goes, production moves under the umbrella of the firm.
The greater the transactions costs of buying in the market, the larger the firm. Coase 
argues that by its make-or-buy decisions a firm finds its optimal size. (Essays on 
Economics 8-9).
Mathews takes issue with Coase's fundamental distinction between markets and 
management. On the one hand, he says, firms that buy in the market must search for 
suppliers, make and monitor contracts, and monitor and measure input performance. In 
other words they must engage in “managed buying.” On the other hand, when a firm 
decides to make an input, it must engage in a market transaction, i.e., it must hire 
managers. Mathews says “the firm’s make-or-buy decision is not a decision about 
whether to manage or use input markets; it is a managerial decision about which input 
markets to use” (43).
Mathews continues that transactions costs, like all costs, are subjective. In 
business, they are subjective to individual entrepreneurs who have different creative 
abilities. Entrepreneurs therefore perceive costs differently. Mathews says that “because 
the perceptions of entrepreneurs differ, the costs of buying an input versus the costs of 
making an input will differ from firm to firm.” He continues that “the firms with the 
lowest costs are the firms with the greatest entrepreneurial ability.” Therefore, “the 
productivity of an input depends not only on what the input is employed to do, but also on 
which entrepreneur employs it” (45). The upshot of Mathews’s argument about 
transactions costs is that firms integrate vertically because they have lower costs due to 
superior entrepreneurial ability rather than, as Coase argues, to get lower costs.
In either event, there are profit-managed organizations or firms that emerge in the 
private property order that help prevent lying. They do so by generating and/or 
transmitting information about individuals, businesses, and products for a price. As
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discussed in Chapter 2, these organizations come under the heading of what Klein calls 
“trust for hire.” They exist because entrepreneurs recognized that people are willing to 
pay to have their uncertainty removed. Such organizations include Dun and Bradstreet, 
Underwriters Laboratories, A. C. Nielsen, industry newsletters, product publications, 
restaurant and movie reviews, employment agencies, the Better Business Bureau, medical 
data banks, referral services, and many others.
Businesses like Dan and Bradstreet, Consumer Report, and A. C. Nielsen are in 
essence businesses that people hire to monitor other businesses. In Chapter 1 ,1 pointed 
out that this can cause problems. There, I use the example of person A who hires person 
B to paint his house. In that example, A, who is the principal, had no way of knowing 
how many hours it took B, who is the agent, to paint his house. One of A’s options was 
to hire person C to monitor B, but that raised the question about who would monitor C. 
This example was used to demonstrate the hierarchical nesting of the agency problem 
inherent in the information relation. Who, then, is to monitor Dun and Bradstreet?
Klein’s trust-for-hire concept shows how the market mitigates the nesting problem by 
requiring that those in the business of monitoring must look after their own reputations in 
order to make a profit. One might say that Dun and Bradstreet and hundreds of other 
organizations like them are selling trust as a commodity. Their need to make a profit 
requires that, like any other business, they protect their reputation for providing quality 
products.
Klein shows how the market solves the nesting problem in external relations 
between firms, but what about relations between people within firms? Members of firms 
are generally organized hierarchically with nonprice relations between them, which 
resembles bureaucratic management. This would seem to suggest that the internal 
structure of firms would be plagued with the nesting problem and that management of 
subordinates is a cosdy problem. However, according to Mises, there is a fundamental 
difference in the relations between members in firms and the relations between members 
in nonprofit organizations. Mises says that
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bureaucratic management is management bound to comply with detailed 
rules and regulations fixed by the authority of a superior body. The task of 
the bureaucrat is to perform what these rules and regulations order him to 
do. His discretion to act according to his own best conviction is seriously 
restricted by them. {Bureaucracy 45)
These conditions require a strict chain of command with supervisors closely monitoring 
subordinates to see that they follow the rules. Supervisors must also be monitored by 
higher level supervisors, who are, in their turn, monitored by still higher level supervisors 
and so on until we come to the supreme authority.
Comparing this to profit management, Mises says that all transactions are
evaluated in terms of profit and loss. A strict chain of command is not necessary or even
desirable. Nor is it necessary that supervisors monitor subordinates with a high degree of
scrutiny. Subordinates have a relatively higher degree o f personal discretion than they do
under bureaucratic management. Mises says that
the only directive that the general manager gives to the men who he 
entrusts with the management of the various sections, departments, and 
branches is: Make as much profit as possible. And an examination of the 
accounts shows him how successful or unsuccessful they were in 
executing the directive. {Bureaucracy 33).
The problem of how to monitor the monitor within the firm is solved by examining the 
profit and loss statement.
Thus, the internal nesting problem of firms and the nesting problem between firms 
are both solved by the profit motive. This solution is what we might call a “systemic 
solution,” i.e., the solution is fundamental to the nature o f the institutional structure itself. 
The causal direction proceeds something like this: Property rights as the rules of the 
game determine that people can only compete for goods and services in a voluntary 
manner; their competitive actions result in markets; markets determine the nature of and 
the size of organizations that emerge in society; the firm is the predominant organization 
that emerges; firms use double entry bookkeeping to measure profits and loses. The 
profit-and-loss statement eliminates costly monitoring. In essence, it is an unintended
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solution that is the result o f spontaneous processes set in motion by people attending to 
matters only within their limited areas of concern as defined by their property rights.
What about honesty in nonprofit organizations in the private property order? 
Nonprofit organizations within a market society are ordered according to bureaucratic 
management, which has no profit-and-loss statement to monitor subordinates. This 
suggests that these organizations and their members cannot be monitored in the private 
property order. However, such organizations rely on voluntary financial support so they 
must monitor their member’s behavior. These organizations, as Klein pointed out earlier, 
are simply a part of its members’ reputational nexus. Members of nonprofit organizations 
behave themselves because such organizations can confer moral seals of approval and 
because organizations are sources of information about members for other peoples’ 
decisions. Being expelled from such groups for bad behavior or being listed in their 
social data bank as undependable is very costly because members must make their living 
in the market. Fellow members are potential customers, and they are sources of 
information for others. The fact that members of nonprofit organizations make their 
living in the market requires them to look after their reputation in nonmarket situations.
There are many real-world examples of nonprofit organizations whose purpose is 
encouraging and instilling honesty in people by reducing the opportunity and the 
inclination to lie. Some groups hold truthfulness as a moral ideal. Others establish 
professional codes of conduct. Both groups increase the expected costs of lying. 
Examples of the first case are churches, Boy and Girl Scouts of America, and the 
Fellowship for Christian Athletes. Examples of the second case include the American 
Medical Association, the Bar Association, and the National Education Association.
In summary, we find that organizational possibilities in the private property order 
that are contrary to the generally perceived good of the community tend not to come into 
existence or once emerged tend to disband because of informal norms and sanctions 
against them. We also find that organizations that do emerge are mostly profit 
management organizations that compete to serve community needs with ever-increasing 
refinements in organization, management, and entrepreneurial action, including those that
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help prevent lying. These organizations are not plagued by nesting of the agency problem 
because of their need to make a profit. Finally, nonprofit organizations are not plagued 
by the nesting of the agency problem because their members are subject to market 
relations and its subsequent discipline in the pursuit o f their livelihoods.
The Free-Rider Problem
The free-rider problem is considered by many social scientists as the fundamental 
problem of collective action. In this view, free riding is harmful, and free riders are 
people who receive benefits from the collective action of others without paying for them. 
Since Olson brought this problem to our attention in his pioneering book The Logic o f  
Collective Action, social scientists have taken turns applying foreboding labels to it. For 
example, Eggertsson calls it “the great scourge of collective action” (66), and North calls 
it a “fundamental dilemma” (Structure and Change 47). The view of these writers might 
be called the “conventional view” in that it is shared by most writers on the topic.
In the conventional view, nonpaying can be seen to be synonymous with lying in 
two ways. First, people who free ride do not reveal their true preferences, or as Kuran put 
it in Chapter 1, they engage in preference falsification. This view accuses free riders of 
pretending that they do not want the benefits that they receive free. Second, as Barnes 
tells us in Chapter 2, people who lie are free riding on truth-tellers. In this view, truth- 
tellers, by telling the truth, pay their share of the cost o f creating a trustful society, 
whereas liars avoid the costs of truth-telling and benefit from the trustful society where 
their lies are more readily believed.
In Chapter 2, Olson argues that free riding can only be prevented with excludable 
incentives or by the use of coercion, and North argues that ideology can overcome the 
incentive to free ride. Applying these remedies to public television, a real-world example 
of free riding in the conventional view, we find that supporters solve the free-rider 
problem by using all three of the above methods. First, the public is enticed to donate by 
the offer of excludable goods such as posters, coffee mugs, plaques, etc. Second, 
promoters lobby government for financial support of funds obtained through taxation. 
Third, they portray public television as a selfless, pioneering cause that uniquely serves
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the needs of society, which appeals to people’s moral ideologies. Olson’s and North’s 
remedies for free riding are apparently insufficient, since public television also engages in 
for-profit advertising.
The conventional view does not account for the beneficial-free-riding view. This 
view can be shown with the following examples: Flower lovers benefit from those who 
plant flower gardens; your neighbor benefits from your shade tree; people benefit from 
each other’s personal hygiene; nonsavers benefit from savers; wage earners benefit from 
employers who invest in capital; the current generation benefits from the capital 
accumulation of their ancestors. All of these benefits are received without payment, 
which makes them examples of free riding. However, it could hardly be said that free 
riding is a problem in these instances. How can free benefits be a problem if the 
producers of those benefits do not care?
The beneficial view of free riding requires that we qualify the conventional view a 
bit. We now see that all freely received benefits are not harmful; therefore, free riding 
becomes a free-rider problem in the conventional sense only if a producer objects to his 
goods being used without payment and cannot stop it.
This qualified view of free riding has three implications important for this study. 
First, it implies that there is little free riding in the market. In light of this implication, the 
existence of a good produced by the market is a testament to the truth of the following 
statements: The producer of the market good objects to someone using it without paying 
for it; provision of the good is not plagued by free riding. We know the first statement is 
true because the producer makes the good available only to those who pay for it. We 
know the second statement is true because if it were not true, the producer would not 
produce this good. The second implication of the qualified view is simply the flip-side of 
this conclusion, i.e., free riding exits primarily in nonmarket provision of goods and 
services.
The third implication is that free riding can be compulsory. This view simply 
acknowledges that someone might enjoy free benefits at others’ expense if the state so 
rules. That is, if formal laws block the producer from preventing the free use of his
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goods. Real-world examples include welfare programs, unemployment benefits, 
community improvement grants, and any other use of general tax moneys to benefit only 
a few. The compulsory view argues that the conventional view places the label of “free 
rider” on the wrong party in collective action.
To clarify this and to understand how the conventional view, the beneficial view, 
and the compulsory view are related, consider the following example: Suppose Miss 
Marple plants and tends a bed of flowers on her own lot and is pleased that her flowers 
are also enjoyed by her neighbors, who at this point are engaging in beneficial free riding. 
The size of the flower bed is constrained by Miss Marple’s flower budget and her time 
available for tending- Now suppose that Miss Marple wishes her flower bed to be larger. 
She asks her neighbors to contribute to a flower kitty to pay for their enjoyment. A few 
donate but most do not. Those who do not contribute are now engaging in free riding 
according to the conventional view. Miss Marple argues at the town council that a flower 
tax would benefit everyone by beautifying the town. The town council levies a flower tax 
and gives the proceeds to Miss Marple to enlarge her flower garden. Miss Marple is now 
engaging in free riding according to the compulsory view.
According to the compulsory view, Miss Marple’s neighbors are not free riders 
because she can prevent them from getting free benefits by building a fence around her lot 
and charging a fee to see her flowers. Miss Marple, this- view maintains, conjures a 
problem where none exists, simply because she does not like what she believes will be 
the market outcome, i.e., few paying admirers and a costly fence. According to this view, 
the only free rider in this example is that of Miss Marple herself who is using coercive 
authority to enjoy free benefits against the will of community members who produced 
them.
According to the compulsory view, the conventional view of the free-rider 
problem has it backward. People who refuse to pay for benefits in such cases are not free 
riders. They are simply not paying for a benefit that they did not ask for and in some 
cases may not want. Perhaps some people dislike flowers and the bees that they attract. 
The real free riders, in this view, are people who use state power to get financial support
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for their cause, thereby allowing them to free ride on tax payers. Rothbard argues that an 
attack on free riding has meaning only when directed “against the free-rider who wants 
compulsory free rides (emphasis his)” {Man, Economy, State 888).
The compulsory view suggests an incentive to lie that is reminiscent of Kingdon’s 
policy entrepreneur, discussed in Chapter 1, and North’s intellectual entrepreneur, 
discussed in Chapter 2. Those writers show how truth becomes instrumental under 
conditions where one is trying to persuade the state to grant personal or group privileges. 
In our example above, Miss Marple can consider lying as a strategy in her efforts to 
persuade the town council to levy a tax. This idea will be developed further in the next 
chapter.
I now investigate what conditions allow more free riding. It is these conditions 
that affect the benefit-cost ratio of lying. According to the compulsory view, more free 
riding takes place as the role of the state is enlarged, allowing it to grant more personal or 
group favors. This view requires no further consideration here, because by definition the 
state in the private property order is restricted to the role of protecting private property 
rights; therefore, it cannot grant favors in the private property order.
According to the conventional view of free riding, more free riding takes place 
when collective action is not backed by excludable incentives, coercion, and ideology. 
Also important is the size of the group. Olson argues that “in the absence of selective 
incentives, the incentive for group action diminishes as group size increases, so that large 
groups are less able to act in their common interest than small ones” (“The Logic” 204). 
Olson adds that large groups can be more successful if they are “federated” or organized 
as an assembly o f many smaller local cells.
To this list of conditions that increase free riding in the conventional sense, we 
add two more: less use of the market and interference with the market process. Both of 
these conditions would cause more conventional free riding, because both would require a 
greater reliance on the use of collective action in the production of goods. There is no 
interference with the market process in the private property order, so we need not
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consider this condition further until Chapter 4. It is with the first of these conditions that 
we must deal with now.
The conventional view of free riding is closely associated with the concept of 
“public goods.” These are goods that some economists argue will not be provided by 
markets, at least in sufficient amounts, because the rents from the use of such goods 
cannot be captured by entrepreneurs. According to this view, public goods must therefore 
be provided collectively. If such goods exist, then there exist a rather high degree of 
collective action in the private property order to provide goods that the market cannot 
provide. This suggests a high level of lying in the production of goods in the private 
property order. I argue next that no such goods exist.
Public goods are said to be nonexcludable since people cannot be stopped from 
using them without paying. They are also said to have no marginal costs for additional 
users. According to this theory, there are many such goods including defense, roads, 
education, information, and even fireworks displays. The favorite example of public 
goods used for decades in economic textbooks is the lighthouse. As the argument goes, 
once a lighthouse is constructed, its beacon benefits all passing ships, even those who do 
not pay for its construction or operation, and there is no additional cost to the owner for 
allowing an additional ship’s captain to view its beacon. Therefore, says the argument, 
entrepreneurs will not provide lighthouses. However convincing this argument may have 
sounded in the past, today the problem has been eliminated by modem technology. It is 
now possible for lighthouse beacons to be seen only by ships with the proper equipment 
and to charge for the use of that equipment.
But before modem technology, was it really impossible to make a profit from a
lighthouse? Public goods economists were embarrassed to learn from Coase’s “The
Lighthouse in Economics” that privately built lighthouses—in spite of having to compete
with corporations granted patents by the Crown—played an important role in 17th , 18th,
and early 19th century British lighthouse provision. Coase’s study shows that
lighthouses were built, operated, financed and owned by private 
individuals, who could sell the lighthouse or dispose of it by bequest. The
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role of the government was limited to the establishment and enforcement 
of property rights in the lighthouse. (375)
Another example used by public goods economists to illuminate the public goods 
argument is that of the apple farmer and the beekeeper. According to this example, apple 
nectar provides food for the bees while the bees provide a pollination service for the 
farmer. However, according to this argument, neither the beekeeper nor the apple farmer 
knows the extent to which his resources have been of service to the other. Therefore, the 
beekeeper cannot charge the apple farmer for a pollination service and the apple fanner 
cannot charge the beekeeper for his nectar. The conclusion is that apples and honey will 
be under provided. Cheung brought this example to ruin by showing that the example did 
not match with actual practice. He documented that in the U. S. “contractual 
arrangements between farmers and beekeepers have long been routine” (12).
Rothbard further shows the weakness of the public-goods argument by showing
that the conceptualization of the free-rider problem is based on a faulty analysis of the
real nature of the situation (Man Economy State 886-890). He focuses on defense, the
public goods example that many economists retreat to when other examples are found to
be wanting. He points out that an increase in population requires the hiring of more
police and hence greater costs for greater use, and that people can be excluded from
defense services simply by refusing to protect the property o f nonpayers. He also argues
that no good is truly collective in the sense of providing benefits to everyone because
people value goods subjectively and in different amounts.
Thus defense cannot be a collective good so long as only one pacifist or 
one anarchist exists in the society, for these persons will receive a harm 
rather than a benefit when they receive the “service” of coercive defense. 
And defense is not a collective good because its recipients can be excluded 
and separated. (Logic o f Action Two 75)
Rothbard continues that “economists, trained to think of marginal units everywhere else, 
suddenly start referring to defense as a  ‘lump’ when discussing government. In reality, 
however, there is a vast range of ‘defense’ services that the government (or any other 
defense agency) could supply to its customers” (Logic o f  Action Two 73).
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Shand points out another deficiency of the public goods view using the “bridge”
example common in public-goods theory.
The subjectivist criticism of this classic argument for certain forms of 
public ownership is that its concept o f marginal costs is wrong— it fails to 
recognize that costs are subjective. The fact that the cost incurred by the 
extra user of the bridge is zero, is irrelevant to a decision to build the 
bridge in the first place. The original decision to build the bridge is 
subjective in the sense that other opportunities of investing the money 
would have presented themselves at the time and these were rejected in 
favour of building the bridge. (24).
Though illuminating, Shand’s comment misses an implication of subjectivist theory. 
Whether the bridge owner incurs additional costs from allowing one more user is not 
immediately apparent to outside observes since costs are subjective to the owner. The 
extra user may be a competitor or may have robbed the owner and be making his getaway 
across the bridge, or maybe the owner just does not like him. In these cases, the owner 
would incur costs that are not observable. What is observable, in the long term, is that 
bridges deteriorate from use, which indicates that there are marginal costs for an extra 
user even in the objective sense.
The above writers show that there are fatal weaknesses in the public goods 
argument. We encounter the public goods argument again in the next section where we 
find the argument is even weaker as it relates to information. I therefore think it is 
reasonable to discount this view entirely. This accords with Rothbard, who concludes 
that there is no such thing as public goods, that creative entrepreneurs can capture the 
rents from the production of any good, and that there are always marginal costs for extra 
users (Logic o f  Action Two 81). We can now conclude that production in the private 
property order takes place predominantly in the market where the opportunity to free ride, 
at least in the long term, is practically nonexistent.
This conclusion does not preclude the possibility for collective action in the 
private property order. Real-world examples that apply to the private property order are 
abundant. There is the market version of collective action, such as partnerships, 
corporations, and other contractual relations, which do not allow free riding. However,
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there is also nonmarket collective action. We first think of small community nonmarket 
collective action, such as bam raisings, harvesting bees, volunteer fire protection, 
assistance to the unfortunate, and little league baseball. On a larger scale we might 
include disaster relief efforts, such as Red Cross, and voter registration and voter turnout 
efforts.
In the private property order, people often use a combination of market and 
nonmarket action to solve their problems. Take for example the community problem of 
providing a baseball diamond. The real-world community of Boelus, Nebraska solved 
this problem in a manner typical of the private property order by using a variety of market 
and nonmarket activities. The use rights to the land were donated by a local land owner. 
Local businesses, as an advertising effort, donate money for construction and 
maintenance. The baseball league charges a gate fee. Coaches pass the hat through the 
bleachers during ball games. Team members and their parents conduct fund raisers. A 
for-profit concession stand is leased to a community member. Coaches, parents, team 
members, and interested community members volunteer their services for spring cleaning 
of the premises.
The potential for free riding exists in such activities as passing the hat and spring 
cleanup. But very little takes place because the actions of each individual are being 
monitored by his neighbors. If one refrains from dropping in the hat, one’s neighbor 
takes note. The same is true if one does not show up for spring cleaning. All those 
factors that promote community as discussed earlier in this chapter, act to prevent free 
riding: The kinship factor promotes a sense of identity, role, and responsibility; the 
isolation factor promotes a sense of shared fate; the common values factor promotes 
community consensus and sanction. In a similar vein, those factors that promote 
reputation and ideology also help prevent free riding in the private property order.
In the private property, as in Boelus, there are people who walk the shortcut by the 
river to avoid the gate fee, who do not drop in the hat, who do not volunteer or donate and 
still attend ball games, but they do so at their own risk. For most people in a small 
community these are risky choices. Their well-being in the community depends on the
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good will of their neighbors. However, for others, avoiding payment is not so risky. In 
every community there are the poor and unfortunate, at least relatively so. The norms of 
the community may grant these people free baseball-diamond benefits by not forming a 
consensus and implementing sanctions against them. That is, neighbors may take note of 
these people’s pay-avoidance but do nothing about it. Community members may chalk 
this up as doing a good deed, but it may also be seen as simple price discrimination. The 
poor and unfortunate, by their presence, are adding to team-fan group dynamics, and they 
are adding to community solidarity. For those unable to pay more, perhaps, in the eyes of 
more fortunate community members, this is payment enough.
Finally, we must consider whether free riding is a problem in regards to defense, 
the only good that is totally provided collectively in the private property order. Even 
though defense is not a “public good,” since it is provided collectively on a large (total) 
scale, it is vulnerable to conventional free riding. However, the state can, a 'la  Olson, 
offer excludable incentives to encourage donations, and it can “federate” the provision of 
defense, i.e., organize defense as a federation of many small defense units rather than one 
large one. The state can, a 'la  North, use ideology to inspire loyalty and duty.
Furthermore, a 'la Rothbard, defense can be denied to those who do not pay and can be 
provided in different amounts to different people or different sections of the country. 
Finally, defense can be provided in the community setting to make best use of 
monitoring, reputation and ideology, and it can be provided by a combination o f market 
and nonmarket action.
In summary, the private property order has a high incidence of beneficial free 
riding, a low incidence of conventional free riding, and no compulsory free riding. 
Beneficial free riding occurs as people benefit from the capital investments of producers 
who do not care that they create free benefits. Conventional free riding is prevented by 
market production and by nonmarket collective action that takes place within community 
contexts, where monitoring is easy and where reputation and ideology are most effective. 
There is no compulsory free riding because the state is restricted from granting personal 
or group benefits to some at the expense of others. There are no special interests lying to
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state officials in order to get special favors because the state has no favors to give. Most 
importantly, production within the private property order is predominantly market 
production, since there is no need for state provision of radio and television, roads, 
streets, parks, mail delivery, or schools.
Institutional Restrictions of Communication
In this section I evaluate the degree of institutional restrictions on communication. 
This is important because if people are prevented from communicating with each other, 
they cannot engage in reputation, community, or ideology; hence, more lying to obtain 
benefits will take place. Previously in this chapter, we discussed obstacles to 
communication in the section on ideology. There we saw that people are isolated into 
different communities by differences in culture, language, education, divisions of labor, 
jargon, technical language, etc. All of these forms of isolation are barriers to 
communication. We also saw that various communities may have norms against 
communicating with persons of different races, religions, families, or sex, or any other 
social division. All of these obstacles also apply to this section, but I consider these ideas 
sufficiently developed, so I do not mention them again until the final summary.
In the most general sense, communication is the making of assertions by one party 
for the enlightenment of a second party. Searle told us in Chapter 1 that assertions are 
illocutionary acts that have rules, one of which is that the expressed proposition must not 
be obviously true to both parties. This is just to say that if you know of something, then I 
cannot inform you of it. If everyone had perfect information, there could be no 
communication. Searle’s rule simply reminds us that people communicate because they 
have different sets of information, and that they can mutually benefit themselves by 
exchanging information. However, different sets of knowledge means that private 
information is present in the communication process, and that people can use their private 
information for lying.
Communication, whether oral, written or otherwise, requires both a sender and a 
receiver, both of whom can be actively or passively involved in the transfer of 
information. The distinction between active and passive communication is intent. This
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
165
makes possible four cases: (1) both have intent to communicate; (2) neither has the 
intent to communicate; (3) sender intends to communicate but receiver does not; (4) 
sender does not intend to communicate but receiver does. Let us take a look at each case. 
In the first case. Rod dials the phone and his wife, Jeane, answers it. Both the sender and 
the receiver intend to communicate. The same is true of written communication; the 
writer and the reader both intend to communicate although, in the case of books, they 
may never know each other and there may be a long time interval between the processes 
of sending and receiving. In the second case, Rod has a bad day and the stress in his 
voice causes Jeane to become irritable. Here, both Rod and Jeane are communicating 
passively, because neither of them has the intention nor may even be aware of being 
involved in this process. In the third case, Rod leaves subtle hints about a fishing pole 
that he has been eyeing, and Jeane, thinking it was her idea, buys the pole for his 
Christmas present. In the fourth case, Rod privately observes how Jeane plants her flower 
garden and then plants his flowers in the same manner. In this case, Rod is purposely 
learning from Jeane but her role is unintentional. Before we look for barriers to 
communication in the private property order, it will be helpful to see how these cases 
apply to lying.
Only cases one, three and four apply to lying, since in case two there is no intent 
in either sender or receiver. Case one is the normal or familiar case of lying, i.e., one liar 
misinforming one or more dupes who are actively involved in the communication 
process. It is also the case of the information relation, where both Informer and Informee, 
while engaging in communication, are both actively evaluating the benefits and costs of 
their options. Case three is a more subtle and subversive way of lying. It involves 
deceiving the dupe when his guard is down. People let their guard down when they 
believe that the information they are receiving has a neutral source, i.e., they are unaware 
that there is intent behind the message.
For example, suppose the boss does not want his employees to know o f his 
absence. He may hang his coat on the rack, put his over-boots by the door, post a  sign 
that says, “Please do not disturb,” and leave his radio playing. That way his presence fills
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the office and inspires productive employees even though he is physically absent. This 
kind of lying requires dissimulation, indirect messages, and the staging of events and of 
the dupes physical environment. It is what we all do to fool potential burglars when we 
go on vacation. We stop newspaper delivery, connect interior lights and radios to timers, 
leave fake messages taped on the door, have a neighbor raise and lower the shades daily, 
and hire the lawn to be mowed midweek. In other words, we are staging the environment 
to communicate a false message, the message that we are home.
Case four, as it is, presents no opportunity to lie; however, with a slight 
alteration, it becomes case one or three. Returning to an example above, Rod privately 
observes Jeane planting her flowers. Since Jeane is not aware that Rod is observing her 
actions, she obviously does not intend to teach him how to plant flowers; therefore, there 
is no reason to suspect that she is lying. Now suppose that Jeane becomes aware of Rod’s 
presence. She can either reveal or not reveal her knowledge to Rod. If she reveals her 
knowledge, this case reverts to being case one; both persons are actively involved in 
communicating and both know it. If she does not reveal her knowledge, this case 
becomes like case three; she can intentionally send false messages with her actions while 
Rod’s guard is down. Jeane can intentionally demonstrate incorrect horticultural methods 
to mislead Rod. This is, of course, assuming she has a reason for doing so. Perhaps they 
are competing for top honors in the local flower show.
In this form, case three is more commonly known as “disinformation,” a term 
often used in regard to false internal communiques intended to deceive the enemy in time 
of war. Barnes calls disinformation “black propaganda” or “deceit that is suffered as 
much by one’s trusting supporters as by one’s enemies.” The target of disinformation, he 
says, “is the actions of the enemy or the thoughts of one’s own citizens” (26-27). The key 
to disinformation is the staging of events in such a way that leads the target to believe that 
there is no intent to deceive. He will consequently let down his guard and believe lies.
Barriers to communication invite lying, because they prevent the formation of 
reputation, community, and ideology, all strategies to prevent lying. If people are unable 
to communicate with each other, they cannot gossip or engage in extended dealings
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whereby they educate themselves about their social world; they cannot “spread the 
word,” so to speak, about truthful or untruthful behavior of others. Barriers to 
communication obstruct people’s efforts to protect themselves from lying, increase 
overall private information, and thereby increase the benefit of lying.
The only formal barriers to communication in the private property order are 
private property restrictions. In case one above, where both Sender and Receiver intend 
to communicate. Sender must own the ideas that he sends, and he must own or rent the 
means of communication, such as a printing press or broadcast equipment. Also, Sender 
and Receiver must own the ground upon which they stand or have permission to be there. 
In case three, where Sender intends to communicate but Receiver does not, Sender must 
have Receiver’s permission to enter the premises and to disperse his message. Sender 
cannot, for example, come into Receiver’s house and leave subtle hints that Receiver will 
unintentionally pick up, or he cannot turn on Receiver’s television so that Receiver will 
hear his message. In case four, Receiver must have Sender’s permission to enter the 
premises. Receiver cannot enter Sender’s house and observe him secretly.
The sparsity of formal restrictions to communication in the private property order, 
may seem to leave people vulnerable to lying, libel, slander, plagiarism and invasion of 
privacy. However, property rights and informal norms provide the necessary protection 
from these undesirable aspects of communication freedom. Rothbard argues that “the 
only right ‘to privacy’ is the right to protect one’s property from being invaded by 
someone else.” (Ethics o f  Liberty 121-122,). Even so, in the practical sense, people still 
can acquire the level o f privacy that they desire by exercising their property rights. 
Rothbard shows that even though people have a property right to the ideas and opinions 
that are in their heads, there are property right limits as to what they can say and print. 
People are legally prevented from (1) the “telling” of ideas that they have previously 
agreed not to reveal, (2) the “telling” o f ideas that they have acquired by invading 
someone’s property, and (3) the “telling” of ideas that are copyrighted. The first 
exception is legally prevented, because it is a  case of breech of contract. The second 
exception is equivalent to breaking and entering and stealing personal property. The third
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exception is also a breech of contract. For example, if  you buy the sheet music to my 
latest song, you will notice that I have stamped “copyrighted” on it. That means your 
purchase is conditional rather than absolute. If you buy the music you are agreeing to 
these terms: You may sing the song, but you may not pretend that you wrote it and sell it 
under your name. Copyright laws protect what Rand calls “intellectual property” 
{Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal 130).
Even though there are few formal laws against communication in the private 
property order, informal norms may prevent certain instances of communication. For 
example, norms may develop that prevent lying, libel, slander, and invasion of privacy. 
People within a community form a consensus as to what is appropriate behavior regarding 
these issues in order to maintain community cohesiveness. This consensus results in 
norms that regulate behavior within acceptable standards. Also, norms may develop 
preventing communication between races or social classes. However, as we have seen in 
a different context, norms intended to keep people apart tend to dissipate in a market 
society due to the cost of abiding by them.
The obvious conclusion o f the above discussion is that there are few restrictions to 
information and communication in the private property order. However, this conclusion 
must remain tentative until I deal with the welfare economic view of information, which 
finds formidable barriers to the flow of information in free markets. Arrow, the main 
proponent of this view, argues that we cannot expect markets for information to be 
efficient because of two characteristics of information: (1) “it is, by definition, indivisible 
in its use” and (2) “it is very difficult to appropriate” (246). Arrow’s view is nothing 
more than the public goods argument applied to information. As the argument goes, once 
information is produced and sold it becomes general knowledge; therefore, its producer 
cannot appropriate rents for its use. Consequently, information will be underproduced. 
Continuing Arrow’s argument, one can give information away and still have it, which is 
the no-marginal-cost- for-an-extra-user part of the argument. Arrow recommends 
government provision of information to compensate for the market’s under provision of 
it.
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We saw above that there are severe problems with the public goods view in regard 
to goods and services. These same problems crop up when applying the public goods 
view to information. The obvious problem with this view is that it does not match what 
we observe. In the real world, protected by copyright laws, people routinely capture rents 
from information by selling books, compact discs, newspapers, magazines, cable 
television installations, commercial time, seminars, consultation services, admittances to 
speeches and movies, tuition to private schools, and in hundreds of other ways. Also, 
Arrow’s view that information becomes general knowledge once it is sold ignores the fact 
that learning has costs. The fact that you Ieam something does not mean that I learn it as 
well. Furthermore, it is obvious that there are real marginal costs for producing an 
additional book, compact disc, newspaper, etc.
There are also theoretical problems with Arrow’s view. Demsetz argues that 
Arrow’s contention that information is nonappropriable or nonexcludable is seeing 
“special and unique problems in establishing property rights to information when the 
problems are neither special nor unique.” “It is true”, says Demsetz, “that all ‘theft’ of 
information cannot be eliminated at reasonable cost. But knowledge is not unique in this 
respect, since the same can be said of any valuable asset” (“Information and Efficiency” 
170).
Demsetz also finds fault with Arrow’s “solution” to the information “problem.” 
Arrow says that “any information obtained...should, from the welfare point of view, be 
available free of charge (apart from the cost of transmitting information).” In other 
words, information should be government provided. Arrow says that “this insures 
optimal utilization of the information but of course provides no incentive for investment 
in research” (ctd in Demsetz “Information and Efficiency” 172). Demsetz responds by 
saying that
it is hardly useful to say that there is ‘underutilization’ of information if 
the method recommended to avoid ‘underutilization’ discourages the 
research required to produce the information. These two activities simply 
cannot be judged independently. Since one of the main functions of 
paying a positive price is to encourage others to invest the resources
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needed to sustain a continuing flow o f production, the efficiency with 
which the existing stock of goods or information is used cannot be judged 
without examining the effects on production. (“Information and 
Efficiency” 172)
Arrow’s “solution” also conflicts with casual observation. Do real-world governments 
provide more information than markets? Comparing the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of 
news sources in the minimal government environment of the U. S. with Pravda, the 
single official news source in the former Soviet Union, a totalitarian state, it would appear 
that the opposite is true.
Arrow, pointing to the lack of commodity options provided by the market, is 
quoted by Demsetz as saying that the market’s “unwillingness or inability to bear risks 
will give rise to a nonoptimal allocation of resources, in that there will be discrimination 
against risky enterprises as compared with the optimum” (“Information and Efficiency” 
164). Demsetz points out that marketing options costs that exceed the gains from the 
adjustment of risk would also account for the nonexistence of the options. The only way, 
he says, that we could assume that this market result is nonoptimal is if we assume that 
risk-bearing can be done at no cost. ‘T o  make this assertion is to deny that scarcity is 
relevant to optimality, a strange position for an economist” (“Information and Efficiency” 
164). Today, or course, one can purchase options on most any commodity.
Bates and Hirshleifer argue that there are still further problems with the public 
goods view of information. Bates points out that the public goods approach to 
information creates a paradox in that advertising implies a negative marginal cost since 
the producer pays the cost of production and at least part of the cost of distribution.
Public goods analysis does not allow for a negative cost. Bates suggests this paradox is 
caused by analysts confusing “information” with the “information good,” i.e., the 
physical object to which information is linked such as books and compact discs. He says 
that the cost side is usually figured from the cost of producing the physical manifestation 
of information, where as the demand side is analyzed from the view of value o f the 
information itself. “With costs and benefits not being determined by related aspects of
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the good in question, it is hardly surprising that, under traditional economic analysis, the 
various efficiency criteria might not be satisfied for information goods” (81).
Hirshleifer calls Arrow’s approach to information the “sale” motive approach, 
since Arrow assumes that profits from the production of information come only from its 
sale. Hirshleifer introduces what he calls the “pushing” motive for the production of 
information. It amounts to this: If you were in possession of certain information, you 
might act in ways that benefit me; therefore I would profit by producing the information 
and giving it to you. This push motive explains advertising. It also shows how the 
inventor of an idea might be motivated to spread the new idea far and wide, because he is 
in a position to predict price reevaluations ensuing from the publication of his idea. 
Hirshleifer notes that here the profit motive dictates the widest possible dissemination of 
information. He concludes that “the speculative ‘pushing’ motive, in contrast with the 
sale motive that the patent institution facilitates, furthers both the utilization and the 
production of information” (64).
Summarizing this section, there are three formal, private-property-rights 
restrictions to communication in the private property order: People are forbidden from 
communicating ideas that they previously agreed not to reveal, that they acquired by 
invading someone’s property, and that are copyrighted. There is no legal right to privacy 
or legal protection from libel and slander in the private property order; however, informal 
norms restrict these negative kinds of communication to acceptable standards. Informal 
restrictions to communication, like norms against communication between social classes, 
tend to dissipate due to the costs o f abiding by them. The welfare economists view that 
free markets have systemic obstacles to the creation and flow of information that can be 
removed by government has flaws serious enough to warrant discounting the entire view.
The conclusion that communicadon is essentially unrestrained in the private 
property order appears to be in conflict with the earlier conclusion that there are high 
costs for alternative information. However, the factors that cause high costs for 
alternative information, differences in language, culture, value referents, education, etc., 
do not exist to any great extent within community. These factors exist only between
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communities. Therefore, the fact that communication flows freely within community and 
is restrained between communities makes possible the existence of both gossip and total 
ideology as social forces that constrain lying.
Time Preference
Earlier in this chapter, we saw how the private property order promotes 
expectations of a secure future and thereby encourages and allows people to value the 
future, i.e., to value future transactions. Our earlier concern was to show how 
expectations of a secure future promoted the functioning of the reputation strategy. Here 
our concern is how expectations of a secure future affect the benefit-cost ratio of lying.
Among the factors discussed earlier that give people cause to expect a bright 
future in the private property order are secure property rights and a restrained state. These 
factors lead to other contributing factors, such as the freedom to make incremental 
choices about one’s wealth and personal welfare, the freedom to enter associations with 
others that one believes beneficial, and freedom from the possibility of being conscripted 
to fight a war. Such factors make the future probable and real to people; they expect to 
exist in the future in a well state of being. Therefore, trading off some part of their 
present consumption in order to provide for greater consumption in the future becomes a 
viable option in their overall strategy to benefit themselves. In short, they can take a 
long-term view of what constitutes personal benefits. The flip side of this is that people 
value the present with less urgency than they would if their future was less certain. Short­
term benefits are discounted and future benefits receive a premium. People feel less 
urgency about present consumption because they are confident that by deferring present 
consumption they have improved their overall well-being.
When events occur that lower people’s expectations for the future, they place a 
new urgency upon consuming in the present and discount the value of future ,
consumption. This relationship between the value of present and future goods is what 
economists call “time preference.” People with a high time preference greatly prefer 
having their cake now rather than later. People with low time preference are more 
content to delay consumption in the present so as to have resources available to invest
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and, thereby, to create a more secure future. If there are present events or situations that 
make the future appear less certain or less appealing, people concentrate their 
consumption of goods in the present where they are certain that they will be able to 
consume them.
As an illustration of how time preference affects the benefit-cost ratio of lying, 
imagine the simple two-person-society information relation under conditions where future 
prospects are bright for both Informer and Informee. Under these conditions. Informer, in 
choosing whether to lie, chooses between the short-term benefits of lying and the Long­
term costs of getting caught, or the long-term benefits of truth-telling and the short-term 
costs of foregoing the benefit of lying. Under this incentive structure. Informer tends to 
be truthful because it is relatively more beneficial to him. His total stream of expected 
benefits greatly offsets his total stream of expected costs. Meanwhile, Informee rests 
secure that the reputation strategy is intact and that Informer has little incentive to lie.
Now suppose that both partners learn that the state has declared war on the 
neighboring nation and that Informer is being conscripted. Under these conditions, the 
future becomes less certain. Informer now discounts long-term costs and long-term 
benefits and puts a premium on short-term benefits. Under these circumstances the total 
stream of expected benefits from lying outweigh the total stream of expected costs. 
Informee is aware of Informer’s heightened incentive to lie but has fewer useable 
strategies than before. Reputation becomes nonfunctional as Informer stops caring about 
future transactions. Community dissolves since Informer and Informee no longer share 
the same fate nor are they economically interdependent. It is also likely that such an 
event would cause severe enough changes in terms of exchange as to cause people to 
question their beliefs, which means a breakdown of total ideology. Thus, Informer’s 
expected costs of lying go down while his expected benefits go up. We can conclude 
from this that social institutions that give people cause to expect a bright future decrease 
lying by lowering the expected benefits of lying in relation to expected costs. Conversely, 
social institutions that cloud the future or create a heightened level of uncertainty increase 
lying by increasing the expected benefits of lying in relation to expected costs.
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In the private property order, one encounters little reason to doubt the existence of 
the future. The rules of the game are clear, unchanging, and apply to everyone equally. 
There is no opportunity for people to use the power of the state to appropriate one 
another’s property ; therefore, one’s relations with others are friendly and predictable, 
and one can make plans with the expectation that they will come to fruition. There is 
little chance that one will be involved in wars because the state cannot aggress, conscript, 
tax, or implement tariffs and migration barriers. There is no state inspired hyperinflation 
that in the real world causes social unrest, revolution, and a depreciation one’s relative 
income position. One can travel widely without fear of physical violence. One is free to 
make choices regarding one’s personal wealth and welfare that one believes will benefit 
one’s life. One’s material well-being does not depend on collective action and therefore 
is not plagued by the free-rider problem. Instead, it is rooted in market relations, which 
means that it rests, on the one hand, on one’s personal abilities and creativeness and, on 
the other hand, on other people’s self-interest rather than their good will. These 
conditions in the private property order tend to engender a low time preference relative to 
conditions where the state is less constrained.
Ethical Codes of Conduct Engendered by the Private Property Order
There is a tendency in the private property order for behavior to take on a certain 
character. This is because the market has its requirements for behavior and obliges 
people to accept its standards to the extent that they gain their sustenance therein. This 
phenomenon, on a very basic level, can be observed in students who change their 
behavior to get a job. Students, having no requirement to provide their own food and 
shelter, are free to flaunt adult standards of propriety. They may dress or wear their hair 
differently than adult standards or speak using an offensive vocabulary. An overnight 
change in such behavior occurs when students wish to take a job in order to purchase a 
car. Working at the local supermarket, students are clean cut, appropriately dressed and 
polite. They are free to indulge their disdain for adult standards only when they are not at 
work. This transformation is commonly known among middle and high school teachers.
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This same phenomenon can be observed in the differences in behavior between 
college professors and business executives. Business executives methodically dress in 
the required suit and tie and visit the barber on a regular basis. They are careful of 
expressing political views in public for fear it will chase away clients. College 
professors, being more insulated from the discipline of the market, are freer to indulge 
their whims about dress and hair style. They also are less reluctant, at least after they 
have attained tenure, to express political views, their wages depending only indirectly on 
pleasing clients.
This phenomenon has come to be known as the “doiix-commerce thesis.” It is the 
idea that in a market setting, gentle manners, polish, and cordiality are the result of self­
interest. Many political theorists have stressed the importance of the doux-commerce 
thesis including Montesquieu, Smith, Hume, Condorcet, and Thomas Paine. Albert 
Hirschman chose to quote Samuel Ricard as one of the most detailed accounts o f how the 
market generates gentle manners. Ricard says:
Commerce attaches [men] one to another through mutual utility. Through 
commerce the moral and physical passions are superseded by 
interest...Commerce has a special character which distinguishes it from all 
other professions. It affects the feelings of men so strongly that it makes 
him who was proud and haughty suddenly turn supple, bending and 
serviceable. Through commerce, man learns to deliberate, to be honest, to 
acquire manners, to be prudent and reserved in both talk and action. 
Sensing the necessity to be wise and honest in order to succeed, he flees 
vice, or at least his demeanor exhibits decency and seriousness so as not to 
arouse any adverse judgement [sic] on the part of present and future 
acquaintances; he would not dare make a spectacle of himself for fear of 
damaging his credit standing and thus society may well avoid a scandal 
which it might otherwise have to deplore, (qtd in Hirschman 1465)
Ricard here argues, as Hirschman points out, that commerce is a “powerful moralizing 
agent which brings many nonmaterial improvements to society even though a bit of 
hypocrisy may have to be accepted into the bargain” (1465).
The hypocrisy alluded to by Ricard is the basis of much criticism of the doux- 
commerce thesis from writers supporting traditional values. They contend that manners
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and cordiality which are the result of self-interest are not genuine. Therefore, they say, 
the market destroys the values upon which it depends for its survival. Hirschman calls 
this the “self-destruction thesis” (1466). This theme takes several different forms. One is 
that the moral foundation upon which the market depends is not generated by the market 
but is a vestige of an earlier epoch. This view sees the market as a juggernaut that 
destroys everything in its path, including the traditional values upon which it depends. 
Fred Hirsch argues along these lines in his Social Limits to Growth. He says that “the 
weakening of traditional social values has made predominantly capitalist economies more 
difficult to manage, that is, to guide by indirect state intervention” (118). This is no 
criticism of the private property order since within it there is neither pre-capitalist values 
nor state management of the economy.
Schumpeter advanced another form of the self-destruction thesis, an expansion of
the juggernaut view. Schumpeter argues that
...capitalism creates a critical frame of mind which, after having destroyed 
the moral authority of so many other institutions, in the end turns against 
its own; the bourgeois finds to his amazement that the rationalist attitude 
does not stop at the credentials of kings and popes but goes on to attack 
private property and the whole scheme of bourgeois values, (qtd, in 
Hirschman 1469)
Hirschman points out that “capitalism is here cast in the role of the sorcerer-apprentice 
who does not know how to stop a mechanism once set in motion—so it demolishes itself 
along with its enemies” (1469).
The juggernaut criticism is contradicted by what Hirschman calls the “Feudal- 
S hackles Thesis,” another criticism of the market order that holds that market values lead 
to its being too weak to displace the values and authority structure of the ancien regime. 
According to this view, says Hirschman, the values of the bourgeoisie, who are the 
standard bearer of the market order, lead them to be submissive and congenial in the face 
of authority rather than to confront it. In this view, the pre-capitalist or traditional values 
are an obstacle to the full flowering of capitalism and its market values rather than being 
the moral foundation upon which it depends.
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The values demanded by the market are generally associated with the “middle 
class” a somewhat ambivalent term. Writers often refer to this class as the “bourgeoisie,” 
a term use by John Locke to mean “ideal man.” Locke favored the rising bourgeoisie and 
their social attitudes over either the traditional landed classes or the multitude. His 
bourgeois man is of humble origin and has overcome the deficiencies of his birth by using 
his ability. He is self-directed, self-disciplined, and prudent in judgment. He is a rational 
creature of enlightened self-interest, and is the moral equal of other men with the natural 
rights of life, liberty, and property. He is calculating in the pursuit of happiness, but even 
so, is a sincere and dedicated Christian who has the will, ability, and the means to reflect 
upon intellectual matters and to engage in public affairs. He holds an egalitarian view of 
mankind in that all people have the same frailty of knowledge, and all are equally fallible. 
He, therefore, is never willing to submit uncritically to authority or received opinion. 
(Wood, 124-135).
The term “bourgeois” acquired a pejorative sense from Marx and other writers 
who criticized the values of the middle class. Bourgeois values are those demanded by 
the market. Maria Ossowska selects Benjamin Franklin as the incarnation of the 
“bourgeois morality” in America and Daniel Defoe in England. These are writers, she 
says, that “propagated as positive the slogans and values that were depreciated by their 
critics” (160). Ossowska cites Max Weber’s contention that Franklin was “the apostle of 
the ideal of a man worthy of credit” (162). In order to gain the reputation of a man 
worthy of credit, he must be punctual, avoid waste, be always at work, and avoid the 
tavern. Franklin’s thirteen principles for living the perfect life are: temperance, silence, 
order, resolution, frugality, industry, sincerity, justice, moderation, cleanliness, 
tranquillity, chastity, and humility. According to Ossowska, Franklin admitted that in 
regard to the last two “he did not arrive at complete success” (162).
McCloskey chastises modem day bourgeoisie for being lax in not developing a 
moral foundation for what he calls “bourgeois virtue.” He says that we have only two 
ways of talking about virtue, neither of which supports the market order. They are the 
patrician way and the plebeian way. The patrician way embraces the four classical pagan
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virtues as epitomized by Odysseus: prudence, temperance, justice, and courage. This 
view emphasizes aggressive heroism and supports the aristocracy. The plebeian way, the 
way of St. Paul, values above ail else faith, hope, and charity, and holds that every soul is 
subject to a higher power. This view, says McCloskey, “ is a ‘slave morality,’ bending to 
the aristocratic virtues that Nietzsche and other Hellenizers prized” (“Bourgeois Virtue” 
177).
Following McCloskey’s line of thought we can make some conclusions. The 
aristocracy object primarily to the leveling effect of the market order. Their goal is huge 
feats far and above those of the average citizen. Strength, courage, and aggression are 
their virtues. For them, the gentle manners and cordiality of the bourgeoisie are nothing 
more than weakness. Christians object that bourgeois morality is instrumental, that 
bourgeois manners, cordiality, and good will are rooted in self-interest. The Christian 
goal is heaven, which requires humility and self-denial. They see pride and the pursuit of 
self-interest as a sin. Criticism of bourgeois virtues in this moral environment is 
inevitable because the market neither demands nor rewards heroic aggression or humility. 
As McCloskey puts it, “shamefully we bourgeois are neither saints nor heroes” 
(“Bourgeois Virtue” 178).
Since we are looking for institutions that reduce lying, we must consider being 
criticized by the aristocracy for being honest, punctual in one’s dealings, and cordial as 
being no criticism at all. Furthermore, to be criticized by Christianity for pursuing self­
interest is somewhat hypocritical. Is the pursuit of heaven not the pursuit of self-interest? 
Is altruistic action in the pursuit of heaven not an instrumental use of values?
If we put pagan and Christian virtues into a single pot and presented them to 
bourgeois man, the only one that he would throw out is heroic aggression. The market 
rewards Osysseus’s virtues: Prudence makes for good business deals; temperance 
increases one’s savings; a sense of justice results in fair play; risk-taking requires 
courage. Thus we have the prudent entrepreneur courageously risking his life-savings in 
accordance with the rules of the game. Within the market in the larger sense of the 
private property order, we find that there is room for Christian faith, hope, charity, and
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humility. People are free to organize as they please to worship or to provide charity to 
others. They are free to give away their assets and to keep their generosity a private 
matter.
I now review briefly the findings of the five sections above that make up the 
analysis of the benefit-cost ratio of lying in the private property order. First, the market 
simultaneously solves the economic problem and, to a large extent, prevents particular 
knowledge from being used for lying. Second, the need to make a profit makes 
monitoring of individual behavior in market organizations in the private property order a 
simple matter of looking at the profit and loss statement. Members of nonmarket 
organizations are subject to reputational monitoring by the need to make their living in 
the market. Third, conventional free riding is not a problem in the private property order, 
because the market can produce even those goods considered by some to be public goods. 
Compulsory free riding does not exist in the private property order, because the state is 
not allowed to grant favors. Fourth, communication is unrestrained with the exception of 
property right considerations and informal norms that tend to restrain lying. Fifth, 
conditions in the private property order engender a low time preference, which indicates a 
valuing of the future. Lastly, the market engenders moral virtues that do not abide lying.
In the next chapter I compare protection-from-lying strategies to the institutional 
constraints of a bureau model developed from the works of Weber, Mises, Rourke, 
Downs, and Selznick. Also, as I have done here, I evaluate the bureau model as to how 
its constraints affect the benefit-cost ratio of lying.
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Chapter 4 
Lying in the Bureau
The format of this chapter is very similar to the previous chapter. I first develop a 
bureau model. I then compare the necessary requirements for the successful application 
of protection-from-lying strategies to the institutional constraints of the bureau model. 
Finally, I evaluate the benefit-cost ratio of lying in the bureau model using the same six 
items used in the last chapter to evaluate the private property order. This gives us a point- 
by-point comparison of how protection strategies are able to function and of the benefit- 
cost ratio of lying in both the private property order and bureau models.
The primary bureau model that is developed in this chapter, used as a benchmark, 
is that of Max Weber, whose model of bureaucracy has formed the basis for most 
discussions of bureaucracy. Secondary models by Mises, Rourke, Downs, and Selznick 
are used to qualify Weber’s model and make it more useable for our purposes. The 
bureau model comprises the opposite extreme of the private property order model. 
Together, these two models form a continuum, a larger, more comprehensive model, 
which I use to elucidate a relationship between institutional structure and lying.
Weber’s Model of Bureaucracy
The term “bureaucracy” gets its meaning from the French noun bureau, meaning 
“office” or “department” and the Greek verb kratos, meaning “to rule.” In today’s world, 
as Mises points out, “the terms bureaucrat, bureaucratic, and bureaucracy are clearly 
invectives” {Bureaucracy 1). In spite of its opprobrious connotation, the term 
“bureaucracy” is used to refer to both the administration of an organization by a specific 
set of officials and to the administration of a whole nation by means o f  agencies, bureaus, 
commissions, and departments. Organizations might be thought of as fractals of a 
national bureaucracy, i.e., they have similar internal relations but on a different scale.
Weber’s bureaucracy model contains six conditions that delineate power relations 
between people and establish the source of authority in the model. In summarized form, 
these six conditions are as follows:
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1. There exist fixed and official jurisdictional areas.
2. There exists a hierarchy of graded authority.
3. Management is based on written documents.
4. Management is based on expert training.
5. Officials are full-time employees.
6. Management is based on general rules.
Weber’s model has two additional conditions that pertain to the position of 
bureaucrats, or officials as Weber calls them, within this power structure:
7. Office holding is a vocation.
8. Officials have a social level commensurate with their place in the hierarchy.
In the next few pages, I elaborate each of Weber’s conditions separately in the 
order that they are presented above.
1. According to Weber, bureaucracy operates on a “principle of fixed and official 
jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or 
administrative regulations.” Weber calls these fixed jurisdictional areas “offices.” 
According to this model, an office circumscribes a set of regular activities, which are the 
official duties of the office. People are selected for employment in specific offices and 
obtain the authority to give commands and to wield coercion to discharge official duties 
according to a set of rules, which are laid down by a higher authority (196).
2. According to Weber, this system of offices with official duties as prescribed by 
a higher authority is a multilevel or hierarchical structure where the governed can appeal 
the decision of a lower office to a higher office. This, he says, means a “firmly ordered 
system of super- and subordination in which there is supervision o f the lower offices by 
the higher ones.” Weber says that “the principle of hierarchical office authority is found 
in all bureaucratic structures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as well as in large party 
organizations and private enterprises. It does not matter for the character of bureaucracy 
whether its authority is called ‘private’ or ‘public’” (197).
3. According to Weber, “the management of the modem office is based upon 
written documents (‘the files’), which are preserved in their original or draught form.” 
That is to say, the rules that govern an office are formal, written rules. Therefore, he says,
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each office has “ a staff of subaltern officials and scribes of all sorts.” The staff and the 
files of a given public office, according to Weber, constitute what is properly called a 
“bureau.” In principle, the doings o f the bureau are completely separate from the private 
life of the official. His personal correspondence, money, and assets are all separate from 
those that he deals with in his official capacity (197).
4. According to Weber, “office management, at least all specialized office 
management...presupposes thorough and expert training” (198). The office manager 
must not only have the technical skills that are necessary to serve the purposes of the 
office, such as accounting, personnel management, etc., he must also know the 
regulations or rules that lay out the source and extent of his authority. W eber says this 
condition holds for executives of private enterprises as well as for state officials. (198).
5. According to Weber, “when the office is fully developed, official activity 
demands the full working capacity of the official, irrespective of the fact that his 
obligatory time in the bureau may be firmly delimited.” This is simply to say that office 
management is a full-time job. Historically, Weber says, the situation was reversed, i.e., 
“official business was discharged as a secondary activity” (198).
6. According to Weber, “the management of the office follows general rules, 
which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned. 
Knowledge of these rules represents a special technical learning which the officials 
possess. It involves jurisprudence or administrative or business management” (198).
7. According to Weber, the holding of an office is a vocation, complete with a 
prescribed course o f training, which is itself a full-time job. Also, there are special 
examinations which are prerequisites of employment. While on the job, office holders’ 
activities are seen as duties. Weber continues that office holders are expected to refrain 
from extracting rents in the course of the execution of their duties. Also, he says, having 
been granted an office is not to be seen as payment for past services but, rather, as having 
met the qualifications of the office. “Entrance into an office, including one in the private 
economy, is considered an acceptance o f a specific obligation of faithful management in 
return for a secure existence” (198-199).
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8. According to Weber, the personal position of the official is structured as 
follows:
A. The official usually occupies a social level commensurate with his place in the 
hierarchy. This newly acquired status level is the result of his training, his previous 
social status, and the fact that he has various certificates. The official’s position 
sometimes gives him the authority to grant approval to lower applicants (199-200).
B. The bureaucratic official is appointed by a superior authority rather than elected. 
Election to an office would modify the strictness of hierarchical subordination, 
because being elected is to receive authority from below rather than above. An 
appointed official functions more “exactly” from a technical point of view than does 
the elected official because an appointed official is personally selected for certain 
qualities, one being loyalty (200-202)
C. Public officials usually have tenure, and the position of the official in public 
bureaucracies is normally held for life. The official is not seen to have a right to life 
tenure, but there are specific rules against arbitrary dismissal. (202)
D. The official receives a regular salary and a pension instead of a wage. Salary is 
granted according to status, rank, and or length service (203).
E. The official makes a career out of public service. He moves up the hierarchy which 
has fixed conditions of seniority (203).
When applied to government, the above eight elements constitute what Weber 
calls “bureaucratic authority.” When applied to the private domain, he calls the resulting 
structure “bureaucratic management” (196). In either case, according to Weber, “in 
principle a system of rationally debatable ‘reasons’ stands behind every act of 
bureaucratic administration, that is, either subsumption under norms or a weighing of 
ends and means” (220). Although the above distinction between “bureaucratic authority” 
and “bureaucratic management” does not acknowledge the fundamental distinction made 
by Mises in Chapter 3 between “profit management” and “bureaucratic management,” 
Weber does acknowledge Mises’s distinction indirectly when he says that “errors in 
official statistics do not have direct economic consequences for the guilty official, but
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errors in the calculation of a capitalist enterprise are paid for by losses, perhaps by its 
existence” (235). In other words, officials in nonprofit organizations cannot be held 
accountable by the profit-and-Ioss statement as they can in for-profit organizations as 
Mises pointed out.
Weber says that the development of a money economy is a presupposition of
bureaucracy. He explains:
Even though the full development of a money economy is not an 
indispensable precondition for bureaucratization, bureaucracy as a 
permanent structure is knit to the one presupposition of a constant income 
for maintaining it. Where such an income cannot be derived from private 
profits, as is the case with the bureaucratic organization of large modem 
enterprises, or from fixed land rents, as with the manor, a stable system of 
taxation is the precondition for the permanent existence of bureaucratic 
administration. For well-known reasons, only a fully developed money 
economy offers a secure basis for such a taxation system. (208)
It is clear that in Weber’s view the bureau is an institutional structure that is 
brought about by conscious design. It is therefore diametrically opposed to the 
spontaneous order of the private property order. We can now see that Hayek’s 
fundamental distinction between “spontaneous order” and “organization” as discussed in 
Chapter 3, is epitomized by the private property order and the bureau. We recall that this 
distinction rests on the absence or presence of common purpose. The private property 
order has no common purpose and, hence, no design to which individuals must conform.
It is therefore a spontaneous order. Opposed to this, the bureau is organized around a 
common purpose, has an overall design, and has an authority to see that individuals adjust 
their actions accordingly. The bureau, then, is an organization.
These two opposed forms of social order are the practical outcomes of the two 
opposed strains of individualism traced by Hayek in Chapter 3. Reviewing these strains, 
the British school, known as the “anti-rationalists” due to its emphasis on nonrational, 
spontaneous processes, is the philosophical foundation for the private property order.
The Cartesian school or “rationalists” view of individualism with its emphasis on design 
and man’s perfect or perfectible rationality is the philosophical basis for the bureau.
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We will now look at the bureau models of Mises, Rourke, Downs, and Selznick to 
provide a bit of perspective and to qualify Weber’s model somewhat.
Qualifying Weber’s Bureau Model of Bureaucracy
We remember from Chapter 3 that Mises categorizes all human activity that does 
not take place in the market as “bureaucratic management.” He says that “bureaucratic 
management is the method .applied in the conduct of administrative affairs the result of 
which has no cash value on the market” {Bureaucracy 47). This is a broader definition of 
bureaucracy than that of Weber, who sees feudal, patrimonial, and plutocratic types of 
social order as being distinct from bureaucracy (225).
Mises is not arguing that bureaucratic activity has no value but “that it has no 
price on the market, that its value cannot be realized in a market transaction and 
consequently cannot be expressed in terms of money” (47). The absence of market prices 
in bureaucratic affairs, Mises says, is “the lack of standards which could, in an 
unquestionable, way, ascertain success or nonsuccess in the performance of an official’s 
duties...” The lack of an indisputable standard in bureaus by which to judge performance 
implies considerable personal discretion on the part of subordinates in their compliance or 
noncompliance to the rules o f their office.
Mises points out other difficulties of bureaucracy. He argues that bureaucracies 
also suffer from the lack of progress, from thwarted or distorted science, and from the 
inability to engage in economic calculation. He argues that the need to act according to 
rules eliminates the role of the entrepreneur, who is the risk-taker and innovator. By 
being reduced to following rules, entrepreneurs can no longer use their creativity to 
increase social well-being. “Progress is precisely that which the rules and regulations did 
not foresee; it is necessarily outside the field of bureaucratic activities” {Bureaucracy 
67).
Progress is further stymied, argues Mises, because bureaucracy tends to shape
science for its own purposes. In economics, for example,
governments encourage the specialists who limit their observations to a 
narrow field without bothering about the further consequences of a policy.
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The labor economist deals only with the immediate results of pro-labor 
policies, the farm economist only with the rise o f agricultural prices. They 
both view the problems only from the angle of those pressure groups 
which are immediately favored by the measure in question and disregard 
its ultimate social consequences. (85)
According to Mises, bureaucracies are antagonistic to an integrated body of economic
theory based on the existence of economic law, because
to maintain the theory that there are such things as economic laws was 
deemed a kind of rebellion. For if there are economic laws, then 
governments cannot be regarded as omnipotent, as their policies could 
only succeed when adjusted to the operation of these laws. {Bureaucracy 
83)
Mises argues that the inability of the bureau to engage in economic calculation,
like the absence of an indisputable performance standard, is the result of the absence of
market prices. The term “economic calculation,” according to Mises, means the ability to
value resource inputs in a quantifiable way that reflects the values of consumers. As
Mises puts it, economic calculation
enables us to extend to all goods of a higher order the judgment of value, 
which is bound up with and clearly evident in, the case of goods ready for 
consumption, or at best of production goods of the lowest order. It renders 
their value capable of computation and thereby gives us the primary basis 
for all economic operations with goods of a higher order. {Economic 
Calculation 16)
Mises argues that, due to the bureau’s inability to engage in economic calculation, 
no real-world society modeled after the bureau can actually exist. However, as we saw in 
Chapter 3, Mises argues that the private property order could actually exist even though it 
currently does not and never has. According to Mises’s view, then, the two models that 
we are using for this study, the private property order and the bureau, differ in the 
fundamental way that one could actually exist in reality and one could not.
Moving to the next model, Rourke’s bureaucracy model differs from Weber’s in 
its emphasis on the internal conflict of the bureau. Weber contends that “the absolute 
monarch is powerless opposite the superior knowledge of the bureaucratic expert—in a
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certain sense more powerless than any other political head.” Weber points out that “the 
Russian czar of the old regime was seldom able to accomplish permanently anything that 
displeased his bureaucracy and hurt the power interests of the bureaucrats” (234).
In Weber’s view, then, the monarch, the supreme authority in our model, has 
limited power to control his bureaucratic structure. Rourke concedes that a bureau has 
interests that may diverge from the interests of its supreme authority, such as the 
maintenance of its own power and jurisdiction as an organization and the perquisites of 
its members. He also concedes that a bureau has some power to thwart the edicts of its 
supreme authority. For example, “no agency is likely to support a policy that it perceives 
as diminishing its own standing or effectiveness as an organization.” (2-3).
Rourke argues, however, that bureaucracies are not the monoliths that they appear 
to be. He says that there are four sources for internal disagreement: (1) There is usually a 
sharp difference in the role and attitude between those at the top, which are often political 
appointees, and career administrators beneath them; (2) there is a divergence of views 
between the professionals who do the work of the agency and the administrators who run 
it; (3) there is a divergence of views between outside advisory experts and full-time staff; 
(4) there is a divergence of views between people of different psychological orientation 
toward their work (126-127).
Because of these internal disagreements, Rourke argues in spite of Weber’s 
contention, political executives have considerable power over their bureaucracies. 
Following Amitai Etzioni, Rourke argues that there are“ three kinds of power that 
organizations exercise over their members—coercive, remunerative, and normative. 
Coercive power is the threat or actual use of physical control; remunerative control is the 
use of material rewards as in incentives; and normative power rests on manipulation of 
‘esteem, prestige, and ritualistic symbols’” (104).
Both Weber and Rourke see the supreme authority of a bureaucracy as being a 
political executive outside of the bureaucratic structure. Tailoring this idea to fit our 
model, the political executive becomes simply the supreme authority to which all other 
levels of the hierarchy report. For our purposes, the supreme authority must be inside the
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model, i.e., he must be a  part of the bureaucratic structure. This is necessary because we 
are modeling the whole of society as one bureaucratic structure where all problems are 
common. Therefore, no one in society can be left outside of the structure, not even the 
supreme authority. In our model, as in Rourke’s, the supreme authority has considerable 
power over subordinates. This is tme for the above reasons and because subordinates 
have no alternative social structures to fall back on should they fall into the disfavor of 
the supreme authority. That is, they cannot emigrate; they have nowhere else to go.
Rourke says that whatever degree of influence subordinates have on the decisions 
of a superior comes from their expert knowledge, which is the result of division of labor, 
and from experience. Division of labor results in expert knowledge as problems are 
broken down into manageable parts and people become experts in a narrow area. Also, 
“dealing day in and day out with the same tasks gives public agencies invaluable practical 
knowledge that comes from experience” (17).
Using their expertise, subordinates can influence their superiors’ decisions
regarding public policy in various ways. According to Rourke,
...bureaucratic expertise exercises influence over the development of 
public policy through three primary channels: (1) the ability of 
bureaucrats to gather information and to give advice that often shapes the 
decisions of political officials; (2) the capacity o f  bureaucratic 
organizations to carry on the tasks that must be performed once policy 
goals are decided upon—the power of implementation; and (3) as a 
critical dimension of this power to implement policies, the discretion with 
which bureaucracies are commonly vested as they carry on the work of 
government” (20).
Rourke argues that standard operating procedures, developed to curb the personal 
discretion of individual bureaucrats, “may also enormously increase the overall influence 
of bureaucratic organizations in the governmental process” (32). This influence comes, 
Rourke says, from the fact that bureaucracies are subject to the effects of inertia and 
momentum. On the one hand, inertia prevents politicians from executing something 
quickly since they must deal with a bureaucracy “at rest” so to speak. On the other hand,
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a bureaucracy in motion has momentum which prevents decision-makers from reversing
their decisions once the bureaucracy has began its implementation (34-35).
Rourke argues that subordinates can also influence policy by their advice to
policy-makers, and that this advise appears most influential when subordinates tell
policy-makers what they want to hear. Using George Kennan’s memoirs as confirmation,
Rourke points out that Kennan appeared very influential in shaping foreign policy with
his advice about the need and methods o f containing Soviet power. This advice, Rourke
says, generally matched the pre-existing views of government officials. “Later on,
however, when Kennan attempted to restrain policy makers from putting undue emphasis
upon military force in applying the principle of containment, his advice was largely
ignored, and he found himself increasingly isolated from power.” Rourke also points out
that Henry Kissinger enjoyed a reputation for being an influential presidential advisor,
but, he says, “it is a fair assumption that Nixon initially chose Kissinger for this position
precisely because his views generally coincided with Nixon’s own orientation toward
foreign policy.” “Hence,” Rourke says, “the best way for a bureaucrat to acquire a
reputation as the power behind the throne may be to confine himself to advice that fits in
with the views of his political superiors, or to give advice only in areas in which he
knows his superior has no very strong opinions” (21).
This suggests that not only do subordinates have an incentive to lie to
superordinates, i.e., tell superordinates what they want to hear rather than what may be
the truth, it suggests that in some situations superordinates may prefer this situation as
well. In the context of American politics, Rourke explains:
The relationship between the president and his advisers at this level of 
administration involves reciprocal benefits: through their role as 
bureaucratic advisers, professionally trained economists and natural 
scientists obtain influence in the policy process that they would never 
other wise enjoy. (23)
“At the same time, however, argues Rourke,
the president also derives tangible political benefits from his use of experts. The 
wisdom o f his policy decisions is greatly enhanced in the eyes of the electorate
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when it appears that these decisions rest on the best professional advice the White 
House has been able to obtain” (23).
Put in terms of our model, lower levels of bureaucracy may cooperate in a kind of ruse in
order to influence the decision of a higher authority.
Before we move to another model, there is one more aspect of Rourke’s model
that has implications for this study. Rourke says that
in the absence of market penalties for poor performance, public 
bureaucracies often seem to be most rewarded when they are not 
accomplishing their objectives and to be least rewarded, if not actually 
punished, when they are. A police department is much more likely to 
receive an increase in appropriation in a crime wave, much more likely to 
have its budget cut when the streets are comparatively serene. An internal 
study of the operation of New York City’s public hospitals showed that the 
lion’s share of appropriations went to hospitals that were doing the poorest 
job in terms of eighteen performance criteria. Under this skewed system, 
it can be argued that it pays a public agency to do poorly the task it is 
asked to undertake (183).
In terms of our model, this is the argument that the supreme authority in a bureaucracy is 
likely to put proportionally more resources at the disposal of ineffective departments, 
which sets up incentives for departments to become ineffective.
Moving now to another model of bureaucracy, Anthony Downs classifies an 
organization as a bureau if it has the following, what he calls, “primary” characteristics:
1. It is large; that is, the highest-ranking members know less than half of 
all the members personally.
2. A majority of its members are full-time workers who depend upon 
their employment in the organization for most of their incomes.
3. The initial hiring of personnel, their promotion within the organization, 
and their retention therein are at least theoretically based upon some 
type of assessment of the way in which they have performed or can be 
expected to perform their organizational roles, rather than upon either
(a) ascribed characteristics (such as religion, race, or social class) or
(b) periodic election by some outside constituency.
4. The major portion o f its output is not directly or indirectly evaluated in 
any markets external to the organization by means of voluntary quid 
pro quo transactions. (2-3)
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Downs rejects Weber’s view that characteristics like hierarchical organization, extensive 
use of rules, impersonality of procedure, and the employment of specialists on a career 
basis are primary traits. Downs argues that these traits are the logical result of Down’s 
own four primary traits above. Thus, Downs calls Weber’s traits “secondary” traits.
Also, Downs says, bureaus “contain forces which inhibit the full development of some of 
Weber’s traits—especially impersonality of procedure” (7).
Downs holds that four conditions must be met before a person can be classified as
a “bureaucrat.” He defines a bureaucrat as any person who
(1) works for a large organization; (2) receives a money income from that 
organization which constitutes a major part of his total income; (3) is 
hired, promoted, and retained primarily on the basis of his role 
performance; and (4) produces outputs which cannot be evaluated on a 
market. (3-4)
Downs argues that, according to these conditions, people working in market organizations 
like Sears, Roebuck, and Company are bureaucrats if their personal output cannot be 
evaluated on a market, even if the value of their inputs can be evaluated (4).
Downs’s model focuses on bureaucrats or officials, as he calls them, as being 
utility maximizers. He says that “in practical terms, this implies that whenever the cost of 
attaining any given goal rises in terms of time, effort, or money, they seek to attain less of 
that goal, ceteris paribus; whereas whenever the cost of attaining a goal falls, they seek to 
attain more of it.” Downs argues that officials have a complex set of goals including 
power, income, prestige, security, convenience, loyalty, pride in excellent work, and the 
desire to serve the public interest, as each conceives it. However, he adds, “different 
types of officials focus on smaller sets of these goals” (4).
Downs constructs a taxonomy of bureaucrats that he says have different sets of the
above goals. He separates bureaucrats into the categories “climbers,” “conservers,”
“zealots,” “advocates,” and “statesmen.” According to this taxonomy, climbers and
conservers are purely self-interested officials. Climbers, says Downs,
seek to maximize their own power, income, and prestige. This can be 
done either by winning promotion to higher rank, increasing the status of
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their existing positions through aggrandizement, or ‘jumping’ to new and 
better jobs elsewhere. (4)
Conservers, he says,
seek to maximize their own security and convenience. Since ‘security’ is 
defined as maintenance of one’s present level of power, income, and 
prestige, conservers favor the status quo. They fear change because it 
might reduce their present prerogatives; hence they oppose innovations 
and change in general. (5)
According to Downs, the remaining three categories are mixed-motive officials,
who value varying degrees of social welfare as well as their personal well-being. Zealots,
he says, “are loyal to relatively narrow policies or concepts, such as the development of
military airplanes by Billy Mitchell. They seek power both for its own sake and so they
can effectuate the sacred policies to which they are loyal” (5). Advocates, Downs says,
are loyal to a broader set of policies or to a broader organization (such as 
naval warfare or Harvard University). They are impartial in judging the 
merits of various proposals within the organization to which they are loyal, 
but highly partisan in supporting that organization in conflicts with 
‘outsiders.’ The breadth of advocacy can vary widely, from a small 
section of a bureau (such as the economics department of a university) to a 
very broad bureau (such as the entire Defense Department). (5)
Statesmen, as Downs sees them,
are loyal to the nation or society as a whole—hence they resemble the 
‘ideal’ officials of public administration textbooks. However, like 
advocates and zealots, they seek power and prestige for personal as well as 
altruistic reasons, since they enjoy having an influence upon important 
policies. (5)
Bureaucrats of all classifications, says Downs, operate in an environment that has 
three characteristics:
1. Information is costly because it takes time, effort, and sometimes 
money to obtain data and comprehend their meaning.
2. Decision-makers have only limited capabilities regarding the amount 
of time they can spend making decisions, the number o f issues they 
can consider simultaneously, and the amount of data they can absorb 
regarding any one problem.
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3. Although some uncertainty can be eliminated by acquiring
information, an important degree of ineradicable uncertainty is usually 
involved in making decisions. (6)
Downs argues that bureaus normally come into being because of the actions of 
zealots, and he says, bureaus have a life cycle, i.e., bureaus, like people, age. We are 
interested in the aging process of bureaus, because our bureau model must be that of a 
mature bureau, one that has reached a  steady state capable, at least in theory, of 
continuing for the long term. Since we are modeling the whole of society as one bureau, 
mature bureau characteristics most nearly represent the steady state of our model.
Downs notes six effects of aging upon bureau behavior. First, with the passage of 
time, he says, “the bureau learns to perform its assigned functions more efficiently.” This 
creates additional capacity without the need for more resources. The surplus capacity is 
used to offer more services, acquire new functions, which adds to power and prestige, or 
to “add to organizational slack by making life easier for themselves” (19-20). In our 
model, then, we can assume that society has surplus resources that authorities can allocate 
with some discretion. This assumption is qualified below.
Second, says Downs, the bureau attempts to “organizationally remember” how to 
deal with situations by making new rules when new situations arise. This implies that our 
model, being a mature bureau, has a large body of rules and regulations. Third, “the goals 
of the bureau’s top officials tend to shift towards maintaining and expanding their 
organization perse, and away from achieving the original formal purposes of the bureau” 
(20). This occurs, Downs says, because large size and more regulations demands that 
more attention be devoted to administration. Also, officials develop an increased interest 
in maintaining the organization because they increasingly have more invested in it. This 
implies that in our model officials at various levels have acquired some goal flexibility 
and that they choose to focus on maintaining and expanding the formal structure under 
their control.
The fourth effect o f aging on bureaus, according to Downs, is that “the relative 
importance of various types of officials in the bureau tends to change.” Zealots, he says,
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tend to lose power because, being so narrowly focused, they are sufficiently biased that 
they can’t settle internal disputes and are, therefore, bad administrators. “Conservers tend 
to gain added power and prestige because they are good administrators and because they 
are more flexible about changing the organization’s goals.” However, Downs says, “if 
the bureau faces a rapidly changing environment, its climbers and advocates tend to come 
to the fore, since they are far more innovation-oriented than conservers” (20). This 
implies that the supreme authority as well as lower level officials in our model resemble 
Downs’s “conserver,” as described above unless the model’s bureaucracy is somehow 
threatened and must make rapid changes.
Downs’s fifth effect of aging on bureaus holds that “the older—and larger—a 
bureau becomes, the more it becomes subject to inertia. The main cause of inertia in any 
large organization is the enormous ‘sunk cost’ represented by its established rules, habits, 
procedures, and inter-personal networks of commutation and authority” (20). Downs 
says that older organizations tend to reject new ways of doing something because the 
benefits of innovation seldom outweigh the benefits of the current arrangements plus the 
costs of altering them. “Since the latter costs may be very large indeed, any innovation 
must be exceedingly profitable before it is likely to be adopted.” In economic terms, 
Downs is saying that as bureaus age, their marginal rate of substitution of innovation for 
current arrangements decreases. Taken in conjunction with effect three above, we find 
that “longevity causes bureaus to become less flexible regarding procedures as well as 
more flexible regarding goals” (21). Since our model is o f a large and old bureau, we can 
infer that it is highly resistant to change.
Downs’s sixth effect of aging on bureaus states that “the bureau’s functions tend 
to expand in scope. If  the relative importance of its initial social function rises and falls, 
it tends to reach out for new functions so as to maintain its power, income, and prestige. 
This process of attaining security through diversification gradually broadens the scope of 
its activities, though it may take decades for this tendency to reveal itself’ (21). As this 
relates to our model, lower level officials may find that the relative importance of their 
bureaus may rise and fall in the estimation of their superiors. This presents a threat to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
195
bureau of possible elimination or restructuring. Officials therefore try to nip this threat in 
the bud by increasing the scope and function of their bureaus.
Before proceeding, I must point out an ironic implication of Downs argument. 
Downs argues that as a bureau ages it becomes more efficient and therefore has surplus 
resources, i.e., resources that were initially needed for the completion of the bureau’s 
mission, but are no longer needed because officials have gotten better at their jobs.
Rather than return these resources to the supreme authority for further allocation, the 
bureau officials retain them for personal benefits.
Extending this argument, the more efficiently officials execute their duties, the 
more resources will be left over for personal use. This, however, depends on the supreme 
authority not finding out about the surplus resources and removing them for further 
allocation. Therefore, when under the scrutiny of the supreme authority, officials must 
appear to need all o f their allocated resources even though actually they do not. Thus, the 
unwritten rule becomes something like this: When the boss is watching, work 
inefficiendy so he thinks that I need all of these resources; when the boss in not 
watching, work efficiendy so that I can get done sooner and have free dme. This 
suggests, contrary to accepted theory, that increased monitoring produces less efficient 
operadon of the bureau rather than more.
Take, for example, the secretary who must complete ten reports per day. Her 
superior monitors her work in a general way only, i.e., by reading her ten daily reports. 
This secretary actually only needs six hours to complete these reports. The rest of the 
dme she plays solitaire on her computer, uses the telephone for personal call, files her 
nails, leaves early and arrives late. In other words, she misappropriates or pilfers the 
resources of the bureau, for if her superior knew she had extra time he would assign more 
dudes. On the unusual day that her supervisor is monitoring her more closely or “walking 
the floor” so to speak, the secretary must slow down and make sure that it takes eight 
hours to complete her reports so that she will not lose her free time on normal days. Thus 
more monitoring results in less efficient work.
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However, no monitoring would likely result in all or most of the bureau’s 
resources being used for personal use. So we finally arrive back with accepted theory in 
the conclusion that there is an optimal level of monitoring. In the above example, either 
more or less monitoring results in more cost to the bureau. More monitoring results in 
higher monitoring costs, and less monitoring results in more resources being pilfered. 
Therefore, at the optimal level of monitoring, there are leftover resources or surplus 
resources, and when they are used for personal benefits they become pilfered resources.
We now turn to Phillip Selznick’s model of bureaucracy, which has four basic 
hypotheses:
1. Every organization creates an informal structure.
2. In every organization, the goals of the organization are modified 
(abandoned, deflected, or elaborated) by processes within it.
3. The process of modification is effected through the informal structure. 
(“Approach To A Theory Of Bureaucracy” 47)
4. The actual procedures of every organization tend to be molded by 
action toward those goals which provide operationally relevant 
solutions for the daily problems of the organization as such. 
(“Approach To A Theory Of Bureaucracy” 49)
Given these hypotheses, Selznick constructs what he believes to be four steps in 
the process of bureaucratization. These steps can be summarized as follows:
1. The primary action in a bureau is delegation, because cooperative effort is complex 
and requires more than one person can do. In other words bureaucratic action is 
“action through agents.”
2. “The use o f intermediaries creates a tendency toward a bifurcation of interests 
between the initiator o f action and the agent employed.” This is so because of the 
creation of two sets of problems. The initiator’s problem is the goal which caused 
him to delegate, and the agent’s problem concerns his social position as agent. This 
conflict manifests itself in a conflict between the course o f the organization and the 
interests o f the agent.
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3. Both initiator and agent want to control the organizational mechanism in order to 
solve their problems. “In this struggle for control, an informal structure is created, 
based largely on relationships involving personal influences rather than formal rules.”
4. “Because of the concentration of skill and control of the organizational mechanism in 
the hands of the intermediaries, it becomes possible for the problems of the officials 
as such to become those which operate for the organization. The action of officials 
tends to have an increasingly internal relevance, which may result in the deflection of 
the organization from its original path, which, however, usually remains as the 
formally professed aim of the organization” (“Approach To A Theory Of 
Bureaucracy” 51).
Selznick focuses on informal actions and processes that occur within the formal
organizational structure. That is, on informal activities that are not part of the duties as
specified by formal roles. In order to flesh-out the above skeleton, we must start at the
beginning. Selznick sees delegation as the “primordial organizational act, a precarious
venture which requires the continuous elaboration of formal mechanisms of coordination
and control” (“Foundations Of The Theory Of Organization” 25). He calls the formal
structure of delegation and control the “action system” of an organization. Selznick says
that the action system or formal structure of organizations does not properly account for
people’s humanity.
From the standpoint of organization as a formal system, persons are 
viewed functionally, in respect to their roles, as participants in assigned 
segments of the cooperative system. But in fact individuals have a 
propensity to resist depersonalization, to spill over the boundaries of their 
segmentary roles to participate as wholes. ( “Foundations Of The Theory 
O f Organization” 26)
Selznick argues that, contrary to conventional theory, “organization may be 
viewed from two standpoints which are analytically distinct but which are empirically 
united in a context of reciprocal consequences. On the one hand, any concrete 
organizational system is an economy; at the same time, it is an adaptive social structure” 
(“Foundations O f The Theory Of Organization” 25-26). The economy function is that of
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dealing with resources and efficiency. This part, Selznick says, is the main focus of
administration. The fact that an organization is also an adaptive social structure becomes
evident, says Selznick, when authorities engage in activities aimed at persuasion and
increasing the legitimacy of their authority. The fact that authorities engage in these
activities implies that they cannot lead without the consent of their subordinates.
Therefore, winning consent and support is an important part of leadership.
“In short, it is recognized that control and consent cannot be divorced even 
within formally authoritarian structures...The indivisibility of control and 
consent makes it necessary to view formal organizations as cooperative 
systems...At the point of action, of executive decision, the economic 
aspect of organization provides inadequate tools for control over the 
concrete structure. (“Foundations Of The Theory Of Organization” 26)
Traditionally, individual assignments within a formal structure are assignments to
roles rather than individuals. These assignments are made with the idea of fulfilling only
the economic function of the role. This kind of assignment, however, ignores that
delegation necessarily involves concrete individuals who have interests 
and goals which do not always coincide with the goals of the formal 
system. As a consequence, individual personalities may offer resistance to 
the demands made upon them by the official conditions of delegation. 
(“Foundations” 27)
It occurs, then, according to Selznick’s theory, that people’s actions in the bureau 
differ somewhat from the duties of their official roles. These deviations are usually 
aimed at fulfilling those needs not provided for by the formal structure and may be in the 
form of resistance to the official goals of the organization. Eventually, he says, deviate 
action results in informal structures of control.
Selznick notes that Roethlisberger and Dickson observed in one study an informal 
structure of control that has three characteristics: “(a) it arises spontaneously; (b) the 
bases of the relationships are personal, involving factors of prestige, acceptance with the 
group, friendship ties, etc.; and (c) the relationships are power relationships oriented 
toward techniques of control” (“An Approach To A Theory O f Bureaucracy” 47). 
Furthermore, says Selznick,
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in large organizations, deviations from the formal system tend to become 
institutionalized, so that ‘unwritten laws’ and informal associations are 
established” . “These institutionalized rules and modes of informal 
cooperation are normally attempts by participants in the formal 
organization to control the group relations which form the environment of 
organizational decisions” (“Foundations Of The Theory Of Organization” 
27).
According to Selznick’s theory, informal structures may either advance or hinder 
formal goal achievement. Informal structures may assist in the attainment of formal goals 
by giving authorities new tools with which to manage. However, those that hinder 
achievement of the formal goals of the organization force a modification of formal goals 
and leadership structure, and they become a part of the organization’s goals and 
leadership. At this point, the cycle of deviation, the formation of new informal 
institutions, and transformation, the acceptance of informal institutions by the formal 
structure, can begin again on a new level (“Foundations Of The Theory Of Organization” 
27).
Selznick calls this process of absorbing new elements into the leadership structure 
of an organization “cooptation.” Sometimes, he says, cooptation is formal because it 
alters the formal structure of the organization. Other times, cooptation is informal, as 
when formal authority informally changes its behavior or policy due to outside pressure 
but does not make these changes part of the formal structure ( “Foundations Of The 
Theory Of Organization” 34-35). It is through cooptation, Selznick says, that the 
organization expresses itself “organically”, i.e., independent of the formal, authoritative 
structure, and in so doing becomes adaptive.
So, what does our model look like after summarizing and integrating the views of 
the previous writers? According to Weber, our model pre-supposes a money economy, 
and is a hierarchy of graded authority with fixed jurisdictional areas, where management 
is based on written documents, expert training, and general rules. Bureaucrats are full­
time vocational employees who have a  social status commensurate with their place in the
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hierarchy, and the supreme authority in our model has limited power to control his 
bureaucratic structure.
According to Mises, our model, because of the absence of market prices, lacks an 
indisputable standard by which to judge performance, lacks incentives for progress, 
thwarts or distorts science to its own ends, and is incapable of economic calculation.
According to Rourke, bureaucrats in our model have some power to influence 
policy due to their expert knowledge and due to the inertia and momentum of the 
bureaucratic structure. However, bureaucrats do not act in common because they have 
conflicting interests. Therefore, super-ordinates have considerable power over 
subordinates. Subordinates in our model have incentive to tell superordinates what they 
want to hear rather than the truth, and superordinates have incentive to prefer this 
situation as well..
According to Downs, bureaucrats in our model are utility maximizers and can be 
classified as “climbers,” “conservers,” “zealots,” “advocates,” and “statesmen.” These 
bureaucrats have limited decision-making capabilities and operate in an environment of 
costiy information and uncertainty. Because our model is an old and established 
bureaucracy, it has surplus resources that can be pilfered by local officials and a large 
body of rules and regulations that makes it highly resistant to change. Also because our 
model is old, authorities, including the supreme authority, resemble Downs’s 
“conserver,” who seeks to maximize his own security and convenience, and who opposes 
innovations and change and favors the status quo. Authorities increase their security by 
focusing on increasing the scope and function of their bureaus. At the same time, rank- 
and-file members have become entrenched and resist efforts to alter their behavior. 
Hence, there is a gap “between the aspirations of the bureau’s leaders and the actual 
performance of its rank and file members” (21).
According to Selznick, our model is both an economy and an adaptive social 
structure. The economy part is the main concern of authorities working through the 
formal structure to fulfill the purpose of the bureau. The adaptive social structure forms 
as officials, engaging in activities outside their official roles, work through informal
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channels to modify the decisions of authorities in order to provide for personal needs that 
the formal structure does not allow for. Through the process of cooptation, the adaptive 
social structure is able to cause our bureau model to absorb new elements into its formal 
structure. Authorities in our model understand that control and consent cannot be 
divorced and, therefore, see winning the consent and support of their subordinates as an 
important part of leadership.
Protection Strategy Effectiveness in the Bureau 
We are now ready to begin the analysis. In this section, I compare the necessary 
requirements for the successful application of protection-from-lying strategies to the 
institutional constraints of the bureau model. This analysis looks at lying from the point 
of view of Informee in the information relationship. We are seeking an answer to the 
question, “How effectively can Informee protect himself from lying in the bureau?”
As in the last chapter, I preface the fust analysis by reviewing the protection 
strategies. First, hostage-taking refers to the practice of holding some part of the 
promisor’s wealth in escrow until the truster has the opportunity to decide if he has been 
lied to. Second, incrementalizing is the strategy of trying a little bit of something before 
committing to a lot of it. Third, seeking pointed knowledge is the strategy of developing 
an information path by asking a series of questions of different people. Fourth, signaling 
is the strategy of differentiating oneself from liars by investing in costly signals. Fifth, 
reputation is the strategy of basing one’s personal exposure to another person’s decisions 
on what one knows first-hand or from the “grapevine” about his honesty in past dealings. 
Sixth, community is the strategy of choosing isolation and interdependence with other 
people in order to increase one’s ability to monitor the behavior of those with whom one 
deals. Seventh, ideology is the strategy of recruiting others into a community of values in 
which all perpetually reaffirm each other’s belief in these values, thereby making 
everyone’s actions and decisions more predictable. People also, strategize by evaluating 
other’s commitment to moral values before dealing with them.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
202
The Simple Strategies
Beginning the analysis, the necessary requirement for hostage-taking is the 
opportunity to hold part of the promisor’s wealth in escrow until his honesty is assured. 
Within the formal structure of the bureau, a superior cannot require a hostage of his 
subordinates unless he is authorized to do so. Even if he were so authorized, what 
hostage could he demand? He could not demand part of their personal wealth, because, 
as Weber said above, in a bureau, personal wealth and bureau wealth are completely 
separate. Certainly, subordinates cannot be authorized to require a hostage of their 
superiors, for this would re-order the authority structure, giving subordinates power over 
their superiors. Officials (I use this term interchangeably with the term “bureaucrat”) of 
equal rank cannot be authorized to require a hostage of each other, for then they would no 
longer be of equal status. Therefore, hostage-taking is completely frustrated in the formal 
structure of the bureau.
Now the question becomes, could hostage-taking occur within the informal 
structures of the bureau? There are surplus resources in our model of the bureau, and 
officials can engage in various ploys to pilfer them for personal use. This means that 
officials at all levels have some resources that could be informally offered as hostages. 
For example, official A could offer as a hostage to official B the keeping o f ten boxes of 
surplus copier paper as an assurance to B that A will complete a task by the promised 
deadline. However, even though official B may request such a hostage, official A has no 
incentive to comply, for he has nothing to gain. If official A is superior to official B, then 
A is under no obligation to comply with B’s deadline and would relinquish part o f his 
authority by doing do. If B is superior to A or if A and B are of equal rank, then A can 
refuse B’s request for a hostage on the grounds that such a transfer is not authorized by 
the formal structure. Thus, the strategy of hostage-taking is stymied at the informal level 
as well as the formal level.
The next strategy, incrementalizing, requires that officials have the opportunity to 
make marginal decisions and to engage in actions that result in preferred changes to their 
current situations, changes that are either large or small depending on one’s desired level
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of risk exposure. In other words, officials must have the opportunity to engage in 
marginal decision making in regard to the execution of the official duties of their offices. 
However, this is completely contrary to the nature of rules and to the decrees of 
authorities. If the official regulations says that a bureau will receive sixteen tons of steel 
and that it will be transformed into six tractors using a specific method, then not only 
marginal decision making but all decision making is precluded. Officials are not free to 
satisfy their preferences nor to choose their risks. The exception to this, o f course, is the 
supreme authority who issued the order for sixteen tons of steel, six tractors, and a 
specific method of production. Being the supreme authority, he could have ordered the 
amounts and the method to be otherwise.
Relaxing our bureau model to include informal structures, we find that 
incrementalizing can take place in regard to pilfered resources. Pilfered resources are 
outside of the purview of the formal structure and, hence, are not allocated by rules but by 
the discretion of local officials. However, the incrementalization of pilfered resources is, 
in the first place, subject to the initial choices of the supreme authority. If there is a 
surplus tractor, it is because the supreme authority chose tractors over alternative 
possibilities, such as sports cars or airplanes. Thus, what incrementalizing is possible 
even in the informal structure of a bureau is constrained by the preferences of the 
supreme authority.
In the second place, incrementalization of pilfered resources is frustrated by the 
inability of officials to evaluate them. To clarify this, recall from Chapter 2 that goods 
have inherent qualities that determine the ease of evaluating them. These qualities range 
from search qualities, which are immediately apparent, to experience qualities, which 
require using the product to evaluate them, to credence qualities, which are difficult for 
laymen to evaluate. To minimize their risk, people prefer the greatest amount of 
incrementalization in regard to goods with credence qualities.
In the bureau, from the point of view of each official, most pilfered resources have 
credence qualities. This is true for two reasons. First, officials have only specialized 
knowledge, which prevents them from evaluating the above tractor, for example, in its
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totality. Second, there are no alternative tractors for comparison. All surplus tractors in 
the model are the same, having been designated so, for the sake o f efficiency, by the 
supreme authority. This further restricts officials’ ability to evaluate tractors. Thus, a 
high preference for incrementalization within the informal structure of a bureau is 
frustrated by officials’ inability to evaluate the pilfered resources. We find, then, that the 
strategy of incrementalizing is completely frustrated in the formal structure of the bureau, 
with the exception of the supreme authority, and highly so in its informal structure.
We next look at seeking pointed knowledge, which is the strategy of developing 
an information path by asking a series of questions of different people. This requires that 
officials have the freedom to choose their problems and to associate with a chosen set of 
other officials that can provide the solutions. This strategy hardly needs discussion, 
especially for anyone who has spent time in the military, since it is obviously precluded 
by the authority structure and the parallel status structure of the bureau. In discussing the 
bureau, I often refer to the U. S. Army as an example, because it is an excellent example 
of the bureau, and because I have personal experience with it. Weber also used the 
Prussian army as an example of his model for the same reasons.
Using the military example, privates do not have the freedom to choose their 
problems nor the choice of how to solve them. Nor can they freely associate with 
sergeants or officers. Privates focus on problems chosen by officers, who issue orders to 
sergeants, who re-issue orders to privates. Privates then comply with these orders 
according to rules called “standard operating procedures.” This same relationship exist at 
all authority levels. For example lower grade officers do not chose their problems but are 
assigned them by higher grade officers.
All military personnel are restricted by the formal chain of command to 
associating with others of their same rank. Privates do not associate with sergeants, nor 
do sergeants associate with officers. This is true in both formal and informal structures 
and even during off-duty hours. Weber’s contention that social status follows rank is 
certainly true in the military. Officers’ clubs and noncommissioned officers’ (NCO) 
clubs reinforce status association even during off-duty hours. We can conclude that from
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the point of view of each soldier, the strategy of seeking pointed knowledge is completely 
frustrated in both the formal and informal structures of the military.
In nonmilitary bureaus, chains o f  command may not be as strictly enforced as 
described above. In public universities, for example, associate professors can make 
appointments with the university president if they like. However, even in these less 
formal bureaus, chains of command still exists, and all staff members know where they fit 
in the authority hierarchy. Chains of command in informal bureaus are, for the most part, 
adhered to, either out of courtesy, respect, or practical necessity. Professors who ignore 
the chain of command run the risk of being seen by administrators and fellow professors 
as noncooperative and, hence, of being excluded from the “inner circle” so to speak. It is 
also true that professors have limited authority to choose their own problems. Therefore, 
even in less formal bureaus, the seeking-pointed-knowledge strategy is largely frustrated.
The next strategy, signaling, is the act of differentiating oneself from liars by 
investing in costly signals. Signaling is possible in the bureau, because officials can 
invest in costly signals in the form of expert training and examinations. According to 
Weber above, a prescribed course of training is part of the full-time duties of the office 
itself, and officials are advanced after completing special examinations. Those officials 
who possess certificates of course completion can use them to signal their eligibility to 
move to higher levels of authority.
Even though signaling is possible in the bureau, it is constrained by the supreme 
authority. Officials cannot choose from all possible signals that may be beneficial for 
differentiating themselves form liars. Instead, officials must choose their signals from a 
set of signals previously chosen by the supreme authority, i.e., they must choose from the 
expert training courses, the contents of which are approved and prescribed by the supreme 
authority. Signaling under these conditions does not so much differentiate oneself from 
liars as signal ones willingness to comport oneself according to the preferences of the 
supreme authority. Officials who possess certificates of course completion or who 
occupy high positions in the hierarchy are signaling to the supreme authority their
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discipleship, and to fellow officials they are signaling their status or relationship to the 
supreme authority.
Officials can also signal their efficiency in the execution of their duties by the 
amounts of surplus resources that their office returns to the issuing authority. The more 
efficient officials do not need all of the resources assigned to them. However, this kind of 
signaling is not likely to take place, because, as Rourke pointed out above, authorities 
tend to remove resources from efficient departments and give them to inefficient 
departments. Any department signaling its efficiency risks being punished with fewer 
resources in the future. Also, returning surplus resources to the supreme authority is to 
relinquish the opportunity to pilfer them for personal use.
Summarizing the above strategies before moving to reputation, hostage-taking is 
defeated at both the formal and informal levels in the bureau. Incrementalizing is 
completely thwarted in the formal structure of the bureau, except for the supreme 
authority, and it is highly constrained in the informal structure. Seeking pointed 
knowledge is completely frustrated in both the formal and informal structures of the 
bureau, with the exception of the supreme authority. Signaling is possible and is 
advanced by the formal structure of the bureau; however, instead of being used to 
differentiate oneself from liars, it is used to signal one’s relationship to the supreme 
authority, that is, one’s status.
Reputation
Reptutation’s necessary requirements are repeated dealings, freely chosen 
partners, the opportunity to select the “don’t play” option, moral seals of approval, 
informal groups, extended dealings, a relatively high value o f the future, and the 
opportunity for tit-for-tat reciprocity. Repeated dealings means frequently interacting 
with the same people. Freely chosen partners means the opportunity to select the “don’t 
play” option if one finds one’s dealing partner unsatisfactory. Moral seals of approval are 
granted to members of formal groups that have standards for admission. Informal groups 
are groups that we can choose to join that have no formal standards of admission. 
Extended dealings recognizes that people discuss their satisfaction or dissatisfaction
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concerning goods and services with others. Valuing the future means valuing future 
dealings. Tit-for-tat reciprocity is the opportunity to treat others as they treat you.
Looking now at each one of these requirements separately, officials in the bureau 
have frequent dealings but only in the short term. The time-span for frequent dealings is 
measured by the length of training courses and examination schedules, after which 
officials are reassigned to new positions. More importantly, however, repeated dealings 
do not influence the behavior of officials in the bureau, because all interaction occurs in 
the course of the execution of formal duties, which are prescribed by rules. Since 
officials are replaceable cogs in the bureaucratic machine, they cannot offer unique 
benefits to each other. Therefore, interaction with a specific official is not valued above 
that of any other that may fill the same office.
Freely chosen partners is also defeated, because in the bureau, partners are not 
chosen at all but assigned by higher authority. Assigned partners also precludes the 
“don’t play” option, thereby defeating another necessary condition of reputation. There 
may be a small amount of discretion regarding one’s partners, such as the right to request 
a transfer to a duty station where one has a friend or away from a duty station where one 
has an enemy, but even this depends on the decisions of the authorities.
Moving to the next requirement for reputation, the bureau grants moral seals of 
approval, as well as a special status, at each level of authority. However, these moral 
seals of approval in the bureau are constrained by the preferences of the supreme 
authority. Training courses, prescribed and approved by the supreme authority, act as the 
standards for admission to the formal group, i.e., the next level of authority, and 
examinations determine who has met the standards. There are no alternative moral codes 
in the bureau that officials can use for comparison. Being met in this manner and under 
these conditions, this requirement is met only weakly.
Informal groups, the next requirement for reputation, are precluded in the bureau 
since all human relations are ordered by formal rules. However, relaxing the model to 
include informal structures, informal groups may form with the use of pilfered resources. 
Downs stated above that one of the discretionary uses o f what he calls “surplus resources”
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is to make life easier for everyone in the bureau. Pilfered resources, in the form o f time 
away from official duties could be used to participate in informal groups.
Extended dealings, as a requirement for reputation, is the phenomenon of people 
discussing their likes and dislikes with others. This cannot occur in the formal structure 
of the bureau, because all interactions are fully prescribed by rules. Assuming informal 
structures in the bureau, officials may engage in extended dealings by pilfering time away 
from official duties. In other words, this necessary requirement for reputation, as well as 
informal groups above, can only be met in the bureau if officials are willing to lie to their 
superiors.
The next requirement for reputation, valuing the future, can best be evaluated in 
the bureau by rating it relative to valuing the future in the private property order. We saw 
in Chapter 3, that people in the private property order value the future primarily because 
their property rights, including right to their bodies, are secure, that is, they are inviolable; 
they cannot be confiscated, trespassed, or regulated. Secure property rights prevent both 
private aggression and state aggression and, thereby, allow long term planning with 
minimal risk. In contrast, property rights in the bureau are not secure. They are only 
what the supreme authority says they are, and he may reorder them at will. Property may 
be confiscated, trespassed, and regulated. This situation makes long-term planning by 
subordinates a high-risk venture. Time and resources committed to future projects may 
be lost completely if the supreme authority alters the property rights structures in the 
interim. Since the supreme authority is not confined to a specific role, he can maximize 
his utility by ordering property rights in a way that serves his preferences at the expense 
of individual members of society.
Consequently, individuals have little control over their future in the bureau. As 
Weber puts it, the official in the bureau “is only a single cog in an ever-moving 
mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march” (228). Hayek 
expresses the same sentiment in saying that “individuals have become interchangeable 
units with no other definite or durable relations to one another than those determined by 
the all-comprehensive organization” (Individualism: True and False 27). People do not
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have the freedom to make incremental choices concerning their future welfare; they can 
only do as they are instructed by authority. Nor do they have the freedom to enter 
beneficial associations with others; they associate with those that duty dictates.
We move now to the final necessary requirement for reputation, tit-for-tat 
reciprocity, which is the opportunity to treat others as they treat you. Reciprocity has no 
meaning in the formal structure o f the bureau. The whole idea of exchange as quid pro 
quo is precluded by formal rules that specify who does what with what, when, and to 
whom. Reciprocity takes on meaning only in the informal structure of the bureau. Here, 
officials can use pilfered resources to do favors for those that they believe will reciprocate 
in the future. As above, however, this requirement being met in the informal structure of 
the bureau depends on official’s willingness to lie to superiors.
Before moving to the next protection strategy, community, I first summarize what 
has been said about reputation in the bureau: Repeated dealings are restricted to the short 
term and are of no value to the dealing partners; freely chosen partners and the “don’t 
play” option are defeated in the bureau; moral seals of approval is met but only weakly, 
since all moral seals reflect only the supreme authority’s preferences; informal groups 
and extended dealings are both precluded by the formal structure of the bureau, but they 
are possible in the informal structure if officials lie to their superiors; people in the 
bureau value the future relatively lower than people in the private property order due to 
insecure property rights; reciprocity is possible only in the informal structure of the 
bureau, and there it depends on official’s willingness to lie to superiors.
The necessary requirements for reputation fare badly in the bureau. For the most 
part, they are precluded by the bureau’s formal structure. Even when they are met in the 
bureau’s informal structures, they are dependent on the presence of pilfered resources and 
official’s willingness to lie to superiors. Since lying as a long term strategy is not likely 
to be successful, I cannot justify counting as “met” any requirement that depends on 
lying. I, therefore, conclude that of reputation’s eight requirements, only one, moral seals 
of approval, is weakly met and that reputation is not able to function as a protection-from- 
lying strategy in the bureau.
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Community
As I have stated before, community is a protection-ffom-lying strategy in the 
sense that we choose to participate in it. A preference for a more trusting environment 
may lead us to choose isolation, intense interaction, and interdependence with a group of 
people so as to develop a history with them that we can refer to in future episodes of risk 
exposure with them. This choice amounts to a strategy since we are aware that in the 
process o f satisfying our preferences for risk tolerance we are finessing a shared fate with 
people, which causes everyone to be more concerned about each others well being.
Before starting the analysis of this section, I review our working definitions of 
community and society and the requirements for community that I use for analysis. The 
definitions are derived from the works of Hawley, Parsons and Shils’s, Tonnies, 
Durkheim, Hillary, and Pahl as discussed in Chapter 2. Communities are dynamic social 
networks that are organically formed, that exist in varying intensities, and that influence 
people’s behavior. Society is a social network that contains many communities, that is 
based on the division of labor, and that is integrated by the state. This definition of 
society is not inclusive in that it does not describe pre-state societies; however, state 
societies are our primary focus here.
For reasons given in Chapter 2 ,1 use Merry’s requirements for gossip to analyze 
community in the bureau. They are: isolation, economic interdependence, consensus and 
sanction, and similar values. Furthermore, since I concluded in Chapter 2 that 
community exist in different degrees of intensity, I use Ferdinand Tonnies’s notions of 
Gemeinschaft o f  blood, locality, and mind—with their corresponding requirements: 
kinship relations, collective ownership of land, and common sacred places and 
worshipped deities—as a measure of what degree of community can exist in the private 
property order.
As we saw in Chapter 3, society in the private property order takes the form of a 
spontaneous order. In the bureau, society takes the form o f an organization, because it 
has purpose, design, and a central authority who commands people to conform to plan. In 
this analysis, we are asking if community, which is of spontaneous origin, can exist in a
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planned society. By definition, this cannot occur in the formal structure of the bureau 
where all activity and human relations are planned. If the supreme authority were to 
allow spontaneous organizations he must relinquish control over the design and execution 
of policy. The analytical question that is pertinent here is whether community can occur 
within the informal structure of the bureau and if so to what degree. To show this, it is 
necessary to apply community requirements to both the formal and informal structure of 
the bureau, for the sake of comparison, even though community is precluded in the 
formal structure.
Beginning with isolation as a requirement for community, as we saw in Chapter 3, 
social isolation can be achieved by geographical separation, physical obstacles, 
passwords, transactions costs, language, education, culture, and acquired skills, such as 
literacy or skills associated with the various divisions of labor. The formal structure of 
the bureau does not allows those kinds of isolation that are most important for 
community, i.e., isolation by language, education, and culture. For the sake of efficiency 
and control, the supreme authority can not allow multiple languages, nor can he allow 
parents to choose unique education for their children. As future interchangeable cogs in 
the bureaucratic machine, children must speak the same language and undergo the same 
basic education. In the long term, which is the temporal condition of our mature model, 
the same language and the same education lead to a common culture. These conditions 
are non-negotiable in the informal structure, because allowing people to isolate 
themselves according to language, education, and culture would result in loss of control 
of the bureau.
The next requirement for community, economic interdependence, is not met in the 
formal structure of the bureau, because officials are not dependent upon each other for 
their economic well-being. According to Weber, officials are paid a full-time wage, 
allocated according to formal rules as set by the supreme authority. Fellow officials need 
not even have a sense that they need to cooperate to ensure the success o f their bureau. 
The reason being, as Rourke, suggests, that poorly performing bureaus receive more 
resources rather than less. In the informal structure of the bureau, economic
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interdependence occurs because of pilfered resources. Officials can give and receive 
pilfered resources as payment for informal debts. Informal economic interdependence 
must be covert so as not to draw the attention of the supreme authority.
Turning to the next requirement for community, consensus and sanction is met in 
the formal structure of the bureau but in appearance only. Consensus has a different 
meaning in the formal structure of the bureau than in the private property order, where it 
means agreeing by mutual consent. In the bureau there is no consent or nonconsent.
There is only compliance. Officials are not free to agree or disagree about anything.
They are bound by the rules of the supreme authority. The supreme authority structures 
his preferences into rules that set standards of behavior for everyone. All officials must 
appear to accept the supreme authority’s preferences to avoid being sanctioned. Sanction 
is thus separated from consensus and becomes personal vindictiveness on the part of the 
supreme authority rather than a community response.
In the informal structure of the bureau, the consensus and sanction requirement for 
community is met, but can lead to a community of liars that sanction each other for truth- 
telling. In general this can occur because, as Mises argued above, the bureau lacks an 
indisputable standard by which to judge performance. Without market prices, the 
supreme authority cannot engage in profit management, i.e., he cannot command officials 
to make a profit and then use the profit and loss statement to see if they complied. The 
lack of a definitive standard by which to judge performance gives officials considerable 
leeway in their compliance to official rules.
Looking more specifically at how a community o f liars is formed, lacking the 
opportunity for profit management, commands from the supreme authority must take the 
form: Do such-and-such x  number of times or to x%. For example, military orders might 
read: Train each of your troops to hit the bulls-eye eight out of ten times; Train 100% 
your troops to drive a two-ton truck. However, verification of the implementation of such 
orders can be difficult. For example, when I went through basic military training during 
the Viet Nam era, it was common practice on the rifle range to “doctor” the targets so that 
each trainee qualified. Evidence of marksmanship, of course is what higher authorities
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wanted to see. As it worked, trainees qualified in pairs: One fired while the other one 
scored. If firers did not put enough holes in their paper target to qualify, scorers often 
added a few with their pencils. Targets were signed and presented upward to sergeants, 
who passed them up to officers, who presented them to commanders, who used them as 
documentation that their entire companies qualified.
In the introduction of Altheide and Johnson’s Bureaucratic Propaganda, 
Sociologist Joseph Gusfield relates a similar experience as a young man in the U. S. 
Army:
When I was nineteen and in the U. S. Army, my division began a 
campaign to teach all men to drive an army two-ton truck. I told the 
officer in charge that I didn’t even know how to drive a car. It was no use. 
I was ordered into the cab of a truck and given the wheel. Promptly I 
drove the truck into a ditch. After this display of ignorance or 
stubbornness, I was dismissed from the training session. My unit, and the 
entire division, reported that 100 percent of the men were now trained in 
driving a two-ton truck. Two years later, at another post, I was ordered to 
assume duties as an auxiliary truck driver. After all, my service record 
attested to the ‘fact’ that I had been so trained, (xi)
In a similar fashion, physical training tests are commonly “finessed” so that all or most, 
especially key personnel, pass them. These examples illustrate, as Gusfield puts it, “the 
discrepant worlds of ‘official facts’ and ‘realities’” (Altheide and Johnson’s Bureaucratic 
Propaganda xi). This is what Altheide and Johnson mean by the term “bureaucratic 
propaganda,” i.e., official organizational records that are deliberately constructed with an 
eye to reflecting a beneficial reality to outsiders who hold power over the organization.
Bureaucratic propaganda might be thought of as the institutionalized form o f 
subordinates telling their superiors what their superiors want to hear, and of superiors 
pretending it does not happen since they also benefit. In Gusfield’s example, trainees, 
training sergeants, and company commanders, all tell their superiors what they want to 
hear and all accumulate promotion points for doing so. This deception continues up to 
the supreme authority who has no unequivocal standard by which to verify anyone’s 
compliance.
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This process of falsifying official records is so prominent in the U. S. Navy that it
has acquired the unofficial title o f “gundecking.” One junior officer described
gundecking as follows:
Well, gundecking , is, ah, the job that you know, but that you don’t 
actually go ahead and perform the job, you just go ahead and write the 
results down without performing the job. (qtd. in Altheide and Johnson 
184)
As to its prevalence,
I’d say that before PMS [planned maintenance system] began only the 
officers and most of the leading Petty Officers knew about it, that, well, 
anyone who had to do a lot of paperwork as part of his job, or who had to 
handle a lot of chits on an everyday basis. Since PMS I think probably 
everyone in the navy knows what gundecking is, even to the lowest 
Seaman Deuce; that is, anybody who’s been out of boot camp for more 
than a week, (qtd in Altheide and Johnson 186)
This informal charade is the result of military officials at various levels having 
reached an informal consensus to engage in deception. What is more, the consensus is 
backed by informal sanctions. According to Selznick, officials use sarcasm, ridicule, and 
the formation of cliques as a means of exercising control over members of informal 
groups and thereby eliciting a consensus on informal matters (“Approach To A Theory Of 
Bureaucracy” 47). In the military, more direct means are often used, such as the 
unofficial “blanket party.” In Gusfield’s example or the marksmanship or physical 
training examples above, troops who complain about “doctored” records are shunned and 
labeled as troublemakers. They encounter a lack of cooperation from fellow troops and 
their promotability suffers. Thus is formed a community of liars backed by sanctions for 
those who tell the truth.
The next requirement for community, “similar values,” is similarly split between 
official policy and actual practice. Officially, everyone has the same values because the 
supreme authority rules it so. The supreme authority decides what values everyone 
should hold according to his own preferences. These values become a part of the official
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regulations, and everyone is required to act accordingly ; they become part of the expert 
training courses, and they are reinforced at each level with drill and ceremony.
However, each of our above writers shows that values differ among officials in 
actual practice. Weber pointed out above that officials gain a social status commensurate 
with their place in the hierarchy, and different statuses are often marked by different 
values. Mises’s indisputable-standard argument points out that officials act according to 
different values when given the opportunity. Rourke’s argument that subordinates tell 
superiors what they want to hear indicates a difference in values between them.
Rourke also argued above that there are four sources for internal disagreement for 
bureaucrats. I repeat them here: ( I) There is usually a sharp difference in the role and 
attitude between those at the top, which are often political appointees, and career 
administrators beneath them; (2) there is a divergence of views between the professionals 
who do the work of the agency and the administrators who run it; (3) there is a 
divergence of views between outside advisory experts and full-time staff; (4) there is a 
divergence of views between people of different psychological orientation toward their 
work (126-127).
In the first case, Rourke says that “very often, their internal and external 
responsibilities pull executives in opposite directions. Decisions they make to maintain 
harmony with the outside world may alienate the organization’s employees” (115). In our 
context, the outside world are all echelons in the hierarchy above or below one’s 
immediate concern. Therefore, there are differences in value between administrators, 
who must maintain harmony with their superiors, and subordinates, who are alienated by 
what they consider to be adverse rulings.
In the second case, professional employees such as research scientists participate 
in the organization because it gives them the opportunity to practice their profession. 
Their views are mostly formed by their profession. Hence, their main loyalty lies with 
their profession and not the organization (Rourke 132). Administrators do the 
housekeeping functions, like managing funds and ensuring efficient use of resources. 
Their views are shaped by the organization. “In a dichotomy of this sort, professionals
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care about effectiveness of policy—achievement o f objectives no matter what the 
cost.. .Moreover, the inability of professionals to take costs into adequate account in 
pursuing policy goals, or to follow lines of authority and orderly procedure, is often a 
source of confusion and conflict within organizations” (Rourke 134).
In the third case, sometimes a department head may bring in outsiders for various 
reasons. This happens in the military, for example, when a person of lower rank but 
superior or special knowledge is put in charge o f personnel with greater rank. Rourke 
says that bringing in outsiders can hurt the moral of the career employees who feel left 
out or mistrusted. “In the long run lateral entrance can thus make it substantially more 
difficult to attract imaginative and capable personnel to permanent positions within the 
agency and in this way may actually reinforce mediocrity in the career staff’ (140).
In Rourke’s last case, people in the same bureau may differ, because of different 
psychological orientation toward their work, on the importance of the bureau’s mission, 
on the necessary degree of structural control over them, and on work ethics.
Downs’s taxonomy of bureaucrats is a  further argument that there are differing 
values within the bureau, because his “climbers,” “conservers,” “zealots,” “advocates,” 
and “statesmen” all have different goals. Also, Selznick’s contention that organizations 
are adaptive social structures containing informal structures that work to modify the 
formal structure in order to provide for unmet needs implies a divergence of values 
between those in charge of the formal structure and those who are not.
Briefly summarizing the requirements for community, community is precluded by 
definition in the formal structure of the bureau. In the informal structure of the bureau, 
two requirements are not met, one is met covertly, and one is met but leads to lying. The 
isolation requirements that are most important for community—language, education, and 
culture—are not allowed, because doing so would result in loss of control o f the bureau. 
The economic interdependence requirement is met through pilfered resources but must be 
covert. The consensus and sanction requirements for community are met, but they lead to 
a com m unity of liars that sanction each other for truth-telling. The similar-values 
requirement for com m unity is not met due to internal conflicts in the bureau.
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In light of the above conclusion that community essentially does not exist in the 
bureau, it may seem like an unnecessary exercise to evaluate its degree or intensity. 
However, such an analysis can give us some idea as to the extent of the covert activities 
stemming from the existence of pilfered resources. It can also help us gauge the extent of 
the community of liars, which we saw results from informal consent and sanction in 
conjunction with the absence of an indisputable standard forjudging performance.
Therefore, I next evaluate the degree of community allowed in the bureau by 
evaluating the opportunities for Gemeinschafi o f blood, Gemeinschaft of locality, and 
Gemeinschafi of mind, with their corresponding requirements: kinship relations, 
collective ownership of land, and common sacred places and worshipped deities.
At the most basic level, Tonnies’s Gemeinschaft of blood refers to the family and 
those conditions that exist among relatives living under one roof (42-43). This degree of 
community is not allowed in the bureau. Members of a family cannot decide to extend 
their family relations into the bureau, working together under the same roof. Placement 
in the bureau depends on having completed expert training and on the preferences o f the 
supreme authority. Authorities at all levels discourage family members in the same 
bureau because of split loyalties; brothers are more likely to be loyal to each other than to 
their supervisors.
Supposing, however, that family relations were not prevented by official rules and 
were not discouraged by authorities, family relations still cannot exist within the bureau. 
The bureau is antagonistic to family social structure, because it tends to reverse its power 
structure. Status in the family is based on age, gender and family relationship, whereas 
status in the bureau is based on one’s position in the hierarchy and ignores family social 
structure altogether. Combining family and the bureau may result in a son or daughter 
with a higher status than the father. O f course this same result can occur in the private 
property order; for example, a father may work for his son. However, there such a 
relationship occurs voluntarily rather than by directive.
Suppose further that a family was assigned to work together in a bureau, and that 
they were assigned their positions so as to retain the family social structure. Say, for
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example, that the father is the head administrator, the mother is next in line, and the 
children receive authority according to their ages or their sex. According to Weber and 
Rourke, the subordinate children have power over the father because of their expert 
knowledge, and according to Selznick, the subordinate children can form informal 
structures to usurp the power of the father. Also, according to Rourke, the family 
relations in our model are tom apart because of conflicting interests inherent in bureaus, 
and they are likely to self-select into different categories in Downs’s taxonomy of 
bureaucrats, causing further conflict of interests. Therefore, extending family relations 
into the bureau results in the breakdown of family relations.
Moving to Gemeinschaft of location, we find that its “collective ownership of 
land” requirement is met in the bureau. Although resources in the bureau are not 
collectively owned in the sense that everyone is free to use them, selected resources are 
allocated by the supreme authority to be used by certain people in common. For example 
the roof and the walls that comprise the tractor factory are to be used by all employees of 
the factory for the accomplishment of official purposes. So too is the land upon which 
the factory sits. In a similar manner, other resources are allocated for common usage to 
other groups. This is simply a practical matter for the supreme authority who realizes that 
in some instances common usage of resources is required to meet his needs.
In the informal structure, some resources not intended by the supreme authority to 
be used in common take on a common property usage and further help meet Tonnies’s 
requirement. This occurs because people refuse to be automatons. As Selznick made 
clear earlier in this chapter, people resist being depersonalized and tend to participate as 
wholes. Officials require some discretion as to the conduct, care, and maintenance of 
their bodies and minds, such as hygiene, health, and social needs. They also require some 
discretion to complete their official duties, such as where to stand, sit, or walk, how many 
minutes to discuss an official task, what words to use, whether to loan one’s stapler, etc. 
Because of such needs that the formal structure does not provide for, bureau members 
work through informal structures to modify the bureau structure so that it will allow for 
them. Through this process of “cooptation,” as Selznick calls it above, the supreme
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authority, realizing that control and consent cannot be divorced, allows some common 
usage of property for personal and official purposes when he believes that it will win the 
consent and support of his subordinates.
Moving to Tonnies’s third type of community, Gemeinschaft of mind and its 
requirement of “common sacred places and worshipped deities,” we find that this 
requirement has both a sacred and a secular context and that both contexts are met in the 
bureau. The sacred context, of course, is that of churches or other sanctified places, 
sacred icons, and the worshipping of a supreme being. The secular context is that of 
parade grounds, war memorials, public coliseums and other state-aggrandizing areas and 
structures in which legitimation activities take place. Legitimation activities are official 
celebrations of social institutions. In the real world, we all participate in legitimation 
activities, such as Fourth-of-July parades and Memorial Day observances. At such 
events, the American flag fills the role of a sacred icon, and the Pledge of Allegiance is a 
reaffirmation of one’s beliefs.
People in our model, like people of diverse cultures throughout history, have 
spiritual needs, and they desire to engage in worship and other religious activities. Given 
this assumption, that spirituality is a part o f the human condition, the supreme authority in 
our model, faces a dilemma. On the one hand, if he officially allows religious worship, 
then he is ruling that there is a supreme being with authority greater than himself. This is 
tantamount to ruling that he is not the supreme authority. On the other hand, if he does 
not allow religious worship, he risks losing the consent and, hence, control of his 
subordinates. A list of his choices are as follows:
1. Officially allowing religious worship and thereby creating a source of authority 
greater than himself.
2. Officially allowing religious worship and ruling that he is the earthly manifestation of 
the supreme being, thereby retaining his supreme authority status and the consent and 
control of his subordinates.
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3. Unofficially allowing religious worship, i.e., looking the other way, thereby retaining 
official status as supreme authority and official consent and control o f his 
subordinates.
4. Officially disallowing religious worship, thereby retaining supreme authority status 
but risking the loss o f consent and control of his subordinates.
Which choice does the supreme authority make? The supreme authority in our 
model is a utility maximizing conserver, who seeks to maximize his own security and 
convenience by focusing on increasing the scope and function of his bureau. He also 
opposes innovations and change and favors the status quo. He would not choose number 
one because this choice threatens his security and convenience, reduces the scope and 
function of his bureau, and is a change from the status quo. Nor would he choose number 
four, because, even though it represents an attempt to retain the status quo, this choice 
requires risk taking, it does not increase the scope and function of the bureau, and so, 
does not maximize security and convenience. Choice three appears a desirable choice, 
since it retains the official status quo and the security and convenience of the supreme 
authority. However, it does not increase the scope or function of his bureau. Therefore it 
does not maximize his security.
The best choice for a utility maximizing conserver is choice two. Earlier,
Selznick showed that cooptation can help as well as hinder the official goals of an 
organization. Choice two is an example o f cooptation advancing the interests of the 
supreme authority. This choice increases his security and convenience by increasing the 
scope and function of his bureau but otherwise retains the status quo; a perfect solution 
of “divine right.” However, since the supreme authority must rule which god he is the 
earthly manifestation of, this solution assumes that everyone in the bureau worships the 
same god. If we assume that all information comes from inside the bureau model, 
nothing exogenous, then we can assume that total ideology reigns, and hence, that 
everyone in our model believes in and worships the same god.
So far, I have established only that the sacred context of Tonnies’s requirement for 
Gemeinschaft of mind is met throughout the bureau. I now look at the secular or
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legitimation context of this requirement in the bureau. Legitimation activities are a part 
of the official rules and are steeped in ideology , of which religion is a subclass. There 
are four reasons that this is so: First, our bureau model is old, has a large body of official 
rules, suffers from inertia and is highly resistant to change; second, it follows from this 
that the bureau is steeped in tradition that is formalized in official rules; third, given 
Downs’s argument above that “the goals of the bureau’s top officials tend to shift 
towards maintaining and expanding their organization per se, and away from achieving 
the original formal purposes of the bureau,” it is in the interest of all authorities that their 
subordinates periodically reaffirm the legitimacy of and their belief in the bureau as a 
social institution. Fourth, since authority in the bureau, given the arguments and 
conclusions above regarding religion, flows from the supreme being, legitimation 
activities take on a sacred aspect and fulfill the spiritual needs of subordinates.
Summarizing the degree of community in the bureau, Gemeinschaft of blood is 
precluded by the bureau, because families cannot decide to extend their family relations 
into the bureau, because authorities discourage family members in the bureau due to split 
loyalties, because the bureau tends to reverse the family’s power structure, and because 
family relations are tom apart due to conflicting interests inherent in bureaus. 
Gemeinschaft of location is partially met as a practical matter in the formal structure of 
the bureau and further met through cooptation in the informal structure. Gemeinschaft of 
mind is met in the sacred sense in the bureau through a process of cooptation initiated to 
meet spiritual needs, which results an official policy of “divine right.” Gemeinschaft of 
mind is met in the secular sense in the form of legitimation activities.
Two of the three degrees of community are solidly met in the bureau. This 
conclusion suggests that in spite of the above conclusion that community essentially does 
not exist in the bureau, those fragments that do exist can be persistent and strong. It 
further suggests that the above discussed covert activities and community of liars are a 
persistent feature of the bureau.
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Ideology
In this section, I identify conditions in the bureau that allow the formation of total 
ideology. As I did in Chapter 3 ,1 focus on the necessary requirements of total ideology 
rather than of particular ideology, both as defined by Mannheim, because total ideology 
has the ability to prevent people from lying whereas particular ideology does not.
Ideology is the strategy of recruiting others into a community of values in which 
all perpetually reaffirm each other’s belief in these values, thereby making everyone’s 
actions and decisions more predictable. Also, people strategize by evaluating other’s 
commitment to moral values before dealing with them. Ideology’s necessary 
requirements, as identified in Chapter 2 by Mannheim, Sowell, North, and Higgs, are 
isolation, rigid social classes, no vertical social mobility, no communication between 
classes, a  high cost for alternative information, minimal changes in the terms of 
exchange, and the opportunity to satisfy the craving for association with like-minded 
people.
Beginning with isolation, we saw in the last section that the bureau does not allow
isolation by language, education, and culture. This conclusion holds in this context as
well, because these are the elements of isolation that are important to ideology. The
supreme authority finds that a common language and education are necessary to influence
the beliefs of his subordinates. Rourke explains why this influence is important to the
supreme authority:
Organizational esprit depends very much upon an administrative agency’s 
developing an appropriate ideology or sense of mission, both as a method 
of binding outside supporters to the agency and as a technique for 
intensifying its employees’ loyalty to its purposes. (107)
In other words, control over subordinates requires their consent, and consent is best 
gotten by indoctrination. This process of indoctrination both demands and results in a 
common language, education, and culture. Therefore, isolation is not possible in the 
bureau, at least not in the sense that isolation is important for ideology, i.e., isolation by 
differences in language, education, or culture.
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Mannheim’s “rigid social classes” requirement for ideology is met in the bureau. 
Rigid social classes result from fixed jurisdictional areas that are insulated from each 
other by official rules and expert training requirements. These social classes become 
increasingly static with age, due to increasing inertia. Administrators in the bureau are 
conservers who focus on maximizing their security and maintaining the status quo. As 
Downs tells us, “they fear change because it might reduce their present prerogatives; 
hence they oppose innovations and change in general” (5). Also, following Selznick, 
officials are able to satisfy their needs through cooptation without the necessity o f  moving 
to a different level in the hierarchy.
Mannheim’s next requirement for ideology, “no vertical social mobility,” is also 
met in the bureau. This conclusion may seem wrong at first, since officially, bureaucrats 
are allowed to move up through the hierarchy by taking expert training and passing 
examinations. At what might be called the micro level, many officials actually do 
progress up through the ranks. For example, in the U. S. Army, privates advance to 
specialist, who advance to sergeants. Sergeants then ascend to higher levels of 
sergeantdom through additional training and time-in-grade. These soldiers are enlisted 
personnel called “noncommissioned officers” or NCOs. Also at the micro level, there are 
various ranks that officers advance through, from second lieutenant to general.
At the macro level however, there is a dichotomy between officers and NCOs that 
is equivalent to the distinction between administrators and employees in the civilian 
workplace. The crevasse between NCOs and officers is wide and deep and is perpetuated 
by the official policies o f the military. Consequently, few soldiers cross it even though it 
is not against the rules. An enlisted person can chose to quit the ranks of the NCO and go 
to officer school and henceforth be a part of the administration. However, as in civilian 
life, most young people choose the life of an administrator or a professional employee at 
the onset. As they age, some cross over, but most do not.
This situation is similar to the one in Chapter 3 in which Redneck and Yuppie do 
not cross over into each others’ lifestyles because of how they see themselves. Officers 
see themselves primarily as “planners” and “strategists.” NCOs see themselves as
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“doers.” Each group sees the other in a somewhat derogatory light. Officers see NCOs 
as somewhat dull and unimaginative; NCOs see officers as lazy. The latter is 
immediately evident to the new recruit who is reprimand for mistakenly calling a sergeant 
“sir” with, “D o n ’t  CALL ME ‘SIR’ p r iv a te ;  I w ork  FOR a  LIVING 1” There is a similar 
disdain of administrators and employees, one for another, in the civilian workplace. I 
witnessed this phenomenon as I walked home across the University campus one evening. 
Passing two people talking, I overheard one say, probably only half jokingly, something 
similar to, “Supervisor? You wanna be a supervisor? I’m not sure I want you for a friend 
anymore.”
This separation of classes is also evident in Rourke’s four sources of internal 
disagreement in the bureau, as discussed above. Briefly reviewing, he said that internal 
disagreement occurs (1) between those at the top, which are often political appointees, 
and career administrators beneath them; (2) between the professionals who do the work 
of the agency and the administrators who run it; (3) between outside advisory experts and 
full-time staff; and (4) between people of different psychological orientation toward their 
work.
All four of Rourke’s examples are basically conflicts between those who give
orders and those who must follow them. Selznick makes this same distinction;
The use of intermediaries creates a tendency toward a bifurcation o f  
interest between the initiator o f the action and the agent employed. This is 
due to the creation of two sets o f problems: for the initiator, the 
achievement of the goal which spurred him to action, and for the 
intermediary, problems which are concerned chiefly with his social 
position as agent. (“Approach To A Theory Of Bureaucracy” 51)
I, therefore, conclude vertical mobility in our context should be defined as 
movement from the agent class to the class of those who initiate action. Perhaps a less 
cumbersome designation is from employee class to the administration class. Given this 
definition, I further conclude that ascending the ranks at the micro level is not actually 
vertical mobility. It more nearly resembles what Mannheim earlier called “horizontal 
mobility” or mobility among people of the same class. Seen in this view, vertical
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mobility occurs infrequently in the bureau for essentially the same reasons that it rarely 
occurs in the private property order, i.e., there are too many personal costs involved in the 
move. People generally tend to find a comfortable niche and stay there, or at least close 
by.
Mannheim’s next requirement for ideology, “no communication between classes” 
is also met in the bureau. This is not to say that there is no communication in the bureau. 
There are, of course, official directives that go between the fixed jurisdictional areas in 
the bureau, but this is not communication in our context. Mannheim had in mind the kind 
of communication that can breakdown the ideology of the classes—the kind of 
communication or information that the country boy experiences as he walks to the city 
and becomes pan of a different social class. This kind of communication allows one to 
see things from the perspective of a different class.
Lack of ideology-destroying communication in the bureau results primarily from 
the need to restrict communication to bare essentials, from inherent conflicts between 
classes in the bureau, and from division of labor, each of which we must discuss further. 
Downs argues that the need to restrict communication to bare essentials is one of the 
main reasons that people resort to hierarchical organization. He explains that hierarchical 
organization prevents supervisors from receiving a flood of irrelevant messages, because 
at each level, managers scan reports that come from above and from below, then pass 
them up and down to the appropriate people. Each manager acts as a communication 
intermediary for managers both above and below his position in the hierarchy. This 
further restricts communication between classes, because, according to Downs, “such a 
com m unications hierarchy implies very different types of knowledge at different levels” 
(8). The higher one’s position in the hierarchy, the more general is his knowledge, and 
the lower, the more specific.
The need to restrict communication to bare essentials hinders overall 
com m unication between classes in the bureau in yet another way. Differences in 
knowledge among the various levels of the hierarchy and the opportunity to scan and
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select messages allows managers acting as communication intermediaries the opportunity
to distort messages to serve their own convenience before passing them on.
Since bureaus have no objective measure of success similar to the profits 
of a business firm, it may be extremely difficult for one’s superiors to 
distinguish between accurate reporting and deliberate distortions...Under 
such circumstances, officials can engage in considerable distortions 
without too great a risk of being detected. (Downs 11-12).
Distortions are exacerbated by the bureau’s chain of command, which authorizes 
people to initiate communication only with certain other people. For example in the U. S. 
Army, personnel are only authorized to initiate communication with their immediate 
supervisor. A private with a problem must pass his request through as many as five levels 
to get to the company commander. This requirement is intended to prevent upper echelon 
commanders from receiving a flood of communication that they cannot handle; however, 
it also has the effect of reinforcing class status levels rather than breaking them down. As 
Weber told us above, each position in the hierarchy has its own status level, and a chain 
of command officially recognizes these status levels.
Communication between classes is also hindered by internal conflicts in the 
bureau, i.e., conflict between supervisors and subordinates, professionals and 
administrators, outside advisory experts and full-time staff, and between people of 
different psychological orientation toward their work. Communication between these 
classes is restricted due to their lack of similar values. We saw in Chapter 3 that 
contextual value references is an important part of communication. Such value references 
are not present among these conflict classes, therefore communication between them is 
hindered.
Since people in each of these conflict classes are utility maximizers, it sometimes 
serves their interests to “keep each other in the dark,” so to speak, about various issues. 
Because of their inherent conflicts, they are suspicious of each other, and they often 
engage in sandbagging or exaggeration in an attempt to alter the other’s behavior. 
Supervisors tend not to reveal to their subordinates the true motivation behind a directive,
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and as Rourke qualified our bureau model, subordinates tend to tell their supervisors what 
they want to hear.
A final problem for communication between classes in the bureau is that of the 
difficulty of communication between divisions of labor. Communication between 
divisions o f labor in this sense is restricted by different sets o f knowledge due to expert 
training, by technical languages, and by jargon. This inability to communicate because of 
different technical languages is especially evident in the military where each specialty has 
its own techno-speak as well as colloquial speech. As Altheide and Johnson explain,
a fundamental feature of the processes leading to organizational 
competence is learning the specialized lexicon or vocabulary. This 
socialization involves learning the vocabulary and the situated use of the 
vocabulary by members in actual occasions of the everyday routine. The 
various branches of the military form a ‘natural language community,’ 
with these languages distinguishing not only the general membership 
categories within the community (or organization) but also subdivisions of 
membership. (182).
No small part of the specialized lexicon of various subdivisions of the military is the 
blizzard of acronyms that one must learn to even follow a casual conversation.
I conclude that the no-communication-between-classes requirement for ideology 
is met in the bureau even though communication between classes in the form of official 
directives is a formal part of bureau regulations.
Sowell’s requirement for ideology, “a high cost for alternative information,” is 
also met in the bureau. Alternative information in the bureau officially does not exist, 
because it is information contrary to the interests of the supreme authority and the 
purpose of the bureau. It is information not authorized by official decree and not codified 
in formal rules.
Even if alternative information did exist in the bureau, officials would reject it, 
because it means change. Officials in the bureau are committed to the status quo, because 
their income depends on the bureau structure remaining unchanged, and because they 
have a large time-investment in the bureau. Not only are officials committed to the status
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quo, they also have considerable influence, opportunity, and resources with which to 
protect it. Cooptation activities can be aimed at reinforcing the status quo, as can surplus, 
or as we call them, “pilfered” resources. Subordinates can condition their consent to be 
led on the leadership’s official continuation o f the status quo, and they can punish leaders 
that champion change with inertia and the general frustration of policy.
The lack of an indisputable standard by which to judge performance and 
outcomes, due to lack of market prices, also shields officials from alternative information 
and, hence, reinforces the status quo. The lack of an indisputable standard makes it 
doubtful that officials could identify alternative information were they to encounter it. 
This lack of standard creates the opportunity to “goldbrick,” that is, intentionally making 
one’s bureau look “needy” by not attaining the bureau’s goals. The prospect of increased 
resources for their “needy” bureau is a reason for officials to thwart alternative 
information. The lack of an indisputable standard also thwarts alternative information by 
creating the incentive and the opportunity for officials to tell each other what they want to 
hear rather than what is objectively measurable. As we shall see later, this is the essence 
of the process that Mises refers to above whereby science becomes distorted to suit the 
purposes of the bureau.
Alternative information is also thwarted due to internal conflicts in the bureau. 
There are four internal conflicts shown by Rourke discussed above, which are essentially 
conflicts between order givers and order takers, and there is also the conflicts between 
Downs’s bureaucratic types, i.e. “climbers,” “conservers,” “zealots,” “advocates,” and 
“statesmen.” Because of internal conflict, there is no united effort, even in the informal 
structure, to seek or provide alternative information. In our present context, Downs’s 
climbers and zealots, those most likely to seek or propagate alternative knowledge, are 
frustrated by conservers who are in positions of power in our mature model.
Turning now to North’s minimal-changes-in-the-terms-of-exchange requirement 
for total ideology, we first review from Chapter 3 the four changes in terms of exchange 
that North argues are sufficient to alter peoples’ perception about the fairness of the
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economic system and, hence, sufficient to cause people to alter their ideologies. They are
as follows:
1. an alteration in property rights which denies individuals access to 
resources which they had heretofore come to accept as customary or 
just (the enclosure of common land, for example).
2. a decline in the terms of exchange in a factor or product market away 
from what had come to be regarded as a just exchange ratio.
3. a decline in the relative income position of a particular group in the 
labor force.
4. a reduction in information costs that results in individuals perceiving 
that different and more favorable terms of exchange may prevail 
elsewhere. (Structure and Change 50)
If these terms of exchange do not cause people in the bureau to adopt a different ideology, 
then North’s requirement for ideology is met.
North’s first example does not threaten total ideology in the formal structure of 
the bureau, because there are no just or unjust uses of property. There are only those uses 
as prescribed by the supreme authority that constitute the duties of one’s office. Officials 
realize that they do not own the resources that they use on a daily basis, and they use them 
according to official decree.
However, in the informal structure of the bureau, officials may indeed come to see 
their desk, their, room, their job, or other resources used on a daily basis as belonging to 
them, and be resentful if these resources are taken away by the supreme authority. 
Officials may come to regard pilfered resources in the same manner, since they have 
discretion over them. Even so, this requirement is not threatened in the informal 
structure, because officials can effectively retain control of such resources through 
cooptation, inertia, and pilfering. In any event, the supreme authority, realizing that he 
cannot separate control from consent, informally makes the necessary concessions. 
Otherwise, as Rourke argues, there will develop a gap “between the aspirations of the 
bureau’s leaders and the actual performance of its rank and file members” (21).
North’s second and third examples above do not threaten total ideology, because 
there are no factor or product markets and no declines in relative income positions in the
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bureau. Factor or product markets simply do not exist in the bureau, so we need not 
worry about their declines. Income positions are determined by one’s seniority and place 
in the hierarchy. Increased wages follow greater seniority and heightened expert training. 
These ranked wages are set by rules and are not affected by the adversities encountered by 
the bureau nor by the discretion of other officials.
Neither does North’s fourth example threaten the bureau’s ideology. In this 
example, the phrase, “a reduction in information costs,” is cast with the same meaning as 
Sowell’s “alternative information,” already discussed. Information that allows one to see 
more favorable terms of exchange elsewhere is certainly alternative information. Since it 
has already been shown that alternative information does not exist in the bureau, I will 
not consider this example further.
I conclude after examining North’s four examples of terms of exchange that his 
minimal-changes-in-the-terms-of-exchange requirement for total ideology is met.
The final requirement for ideology is Higgs’s craving-for-association-with-like- 
minded-people requirement. This requirement is also met in the bureau. Officials at the 
same level in the hierarchy have the same social status and similar values. Their position 
in the hierarchy is determined by their age, ability, training, and personal inclinations. 
Officials with the same amount of seniority, ability, and expert training, and who are of 
the same bureaucratic type, i.e., “climbers,” “conservers,” “zealots,” “advocates,” and 
“statesmen,” will generally have similar values and end up together on the hierarchy.
This is not a contradiction of an earlier conclusion that the similar-value requirement for 
community is not met in the bureau. That conclusion was in regard to the bureau as a 
whole, while this conclusion is in regard to one’s position on the hierarchy within the 
bureau. As was pointed out in Chapter 3, this requirement of Higgs’s is very similar to 
Tonnies’s Gemeinschaft o f Mind. Since we have already seen that Tonnies’s requirement 
is met, both in the sacred and the secular sense, I further conclude that Higgs’s 
requirement is met as well.
.Sum m ariz ing  ideology before moving to the benefit-cost analysis section, all the 
requirements for ideology are met in the bureau except the isolation requirement.
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Isolation is not allowed in the form of language, education, and culture, because of the 
needs of the supreme authority to shape the beliefs of his subordinates. Mannheim’s 
rigid-social-classes requirement for ideology is met because of inertia, resistance to 
change, fixed jurisdictional areas, and official rules. Mannheim’s no-vertical-social- 
mobility requirement, defined here as movement from the agent class to the class of those 
who initiate action, is met, because there are too many personal costs involved in the 
move. Mannheim’s no-communication-between-cfasses requirement for ideology is met, 
by the need to restrict communication to its essentials, because of inherent conflicts 
between classes, and because of division of labor. Sowell’s high-cost-for-altemative- 
information requirement is met, because alternative information in the bureau officially 
does not exist. North’s minimal-changes-in-the-terms-of-exchange requirement is met, 
because there are no property rights nor factor nor product markets in the bureau, because 
officials can use cooptation to retain control of resources for which they have acquired 
feelings of ownership, because the supreme authority informally makes concessions to 
retain control, and because the costs of information, seen as alternative information, 
cannot be reduced in the bureau. Finally, Higgs’s craving-for-association-with-like- 
minded-people requirement is met in a manner similar to Tonnies’s Gemeinschaft of 
Mind requirement for community.
The Benefit-Cost Ratio of Lying in the Bureau
I now turn to the second analysis of the bureau, which is a point-by-point 
evaluation of six items that affect the benefit-cost ratio of lying. By investigating these 
items, we will be looking at lying from the other side of the information relation, that is, 
from the point of view of Informer as he weighs his expected costs and benefits of lying 
versus truth-telling.
First, I consider how people use Hayek’s “particular knowledge” when they are 
under the constraints of the model. Second, I consider what organizations are possible in 
the model and how they affect the opportunity to lie. Third, I evaluate the extent of the 
free-rider problem in the model. Fourth, I consider whether the model has institutional
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restrictions on communication. Fifth, I evaluate the time preference level within the 
model. Lastly, I look at what ethical codes of conduct support the model’s constraints. 
Particular Knowledge
We saw in Chapter 1 that individuals have unique knowledge that is important to
society as a whole. We saw also that Hayek calls this unique knowledge “the knowledge
of the particular circumstances of time and place” (“Use of Knowledge” 80). We saw in
Chapter 3 that according to Hayek, the economic problem o f society is a problem of
how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of 
society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. 
Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is 
not given to anyone in its totality. (“Use of Knowledge” 77-78)
Here we look at how the bureau attempts to solve the economic problem and what affect 
this process has on the benefit-cost ratio of lying.
The term “particular knowledge” refers to the bits of unique knowledge that are 
safely and secretly tucked away in the minds of individual people. If all of these secret, 
unrelated bits of knowledge can be integrated and directed toward the betterment of 
society, then society as a whole is better off. We saw in Chapter 3 that the private 
property order accomplishes this task with the spontaneous processes of the free market. 
In the bureau, this task falls to the supreme authority. He cannot resort to spontaneous 
processes for a solution to the economic problem, because they do not exist in the bureau. 
There, everything is ordered by design. His only option is to command his subordinates 
to report their unique information to him so that he can use it to make decisions and set 
rules and regulations.
Solving the economic problem is important for this study since particular 
knowledge is private information and, hence, can be used for lying. In the bureau where 
officials are utility maximizers, the question arises as to whether officials are able to 
benefit themselves by lying in the process of reporting their particular information to the 
supreme authority. It is clear that they can if they know the intentions of the supreme 
authority. For example, suppose that the supreme authority wishes to set a  realistic
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production schedule for the production of tractors. He, therefore, orders the manager of 
each tractor factory to report the amount of time and other resources that it takes to 
manufacture one tractor. With this information he can allocate less resources to the more 
efficient plants and more resources to the less efficient plants. This situation presents 
both a threat and an opportunity to plant managers. The threat lies in the realization that 
the supreme authority intends to allocate future resources on the basis of their reports, and 
that he will use their reports as base figures for future production. To meet these threats, 
managers tend to exaggerate the amount of resources necessary for their plants to make 
one tractor. This assures them greater future allocations of resources and establishes a 
lower baseline for future production. The situation presents an opportunity for managers 
in that the information requested by the supreme authority is known only to them. 
Managers take advantage of this opportunity, again, by exaggerating the figures on their 
reports, which results in their being allocated more resources and being given a more 
leisurely production schedule.
In the real world, the process of exaggerating or understating information to a
central authority for the purpose of extracting rents is well known. Milgrom and Roberts
call the results of this process “influence costs." They argue that attempts at influence are
inevitable because central authorities must rely on information provided by others.
Moreover, the employees affected by a decision are often the very ones 
executives must rely on. In such circumstances, employees will have 
strong reasons to try to influence decisions, and their attempts at influence 
will impose costs on the organization. For example, employees may 
distort the information they report o r withhold information from the 
central office and from other employees. (“Bargaining Costs” 81)
This is the same situation that Downs warned us about earlier. There, he said that 
officials are tempted to distort information (1) by minimizing or suppressing information 
unfavorable to their performance or abilities and exaggerating what is favorable to 
themselves, and (2) by de-emphasizing information likely to displease their superiors and 
exaggerating that which will please them. One of Rourke’s qualifications of our bureau 
model also speaks to information distortion, i.e., that, “the tendency is strong for career
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bureaucrats to tailor their recommendations to fit what they believe are the policy views 
of the political executive” (128). People who find themselves in the above situation not 
only have incentive to lie, they also have strong reasons to attempt to increase their 
leeway to lie. In the bureau this is relatively easy, since the bureau lacks an indisputable 
standard by which to judge performance.
People who, in this context, engage in distortion o f information for personal 
benefits have received their own appellation from various writers. As we saw earlier, 
Kingdon calls them “policy entrepreneurs” and North calls them “intellectual 
entrepreneurs.” Both terms refer to people trying to benefit themselves in the policy­
making process by saying the “right” thing rather than what is true. The extent of the 
“policy entrepreneur” problem in the bureau is suggested by Boulding’s contention that 
“there is a great deal of evidence that almost all organizational structures tend to produce 
false images in the decision-maker, and that the larger and more authoritarian the 
organization, the better the chance that its top decision-makers will be operating in purely 
imaginary worlds” (30).
We can conclude from this discussion that the economic problem, as described by 
Hayek, cannot be solved in the bureau, and that attempts by the supreme authority to 
solve it result in distorted information. This failing of the bureau increases the expected 
benefits of lying.
Organizations
In this section, we examine the kinds of organizations that come into existence in 
the bureau and evaluate their effect on the overall benefit-cost ratio of lying in the bureau. 
To begin with, it should be noted that all organizations that come into existence in the 
bureau have the same structure as the bureau itself, i.e., they are hierarchically structured 
with different levels of authority, and exist for the convenience of the supreme authority. 
It should also be noted that neither the supreme authority nor his subordinate managers 
can make use of profit management. Earlier, Mises made a fundamental distinction 
between profit management and bureaucratic management. This distinction does not 
exist in the bureau, hence, there are no for-profit organizations.
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The absence o f profit management leaves the bureau susceptible to the internal 
nesting of the agency problem. Earlier this problem was described as the problem of how 
to monitor the monitor. This problem is solved systemically in the private property order 
through for-profit production, but in the bureau, it must be dealt with manually by 
managers at each level of the hierarchy. This reality necessitates a high level of 
monitoring of subordinates by managers. However, managers face another problem in 
the bureau: They do not posses sufficient specific knowledge to monitor their 
subordinates. Downs explained earlier that “a communications hierarchy implies very 
different types of knowledge at different levels” (8). Therefore managers, who have only 
a general knowledge of their subordinates’ specialties, cannot effectively monitor their 
subordinates.
Managers compensate for their lack of specific knowledge by structuring the 
bureaucratic hierarchy in such a way that they monitor only subordinates with specific 
knowledge similar to their own. Instead of managing many subordinates with differing 
specialties, they manage only a few subordinates with the same specialty. This creates 
what Downs calls “tall” hierarchies. Tall hierarchies have “narrow spans of control but 
many levels.” Downs says that tall hierarchies “are appropriate in organizations where a 
large number of conflicts are likely to occur, since they have a high ratio of conflict- 
settlers to total members.” Downs contrasts tall hierarchies with what he calls “flat” 
hierarchies which have “wide spans of control and few levels.” Flat hierarchies “are 
appropriate for organizations where fewer conflicts are likely” such as “bureaus with 
relatively simple or clearly-defined functions...” (9).
Even by resorting to tall hierarchies, managers cannot solve the monitoring 
problem, because tall hierarchies require more levels. We must remember that each level 
of a hierarchy acts as a communication intermediary for the levels above and below. 
Downs said earlier that this is necessary in order for managers to avoid message-overload 
from a flood of nonrelevant messages. He also pointed out that each communication 
intermediary has the incentive and the opportunity to distort the messages that he scans 
and sorts before passing them on. Therefore, by increasing the number of levels in the
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hierarchy for the purpose of increasing their ability to monitor, managers inadvertently 
distort the overall communication o f the bureau. They face a tradeoff between accurate 
communication and effective monitoring of subordinates. It might be said that they are 
between the proverbial “rock and a hard place,” because in regard to reaching the 
objectives of the bureau, these tradeoffs amount to the same thing.
Managers cannot look outside of their organizations for help with their monitoring 
problems, because there are no “Dun and Bradstreets” or “Underwriters Laboratories” in 
the bureau. That is to say, there are no self-monitoring organizations that can be enlisted 
to help solve monitoring problems. There are, of course, auditing committees and special 
investigators as appointed by the supreme authority, but the monitoring problem is still 
not solved. These special purpose organizations must also use bureaucratic management 
and, hence, suffer the same weaknesses as the bureaucratic structures that they are 
assigned to scrutinize. By enlisting such help, managers come full-circle and arrive at 
where we started in Chapter I , with the question, “Who will monitor the monitor?”
In summary, I conclude that the internal nesting of the agency problem cannot be 
solved in the bureau. The nesting problem is acute in the bureau due to the absence of 
profit management. Furthermore, managers’ efforts to compensate for this lack is 
frustrated at every turn. Their lack of specific knowledge leads them to create tall 
hierarchies with many levels of authority. Tall hierarchies create overall information 
distortions in the bureau, which is essentially another monitoring problem. Monitors 
from outside the organization are no solution, because they also require monitoring. I 
further conclude that this is a structural deficiency of the bureau, because no institutions 
exist to solve this problem, and because institutions that do exist preclude individuals 
from solving it independently. Under these circumstances, the benefit-to-cost ratio of 
lying is high.
The Free-Rider Problem
In this section, I evaluate the opportunity to free ride in the bureau. In Chapter 3, 
we looked at three different kinds of free riding: beneficial, conventional, and 
compulsory. Beneficial free riding does not foster lying; therefore, we need not
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considered it further. Conventional free riding—not paying ones share of a collective 
action—is an important indicator of the benefit-cost ratio o f lying because people who 
engage in it are hiding their true preferences. The presence of compulsory free riding—  
state granted favors—indicates the opportunity and the incentive to lie in the pursuit of 
state granted favors.
The conventional view of free riding is closely associated with the concept of 
“public goods,” at which we looked in detail in the last chapter. In this view, free riders 
lie by not stating their true preferences for a collectively provided good in order to avoid 
paying their fair share of it production costs. Public television is the common example of 
conventional free riding. People who watch public television but do not donate to its 
support are considered free riders in this view. According to the conventional view, free 
riding increases as collective action increases in scope, and when it is not backed by 
excludable incentives, coercion, and ideology.
We have already seen that the collective provision of goods is the condition under 
which conventional free riding is a problem. Conventional free riding is potentially a 
huge problem in the bureau, in the first place, because all problems are common 
problems, i.e., they are all dealt with collectively. In the bureau context, the scope of 
collective action is as large as it can be; it is total. Therefore, Olson’s advice to keep 
collective actions small in order to minimize free riding goes completely unheeded.
In the second place, conventional free riding is a potential problem in the bureau 
because of the need to delegate, coupled with the absence of profit management. 
Delegation or “action through agents” as Selznick has called it, is necessary because of 
the “increasing number and complexity of functions.” Selznick argued earlier that 
delegation creates a bifurcation of interests between the delegator and his agent. The 
delegator wants to achieve the goals o f the organization and the agent wants to solve his 
personal problems not addressed by the formal structure o f the organization. If the agent 
is to solve his problems, he must engage in free riding. As Selznick puts it, “the character 
of the agent’s new values are such as to generate actions whose objective consequences 
undermine the professed aims of the organization” (“Approach To A Theory Of
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Bureaucracy” 51). In short, the necessity to delegate provides the motive to free ride, and 
as has been shown, the lack of an indisputable standard of performance provides the 
opportunity.
In the third place, conventional free riding is a potential problem in the bureau 
because officials in the bureau essentially are in a commons environment, i.e., they face 
the same incentives as the herders in Hardin’s pasture model of the commons as 
discussed in Chapter 3. The herders in Hardin’s model get marginal benefits greater than 
marginal costs each time they overgraze, because they privately captured the benefits and 
publicly share the costs, which result from the depletion of the resource. In our context, 
officials who use more resources than they need are “overgrazing.” They privately 
capture the benefits from the overuse o f resources in the form of a more leisurely 
production schedule and pilferable surplus resources, and they share the costs o f a smaller 
resource pool with everyone.
Officials in our bureau model can appropriate resources from the common pool by 
appearing to be less efficient than they really are. This is the case of our secretary above 
who operates by the rule: When the boss is watching, work inefficiently so he thinks that 
I need all of these resources; when the boss is not watching, work efficiendy so that I can 
get done sooner and have free dme. The lack of an indisputable standard by which to 
judge performance in the bureau allows officials to conceal their work effort and ability. 
Such concealing of one’s ability is free riding according to the conventional view. By so 
reducing one’s effort, one is not paying one’s fair share of the effort-cost of operating the 
bureau.
Now that we have seen that the potential for conventional free riding in the bureau 
is huge, we must now evaluate the effectiveness of excludable incentives, coercion, and 
ideology in preventing conventional free riding. Excludable incentives are not effective 
reducers o f conventional free riding in the bureau because of the existence of surplus 
resources. The supreme authority can rule that all subordinates who accomplish their 
duties up to a certain standard receive a bonus, while those that fail to meet the standard 
do not. However, such bonus incentives are immediately discounted by officials, because
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in order to acquire them, officials must reveal their true abilities and effort potential and, 
therefore, must give up their relaxed production schedule and surplus resources.
Suppose, for example, that the secretary’s supervisor above offered her a 
secretary-of-the-week award if she could type twelve reports per day rather than ten. She 
must now choose between the secretary-of-the-week award and two free hours per day 
that she obtains by pilfering surplus resources, because to obtain the award, she must 
reveal her true abilities. When her boss discovers that she can type twelve reports, he will 
assign her more reports on a regular basis. The secretary will lose her leisurely 
production schedule and her freedom to engage in personal matters while at work. The 
excludable incentive provides her a short-term benefit but extracts long term costs. The 
rational choice is that she not change her behavior, so the excludable incentive has not 
prevented free riding.
Surprisingly, neither can coercion be used to any great extent in the bureau in 
order to overcome conventional free riding, because the supreme authority has only 
limited power to control his bureaucratic structure. The supreme authority can order his 
subordinates to produce up to a standard, but they have the ability to resist such an order. 
They also have the inclination to resist, because they are conservers that lack incentive for 
progress and change, and because they are in control of surplus resources that they do not 
wish to give up. Subordinates can use inertia and momentum to frustrate the supreme 
authority’s policies. They have specific knowledge that the supreme authority does not 
have, hence, they can distort science to their own ends and use it against the supreme 
authority. They can conceal their tme abilities due to the lack of an indisputable standard 
by which to judge performance.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the supreme authority would readily engage in 
coercion even if he could, because he is a conserver, himself, who seeks to maximize his 
own security and convenience, and who opposes innovation and change in favor o f the 
status quo. The supreme authority realizes that nullification of compulsion is an objective 
of sufficient interest to all subordinates that it may temporarily unite them against him  in 
spite o f their internal conflicts. The supreme authority also realizes that control o f his
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bureaucratic structure cannot be divorced from the consent of his subordinates and that 
winning the support of his subordinates is an important part of leadership. Therefore, 
coercion does not prevent conventional free riding in the bureau.
The elimination of excludable incentives and coercion leaves ideology as the
supreme authority’s only tool for controlling conventional free riding in the bureau. We
saw earlier that all of the requirements for total ideology are met in the bureau.
Therefore, the supreme authority can rule that an appropriate ideology be a part of the
expert training of his subordinates. Rourke, citing Kaufman’s The Forest Ranger, shows
the success of one real-world ideology at preventing conventional free riding:
In a study of the Forest Service, Herbert Kaufman showed how 
subordinate officials can be so thoroughly indoctrinated with policy goals 
that the exercise of their discretion can be relied upon to mirror faithfully 
the organization’s objectives. The premises on which their decisions rest 
have been firmly implanted by a uniform educational background, an 
effective program of in-service training, and an agency manual that clearly 
spells out the choices appropriate in particular situations. (39)
However, such faithful execution of the organization’s policy objectives is not 
likely outside pockets of total ideology in the bureau like that of the Forest Service. On a 
larger scale total ideology is weakened in the bureau because of the existence of internal 
conflicts and because of structural incentives to act contrary to bureau ideology. Internal 
conflicts require ideology to be custom-tailored for each homogeneous segment or class 
interest. Our previous analysis of ideology showed that there is limited contact between 
classes in the bureau; however, when they do make contact, each shows the other that its 
ideology is particular in nature, thereby breaking the total ideology spell. Structural 
incentives in the bureau weaken total ideology by enticing officials to act contrary to 
formal policy. For example, officials are tempted to acquire surplus resources even 
though formal policy forbids it. They can also increase their personal security by 
focusing on increasing the scope and function of their sub-bureau at the expense of the 
whole bureau. I therefore conclude that ideology is not an effective tool against 
conventional free riding except in isolated pockets.
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Moving now to the compulsory view of free riding, according to this view, free 
riders are those who use state coercion to fund their personal visions, which are beyond 
their personal means. These personal visions are always different from what compulsory 
free riders expect the market or voluntary outcomes to be. According to this view, trade, 
labor, environmental, and other special interest organizations lobby for compulsory free 
rides on the backs of taxpayers. In this view, people have an incentive to lie by 
exaggeration, omission, and misrepresentation in their attempts to persuade state 
authority to fund their visions. According to the compulsory view, free riding increases 
as the role of the state is enlarged, allowing it to grant more personal or group favors.
The supreme authority may officially delegate to favored subordinates desired 
positions or authorizations. In doing so he is granting the favor of power over more 
people and over greater amounts of resources. To receive such favors is to signal to 
others one’s relationship to the supreme authority and the accompanying status. The 
supreme authority may also grant favors unofficially by altering his behavior but not the 
official rules. For example, he may choose not to enforce a rule and thereby benefit a 
subordinate. Under the conditions of the bureau, favor granting is seen as a virtue by both 
the supreme authority and his subordinates. The supreme authority sees favor granting as 
an important tool of control as well as a way to indulge his personal preferences, and his 
subordinates see it as a desired prize to be won. In short, the supreme authority and his 
subordinates trade favors and consent.
Compulsory free riding plagues our bureau model, because the official role o f the 
state is a total role, i.e., all problems are common problems. The state, seen as the locus 
of coercive power, resides in our model as the supreme authority, who alone has the 
coercive power to officially grant or withhold favors. The supreme authority’s most 
highly prized favor is the delegation of his authority. Delegation is prized by 
subordinates for two reasons. First, as we have already determined, it allows 
subordinates to free ride in the conventional sense. Second, it is the source of state 
granted favors, i.e., compulsory free riding.
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In summary , conventional free riding occurs in the bureau because all problems 
are common problems, because of the necessity for the supreme authority to delegate in 
the absence of profit management, and because officials face the incentives of a commons 
environment. Excludable incentives are not effective against conventional free riding, 
because they are discounted by officials, who must reveal their true abilities to get them. 
Coercion is not effective against conventional free riding, because subordinates have 
sufficient informal power to resist the supreme authority's order, and because the 
supreme authority does not prefer to use coercion, since he realizes that control o f his 
subordinates requires their consent. Total ideology is not effective against conventional 
free riding except in isolated pockets in the bureau. Compulsory free riding plagues the 
bureau, because the state’s official role is total, and because free riding is seen as a virtue. 
The supreme authority grants favors out of necessity to win the consent of his 
subordinates, and they exchange their consent for his favors. I conclude that the benefit- 
cost ratio of free riding in the bureau favors free riding in both the conventional and 
compulsory sense.
Institutional Restrictions of Communication
In this section, I evaluate the institutional restrictions of communication in the 
bureau. These restrictions are the result of two primary features of the bureau: 
hierarchical structure and the absence of spontaneous processes. It is important to 
evaluate institutional restrictions to communication in relation to lying, because if people 
are unable to communicate in a manner meaningful to themselves, they cannot engage in 
reputation, community, and ideology. Deprived of these strategies, people are vulnerable 
to lying, and the overall expected benefits of lying exceed the expected costs.
Barriers to communication associated with the hierarchical structure of the bureau 
are those caused by division o f labor, chain o f command, inequality of power, and 
secrecy. We have already discussed the barriers created by the division of labor and 
found them twofold. First, officials with different duties must acquire different technical 
specialties. This separates the population of the bureau into pockets of specialist who 
have difficulty communicating with each other. Second, officials at different levels
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acquire knowledge with different degrees of specialty and generality, which makes inter­
level communication difficult. We also have seen that a chain of command restricts 
communication between people of different statuses. Officials can com m unicate directly 
only with their immediate supervisor.
Yet to be discussed are restrictions on communication caused by inequality of 
power, and secrecy. As Rourke explains, “the inequality of power inherent in hierarchy 
means that the view of highly placed individuals carry immense weight, not because their 
arguments are persuasive but simply because of the exalted status from which they speak” 
(148). This is simply to say that higher level officials get more say than lower level 
officials, because, as Dahl and Lindblom put it, people at the top of a hierarchy “decide 
when, in what conditions, and with whom consultation takes place” (qtd. in Rourke 149). 
Rourke concludes that “hierarchy can thus be an immensely important factor inhibiting 
discussion and free exchange of ideas in bureaucratic policy deliberations” (149).
Secrecy is a barrier to communication for two reasons: First, because it prevents 
access to desired information; second, because secrets can be used for lying. Regarding 
the first reason, we saw in Chapter 3 that secrets are minimized in the private property 
order because people “sell” their secrets, i.e., their secrets are imbedded in goods offered 
for sale and can be discovered by deconstructing these goods. The second reason above 
is the essence of Hayek’s “economic problem.” In Chapter 3 we saw that the private 
property order solves this problem with the free market, which allows people to use their 
secrets or particular knowledge to benefit themselves without using it for lying.
In the bureau, goods and services do not contain the particular knowledge of the 
people who make or provide them. Goods and services are made and provided according 
to directive. Particular knowledge stays with individuals, which is to say, as we saw 
earlier in this chapter, that the bureau cannot solve the economic problem, and that, 
therefore, people have the incentive and the opportunity to use particular knowledge for 
lying.
Rourke says that “the growth of bureaucracy in American government has brought 
about an enormous expansion in the secretiveness with which public policy is made”
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(155). This tendency toward secrecy in the bureau develops because of a need for honest
reporting and forthright expression during policy formation. Without secrecy, officials
tend to dissemble during policy deliberations concerning controversial issues . Rourke,
noting that American administrative agencies have more control of information that is
released to the public than does the legislature, concludes that
because privacy is conducive to candor in policy deliberations, 
administrative policy making may permit more honest exploration of 
alternatives than is possible in the legislature. People are less often 
compelled to edit out of their discussions ‘dangerous thoughts’ that might 
get them into trouble if they were widely known. (156)
We can now see that the tendency toward secrecy in policy deliberations in the 
bureau increases the benefit-cost ratio of lying from both sides of the information 
relation. As a barrier to communication, secrecy makes Informee more vulnerable by 
restricting his use of reputation, community, and ideology. As a bulwark for private 
information, it empowers Informer. This constitutes an administrative paradox in that a 
necessity to elicit truthful reporting by subordinates (secrecy) further empowers them to 
lie.
Rourke says that there are other costs as well. Because of secrecy, government 
officials make decisions without the benefit of all the pertinent information that is in the 
hands of the government itself. “Moreover, when policies are determined in private, the 
sources of influence on these decisions may be unknown, and many groups whose 
interests are affected may not be consulted at all “ (156). Casting Rourke’s views in the 
context of our model, bureau departments hide their proceedings from each other in order 
to expedite policy formation, and in the process, they make decisions without pertinent 
information that affect other departments who have this information.
The second primary source of institutional restrictions to communication in the 
bureau is the absence of spontaneous processes. Communication barriers resulting from 
the absence of spontaneous processes manifest themselves in the need for rules to guide 
human interaction, in the absence of market prices, and in the absence of an indisputable 
standard forjudging performance.
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The necessity of rules to guide human interaction in the bureau results in 
communication being restricted to that which is formally authorized in relation to policy 
formation and implementation. To this end, communication is initially used to acquire 
the information necessary to form policy. We have already seen how information 
becomes distorted in this process. Communication is then used to implement policy.
Here it takes the form of written rules and of orders or commands issued orally by 
superiors to subordinates. Following implementation, communication is used to evaluate 
policy and its implementation. In this setting, supervisors and subordinates discuss the 
successes and failures of implementation for the purpose of improving policy and fine 
tuning implementation.
These uses of communication can easily be observed in the U. S. Army. First, 
high level officers or NCOs have a dialogue with the social sciences to acquire 
knowledge about social organization and motivation. From this information, the Army 
devises official standard operating procedure (SOP), which is its official policy regarding 
treatment of the troops, e.g., realistic physical expectations, nutritional needs, 
motivational techniques, leadership characteristics, etc. Implementation takes the form of 
mission assignments that serve the needs of the Army and are in accordance with SOP. 
After every mission, squads, platoons, and companies conduct what is called “after action 
reviews.” Here supervisors and subordinates discuss what worked and what did not.
Any communication not related to formation, implementation, or evaluation of 
policy is forbidden in the bureau. This is so because unofficial communication subverts 
formal policy. In the Army for example, informal chat about personal matters between 
sergeants with adjacent desks, though seemingly harmless, delays pursuit o f the official 
mission and thereby threatens it. These sergeants are pilfering time allocated for official 
duties.
Real-world efforts to restrict unofficial communication in bureaus are readily 
observable in both the U. S. Army and public schools. Unofficial communication 
between the troops is allowed only during off hours. During duty hours, SOP restricts 
com m unication to policy or mission matters between officials of appropriate status. New
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recruits quickly learn the virtue of not speaking unless authorized to do so. So do the 
students in the public school classroom, who are punished or detained for unauthorized 
talking with their neighbors. Both the drill sergeants and public school teachers 
understand the necessity of restricting the unofficial communication of their charges in 
order to keep them focused on official goals.
The next institutional barrier to communication in the bureau resulting from the 
absence of spontaneous processes is the absence of market prices. Spontaneous processes 
like communities and markets provide means of communication in the private property 
order that are not duplicated in the planned environment of the bureau. As has been 
shown, members of a spontaneous community can communicate in a more fundamental 
way than strangers, because they have common intellectual, social, and emotional value 
references, or what I earlier called the “waik-a-mile-in-my-shoes-condition.” Also, 
markets, through market prices, constitute an intricate web of communication that makes 
producers aware of consumer preferences on a minute-to-minute basis.
Without market prices, there is no indisputable standard forjudging performance,
the third and final instance of communication barriers associated with the absence of
spontaneous processes. No indisputable standard makes it difficult for monitors to
recognize distorted information. This creates the opportunity to distort information,
because it gives reporters of information a certain leeway as to the accuracy of their
reports. Hence, they can serve their own needs to some degree by exaggerating this or
suppressing that. The incentive to distort comes from the process of policy formation
itself. Rourke explains that
most policy issues have a zero-sum quality—gains by some groups will 
have to be offset by losses for others. The decision o f bureaucrats, no less 
than those of politicians will involve redistribution of costs and benefits, 
and will as an inevitable result be political. (151-152)
We have seen how supervisors in the bureau, due to the lack of an indisputable 
standard, resort to the use o f tall hierarchies to minimize distortion and how tall 
hierarchies result in more levels of distortion. To demonstrate the magnitude of this
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distortion, Downs uses an example from Tullock’s undated, unpublished manuscript “A 
General Theory of Politics.” Tullock’s example assumes that messages are altered by 
10% at each level in a six level hierarchy. After allowing for errors and for lower levels 
of ability at lower levels of the hierarchy, the result, regardless of whether information is 
going up or down, is that when arriving at its final destination, the information has been 
distorted by 41%. Downs argues that a 10% distortion at each level is conservative, 
especially for reports of a qualitative rather than a quantitative nature. ‘‘As a result, well 
over half of what people in the bureau are doing may have nothing whatever to do with 
what its leaders want to accomplish, or what they have ordered to be carried out. Even 
under the most sanguine interpretation, a large fraction of the behavior of bureau 
members is likely to be completely irrelevant to it leaders’ intentions” (15).
Downs argued earlier that officials distort information in two basic ways: ( l)by 
minimizing or suppressing information unfavorable to themselves and exaggerating what 
is favorable, and (2) by de-emphasizing information likely to displease their superiors and 
exaggerating that which will please them. The latter distortion suggests Rourke’s 
contention that subordinates tend to tell superiors what they want to hear. This distortion 
has implications that deserve further investigation.
Earlier, Rourke argued that presidential advisors gain status if they say the “right 
things” to the president, and that the president gains credibility if he chooses advisors 
willing to say the “right things.” This situation rings of mutual self-deception as 
discussed in Chapter I. There, the liar and the victim both engage in self-deception: the 
liar so that he does not give himself away by involuntary body language, and the victim, 
because consciously acknowledging the truth is too costly. We saw that, under such 
circumstances, liars could assert their lies with the confidence of truthtellers to victims 
who are stone deaf to the truth, and that people in such a relationship would not be lying, 
according to our definition, but would simply be living in a fantasy world.
Cast in our present context, on the one hand an advisor can be more convincing if 
he believes that his distortions are not really distortions. To believe this, he must ignore 
all information that casts doubt on his forgone conclusion. He must also block all
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thought that his advice in anyway resembles a pandering service rendered in payment for 
benefits received. A president, on the other hand, has ears only for reports that show that 
his policies are succeeding, because admitting failure to constituents results in failure at 
the polls. Such selective hearing requires that he block any thought that his choice of 
advisors is based on their willingness to engage in sycophancy.
It takes only a minor feat of extrapolation to visualize this relationship in varying 
degrees between all supervisors and their subordinates at all levels of the bureau. Take 
for example the troop training cases noted earlier. In both the firing range example and 
the driver training example, simple deception may take place at the trainee level, but 
mutual self-deception must surely occur beyond that point in the echelon, because each 
military authority at each level was, at some point, a trainee himself.
Rourke’s president-advisor example and the troop training examples suggest that 
the hegemonic relationships created by the hierarchy of the bureau are conducive to 
mutual self-deception, at least to the degree that they provide subordinates with incentive 
to tell their superior what he wants to hear. Given this, mutual self-deception can then be 
seen as a barrier to communication in that it prevents communicators from 
communicating what is true, or rather, what they would believe to be true if they were not 
involved in a self-deluding relationship.
Taking the example a step farther, Rourke’s president-advisor case suggests that 
scientific advisors have incentive to distort their respective sciences to make them support 
the official view of things. Because the president wants to believe his economic policies 
are working, his economic advisors, if they wish to remain the power behind the throne, 
had better find evidence that this is so. Advisors have some leeway to do this in their 
choice of theories, data, and quantification techniques.
The social sciences are especially noted for their leeway for purposeful distortion 
because of their lack of what Richard Burian calls “reality therapy” (ctd. in Bauer 89). 
Bauer borrows Burian's phrase to describe the process whereby the rational opinion of 
scientists as to what is true is sensitive to the test of nature. Scientists bump into reality, 
so to speak, and are thus guided by it (89). He says that reality therapy forces natural
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scientists to generally agree on what is true even if some new truth goes against their 
personal beliefs. However, he says, “in the social sciences, by contrast, it is very difficult 
to find even trivial things to study that do not have some immediately evident bearing on 
political, social, or religious doctrine; and so from the very beginning of studies of 
apparent minutiae, opposing schools of thought will disagree” (135).
Even natural scientists as presidential advisors have some leeway to fashion their
reports to support official positions in spite of reality therapy. This leeway is most likely
largest in new areas of scientific investigation where theories have not been confirmed or
refuted, and hence, a scientific consensus has not been formed. An example in our
current world is environmental science. In such cases, as Rourke points out, even
quantitative techniques become suspect.
The greatest danger that these quantitative techniques of analysis present is 
the possibility that they may arm error with the seeming support of 
scientifically established fact, giving ill-advised policies greater credence. 
When this occurs, the finely honed rationalizing instruments of managerial 
science can become dispensers of irrationality measured out with 
mathematical precision. (175)
From this we can see that quantitative techniques could also arm intentional distortion in 
the same manner.
So where does all o f this lead? We have followed a thread from bureaucracy to 
hegemony, from hegemony to mutual self-deception, from mutual self-deception to 
sycophancy, and from sycophancy to the practical distortion of science. This thread 
connects institutional structure with scientific belief. In short, it suggests a sociology of 
science.
Sociology of science is certainly not a new idea. Mises points it out in the actions 
of Marx, whose “main contributions to the success of pro-socialist propaganda was to 
outlaw the study of the economic problems of a socialist commonwealth” (Bureaucracy 
57), and in a speech by Emil du Boi-Reymond in 1870 when he was Rector of the 
University of Berlin and President of the Prussian Academy of Science, who said, “We, 
the University of Berlin, quartered opposite the King’s palace, are, by the deed of our
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foundation, the intellectual bodyguard of the House of Hohenzollem” (qtd. in 
Bureaucracy 82). My argument for the sociology of science is particularly relevant here, 
because it is evidence that the bureau restricts communication in a fundamental way, i.e., 
it spurs officials including scientists to communicate with false information.
In summary, communication is institutionally restricted in the bureau by two 
primary causes: hierarchy and the absence of spontaneous processes. Communication 
restrictions associated with hierarchy are division of labor, chain of command, inequality 
of power, and secrecy. The absence of spontaneous processes manifests communication 
restrictions in the need for rules, in the absence of market prices, and in the lack of an 
indisputable standard forjudging performance. Rules are a barrier to communication 
because they preclude unofficial communication. Market prices are an important form of 
communication that are not duplicated in the bureau. Their absence leaves the bureau 
without an indisputable standard forjudging performance and results in monitoring 
difficulties. Hence, it creates the opportunity to purposely distort information for 
personal benefits. The incentive to purposely distort information springs from the nature 
of policy procedures, which are necessarily conducted in the form of a zero-sum game 
and, hence, are inherently political. Purposeful information distortion can lead to mutual 
self-deception on the part of both subordinates and supervisors, and can ultimately lead to 
the socialization of science.
Time Preference
In this section, I evaluate the institutional structures that affect time preference in 
the bureau. People’s time preference is important in the formulation of their benefit-cost 
ratio of lying, because as Axelrod’s computer tournament demonstrated in Chapter 2, if 
one does not value the future sufficiently, the rational choice is a noncooperation strategy. 
A high time preference imparts an urgency to people’s desire to consume in the present. 
This increased urgency causes people to discount any expected long-term benefits of 
truth-telling and any expected long-term costs of lying. It also causes them to put a 
premium on expected short-term benefits in relation to short-term costs. In short, people 
are more apt to lie if they have a high time preference.
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On the surface of things, it seems intuitive that officials in the bureau have a 
secure future and therefore a low time preference. Our real-life experience with 
bureaucracy, say the U. S. Postal Service or the military, indicates that fastidious 
adherence to bureau rules guarantees that officials will have continuous employment 
followed by a generous pension. This view of bureaucracy gives rise to the many jokes 
about civil servants. For example: How is a civil servant like a spent rocket? He serves 
no useful purpose and cannot be fired.
However, according to our model of the bureau, the future is not as secure as it 
seems. How secure could one’s future be under the following conditions?:
1. Status is fundamental to well-being.
2. There are few incentives for progress.
3. There are severe internal conflicts.
4. Super-ordinates have considerable power over subordinates.
5. Subordinates can subvert official policy.
6. There is severe distortion of information, including the sciences.
7. There are incentives for inefficient use of resources.
8. Officials work in an environment of cosdy information and 
uncertainty.
9. There is much pilfering of resources.
10. Officials are resistant to change.
11. Authorities are conservers, who maximize their personal security and 
convenience, oppose innovation and change, and favor the status quo.
Selznick’s argument that the bureau is an adaptive social structure further 
underscores my argument here that the institutional structure of the bureau creates future 
uncertainty; for if the bureau were actually serving the perceived future needs of 
individuals, there would be no need for cooptation; the bureau would not be an adaptive 
social structure.
There are property rights in the bureau, but they are not secure as they are in the 
private property order. In their place are de jure property rights as granted by the supreme 
authority and de facto  property rights as determined by one’s physical circumstances. 
Neither of these forms of property rights is secure. The supreme authority can grant de 
jure  property rights or take them away at his discretion. De facto  property rights come
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and go at the discretion of the supreme authority as he reassigns subordinates to new 
positions and locations. People cannot plan their futures secure in the knowledge that 
property right relations will not change.
A primary cause of future uncertainty in the bureau is the state’s ability to make
war with other states. For people living under the unrestrained state, the threat of war is a
chronic reality. The state cannot only initiate war, it can conscript its citizens to fight it.
The state can initiate war for revenge, for land and booty, to enforce racial or ideological
purity, or to glorify itself. The state, being a utility maximizer, also engages in economic
nationalism. That is, it antagonizes neighboring states with trade and immigration
barriers that are harmful to them but beneficial to itself and its constituents. Sennholz
explains using the example of U. S. sugar policy:
To afford our domestic producers a temporary gain, we partially close our 
markets to Central American sugar. In other words, we cause domestic 
prices of sugar to rise and depress foreign prices, subsidizing our sugar 
fanners at the expense of American consumers and Cuban farmers. This 
is economic nationalism. (92)
Such restrictions create economic pressures that affect the citizens in both countries.
Each domestic farmer, wage earner, and manufacturer sees himself as being better off if 
foreign restrictions are eliminated while domestic restrictions are retained. These 
economic pressures on top of old hatreds caused by territorial, racial, or ideological 
disputes set the stage for national aggression with the backing o f the populace.
This view of the supreme authority in international affairs is similar to a theory of 
state called “realism.” According to Frieden and Lake, realism is based on three 
assumptions: First, realism sees the state as the dominant actor in and the proper unit for 
the analysis of international political economy; second, realism assumes that a nation­
state acts in a monolithic manner to maximize its power; third, realism sees the nation­
state as acting rationally because it evaluates its options and selects the one that results in 
the most power for the least cost In this view, states see themselves as being in an 
anarchical, zero-sum relationship with each other in which one state’s increase in power 
relative to another state is a gain for it at the other’s expense. (31-32).
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In the twentieth century, with so many other reasons to go to war, immigration 
and trade barriers have often been the “straw that broke the camel’s back” so to speak, 
because they create economic pressures that affect the citizens in both countries. Thus, 
the stage was set for national aggression with the backing of the populace. This situation 
is what Mises calls “total war.” He explains that “under free trade and freedom of 
migration no individual is concerned about the size of his country,” since he is free to 
cross borders at will in order to take advantage o f any perceived advantage from doing so. 
However, “under the protective measures of economic nationalism nearly every citizen 
has a substantial interest in these territorial issues” (“War and the Welfare State” 80).
Under these conditions the likelihood of war is high. Supreme authorities can set
policies that antagonize each other’s societies. They can conscript troops, marshal armies
and resources, and initiate war. The two world wars are testaments of the likelihood of
total war when the state is not sufficiently restricted. Applying realism theory to the latter
part of the 19th century, many nations adopted protective tariffs which set off a chain
reaction. Clarence Carson explains:
This set off a quest for colonies, which would provide both a market and 
raw materials for the country which possessed them. Germany was a 
major new entry in the field, but Russia was also expansive, and a united 
Italy began to take an interest in colonies. To back up the effort, Germany, 
particularly, enlarged its navy, and countries began an armaments race. 
(183)
World W ar I began as a result of nation-states trying to maximize their power 
relative to neighboring nations by acting opportunistically in regard to the conflict 
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. Nations weighed the costs and benefits of waging 
war or remaining neutral. Some nations quickly took sides and entered the war, and 
others, including the U. S., waited until the cost-benefit ratio changed before entering. 
Italy actually switched allegiances when offered a piece of the Austria-Hungary pie.
World War II, according to Carson, was the continuation of World War I. Carson says 
that “the treaties of peace with the defeated Central Powers so badly upset the power
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system in Europe and left festering wounds to the pride and status o f these truncated 
countries that another war became, if not inevitable, at least highly likely” (200).
Another important cause of future uncertainty in the bureau is the fact that the 
supreme authority is in control of money. He controls both the nature of money and the 
amount or supply of it. Being a utility maximizer, the supreme authority adjusts the 
nature and supply of money to server his personal preferences. For example, if he wishes 
to initiate a war, he inflates the money supply so that he can out bid his subordinates for 
war materials. This view is consistent with Rothbard’s argument in Chapter 3 that 
“inflation is the health of the State; it is the natural tendency of the State; and it is largely 
to enable it to inflate for its own benefit that the State is so determined to secure absolute 
control over the monetary mechanism” (Logic One 326-326). Under inflationary 
conditions, the future worth of present saving is uncertain. Money saved for future 
consumption may not have purchasing power in the future. Therefore, people in the 
bureau tend to concentrate their consumption in the present.
Yet another feature of the bureau that undermines people’s attempts to secure 
their future is its inability to engage in what Mises earlier called “economic calculation,” 
i.e., the inability to determine which goods should be produced and what combination of 
inputs should be used in their production so as to maximize want satisfaction in society. 
Mises concludes in his 1920 Economic Calculation that the planned economy on a 
national scale is not possible in the long run. Mises’s argument, which is supported by 
recent history, suggests that the material well-being of officials in our bureau model is in 
question. Besides the fact that the supreme authority is a conserver concerned primarily 
with his own security and convenience, even should he suddenly have a change of heart 
and try to maximize the material well-being of his subordinates, due to the absence of 
market prices, he would be unable to do so. It is reasonable to conclude, that without 
material well-being and with no prospect of acquiring it, officials in the bureau can place 
little value on future consumption. They are essentially faced with the choice of 
consuming if and when they get the chance or possibly not consuming at all. This choice
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set imbues people with an urgency for present consumption or, in other words, a high 
time preference.
There are still other aspects of the bureau economy that suggest that the material 
well-being of officials is insufficient to instill in them a high value for the future. As 
Rourke has told us, policy making is essentially a zero-sum game, where a benefit to 
someone is a loss to someone else. A zero-sum economic environment pits people 
against each other in a kind of free-for-all that breaks down cooperation. This free-for-all 
is visible in both conventional and compulsory free riding, whose essence is the zero-sum 
game. Both kinds of free riding, as I have shown, plague the bureau. Bureau officials 
are, therefore, threatened by each others’ promotions and accomplishments. They see 
each other as adversaries rather than cohorts. This further exacerbates the tensions 
already present in the bureau due to internal conflicts.
Summarizing this section, the institutional structure of the bureau is conducive to 
a higher time preference than those o f the private property order. This is because the 
bureau has no secure property rights to prevent private aggression, no immutable rules to 
prevent state aggression, and no market prices with which to engage in economic 
calculation. Without secure property rights, people cannot take a long-term view of the 
future, because the state may ruin their future plans by changing its mind about the rules. 
The absence of immutable rules grants the state free reign to provoke wars and to inflate 
the money supply and conscript its citizens to fight them. Without the ability to engage in 
economic calculation, the state cannot provide material well-being for its citizens. 
Material well-being is further deteriorated in the bureau by both conventional and 
compulsory free riding and by the fact that the bureau incorporates a zero-sum game 
economic environment, which pits people against each other and breaks down 
cooperation.
From the above discussion, we can conclude that since people in the bureau have 
a higher time preference than those in the private property order, their benefit-cost ratio of 
lying discounts expected long-term benefits and long-term costs and puts a premium on
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expected short-term benefits in relation to short-term costs. Therefore, people in the 
bureau have a greater incentive to lie than they do in the private property order.
Ethical Codes of Conduct Engendered by the Bureau
This section evaluates the institutional structure of the bureau as to its tendency to 
influence people’s ethical codes of conduct. This is important, because what people 
consider to be ethical simultaneously acts as a constraint on certain behaviors and gives 
moral justification for others. It, therefore, rearranges their benefit-cost ratio o f lying and 
truth-telling.
Sowell explains one manner in which the bureau affects one’s ethical outlook. He 
says that
an imposed social pattern that leaves many unrealized economic gains to 
be made from mutually beneficial transactions must devote much political 
power to prevent these transactions from taking place, and must pay the 
cost not only economically and in loss of freedom, but in a demoralization 
of the social fabric as duplicity and/or corruption becomes a way of life.
(.Knowledge and Decisions 330).
The bureau, of necessity, must prohibit many such transactions because they do 
not advance its overall plan. Everything that is not in accord with official regulations is 
prohibited. The U. S. military, for example, has prohibitions regarding dress, hair style, 
speech, human interaction, use of personal property, and nearly every other area of 
personal life. To demonstrate the costs incurred by a society that prohibits mutually 
beneficial transactions, Sowell gives the example of America’s experience with the 
prohibition of alcohol. He could just as well have pointed to gambling, prostitution, and 
drug use. In today’s world, we could also point to prohibitions against certain kinds of 
human interaction as imposed by employment regulations, affirmative action and marital 
sexual conduct laws, or to prohibitions against certain uses of personal property as 
imposed by tax laws, land use and firearm regulations, constructions codes, zoning laws, 
and so on ad infinitum.
The point is that when the state prohibits mutually beneficial transactions, many 
people will engage in them anyway but do so surreptitiously. This point is underscored
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by the well known saying that goes something like this: “income tax laws have made 
liars out of all of us.” People may even feel that they have a moral right to engage in 
certain acts that are prohibited by law. For example, land use laws run counter to the 
moral necessity of private property rights. Under such circumstances, people using 
duplicity to break the law do so with moral rectitude. This sentiment is also reflected in 
popular culture with the lyrics “aint nobody’s business if I do.”
This is a case where citizens believe that the law of the land has diverged from a
higher law of morality. This divergence was fundamental in American civil rights
ferment of the 1960s. Martin Luther King Jr., in his “Letter from Birmingham City Jail”
in 1963, invoked this divergence to explain to white clergymen critics what they saw as
his willingness to break the law. King explained:
The answer is found in the fact that there are two types of laws: There are 
just and there are unjust laws. I would agree with Saint Augustine that 
‘An unjust law is no law at all’... A just law is a man-made code that 
squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that 
is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of Saint 
Thomas Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal 
and natural law. (17)
More than one hundred years before King’s “Letter,” Frederick Bastiat argued that
a divergence between laws of the state and laws of God are the source of a destructive
moral dilemma. Bastiat explained it like this:
In the first place, it erases from everyone’s conscience the distinction 
between justice and injustice... When law and morality contradict each 
other, the citizen has the cruel alternative of either losing his moral sense 
or losing his respect for the law. These two evils are of equal 
consequence, and it would be difficult for a person to choose between 
them. (12)
Relating King’s and Bastiat’s insights to our context, bureau rules prohibit some 
things that people feel they have a moral right to, and they allow other things that people 
feel are wrong. In the first case, people are tempted to ignore the law and follow their 
conscience. In the second case, people are tempted to ignore their conscience and indulge
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in what the law allows. In both cases, as Bastiat pointed out, there is the tendency for 
people to lose the “distinction between justice and injustice.”
Moving to a second way that the bureau affects moral outlook, in his “Structural 
Invitations to Deceit,” Robert Jackall argues that there are two aspects of bureaucracy that 
are particularly crucial in affecting people’s moral consciousness. The first is what he 
calls the “rational/technical ethos of bureaucracy.” By this, Jackall means “that 
[bureaucracy’s] positions and roles are intermeshed according to some rational plan for 
the purpose of reaching a certain goal” (51). Using the example of stockpiling nuclear 
weapons, Jackall says that the goal may be irrational according to some standard, 
however, “the actual internal organization of activities to reach that goal is rationally 
calculated and planned” (51). He says that the rational/technical ethos has a profound 
effect on full-time managers. That is, it “shapes in these men and women a strong 
orientation to their bureaucracy’s goals, habits of careful calculation, and a distrust of 
intangible issues of value which threaten to disrupt the calculated achievement of goals” 
(52). The upshot, he says, is that “the rational/technical ethos, by emphasizing the 
calculated achievement of pre-defined goals, tends to transform all issues, even those 
with grave moral import, into practical concerns” (52).
Consequently, people tend to bracket their moralities, operating on different 
standards inside and outside of the workplace. This allows them to pursue irrational and 
immoral goals in a rational manner without moral conflict. To further get emotional 
distance, officials use a neutralizing vocabulary that removes the emotional content of 
what they are doing. For example, during the Viet Nam war, Jackall points out, “ bombs 
were called‘ordnance’; bom bing‘interdiction’; the cultural extirpation of thousands of 
people ‘pacification’; and defoliation ‘a resources control program’” (53). “In sum, all 
the elements of functional rationality which mark bureaucracy—goal-orientation, 
calculated planning to achieve those goals, and abstracted language—make the institution 
an effective administrative tool, but they also ‘invite’ erosion of moral consciousness.” 
(54).
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The second aspect of bureaucracy th a t, according to Jackall, is particularly crucial
in affecting people’s moral consciousness is the fact that bureaucracy separates them from
the consequences o f their actions. He says this happens because, due to the hierarchical
structure, people suffer from a myopia concerning alternative behavior, and because they
come to feel that since they are obliged to follow orders, they are not responsible for the
outcome. Also important, says Jackall, is the effect of segmented and specialized
division of labor. Segmentation is dividing an operation into smaller tasks so as to
acquire speed through repetition. This is typical of line personnel. Specialization, which
is typical of middle and upper-middle professional personnel, is the narrow but
exhaustive application o f some expertise to a problem. As Jackal points out,
both processes separate people from their work: segmentation separates 
workers from a final product; specialization separates experts from the 
use to which their knowledge is put. This structural compartmentalization, 
where means and ends, actions and consequences are divorced, often 
results in a parallel psychic compartmentalization where responsibility for 
action is lost in the bureaucratic maze. (55).
Organizational goal seeking, segmentation and specialization are also present in the 
private property order. However, effects similar to those that Jackall describes above can 
only occur in the short term. In the long run, people cannot bracket their moralities and 
are not separated from the consequences of their actions because of the need to make a 
profit. Even large corporations must make socially acceptable products and conduct 
business in a socially accepted manner.
Another way that the bureau can influence one’s moral outlook is one we have 
already discussed several times in different contexts. I am referring to the opportunity 
and incentive present in the bureau to benefit one’s self by distorting information supplied 
to a central authority. In this scenario, people are likely to lie and to rationalize their 
choice to do so. Also, as we have discussed, super-ordinates are in a position to offer 
illicit favors to their subordinates, and their power position enables super-ordinates to 
require bribes o f their subordinates. The incentives to distort information, grant illicit 
favors and receive bribes, like Jackall’s rational/technical ethos above, creates a milieu
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where morality becomes a practical matter. Whatever works to get benefits, favors, and 
bribes is good. Whatever does not, is bad.
Furthermore, distorted information, in the form of official reports, becomes the 
official paperwork constituting the files of the bureau. Falsified official reports are what 
Altheide and Johnson earlier called “bureaucratic propaganda.” A common technique of 
bureaucratic propaganda is to present contrived reports as though they were done 
scientifically so as to give them credibility. “The idea is to make the reports appear to be 
scientific, when in fact they are not” (23). According to Altheide and Johnson “it is the 
role of bureaucratic propaganda in the guise of official information that creates the 
impression that the organization is complying with institutional expectations” (31). 
Official reports should therefore, they say, be viewed as an “organizational product with 
practical consequences...” Unfortunately, many social scientists do not view them as 
such and “too readily use official reports for their own research” (36).
Another way that the bureau can influence one’s moral outlook, and the final one
that we will discuss, is through the use of propaganda in the traditional sense. Ellul
defines propaganda as
a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring 
about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of 
individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations 
and incorporated in an organization. (61).
Ellul makes the distinction between what he calls “agitation propaganda” and
“integration” propaganda. Agitation propaganda seeks to destroy the established social
order through rebellion. Integration propaganda “aims at making the individual
participate in his society in every way” (75). Ellul says that agitation propaganda is
temporary, lasting only till the desired result is achieved, while integration propaganda is
a long-term propaganda, a self-reproducing propaganda that seeks to 
obtain stable behavior, to adapt the individual to his everyday life, to 
reshape his thoughts and behavior in terms of the permanent social 
setting...Integration propaganda aims at stabilizing the social body, at 
unifying and reinforcing it. It is thus the preferred instrument of 
government... (75)
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Since our bureau model is old and established, it is integration propaganda that applies to 
our situation.
Ellul says that “for propaganda to succeed, a society must first have two 
complementary qualities: it must be both an individualist and a mass society” (90). By 
“individualist society,” Ellul means one where the individual has been separated from 
groups like family, village, or parish. These groups must be broken down, says Ellul, 
because “such groups are organic and having a well-structured material, spiritual, and 
emotional life, they are not easily penetrated by propaganda” (91). The breaking down of 
these groups results in a massed society, i.e., a society comprised of individuals in 
isolation from parochial social norms. This is the social condition that Durkheim and 
many other writers refer to as “anomie” (304). Ellul also uses the term “total 
propaganda,” meaning that to be effective, propaganda must completely surround the 
individual. It must be orchestrated so that it comes through all the mass media, 
education, and even from the pulpit (9-13).
Ellul’s usage of the term “propaganda” is similar to Hayek’s term “totalitarian
propaganda.” Hayek says that
what so completely changes its nature and effect in a totalitarian state is 
that all propaganda serves the same goal—that all the instruments of 
propaganda are co-ordinated to influence the individuals in the same 
direction and to produce the characteristic Gleichschaltung of all minds.
CRoad to Serfdom 153-154)
Hayek argues that totalitarian propaganda is necessary for the planning authority that 
wishes the people to cooperate in the realization of its social plan. To get their 
cooperation, the planning authority must justify its plan, its decisions, and its values in 
the minds of the people. This need to rationalize its official position forces the planning 
authority “to construct theories, i.e., assertions about the connections between facts, 
which then become an integral part of the governing doctrine” (Road to Serfdom 156). In 
this process, the truth of theories becomes relative to whether it advances or hinders 
people’s acceptance of the overall social plan. Hayek argues that the moral consequences 
of totalitarian propaganda are that “they are destructive o f all morals because they
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undermine one of the foundations of all morals: the sense of and the respect for truth” 
{Road to Serfdom 155).
Church gives a contemporary example o f authorities rationalizing their official 
position at the expense of truth. He says that given the confusion in the science 
community regarding environmental cause and effect, “paper versus plastic” is a difficult 
decision and either choice may be “correct.” Under such circumstances, consumers may 
make environmentally beneficial choices on their own. However, he says, commentators 
and legislators are not willing to rely on individual choice because they recognize that it 
may deviate from their desired policy. These people massage the message so that 
consumers’ choices will advance the “correct” policy goals. Church says that “this 
approach lacks internal consistency because it manipulates and guides consumer 
purchasing decisions under the guise of advertising regulation. In other words, to 
accomplish environmental policy goals, truth becomes irrelevant” (269).
Relating the above to our bureau model, the supreme authority wants everyone in 
the bureau to cooperate toward the accomplishment of his social plan, which, since he is a 
conserver, is formulated primarily to maximize his own security and convenience. 
Knowing that his subordinates can stymie his plans, he realizes that he must have their 
cooperation. Since he cannot acquire cooperation on their terms without sacrificing his 
plan, he proceeds to convince his subordinates as to the value of his plan, that is, that his 
plan is their plan. To alter their values, he first breaks up organic groups like families and 
brotherhood groups, which result in an individualist and a mass society and leaves 
individuals vulnerable to propaganda. He then constructs “theories” that justify his plan 
and surrounds his subordinates, from birth to death, in total propaganda.
With propaganda, the instrumentalization o f ethics comes full circle. In Jackall’s 
view and Milgrom and Roberts’s view, as discussed above, subordinates take a pragmatic 
view o f ethics in order to accomplish the goals of their departments and to acquire 
personal benefits. In Ellul’s and Hayek’s views, superordinates adopt this view o f ethics 
in order to manipulate their subordinates. This process is reminiscent of Rourke’s 
president-advisor situation above that we saw can result in a socialization of science.
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In summary of this ethics section, we have seen that the bureau tends to engender 
a disrespect for the law and to instrumentalize morality. Of necessity, it must prohibit 
what many people consider to be mutually beneficial transactions because these 
transactions do not advance its overall plan. When such transactions are prohibited, many 
people will engage in them surreptitiously, especially if people believe that the law of the 
land is contrary to moral law. When people must choose between the law and their moral 
code, they loose respect for the law. The bureau tends to transform morality into a 
pragmatic concern because the bureau emphasizes calculated achievement of pre­
determined goals, because it separates people from the consequences of their actions, 
because it provides the opportunity and incentive to distort information for personal 
benefit, and because it requires that authorities obtain consent of the people through 
propaganda.
Before advancing to a direct comparison of the bureau with the private property 
order in the next and concluding chapter, I first summarize our findings in this second 
analysis of the bureau.
We found that the economic problem is not solved in the bureau. That is, 
particular information is not integrated and aimed at the betterment of society, as it is in 
the private property order, but instead is used for lying. I conclude that this failure and 
the lack of an indisputable standard of performance result in large expected benefits for 
lying relative to costs. Thus, people can, with relatively little risk, use their particular 
knowledge to lie to the supreme authority in order to get personal benefits. This 
constitutes an institutional-structure bias toward lying in the bureau.
We also found that the internal nesting of the agency problem cannot be solved in 
the bureau due to the absence of profit management. Managers’ lack of specific 
knowledge leads them to create tall hierarchies with many levels o f authority. Instead of 
solving the nesting of the agency problem, tall hierarchies create overall information 
distortions in the bureau, which is essentially another monitoring problem. Monitors 
from outside the organization are no solution, since they also require monitoring. I 
further conclude that this is a structural deficiency of the bureau, because no institutions
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exist to solve this problem, and because institutions that do exist preclude individuals 
from solving it independently. Under these circumstances, the expected benefit-to-cost 
ratio of lying is large.
As to free riding, we saw that conventional free riding is rampant in the bureau 
because all problems must be solved collectively, and because the tools to fight 
conventional free riding, excludable incentives, coercion, and ideology, are ineffective. 
We also saw that compulsory free riding plagues the bureau, because the state has the 
power and the need to grant favors, and because favor granting and receiving are seen as 
virtues. Compulsory free riding is a structural necessity in that the supreme authority 
must grant favors to win the consent of his subordinates. I conclude that the benefit-cost 
ratio of free riding in the bureau favors free riding in both the conventional and 
compulsory sense.
In regard to communication barriers, we saw that communication is institutionally 
restricted in the bureau due to elements associated with hierarchy and the lack of 
spontaneous processes. We saw that restrictions associated with hierarchy are caused by 
division of labor, chain of command, inequality of power, and secrecy. We saw that the 
lack of an indisputable standard forjudging performance creates the opportunity to 
purposely distort information for personal gain, and that purposeful information distortion 
can, in turn, lead to mutual self-deception on the part of both subordinates and 
supervisors, and can ultimately lead to the socialization of science. I therefore conclude 
that because of communication restrictions in the bureau, people find it difficult to engage 
in reputation, community, and ideology. Being deprived of these strategies, people are 
vulnerable to lying, and, hence, the overall expected benefits o f lying exceed the expected 
costs.
Furthermore, we saw that conditions in the bureau are conducive to a high time 
preference, because the bureau has no secure property rights nor immutable rules to 
prevent aggression, and because it has no market prices with which to engage in 
economic calculation. Without secure property rights and immutable rules, people cannot 
take a long-term view of the future, because people may be aggressed upon by fellow
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citizens or be conscripted to fight wars provoked by the state. People’s uncertainty is 
enhanced by the fact that the state is unable to engage in economic calculation and 
therefore cannot provide material well-being for them. I conclude that since people in the 
bureau have a high time preference they adopt a short-term view toward consumption 
which instills an urgency that increases their expected benefits of lying.
Finally, in regard to ethical codes of conduct, we have just seen that the bureau 
tends to engender a disrespect for the law and to instrumentalize morality. People lose 
respect for the law when it diverges from their moral code, and they must choose between 
them. People adopt an instrumental view of morality because the bureau emphasizes 
calculated achievement of pre-determined goals, because it separates people from the 
consequences of their actions, because it provides the opportunity and incentive to distort 
information for personal benefit, and because it requires that authorities obtain the 
consent of the people through propaganda. I conclude that the bureau’s influence on 
people’s ethics increases the likelihood that they will lie by reducing their overall 
perceived cost of lying.
In the next and concluding chapter I pull together all of our findings regarding the 
bureau and the private property order and compare them directly. I also comment as to 
my perceived achievements of this work and offer some suggestions for further research.
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions
The focus of this study is to search for theoretical links between institutional 
structure and the optimal level o f lying. Chapter 1 developed the information relation, a 
two person society engaged in the exchange of information, and showed that this relation 
is plagued by lying because o f the agency problem. Chapter 2 developed seven 
protection-from-lying strategies. Chapters 3 and 4 developed two models of society that 
fit at opposite ends of a no-central-planning/total-central-planning continuum and 
conducted two analyses on each model. The first analysis evaluated how well protection- 
from-lying strategies are able to function in the models. The second analysis appraised 
the overall expected benefits of lying in the models. These analyses enable us to 
determine whether one model has a lower optimal level of lying than the other. If one 
model is more accommodating to protection strategies than the other, that fact can be 
counted as an indicator that the same model also has a lower optimal level of lying than 
the other. If one model has lower overall expected benefits from lying than the other, that 
fact can be counted as a second indicator that the same model also has a lower optimal 
level o f lying than the other.
In this chapter, I compare the results of the previous analyses, form a conclusion 
regarding the relationship between institutional structure and lying and bring out some 
implications of this conclusion. I also discuss how this study relates to the work of other 
writers and offer some suggestions for further research.
Results of the Analyses
Table 1 below shows the results of the first analysis of each of the two previous 
chapters and compares the private property order and the bureau directly. As we see, all 
of the protection strategies are viable in the private property order, which is to say, their 
necessary requirements are compatible with its institutional structure. The institutional 
structure of the bureau is much less accommodating to protection strategies. None of the 
simple strategies are viable. The one strategy among them that is possible is signaling.
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and it is not used for separating oneself from liars but to signal ones status. Looking at 
the complex strategies, of reputation’s eight necessary requirements, only “moral seals of 
approval” is met, and this requirement is restricted to the preferences of the supreme 
authority. From this, it is easy to conclude that reputation as a protection-from-lying- 
strategy is not viable in the bureau.
Table 1. Comparison of Protection Strategies—Private Property Order /  Bureau
x =  Strategy requirements met
Ppo Bur Strategy Ppo Bur Strategy
S im p l e  s t r a t e g ie s C o m m u n it y
X Hostage taking X Isolation
X Incrementalizing X X Economic interdependence
X Seeking pointed knowledge X X Consensus and sanction
X Signaling X Similar values
R e p u t a t io n X Gemeinschaft of blood
X Repeated dealings X X Gemeinschaft of locality
X Freely chosen partners X X Gemeinschaft of mind
X “Don’t play” option Id e o l o g y
X X Moral seals of approval X Isolation
X Informal groups X X Rigid social classes
X Extended dealings X X No vertical social mobility
X High value of future X X No communication between classes
X Tit-for-tat reciprocity X X High costs for alternate information
na X Small changes in terms of exchange
X X Association with like minded people
Community has four necessary requirements, two of which are met in the informal 
structure o f the bureau. The models were also evaluated according to three different 
degrees or intensities of community known as “Gemeinschaft of blood,” “Gemeinschaft 
of locality,” and “Gemeinschaft o f mind.” Two of these three degrees of community are 
possible in the bureau. From these results, one might conclude that community is a 
viable protection strategy; however, these results are deceiving. The two necessary 
requirements of community that are met in the bureau, economic interdependence, and
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consensus and sanction, are, as discussed in Chapter 4, only met in the bureau’s informal 
structure and tend to lead to a community of deceit, because of pilfered resources, and 
because of a tacit consensus backed by informal sanctions to alter official records to 
reflect what superordinates want them to reflect. Under these circumstances, exhibiting 
two of three degrees of community, Gemeinschaft of locality and Gemeinschaft of mind, 
does not reflect well on the bureau, as one might expect. Rather, it suggests that the 
above community of deceit may be persistent in the bureau. I conclude, therefore, that 
community is not a viable protection strategy in the bureau.
Looking at Ideology in the bureau, of ideology’s seven necessary requirements, 
six are met. This suggests that ideology is a viable protection-from-lying strategy in the 
bureau. However, these results belie the fact that the bureau’s capacity to sustain total 
ideology is in the hands of the supreme authority. We must remember to what use he 
puts it. Hayek explained in Chapter 4 that propaganda is necessary for the planning 
authority that wishes the people to cooperate in the realization of its social plan. To get 
their cooperation, the planning authority must justify its plan, its decisions, and its values 
in the minds of the people. This need to rationalize its official position forces the 
planning authority “to construct theories, i.e., assertions about the connections between 
facts, which then become an integral part of the governing doctrine” (Road to Serfdom 
156). In this process, the truth of theories becomes relative to whether it advances or 
hinders people’s acceptance of the overall social plan.
Ellul argued, also in Chapter 4, that for propaganda to succeed, society must exist 
as individuals isolated from the parochial norms of small social groups. To this end, 
groups like family, village, and parish must be broken down, because “such groups are 
organic and having a well-structured material, spiritual, and emotional life, they are not 
easily penetrated by propaganda” (91). These groups are precisely those groups most able 
to use community relations and ideology to thwart lying. Therefore, to establish his 
doctrine, the supreme authority must destroy social relations in which community and 
ideology are most effective as protection-from-lying strategies. The bureau’s capacity to
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sustain total ideology is usurped by the supreme authority and used to sustain propaganda. 
In short, total ideology is transformed into, using Ellul’s term, “total propaganda.”
I conclude, therefore, that total ideology is not a viable strategy to prevent lying in 
the bureau, rather, that it is used instead for massive lying campaigns by the supreme 
authority. This conclusion leaves the bureau with no protection-from-lying strategy as 
compared to the private property order, which accommodates them all. This suggests that 
it is more difficult to protect oneself from lying in the bureau than in the private property 
order. It is clear, then, that our first indicator points to a lower optimal level of lying in 
the private property order than in the bureau.
Comparing the results of the second analysis, Table 2 shows that each of the six 
factors that affect expected benefits of lying tends to reduce the expected benefits of lying 
in the private property order and to increase expected benefits of lying in the bureau.
Table 2.
v::.; I
Effect o f Six Factors onBenefit-Cost Ratio o f 
y^ing—Private PropertyOrder/ Bureau ,
I =  Increases benefit-cost ratio o f  lying
D = Decreases benefit-cost ratio o f lying
Ppo Bur Factors
D I Particular knowledge
D I Organizations
D I Free riding
D I Institutional restrictions of communication
D I Time preference
D I Ethical codes of conduct
However, Table 2 does not bring out the huge contrasts between the effects of 
these factors in private property order and in the bureau. The problem of particular 
knowledge, or what Hayek earlier called the “economic problem,” is systemically solved 
in the private property order and is systemically aggravated in the bureau. Organizations 
in the private property order, with the use of the profit-and-loss statement, avoid the
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nesting o f the agency problem, while organizations in the bureau maximize the bad 
effects of this problem by trying to solve it. Free riding, both conventional and 
compulsory, is practically nonexistent in the private property order while both are 
rampant in the bureau. Except for property rights, institutional restrictions of 
communication are nonexistent in the private property order, but they are ubiquitous in 
the formal and informal institutional structure of the bureau. Time preference tends to be 
relatively low in the private property order and relatively high in the bureau. The private 
property order engenders an ethics of hard work and honesty, while the bureau engenders 
an ethics of pragmatism and purposeful deceit.
The lopsided results of the second analysis makes it easy to conclude that the 
expected benefits of lying in the private property order are lower than they are in the 
bureau. It is clear, then, that our second indicator also points to a lower optimal level of 
lying in the private property order than in the bureau.
We are now ready to answer the question that is the main focus o f this study, i.e., 
whether there is a relationship between institutional structure and the optimal level o f 
lying. The results o f this study suggest that there is a positive correlation between the 
amount of central planning in society and the optimal level of lying, i.e., as central 
planning increases or decreases, so does each individual’s perceived optimal level of 
lying.
In criticizing this conclusion, some may argue that the analyses only apply to 
extremes in institutional structure, that it cannot be assumed that there is a continuum of 
more or less lying between them. Perhaps the opportunities for and the expected benefits 
of lying do not increase at anything resembling a regular rate of change when moving 
from the market model toward the bureau; perhaps there is no marked difference in the 
opportunity to lie anywhere on the continuum except very close to the bureau model. If 
this is the case, then most real-world political structures, fitting safely between the 
extremes, sail in smooth waters while only totalitarian systems need be concerned.
This criticism can be put to rest by observing the results of relaxing our private- 
property-order model just enough to include conditions in the present-day U. S. We
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quickly see that the necessary requirements of reputation and community are already 
considerably diminished. Looking at reputation, for example, Americans are prevented 
from repeated dealings in prostitution, the drug trade, and other victimless crimes, and in 
many business dealings prevented by antitrust laws and other regulations; Americans 
cannot choose the “don’tp la y ” option with respect to minorities, homosexuals, the 
handicapped, and AIDS victims; Americans cannot freely choose partners where race, 
gender, age, sexual preference, body and mind integrity, and AIDS is involved; groups 
cannot confer moral seals o f approval on their members by excluding undesirables, for 
example, a New Jersey Supreme Court ruling prevents Boy Scouts of America from 
excluding gays; extended dealings are interfered with by Federal Communication 
Commission regulations on telephone, radio, television, and Internet communications; 
Americans’ valuing o f  the future is surely lower than if they had not had to face creeping 
regulation of private property, inflation, conscription, two world wars, the Korean, the 
Vietnam, and the Iraq wars, and many armed skirmishes including the latest in Serbia; 
tit-for-tat reciprocity is diminished by bankruptcy laws and courts that let criminals off 
easy.
Present conditions in America also present obstacles to the necessary 
requirements of community. Isolation is diminished by public education, compulsory 
attendance, and anti-discriminatory laws. Economic interdependence is decreased by 
bureaucratization and by welfare entitlements; Consensus and sanction of local groups is 
replace by government backed standards of interaction, such as those inherent in anti- 
discriminatory laws; Similar values become less similar as people compete to get 
government favors.
Looking at ideology in this context, current conditions in America are that of a 
central authority striving to see the realization of its social policy. We saw above that in 
the hands of a central authority, ideology as a strategy takes the form of propaganda to 
persuade people to cooperate with social policy. Americans have endured state 
propaganda justifying conscription, all the wars o f this century, monetary and economic
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policy, social security, forced busing of school children, affirmative action, environmental 
legislation, and many other state actions.
I will refrain from examining in this context each of the six factors that affect the 
expected benefits of lying. However, it would be an easy task to show that in present day 
America each factor tends to raise the expected benefits of lying. The point of this 
discussion is to show that it is not justified to criticize the above conclusion on the basis 
that lying problems may bunch around the bureau end of the continuum.
Support for the above conclusion can be found in the evolution of the Law
Merchant, the body of rules, customs, and practices that rose spontaneously between the
eleventh through the fifteenth century and formed the basic concepts and institutions of
modem Western mercantile law. Bruce Benson, in his “The Spontaneous Evolution of
Commercial Law,” says that merchants of this period developed this body of laws out of
necessity, since there were no existing body of laws that could support inter-regional and
international trade. This body of laws was produced, adjudicated, and enforced
voluntarily. Benson explains:
The Law Merchant ‘governed’ without the coercive power of a state. 
Merchants formed their own courts to adjudicate disputes in accordance 
with their own laws. These courts’ decisions were accepted by winners 
and losers alike because they were backed by the threat of ostracism by the 
merchant community at large—a very effective boycott sanction. (172).
According to Benson, in the twelfth century, the governments of Europe and
England began enacting the customary practices and rules of the Law Merchant as official
commercial law. Merchants, however, continued to use their own courts, so governments
passed laws that made royal courts more desirable and merchant courts less desirable.
For example, new laws gave merchants access to royal appeal, which weakened the
authority of merchant courts.
Thus, through a gradual process of absorption by creating govemmentally 
backed institutional arrangements and laws which would be acceptable to 
the merchants, and by weakening the authority of the merchant courts, 
commercial law began to become part of common law. (176).
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The Law Merchant was weakened further by an English law in 1606 that allowed 
the royai court to reverse the rulings of merchant courts. From that point, the Law 
Merchant became less universal and more localized and “began to reflect the policies, 
interests and procedures of kings” (178). “National states inevitably required that their 
indigenous policies and concerns be given direct consideration in the regulation of 
commerce. As a result, distinctly domestic systems of law evolved as the official 
regulators of both domestic and international business” (Trakman qtd. in Benson 178). 
By the nineteenth century, especially in England, commercial law had lost the 
characteristics most needed for international trade: flexibility, ability to change, 
informality and speed, and reliance on commercial custom and practice.
The Law Merchant was absorbed by European civil law more nearly intact than it 
was by English common law. English courts were thus at a disadvantage with European 
national courts in competition for international dispute arbitration. “As England’s 
relative position in world trade began to decline, common law courts began to lose 
international business disputes to other nations’ courts” (Benson 179). Further pressure 
on English courts was caused by the American Civil War. The naval blockade of the 
South resulted in congestion of the English courts. To avoid lengthy delays, merchants 
engaged in arbitration that bypassed the courts. English courts were thus pressured into 
reintroducing the international Law Merchant into English Law.
Putting the evolution of the Law Merchant into the context of our models, 
international commerce of the time was a large-scale, private-property-order community 
based on similar values. It was through the Law Merchant that this community 
established economic interdependence and consensus and sanction. As the English state 
increasingly intervened in this community, the economic interdependence, consensus and 
sanction, and similar values that form community relations were gradually replaced with 
the central planning of the bureau. When central planning became predominant, 
commercial law became sovereign-serving and unable to meet the needs o f international 
commerce. Traders then re-established community relations outside of the bureau.
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The history of the Law Merchant is support for the above conclusion by the fact 
that when it was interfered with by the nation states, international trade floundered. In 
more detail, international trade of the time was necessarily based on a system of trust, i.e. 
a voluntary system of norms and sanctions that lowered the expected benefits and raised 
expected costs of lying by rewarding honesty and punish cheating. It was necessarily so 
because there was no international sovereign to oversee international trade. There simply 
was no basis other than trust for international trade. Therefore, during the time that 
international trade was flourishing, we can assume that this system was firmly in place, 
that trust was high and lying was low. Conversely, when international trade floundered, 
we can assume that this system broke down, that trust was low and lying was high.
Further support for the above conclusion can be seen in the fact that early on when 
merchants could choose between voluntary courts and royal courts, they chose the 
voluntary courts. This suggests that merchants found more trusting relations in voluntary 
courts that in royal courts. Support for the idea of a continuum of lying between the 
private property order and the bureau can be seen in the fact that later on, when the 
authority of voluntary courts had become undermined and were therefore no longer a 
viable choice, international traders abandoned the English courts, whose laws had 
absorbed less of the Law Merchant, and looked to European courts, whose laws had 
absorbed more of it.
Final support from this example stems from the realization that the evolution of 
the Law Merchant parallels what our models would predict given those circumstances. 
Looking at these circumstances through our bureau model, the supreme authority cannot 
allow the existence of a spontaneous body of laws in the informal structure o f the bureau, 
because it frustrates the implementation of his policy preferences. Realizing that he 
cannot lead without the consent o f his subordinates, he enacts their customs as his laws 
and offers them bribes to use his official courts while he gradually undermines their 
informal processes of consensus and sanction. Once the transformation is complete, the 
supreme authority administers international trading according to his personal preferences. 
These conditions, however, do not meet the needs of his subordinates. They, therefore,
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through cooptation, pressure the supreme authority to make changes to the formal 
structure of the bureau.
Implications of the Conclusion
In this section, I discuss five implications of the main conclusion of this study, 
which, once again, is that there is a positive correlation between the amount of central 
planning used in the solution of society’s problems and the optimal level of lying in 
society. The five implications discussed below are that movement on our continuum 
away from the private property order and toward the bureau tends (1) to breakdown 
community relations, (2) to cause a sociology of value relativism, (3) to change the nature 
of competition (4) to lower society’s overall material standard of living, and (5) to create 
a social environment of mutuaJ self-deception.
The first implication, that increased bureaucracy tends to breakdown community, 
was argued by Ellul in Chapter 4. There he said that the state must breakdown 
community relations in order for propaganda to succeed. Michael Taylor similarly argues 
in his Community, Anarchy and Liberty that the state destroys the main social controls 
that primitive societies and peasant communities use to maintain social order. He 
concludes that “the weakening of community and the development of gross inequality are 
the concomitants and consequences of state formation” (133). Ernest Gellner, leaning 
heavily on Ibn Khaldun’s study of Moslem pastoral societies in northern Africa, reaches 
the same conclusion. He argues that “it is precisely anarchy which engenders trust or, if 
you want to use another name, which engenders social cohesion. It is effective 
government which destroys trust” (143).
Shearmur and Klein argue that a breakdown of community caused by state 
intervention can be seen in the public schools. He says that
the government school itself does not grow out of the efforts o f local 
individuals who voluntarily came together to establish a school that would 
reflect their values. As James Coleman and Thomas Hoffer (1987) put it, 
the government school, in contrast to the private Catholic school, does not 
build from either a “value community” or a “functional community.” The 
anomie of the pupil in the public school classroom is not the result of the
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forces of individual liberty but rather the result of usurpations of that 
principle”! 4L).
In the study cited by Shearmur and Klein above, Coleman and Hoffer compare 
public and private schools. They argue that the orientation of public schools ‘‘sees 
schools as society’s instrument for releasing a child from the blinders imposed by 
accident of birth into this family or that family,” while the orientation of private schools 
“sees a school as an extension of the family, reinforcing the family’s values. The school 
is in loco parentis, vested with the authority of the parent to carry out the parent’s will” 
(3).
Coleman and Hoffer found that “within curriculum programs, private, particularly 
Catholic, school students take more academic courses and fewer vocational courses” and 
that “parental involvement in private schools is greater” (56). All of the authors’ 
comparisons “show strong evidence of greater growth in Catholic schools than in public 
schools, in both verbal skills and mathematics” (92). The study also showed a much 
lower dropout rate in Catholic schools than in both public and non-Catholic private 
schools (116). The most striking result of Coleman and Hoffer’s study, from the point of 
view of this study, is that “Catholic schools are more effective than public or other private 
schools in raising the academic achievement of subpopulations that traditionally achieve 
at lower levels: blacks, Hispanics, children from families that provide lower levels of 
parental support, and children from families with lower socioeconomic standing” (147).
In other words, Catholic schools not only better serve the needs of the traditional white 
mainstream society than do public schools, they also better serve the needs of those 
segments of society that traditionally have had difficulty fitting into the mainstream.
Perhaps this absence of functional communities within the public school system, 
due to compulsory attendance, partially explains increasing incidences of students 
striking out violently against fellow students as at Columbine High School in the spring 
of 1999. As Shearmur and Klein put it, “coerced homogenization stamps out social 
differentiation and personal individuality, which are important preventatives to personal 
frustration, envy, intolerance, and open hostility” (41). Perhaps their argument can also
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aid in explaining increased violence in the workplace. Government regulation o f the
workplace essentially moves the social relations of the workplace away from those of the
private property order, and toward those of the bureau. Shearmur and Klein point out that
in a world of fewer regulations and lower taxes, one might see more fluid 
crossover at the workplace between the economic and the social. The firm 
represents a stock of social capital, which, under a more voluntaristic 
regime, could be adapted more easily to serve community goals like 
education, prayer, culture, charity, recreation, and conviviality’' (41).
A final thought pertaining to the breakdown of community relations by the state, 
perhaps much of the criticism that the market has traditionally received for breaking up 
community and allowing fraud is not so much the fault of the market as the fault of 
governments intervention on the choices and the free movement of people.
The second implication from the conclusions of this study suggest that as a society 
moves along the private-property-order /bureau continuum in the direction of the bureau, 
peoples’ values change from those able to support social order to values less able to do 
so. We saw important arguments to this effect in Chapter 4: Sowell explained that an 
imposed social order criminalizes many mutually beneficial economic transactions, and 
that people dissemble and deceive to get these benefits; King argued that sometimes the 
law diverges from a higher law of morality, and Bastiat argued that when such a 
divergence occurs, people loose either their moral sense or their respect for the law; 
Jackall argued that under bureaucracy people tend to adopt instrumental values; Milgrom 
and Roberts argued that people in bureaucratic relations lie to influence the policy of the 
bureau; Altheide and Johnson argued that bureaus themselves lie in the form of falsified 
official reports or what they call “bureaucratic propaganda.” Hayek argued that central 
authorities lie to get subordinates to cooperate in the implementation of policy.
This idea that bureaucracy breeds values detrimental to social order is argued 
further by Taylor, who sees a problem with the state provision of public goods. In his 
Anarchy and Cooperation, Taylor argues that “the more the state intervenes in such 
situations, the more ‘necessary’...it becomes, because positive altruism and voluntary 
cooperative behaviour atrophy in the presence of the state and grow in its absence” (134).
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Taylor argues that the state weakens local communities by encouraging the “national 
community,” such as national defense and domestic markets. In this process, those 
relations between people that ensured cooperation and social order in pre-state or 
minimal-state times are broken down. The state becomes a mediator between people who 
once worked out their own problems, hence, the state is increasing seen as having the 
responsibility for social cooperation. Peter Kropotkin describes this process as it 
occurred in Europe between the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries in his Mutual Aid. 
As Kropotkin puts it, “in proportion as the obligations towards the State grew in numbers 
the citizens were evidently relieved from their obligations towards each other” (qtd. in 
Taylor Anarchy and Cooperation 135).
Further support for the second implication above is found in Kaplar and Maines’s 
argument that government regulation of the media, particularly the broadcast industry, is 
largely responsible for the low ethical standards of journalism. They argue that regulation 
of the media stifles ethical development in journalism in two ways. First, laws and 
regulations take the place of ethical standards, thus, substituting government ethics for 
private ethics. Second, government regulation presents barriers to the development of 
technologies capable of creating an environment more hospitable to the practice of ethical 
journalism.
To illustrate the first effect above, Kaplar and Maines point to the Fairness 
Doctrine and similar regulations on political editorializing, personal attacks, licensing 
requirements, prime-time access, and children’s programming. The effect of these 
regulations “is that journalists (electronic and print) end up making more and more 
decisions not because of a desire to follow ethical standards of their own choosing 
(private sector or ‘private’ ethics) but because they must comply with government 
regulations and fear the consequences if they don’t” (34).
The second effect above, Kaplar and Maines argue, occurs when government 
regulations interfere with the development o f cable television. Because of its revenue 
structure, cable television does not depend on sensationalism and showmanship to attract 
a large audience and, hence, revenue through advertising as does network television.
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Cable television, therefore, can create an environment
where journalism can be practiced in a way that is more accommodating of 
ethical considerations and less influenced by the commercial pressures 
besetting broadcasters...By retarding the development of this technology, 
however, the government has also retarded an opportunity for the 
development of journalistic ethics (75-76).
Kaplar and Maines discuss the main obstacles that have retarded the development 
of cable television. In addition to being restricted by the Fairness Doctrine and must- 
carry regulations, they cite the FCC’s 1966 Second Report and Order as restricting cable 
markets, and the Cable Communications Policy Ac o f 1984 as giving local authorities rate 
and regulation control of cable companies. The authors cite the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act o f 1992, which rolled back consumer prices 
17% as being the most recent and most repressive of barriers to the development of the 
cable industry. Kaplar and Maines argue that “the implications here for journalistic ethics 
are not promising. A reduction in subscriber revenues could easily mean that the cable 
industry is forced to place a greater emphasis on advertising revenue with the 
concomitant need to attract ever-Iarger audiences” (82). This, they argue, would make 
sensationalism and entertainment the guiding principle of cable as it currently is of 
network television.
Moving to the third implication of this study, we see that a move along the 
private-property-order/bureau continuum toward the bureau changes the nature of 
competition from competing to provide goods and services to competing to acquire 
authority-granted favors. Mises suggests as much when he remarks of competition that 
“the capitalist variety is to outdo other people on the market through offering better and 
cheaper goods. The bureaucratic variety consists in intrigues at the ‘courts’ of those in 
power” (Bureaucracy 105). Milgrom and Roberts argued in Chapter 4 that under 
bureaucratic conditions, lying is an important tool in the competition for policy benefits. 
Their argument and this third implication is substantiated by the case of Robert P.
Liburdy, a cell biologist at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory in Berkeley, an arm of the 
Energy Department Liburdy was found to have published two papers in which he
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
280
eliminated data that did not support his conclusion that there is a link between 
electromagnetic radiation and cancer. “Federal officials say his misrepresentations helped 
him win S3.3 million in grants from the National Institutes o f Health, the Department of 
Energy and the Department of Defense to investigate a link between electric power and 
cancer. (Fairbanks Daily News Miner, July 24, 1999)
This implication is further substantiated by a study done by psychology professor 
Judith S. Kleinfeld at the University of Alaska. Fairbanks in May o f 1998. Kleinfeld re­
examined the study How Schools Shortchange Girls published in 1992 by the American 
Association of University Women (AAUW). The findings of the highly publicized 
AAUW study, were that girls were systematically deprived of equal opportunity in the 
classroom. In her re-examination of this report, Kleinfeld found that
the findings in this report are based on a selective review of the research 
and that findings contrary to the report’s message were suppressed. These 
contrary findings actually show up in studies the AAUW itself 
commissioned; the AAUW not only omitted these findings from their 
media kits but made the data difficult to obtain. (3).
Kleinfeld concludes that
women’s advocacy groups have waged an intense media campaign to 
promote the idea that the ‘schools shortchange girls.’ Their goal is to 
intensify the image of women as ‘victims’ deserving special treatment and 
policy attention. Their sophisticated public relations campaign has 
succeeded. The idea that girls are victimized by the schools has become 
the common wisdom, what educated people just assume to be true. (3).
In the competition for favors, every point of view, whether true or not, improves 
somebody’s prospects at persuading those in control o f the state to grant them favors. 
Therefore, all intellectual disciplines are potentially useful as arguments in the favor- 
seeking process and are therefore, potential interest groups.
The fourth implication of this study is that a move along the private-property- 
order/bureau continuum toward the bureau lowers society’s material standard of living. 
This implication springs directly form the main conclusion o f this study, i.e., that lying 
increases with increased bureaucratization. The relationship between lying and standard
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of living is that more lying means fewer divisions of labor. Increased overall lying 
requires people to retreat from previous more exposed social relations of production to 
less exposed social relations. In general, society must reduce its overall divisions of 
labor.
As division of labor becomes less intense, people must increasingly devote their 
conscious mind-space to new categories, which were previously the specialty of those 
now precluded divisions o f labor. People must now divide their total amount of time and 
energy between more categories of knowledge than before regulation, which means less 
time and energy per category. In other words, bureaucratization tends to make society 
knowledge poorer. As compared to the private property order, the bureau can only make 
use of a smaller set of total information and its social organization must become less 
complex.
This fourth implication is also supported by several arguments in Chapter 4. The 
first is Hayek’s argument concerning particular knowledge. We saw that the private 
property order can solve the “economic problem” and that the bureau cannot. The second 
is Mises’s argument that the bureau cannot engage in economic calculation. The third 
supporting argument from Chapter 3 is my argument that the bureau cannot solve the 
nesting of the agency problem.
A final supporting argument for this fourth implication is related to the change in 
the nature of competition as we approach the bureau end o f the continuum. As discussed 
above, competition in the private property order centers around the production of goods 
and services, while in the bureau, it centers around obtaining favors. This is a change 
away from innovation and production to passing around existing goods. Said differently, 
it is a change from a nonzero-sum economic environment to a zero-sum environment. As 
Rourke reminds us, “it is clear that most policy issues have a zero-sum quality—gains by 
some groups will have to be offset by losses for others(151-152).
The fifth implication o f this study, that a move toward the bureau end of our 
continuum is a move toward a social environment of mutual self-deception and a 
ruination of science, is perhaps the most disturbing. The argument in Chapter 4 went as
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follows: In the bureau, a subordinate has an incentive to tell his superordinates what they 
want to hear rather that what is true; superordinates benefit in this process by being 
“right” or “vindicated” while the subordinate receives various benefits including higher 
status; this process is enhance first Ly mutual self-deception then by reconstructing 
science to provide the required “truth.” In other words, subordinates use science to lie 
convincingly to superordinates to obtain benefits.
Ironically, the implication of self-deception in the bureau is supported by Marxist
Alan Wolfe in his description of conditions of what he calls “late capitalism” but what in
our context is called “bureaucratic relations.” Wolfe writes:
Ultimately, the politics of illusion becomes a politics of falsehood. The 
decision maker learns that lies are more highly valued than truths, and the 
collective work of the bureaucracy becomes the ritualistic construction of 
myths that most men know to be false but that the conditions of their work 
force them to accept as true. (276)
The process, according to Wolfe, does not stop there:
If men of state were able to maintain the distinction between truth and 
falsehood, this whole matter would be Machiavellian and therefore neither 
new nor noteworthy. But it is unique, for just as officials believe their 
own illusions, eventually they accept as true what they had originally held 
to be false. Entrapped by their own lies, their ability to govern becomes 
hindered by the by-now-almost-instinctive tendency to hide the truth from 
themselves. Like hardened criminals, lying becomes so automatic to late 
capitalist officials that their sincerity could fool the best polygraph. (277)
Mutual self-deception as it applies to the sciences suggests a reconstruction or
deconstruction of science to make it more amenable to supporting cherished myths and
favored positions. Experts start out deceiving policy makers and the public and end up
believing their own lies. This implication is supported by Hannah Arendt’s remarks
concerning the use of scientific problem-solvers to formulate policy during the Viet Nam
War. Arendt argues that
the internal world of government, with its bureaucracy on one hand, its 
social life on the other, made self-deception relatively easy. No ivory 
tower of the scholars has ever better prepared the mind for ignoring the 
facts of life than did the various think tanks for the problem-solvers and
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the reputation o f the White House for the President’s advisers. (Crisis O f 
The Republic 35-36)
Arendt concludes that the war was lost “because of the willful, deliberate disregard of all 
facts, historical, political, geographical, for more than twenty-five years” (Crisis O f The 
Republic 32).
Further support for the implication of the misuse of science is found in a study 
done for the Alaska Council on Economic Education that rated thirty-three textbooks 
used to teach environmental issues to Alaska’s 6th through 10th graders. The texts were 
rate according to three considerations:
1. Do the texts fairly and accurately state the facts which are generally 
agreed upon by scientists working on the issue?
2. Do the texts fairly and accurately explain difficulties and complexity of 
scientific methodology?
3. If the available evidence leads scientists to differing conclusions and 
different theories, do the texts fairly and accurately explain these to 
students?
The study’s authors concluded:
With few exceptions, we found that textbook treatment of environmental 
issues is generally one-sided and incomplete. Textbooks often omit basic 
scientific facts, ignore economic reasoning, and paint an overly pessimistic 
picture of the status of the environment. Western industrial societies in 
general and the United States in particular are blamed for virtually every 
environmental ill. (Sanera and Sielaff 5)
The state of environmental education in Alaska likely reflects that of the whole 
nation. The textbooks examined were published by Glencoe, Prentice Hall, Worth, 
Benjamin/Cummings, HarperCollins, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, D. C. Heath, 
Macmilian/McGraw Hill, McDougal Littell, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Scott Foresman, 
and Merrill. These are publishers that combined probably reach most American youth.
Commenting on this study in a separate article, Stephen Jackstadt, director of the 
Center for Economic Education in Alaska, and Michael Sanera, co-author of the study, 
found no fault with getting children personally involved in political issues. “What is 
wrong,” they say, “is to use biased and misleading information about environmental
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issues such as acid rain, global warming, and the so-called population crisis to recruit 
children as shock troops in a crusade to support a particular political agenda”(649).
Finally, in support of the fifth implication, we might ask and then answer the 
following question: If the supreme authority in our bureau model could personally design 
the social sciences in an ad hoc manner, what would the social sciences look like? His 
philosophy would be flexible so that he would always have philosophical support for the 
“truth” of his changing preferences. His economics would “prove" a failing of 
spontaneous processes, show how the supreme authority himself could maximize social 
well-being, and justify his control of money and fiscal policies, all of which would 
strengthen his power over his subordinates by making them dependent upon him. His 
psychology and sociology would “prove” the futility of free-choice, making his 
subordinates still further dependent upon him. His political science would laud the state 
and collective action, and demean the market.
Comparing our answers to the real-world development of the social sciences 
provides perspective concerning their use and perhaps misuse in the service of the state. 
According to social science philosopher Peter Manicas, first in England, then in Germany 
and finally in the U. S., the social sciences developed as instruments o f state to formulate 
policies to address social problems. In England, the need for social research was met by 
the formation of various social improvement organizations, such as the Manchester 
Statistical Society, that were independent from the established universities. Germany, 
thirty years after England, responded to its social problems with the formation of state 
instigated seminars and institutes for the purpose of developing sciences that could direct 
social policy (194-200).
Manicas argues that although the social sciences had long been and instrument of 
the state, the modern social sciences took their present shape primarily in America 
between the late 1800s and the end of World W ar I and have changed only superficially 
since (193). During this time, the natural sciences as well as the social sciences become, 
as Manicas says, “industrialized,” i.e. there developed a  “symbiosis of science, business, 
industry, and the state” for the purpose of solving social problems (201). Industrialization
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of science split science into “pure” science and “applied” science with the state backing 
the “applied” portion. Today, says Manicas, “‘science’ is ‘industrialized science’ is 
‘technocratic science’, and that in critical ways, this is a fundamental problem o f our 
time” (207).
This period described by Manicas coincides with America’s progressive era, 
during which the role of the American state grew to unprecedented proportions. Under 
such circumstances, our model would predict that the current state o f  the social sciences 
would resemble the personally-designed sciences of the supreme authority above. 
Comparing them, we find that this is so. Philosophy in 20th century America has been 
dominated by the relativism of James and Dewy and others, which essentially holds that 
truth is not objective but relative to the situation. Economics is dominated by neo­
classical economics’ market-failure theories, by welfare economics’ govemment- 
maximization-of-social-welfare theories, and by macroeconomics’ theories of 
government fine tuning of the national economy. Psychology is dominated by 
behaviorism, which undermines freewill and sees people as “victims” of their internal 
processes and of circumstances. Sociology is dominated by social determinism, which 
simultaneously undermines freewill and holds that truth is relative to social 
circumstances. Political science is dominated by social democracy, which sees an ever 
increasing role for the state and collective action.
Research Achievements
My work has two implications for economics. First, it shows a serious oversight 
in the economics of information. Currently, most economists approach the study of 
information through the perfect competition model. Consequendy, they focus on how the 
state can finesse the optimal production of information in a monopoly ridden market, with 
no thought of information’s content. Such theories that support state intervention 
implicidy assume that the content of information is not affected by the institutional 
structure in which it is produced. When lying is addressed in the literature, as it is in the 
concepts “adverse selection,” “signaling,” “free riding,” and “moral hazard,” its is most
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often done with an eye to what the state can do to prevent it, essentially ignoring the 
effect that people’s relation to the state has on information.
Second, this study adds a new dimension to the theory of government regulation. 
Government regulation can be seen as piecemeal transformation of spontaneous market 
organization into bureaucratic rule following. In other words, government regulation 
moves society piecemeal toward the bureau end of our continuum, which, according to 
this study, increases lying, breakdowns community relations, engenders an instrumental 
view of morality, causes people to compete less in the production of goods and more in 
the pursuit of government favors, lowers society’s overall material well-being, and 
spawns mutual self-deception and a ruination of science. In short, this study points out 
heretofore unrecognized opportunity costs of government regulation.
This study complements Mises’s price ruination theory by showing that 
government intervention increasingly causes people as well as prices to relay faulty 
information to resource users. It also complements Hayek’s “particular knowledge” 
argument by showing that particular knowledge frustrates central planners because it can 
be used for lying as well as the fact that, as Hayek pointed out, it is dispersed and 
temporal. This study is also an addition to the meager writings on the sociology of 
markets and bureaus in that it shows that these institutional structure tends to “create” 
certain kinds of people, in this case, truth-tellers and liars. It is also an addition to the 
literature on the sociology of science, since it suggests that under certain institutional 
structures, the sciences, especially the social sciences, are valued more for shaping or 
serving policy than for acquiring knowledge.
This study partially bridges the gap between economics and sociology. In doing 
so, it becomes part o f a line of research that Both Douglass North and Kenneth Boulding 
forcefully argue is important for the future development of economics. Boulding aptly 
calls this line o f research “economic sociology” (29). North sees this line of research as 
one that expands neo-classical economic theory to include the sociology o f knowledge. 
North says that “without an explicit theory of ideology or, more generally, of the
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sociology of knowledge there are immense gaps in our ability to account for either current 
allocation o f resources or historical change” (Structure and Change 47).
Recommendations for Further Research
This study points out that information economics and perhaps economics in 
general does not have theories to explain the social effects of the policy measures that 
they recommend. Further research might address the question: How does government 
provision of information affect the quality of information?
This study also provides support that increased bureaucratization changes 
competition from a more beneficial type to a less beneficial or even detrimental type.
This contradicts the claims of the perfect competition model that that government 
intervention changes competition from less beneficial to more beneficial. This suggest 
that the ceteris paribus assumption in regard to state action is not useful. Therefore, new 
research in this area might focus on empirical measurement of a relation between 
increased regulation of industry and increased favor seeking of industry.
Furthermore, this study gives support for the idea that there exists a link between 
institutional structure and people’s values, specifically, that increased bureaucratization 
engenders value relativism. Given the implications that this has for government 
regulation, public schools, and social order in general, it would seem and important 
possibility for research. This relationship should be rather easy to operationalize and test 
empirically. For example, the researcher could collect survey data from both highly 
regulated industries and those that are minimally regulated, or from private schools and 
public schools. A historical approach might compare people’s values in the same 
industry both before bureaucratization and afterward. Research could address the 
questions: Does value relativism result in undesirable economic effects?; are there 
epistemological ramifications of value relativism that affect learning?; is there a relation 
between value relativism and social order? Economics has several theories of value but 
no theory of “values,” i.e. how people acquire specific values or systems o f values like 
value relativism. In his Structure and Change North recommended that such an 
investigation become a part of economic theory, and he certainly approached this question
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
288
in his minimal-changes-in-the -terms-of-exchange condition for ideology as discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this study, but I am not aware of any follow-up by other writers.
An obvious recommendation for further study is to test empirically the theory that 
was developed above, i.e., that there is a positive relationship between the degree of 
bureaucratization and the amount of lying in society. The topic of lying does not lend 
itself easily to testing by data analysis, which takes the following form: lying = 
function(character, benefits, ideology, opportunity, sanctions, etc.). Nor does it lend itself 
to laboratory testing, that must compare what the subject says with what he believes to be 
true. Nor does it lend itself to field studies where the researcher lives among the subjects 
and observes their lying behavior.
Each of these kinds of testing require that researchers “count” the number of lies 
that took place. However, counting lies may be near to impossible, because, as we 
discussed in Chapter 1, identifying a lie as a lie requires that one know what the liar 
believes and what is his intent. Without knowing the subject’s current beliefs and intent, 
all the researcher has is a count of mis-informations, which may be lies, accidents, 
oversights, sloppiness, or a number of other things.
How are researchers to get a handle on what others believe and on their intent.
We cannot ask them in surveys if they are lying, for how do we know that their responses 
are not lies? One approach that may prove useful is historical research comparing what 
people said in the past compared to what they believed and intended at the time. This 
might be done if researchers have access to private diaries or letters as well as public 
statements. However, great care must be taken to ascertain what future use if any the 
author of such diaries and letters foresaw for these writings. As we saw in Chapter 3, if 
the author suspects that his private actions may be scrutinized by others, even future 
generations, he will likely make adjustments in them.
A similar possibility is that of comparing public declarations with private actions: 
for example comparing what someone says about the potential of a given investment with 
how he personally invests his own money. In this contrast, private action could 
reasonable be thought to reflect beliefs and actions of the subject, but, again, only if these
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private actions are indeed believed by the subject to be concealed from the scrutiny of 
others. This last suggestion is far from ideal because it implies a certain amount of 
deception on the part of the researcher to gain access to private records. What is more, if 
access somehow serendipitously appeared, the researcher would still not have captured 
intent.
Researchers interested in empirically measuring lying might consider using 
community or rather the lack o f community as a proxy for lying. Appropriately specified, 
it would perhaps be easier to identify and hence “count” the absence or presence of 
community than it is to identify and “count” lies. This approach is similar to that used in 
this study.
Case studies may prove more promising than any of the above approaches. 
Researchers may deduce predictions from my models or from those of their own 
construction and compare these predictions with actual events, similar to how this study 
uses the example of the Law Merchant above. A prime area for such an investigation, in 
my opinion, this that of American education. American education has a definite pre­
public and after-public history, and it exist currently in private and public forms. These 
facts both speak to a clear delineation between institutional structures. Also, there is a 
tremendous body of literature and research that can be drawn on. What is more, each 
school is an organization supported by ideology with formal and informal internal 
structures.
A final very general recommendation for further research is that of bringing 
together three large and disparate literatures, that of community, the state, and regulation 
of the economy. Community springs primarily from the sociology literature, while the 
state is traditionally the subject of political philosophy, and regulation is found primarily 
in economics. As nearly as I can tell, these literatures rest comfortably each within its 
disciplinary cocoon with little interaction among them. Yet, it seems to me that they have 
important implications for each other, and that they could each benefit by accounting for 
the ideas of the other. I believe that this study has made inroads into this kind of research
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by showing a relationship between state action and the optimal level of lying, which of 
course speaks to both community relations and regulation of the economy.
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